# HASHING OUT THE HASHEMITES: AN ANALYSIS OF JORDAN'S COLLAPSING POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AMONGST EAST BANK YOUTH

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## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

In authoritarian regimes, legitimacy acts as an instrument of obtaining and maintaining power, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is no exception. Jordan is a young country; it was created as a mandate state under Great Britain only one hundred and two years ago and gained independence seventy seven years ago. For a country with such a short timeline, the issue of legitimacy and how it was obtained by the Hashemites, the Jordanian royal family, is a frequent topic in Middle Eastern politics.[1] When the Hashemites began their rule under the British Mandate in 1921, tribal allegiances and rivalries were well established and prompted no need of a central authority by way of a monarchical regime. What did the relationship of these two groups, the tribe and the monarchy, look like during the early days of the regime, what does their relationship look like today, and what is the subsequent status of the regime's legitimacy?

Through the early years of civilization and while under the rule of Roman and Ottoman empires, tribes became an essential pillar in the stabilization of a region that, up until the 20th century, was constantly under someone else's rule.[2] From North America to Africa to Jordan, the word "tribe" is used to describe subgroups of people that often have their own hierarchy and sets of customs and traditions - even laws.[3] In academia, there are some that refrain from using tribe as a descriptor for any group, due to the mass generalization of the word without an accurate understanding of its application to specific groups.[4] However, the Jordanian tribes are identifiable and are recognized as either nomadic, semi-nomadic, or settled. Additionally, tribes

[1] Johannes Gerschewski, "The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-Optation in Autocratic Regimes," *Democratization* 20, no. 1 (2013): pp. 13-38, https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.738860.
[2] Philip Robins, *A History of Jordan*, Cambridge, UK: University Printing House, 2019.
[3] Muhammad bin Ghazi
[4] Colson, "Political Organization in Tribal Societies: A Cross-Cultural Comparison."

built institutions to support them; tribal courts established and upheld laws, diwans, or tribal chambers, offered a space for members to congregate, and agriculture prevailed in the economy.[5]

There are over twenty Jordanian tribes today that have at least a small part of their numbers still residing in Jordan, and as of 2000, at least a quarter of Jordanians came from Nomadic or Semi-Nomadic tribes and another 30% of the population came from Settled Jordanian Tribes of East Bank origin.[6] This makes them a significant part of the modern Jordanian population, and in turn, a significant part of the regime's legitimacy base.[7] Historically, this rings true, but, over the past century, tribes have been increasingly marginalized by the regime. This begs the question of whether Jordan's tribal population will stay loyal to the regime or not.

In order to recognize why the Jordanian regime's legitimacy is now in question, it is necessary to understand what role tribes had in the early twentieth century as the Ottoman Empire was failing and Western powers prepared to take control of the Middle East. In Ottoman lands that now compose Jordan, tribes were at the center of economic, political, and cultural life. Affluent tribes such as the Beni Sakhr and the Beni Hassan had agricultural and security roles that were essential to the region.[8] After World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Abdullah I of the Hashemite family, whose lineage can be traced back to the Prophet Mohammad, was installed by Great Britain as the first emir, or prince, and would later become king of what was then the Emirate of Transjordan; he, with the backing of Great Britain, coopted

[5] Eugene L. Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
[6] Muhammad bin Ghazi, *The Tribes of Jordan at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century* (Jordan: Jam'īyat Turāth al-Urdun al-Bāqī, 1999).
[7] Muhammad bin Ghazi.
[8] Yoav Alon, "The Tribal System in the Face of the State-Formation Process: Mandatory Transjordan, 1921–46," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37, no. 2 (2005): 213–40, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020743805372047.

and coerced the tribes into becoming the support base of the Hashemite family, despite the authority and power that the tribes already held.

**Research Question**

Britain's intervention in Jordan initiated major changes to the tribal way of life and tribal identity. For example, in the beginning years of the mandate period, Abdullah I was given the freedom to uplift tribal leaders by taking them out of the control of the central government and offering them gifts and tax breaks. But by the end of the 1920s, Britain had regained more autonomy in the area due to its "responsibility" to prepare Jordan for statehood[9]. Suddenly, tribal leaders were subject to legal action and forced to pay their share of taxes. This back and forth started a tumultuous period for the tribes because their status with the regime was constantly being questioned as the regime became more and more established.

This thesis asks how tribal identity over time affects regime legitimacy in Jordan. I argue that in contemporary Jordan, youth with a strong tribal identity will consider the regime less legitimate than older Jordanians with a strong tribal identity. The implications of shrinking tribal support for the Hashemites, particularly among tribal youth, are extensive. The average age in Jordan is 23.8 years old, and the unemployment rate, as of 2021, among Jordanians below twenty-five is 46%.[10] These tribal youth will become the next tribal leaders and be in positions of power and influence that may not bode well for the legitimacy of the regime. This is due to the regime not supporting tribes as they have in recent years paired with the rise of a more powerful and influential class of economic elite. I will further explore whether legitimacy amongst just the

[9] Yoav Alon. "Tribal Shaykhs and the Limits of British Imperial Rule in Transjordan, 1920–46," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 32, no. 1 (2004): 69–92, https://doi.org/10.1080/0308653041000170552 4.

[10] "Overview," World Bank, accessed April 16, 2023, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/jordan/overview.

commercial elite is sufficient enough to the regime and whether the tribes have been completely discarded as a support base for the Hashemite monarchy.

**Research Roadmap**

This thesis has four empirical sections: theory, historical analysis, public opinion analysis, and social media analysis. In my theory, I argue that Jordanian youth with a strong tribal identity will consider the regime less legitimate than older Jordanians with a strong tribal identity because the regime is not supporting the tribes as they have historically, resulting in economic and social disparages.

In the historical section, my hypothesis is tested through the tribe-state relationships in the late Ottoman Empire and the following mandate period when King Abdullah I, in conjunction with Great Britain, co-opted the tribes to support the regime. In the following reigns of King Hussein and King Abdullah II in the latter half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, this thesis will show how the rise of the Hirak movement reflects the dissolution of the tribes as a support base and how this was the effect of changing policies that preferences the urban, economic elite.

I will then use the Arab Barometer, a nationally representative public opinion survey, to analyze, quantitatively, what the effect of tribal identity and age is on perceptions of political legitimacy. This thesis will end with a social media analysis that provides examples of what tribal members are saying about political legitimacy on Twitter and Facebook. This chapter affirms that there is relevant discourse that challenges the legitimacy of the regime, and it shows the limitations in using social media to track the movements of a specific group.

**Methodological Contribution**

This thesis will engage these questions using a multi-method approach of historical, statistical, and social media analyses. It will contribute to existing literature on political legitimacy by focusing on the switching of the regime's support base from tribes to commercial, urban elite, evidence for which will be shown through these methods. Most research offers insight on the tribes as a support base in light of the coercive measures used to pull them in or explores the new modern, neoliberal policies of Jordan's economy and the ensuing disparity of the population. I will offer an approach that comprehensively evaluates these two periods, the beginning to mid 1900s and the 21st century, to understand how perceptions of legitimacy shift as tribe/monarchy relations evolve over time and how that evolution is tied to changes in tribal identity.

This thesis takes a multi-method approach to analyzing political legitimacy in Jordan and the role tribal youth play in it. The combination of historical analysis, statistical analysis using public opinion surveys, and social media analysis is not typical to this thematic, or regional, concentration. Researchers usually focus on the method of analysis that they are most interested in and are most skilled at, but this approach overlooks the broader data that is available and undervalues its utility. Not only does this thesis offer thematic contributions to the field, but methodological contributions as well. This is a more comprehensive approach compared to the current research methods for modern Jordan that focus on one method.

## Literature Review

My research question contributes to three main areas of literature: political stability in Jordan, authoritarian legitimacy, and state and nation building. The Jordanian monarchy, much like other Middle East monarchies, retained control after the Arab Spring protests. There were changes to government; King Abdullah II dismissed Prime Minister Marouf Al Bakhit and his

cabinet in 2011 in response to calls for political reform, but the king remained in place even amongst calls for his replacement. Jordan is not representative of the whole Arab world after the Arab Spring, Egypt, for example, saw the resignation of Husni Mubarak in 2011 after mass protests.[11]

Current literature often describes Jordan as an "island of stability".[12] This is not because of the absence of internal and external factors. It is due to Jordan's success in spite of its economic and political uncertainty. However, such a reputation limits discourse and paints a false picture for the rest of Jordan's history. For example, when acknowledging the limitations of Jordan's fragile stability, Odeon Eran states, "the status of the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan has not been subject to question since the establishment of the kingdom."[13] This is an oversimplification of the situation. King Abdullah I was assassinated in 1951, Jordan experienced a civil war in the 1970s and King Hussein was subject to multiple assassination attempts. Jordan, particularly its monarchy, has been threatened multiple times over the past century, but because of political legitimacy, the effects of the instability are not as noticeable as other authoritarian regimes.

There are certain characteristics of an authoritarian regime that help strengthen their legitimacy: ideology, foundational myth, personalism, international engagement, procedural mechanisms, performance, indoctrination, and passivity.[14] Jordan has many of these qualities; in particular, this thesis includes procedural mechanisms and international engagement as modern exhibitions of authoritarian legitimacy. Jordan exhibits these characteristics of authoritarian

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[11] "Egypt Crisis: President Hosni Mubarak Resigns as Leader," BBC News (BBC, February 12, 2011), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12433045.
[12] Faysal Itani, "Stability through Change: Toward a New Political Economy in Jordan," Atlantic Council, 2013.
[13] Oded Eran, "Concerns for Jordan's Stability," *Institute for National Security Studies*, 2019.
[14] Alexander Dukalskis and Johannes Gerschewski, "What Autocracies Say (and What Citizens Hear): Proposing Four Mechanisms of Autocratic Legitimation," *Justifying Dictatorship*, July 2018, pp. 1-18, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351044714-1.

legitimacy through its elections and new focus on foreign investment. This thesis will discuss how tribal youth interact with these institutions of "legitimacy" and, through the aforementioned methodology, how their perceptions of the regime are affected.

Although "nation-state" is a common descriptor for countries, it is argued to be an inaccurate description. The two parts of the description, state-making and nation-building, must be distinguished.[15] Oftentimes, nation building is often done under western values that disregard already existing homogenous communities that most likely would not thrive united as one nation with a core identity. Jordan, and its numerous tribes, is an apt example of this problem. Prior to 1921, there was no sense of national identity in Jordan because there was no monolithic nation nation - it had to be constructed - and it was done so in a way that suited its builders. Jordan came to fruition under its newly installed leader Abdullah I with the direct interference of Great Britain with its role being described as "taking responsibility for the creation of the framework of a modern administration, and introducing a ready-made executive elite from outside Transjordan."[16] As is shown, with Britain's influence, Abdullah I built a state that did not align with the values of the newly formed nation that consisted of different tribes by taking away certain rights, such as to traditionally tribal land, and this put the legitimacy of the regime at risk. Once the new order was set, the next step in nation-building was establishing a regime.[17] This step consists of employing specific mechanisms, like those used by authoritarian regimes, to unite the population under regime rulership.

This introduction establishes tribes, at the beginning of the twentieth century, as being autonomous groups that were successful in cultivating the land, forming political partnerships,

[15] Montserrat Guibernau, "Anthony D. Smith on Nations and National Identity: A Critical Assessment," *Nations and Nationalism* 10, no. 1-2 (2004): 125–41, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1354-5078.2004.00159.x.
[16] Robins, Philip.
[17] Dan Slater and Sofia Fenner, "STATE POWER AND STAYING POWER: INFRASTRUCTURAL MECHANISMS AND AUTHORITARIAN DURABILITY," *Journal of International Affairs* 61, no. 1 (2011): pp. 15-29.

and constructing their own armies. This is done to underscore how powerful a regime would have to be to coerce such a population and how pushing the regime's objectives onto them would not produce a fruitful or durable support base and the resulting relationship between the tribes and the monarchy based on these assumptions is what this thesis will expose. One of the most successful ways a researcher can understand this relationship is through a multi-method analysis. In this way, historical context, statistical analysis, and public opinion can fuse together to create a more holistic, and better supported analysis.

This methodology is particularly useful for my thesis because tribal identity has many forms of expression. It can be seen through the comments that an average Jordanian makes on social media, and it is seen through the ways the regime prioritizes their relationship with the tribes. If tribal identity is a powerful force in Jordanian society, it will compel recognition of their criticism by the regime and require some form of action, whether positive or negative. To understand this topic, attention must be given to the vast ways in which it is denoted within the tribal youth. First, however, broader context must be given to the literature. How is the regime set up, how do we contextualize political legitimacy in Jordan, and what role do tribal youth play in all of this?

## CHAPTER TWO: THEORY

The theory chapter of this thesis requires an explanation of the structure of the regime and the ways tribal youth fit into that structure. My hypothesis states that youth with a strong tribal identity will consider the regime less legitimate than older Jordanians with a strong tribal identity**.** I argue this because the regime has not supported young East Bankers as they have historically. In recent decades, they have prioritized urban, economic elite. This redirection disproportionately disadvantages rural, tribal populations who for decades received food and oil subsidies. Additionally, tribal populations are disproportionately disadvantaged due to their age. Over 60% of the Jordanian population are under thirty years old, and the unemployment rate, as of 2020 youth unemployment levels reached 50% (although this was most likely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic).[18] If the regime knows that a large portion of their population depends on this support, then why do they prioritize the elites?[19]

### Conceptualizing Political Legitimacy in Jordan

Political legitimacy in Jordan is different from legitimacy in other autocratic regimes because of the separation established between the king (the regime) and the government (the parliament and prime minister). The king selects the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister selects their cabinet: the Chairman, the Deputy Prime Ministers, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Local Administration, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates. The Parliament is split between the Senate (the upper chamber) and the House of Representatives (the lower chamber). Members of the Senate are selected by the king and serve four year terms, and

[18] "Home," Empowering Youth and Building Trust in Jordan | OECD iLibrary, accessed April 17, 2023, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/9b4516c5-en/index.html?itemId=%2Fcontent%2Fcomponent%2F9b4516c5-en#:~:text=Youth%20unemployment%20levels%20in%20Jordan,Bank%2C%202021%5B7%5D).
[19] Momani, Bessma."Jordan, International Financial Institutions and Social Justice," 2020.

members of the House of Representatives are elected every four years but the lower chamber is not untouched by the king.[20] The parliamentary elections have been suspended multiple times throughout history, notably from 1967-1989 (due to the occupation of the West Bank) and 2002-2003 (due to the war in Iraq).[21]

Even though Jordan is a constitutional monarchy, which should mean there is no complete, central power within the monarch, the king retains much power over every aspect of the government. His influence in other parts of the government allows him to use them as a scapegoat. If Jordanians voice discontent with the political system, the king will often fire the prime minister; the person "responsible" for the social unrest. This is a request solution used by the regime, but it does not adequately provide changes for the problems East Bankers are protesting about. Here is one example of how King Abdullah II's reaction to the Arab Spring and the subsequent increase of Hirak protests has negatively impacted Jordanian society. The Human Rights Watch states, "civic space in Jordan has shrunk over the past four years as authorities persecute and harass citizens organizing peacefully and engaging in political dissent."[22]

How does this pertain to tribal youth? Tribal leaders are prolific within the Jordanian government, but the suspension of multiple elections prevents tribal youth, who have recently become of voting age, to elect a tribal representative that serves the Hirak constituency.[23] As previously stated, youth are a substantial part of the Jordanian population (over 60%), and the UN only predicts more growth in the 15-25 year old age range by 2030.[24] This lack of representation does not adequately prepare them for a future where they are the leaders. Not only

[20] *The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, 1952, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3ae6b53310.pdf.
[21] Schirin Fathi, "Jordanian Survival Strategy: The Election Law as a 'Safety Valve,'" *Middle Eastern Studies* 41, no. 6 (2005): pp. 889-898, https://doi.org/10.1080/00263200500261985.
[22] "Jordan: Government Crushes Civic Space." Human Rights Watch, September 18, 2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/09/18/jordan-government-crushes-civic-space.
[23] Fathi, Schirin.
[24] "Home."

do the actions of the regime disproportionately affect East Bankers today but also in their potential in the future.

With central control being in the hands of the king, he has the power to align the government with his priorities. The opportunities offered by the urban, economite elite: foreign investment, foreign aid, and rapid urban development incentivize the king to align the country's policies with the needs of the elite instead of the needs of the tribal youth. Even though the elite spearhead large projects that may appear to benefit all Jordanian, they do not. Projects such as skyscrapers and malls did not benefit the average East Banker or even the average Jordanian who struggled to afford basic necessities.[25]

**Literature Review**

Much of the current literature on tribal support maintains that tribes are the base of support for the regime. Sean Yom describes the tribe-state relations as symbiotic and that, in regard to 1920s Transjordan "in conditions of mutual weakness, survival required mutual sacrifice".[26] Greenwood says that Transjordanians have been one of the bases of support for the regime since its creation. Economic security was exchanged for political loyalty, and this relationship continued until the 1980s with the beginning of the neoliberalization period.[27] This is how many researchers characterize the relationship between tribes and the regime.

However, I believe that this dialogue downplays the mix of coercion and cooptation that is used to acquire the tribes as a support base, and it skips over much of the history that builds up to the point of neoliberalization and of East Bankers being tired of their treatment from the regime. Yoav Alon writes, "Despite this symbiosis, relations could become very troubled

[25] Momani, Bessma.
[26] Sean L. Yom, "Tribal Politics in Contemporary Jordan: The Case of the Hirak Movement," *The Middle East Institute* 68, no. 2 (2014): 229–47, http://DX.DOI.ORG/10.3751/68.2.13.
[27] Scott Greenwood, "Jordan's 'New Bargain:" The Political Economy of Regime Security," *Middle East Journal* 57, no. 2 (2003): pp. 248-268.

because this tribal elite also acted to protect the interests of its followers by challenging the central authority which raised them to power."[28]

In this thesis, the words cooptation and coercion are often used side by side. This is not to mean that the words are interchangeable. On the contrary, cooptation refers to the ways in which those in power incentivize groups to work and compromise with them while coercion entails those in power forcing groups to exist in a certain way using the fear of consequences if they do not submit.[29] For example, the 1858 Land Law awarded uncultivated - unregistered - land to settled groups and incentivized tribes to give up their rights to traditional tribal domain and pay their taxes so as to remain in good standing with the Ottomans and continue their lucrative agricultural work.[30] Agriculture was a large revenue stream for tribes at the time, so they could not afford to not follow this law. It is important to note that coercion often follows cooptation; the relationships between the tribes and the regime could not be purely symbiotic because of the obvious differences in power between the two groups.

There is a long record of East Bankers disapproving the regime, but the regime typically dealt with this by offering lucrative positions within the government. Consequently, there is less international acknowledgement of the changes in political legitimacy. For the past few decades, East Bank protestors have been demanding political and economic reform within the government which is much more noticeable to outside audiences. The lack of public opinion surveys prior to 2006 inhibits our ability to see, numerically, the deterioration of political legitimacy in Jordan, but historical evidence implies that it is there.

There is no doubt that the tribes acted as the regime's support base at the beginning of the 20th century. The argument of this thesis is that because tribes were not given much of a choice

[28] Yoav, Alon.
[29] Yoav, Alon
[30] Rogan, Eugene L.

but to support the regime, their relationship with the regime was fraught with conflict even amongst the favoritism granted to tribal leaders. And tribal youth play a role because the "symbiosis" that Yom and Alon refer to no longer exists, and the ones most affected by this change are east bank youth because they are most of the population and yet consistently economically disadvantaged.

It is important to note that legitimization, whether it be from the tribes or the economic elite, is essential to the regime because it contributes to the country's stability. Of course, legitimacy is not all it depends on; other important factors in a regime's stability are repression and cooption.[31] However, the urban, economic elite have been in a particularly advantageous position with the regime since the 1980s due to the economic decline in Jordan spurred by massive foreign debt and the consequent accumulation of loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Receipt of IMF funds obligated the regime to take on a neoliberal economic model that focused on the private sector.[32] This series of events pushed the regime to focus on the economic elite, and progressively neglect its historic emphasis on Jordan's tribes.

As the Hashemites enter the late 1980s, they target the economic elite and less focus is placed on tribal members. International engagement, procedural mechanisms, and performance, specifically, capitalize on what the economic elite can offer the regime. Foreign investment and aid increases, debt decreases, and the regime itself is further legitimized on the world stage. However, these actions can make East Bankers feel isolated and unsupported by the regime that claims to have their interests in mind. These are the implications of the IMF loans, and they make it easier for the regime to make the elite happy than it to make tribes happy. Now there is no longer a reason for the regime to try to be legitimized by the whole population.

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[31]Johannes Gerschewski, "The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-Optation in Autocratic Regimes," *Democratization* 20, no. 1 (2013): pp. 13-38, https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.738860.
[32] Momani, Bessma.

Legitimacy reaps stability through different means, but it depends on how the regime intends to be legitimized. For example, It can come by way of a general perception of a community that believes the actor or institution are "rightful and socially sanctioned", coercion due to the self-interest of the governing party, and it is done because actors want to reduce the cost of exercising power by "securing a higher degree of voluntary compliance",[33] and I believe the third part to be of particular interest to this thesis. Jordan went into great debt partly because of their massively inflated public sector that heavily employed East Bank Jordanians i.e tribal Jordanians lacking Palestinian ties. Buying the loyalty of tribal Jordanians cost the Hashemite regime a large amount of money in public sector investments. By seeking legitimacy through a new urban, commercial support base brought about by the economic liberalization from the 1980s onward, the economic elite, the Hashemites reduced the cost of exercising power, securing a higher degree of voluntary compliance by building upon the community that is more inclined to consider the regime rightfully and socially sanctioned.

In the new Hashemite support base of members of the economic elite, the economic priorities of the regime match those of the support base, and this was not the case one hundred years ago when King Abdullah I coerced the tribes into supporting the regime. In fact, there were few similarities between the two groups at that time. Supporting this claim are policy changes that were called for by the economic elite because of the breaks it gives them amongst the neoliberal reform of the economy. Similar requests made by tribal youth were not met with the same acceptance, even decades prior. Today, the regime is only doing what was done one hundred years prior; they are taking the most profitable population of the region and capitalizing on the gains they are able to bring to the country. The tribes brought military power and

[33] Symons, Jonathan.

knowledge of the region and the elite brought economic prosperity and international recognition to Jordan.

Abdullah I coerced the tribes into being his support base, despite the conflicting interests between the two, because of the large tribal population of the area. Abdullah I, with the help of Great Britain, would have attempted to coerce whatever group controlled the area at the time, no matter the similarities in the tribal lineage of the Hashemites and the various tribes based in Jordan. The Hashemites and the British would have attempted to be legitimized by whomever lived there. From an outsider's perspective, Abdullah I's regime has been legitimized by the tribes; but, the reality is that the tribes were coerced into cooperating with the newly implemented Hashemite regime. It is a reasonable assumption that the deterioration of the tribes as the regime's support base would occur less than one hundred years after its foundation if the legitimacy was not a two way street. There must be a leader that needs a group of people to be their support base and there must be a group of people that see the leader as someone who will create policies that benefit the support base, but Abdullah I was in desperate need of a support base, so it did not matter that all he could find was a one way street forged by Great Britain.

This theory will be tested using historical, public opinion survey, and social media analyses. This multi-method approach will allow me to see different ways in which tribal youth interact with the regime, and, specifically, identify moments in the tribe-regime relationship that indicate deteriorating political legitimacy.

## CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

This chapter analyzes the centralization of trends throughout Jordan's history, particularly in reference to the relationship between the tribes and the Hashemite regime as power changes hands. It begins with the late Ottoman period when Ottoman forces started to urbanize tribes within the cities of Amman, Irbid, Salt and develop bureaucratic institutions that gave the Ottomans a larger presence in the region.[34] Then the post World War I era which sees Jordan as a British Mandate state with control from a British imposed and influenced prince, and later king, Abdullah I.[35] We see how cooperation between the British and the new Hashemite ruler resulted in a cooptation of Jordanian tribes to offer legitimacy to the new regime.[36] Throughout the twentieth century, tribal discontent, in the presence of any regime, is evident as tribal members revolt. Two examples of this are the Karak Revolt (1910) and the Adwan Revolt (1923) which were acts of resistance of the Ottoman Empire and the Hashemites, respectively, and challenged the extent of an outsider's rule.[37][38] Finally, modern changes to the regime's support base are seen throughout the neoliberalization of the economy in the late 20th century and early 21st century.Austerity measures force the regime to cut subsidies and raise taxes which benefit the commercial, economic elite and disproportionately affect tribal youth.[39]

### The Ottoman Empire and Jordanian Tribes

The Ottoman Empire during the 17th and 18th centuries included Northern Africa, the Hijaz (the cities of Medina and Mecca in modern day Saudi Arabia) Jerusalem, Damascus, Baghdad, the Balkans, and Turkey. Although the empire cultivated technological innovation that was more advanced than its European counterparts, communication throughout the empire was

[34] Robins, Philip.
[35] Alon, Yoav.
[36] Rogan, Eugene L.
[37] Alon, Yoav.
[38] Rogan, Eugene L.
[39] Momani, Bessma.

inefficient. When Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Egypt in 1798, Constantinople did not learn of Napoleon's arrival until three weeks later. However, by 1860 Ottoman bureaucracy greatly improved and Ottoman forces began to create a more centralized government in Jordan.

By this time, the differences between the Ottoman Empire and European states became obvious as the latter "had followed a trajectory from absolutism to what is generally referred to as the modern state." "Modern states" were better equipped to make and uphold rules, collect taxes, form armies, and create centralized institutions throughout that state that assured the full extent of its sovereignty. However, as European presence increased in the Ottoman Empire, so did the modernization, that is "westernization", of its institutions.[40] Around the latter half of the 19th century, Ottoman presence increased in Jordan and a more centralized government took place.[41]

The imperial self-rejuvenation project of the Ottoman Empire reached Jordan in the 1860s. The project had success in establishing administrative districts in the north; Amman, the capital of Jordan, was founded by the Ottomans. The empire was able to coexist with the tribes due to their common goal of defense and economic security and this resulted in the settlement of new villages made up of refugees, local peasants, and sharecroppers, but the empire was not successful on their first try.

The tribes had many of their own institutions in place such as courts, security, agriculture, and taxation, and when the Ottomans initially tried to maintain control in Jordan during this period it was through coercive measures. Military force and double taxation (mandatory taxation by the hands of the tribal elite and the Ottomans) caused tensions, and the empire realized their means of cooptation needed to incentivize tribes, not coerce them. The priority was on

[40] Rogan, Eugene L.
[41] Robins, Philip.

establishing legitimacy for the ruler and throughout the later periods under the reign of Kings Abdullah I, Hussein, and Abdullah II this thesis will show how a forced legitimacy creates cracks in its foundation that lead to an unstable support base.

**The Ottoman Empire and the Hijaz**

Ottoman presence increased throughout the Arab World as the empire recognized the limits of its reign, especially as European interference became more threatening. One of the first places to see these changes was the Hijaz. At that time, around 1850, the Hijaz was ruled by Sharif Hussein of Mecca and was a part of the Hashemite family, but cooperation between him and the Ottoman Empire proved to be difficult. Reforms, such as the abolition of slavery and the election of advisory councils, were met with riots and protests as they had European origins.

These interactions between the Ottoman Empire and Mecca were the prelude to the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence. Sharif Hussein of Mecca, Abdullah I's father, and Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, British officer and High Commissioner of Egypt exchanged letters, and in them McMahon promised Sharif Hussein control of an independent Arab Kingdom that he understood to be a caliphate spanning from the Mediterranean to the Hijaz in modern day Saudi Arabia. Encouraged by this promise, Sharif Hussein led the Arab Army in the Great Arab Revolt of 1916.[42]

The Great Arab Revolt took place in the Hijaz and was largely fought by tribal members who made up the Arab forces. The goal of the revolt was to take control from the Ottomans and create the independent Arab Kingdom that Sharif Hussein discussed with British Officer Arthur McMahon.[43] Arab forces were successful in expelling the Ottomans from the Hijaz, Transjordan,

[42] Joshua Teitelbaum, "Sharif Husayn Ibn Ali and the Hashemite Vision of the Post‐Ottoman Order: From Chieftaincy to Suzerainty," *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no. 1 (1998): pp. 103-122, https://doi.org/10.1080/00263209808701212.
[43] Ali A. Allawi, "THE ARAB REVOLT I: CONSOLIDATING THE REVOLT," in *Faisal I of Iraq* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014).

and eventually Syria. The tribal members who fought in the revolt were by no means professional soldiers, but they were empowered by their, "dislike of the Turks as symbols and carriers of a central authority that curbed their freedoms and undermined their livelihood, and a promise that sharifian rule would be more legitimate and accommodating".[44] Unfortunately, the sharifian (Hashemite) rule that they looked forward to was much influenced by Great Britain, and their freedoms and livelihoods continued to be diminished by the regime.

**The End of World War I, British Intervention, and the Creation of Jordan**

World War I came to an end in 1918 with the Treaty of Versaille, but Great Britain and France were planning for their own post war control of the Middle East before the peace treaty was even signed and the allies could know for sure that their plan would be sent in motion**;** the plan of a wide, Middle East occupation. In 1916, the Sykes-Picot Agreement was created and assigned roles for Britain and France to "recognize and protect an independent Arab States or a confederation of Arab states" giving the two countries control over enterprise, local loans, control over and/or full access to certain ports, ownership of certain railways, and more, according to the original document.[45] Importantly, it specified how the territories would be divided between Britain and France: Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq were under the British Mandate while Lebanon and Syria were under the French Mandate.

A year later, the Balfour Declaration announced British support of "a national home for Jewish people" in what is now occupied Palestine but was then still under the rule of the Ottoman Empire.[46] The literature on Britain's motives is varied: did they want to ensure their stake in Palestine, did they need the support of the Jewish population to ensure the war did not end in a draw, or did the influence of the Zionist Organization lobbying in Great Britain push

[44] Allawi, Ali A.
[45] "Sykes-Picot Agreement," May 15, 16 1916
[46] Arthur James Balfour, "The Balfour Declaration," November 2, 1917.

their hand?[47]With these two events, the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration, the British and French established their control over the region through what became formalized as the League of Nations' Mandate System. This set the stage for Transjordan to become the modern, independent state of Jordan that we know today, but this influence will evolve with the state and its effects will change with each King. The effects are distinctly seen in the relationship between the Hashemite regime and the tribes; they are evidence of how deeply intertwined the Western world is with the Hashemites and, subsequently, Jordanian tribes. What this thesis will show is that with the growing presence of Western countries within Jordan less focus is put on East Bank tribes, and this distills their discontent with the regime, especially amongst East Bank youth, because it disrupts their futures. During the creation of this Mandate System, Abdullah I bin Hussein, the future King of Jordan, was a frontrunner for leadership in these new territories.

In 1920, after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Abdullah was given kingship of Iraq by the Iraqi congress. He declined it, but the British saw this as an opportunity to sponsor his brother, Faisal, as King of Iraq instead, where he was strongly supported.[48] Meanwhile, Abdullah traveled to Transjordan and threatened to attack Syria in light of the French occupation, but the British, being allies with the French, convinced him to surrender his plans and chose him as the first Emir of Transjordan. But this is not the sequence of events that Hussein and Abdullah expected as Great Britain violated the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence. As well, Abdullah I did not fulfill his dream of unifying Greater Syria comprising Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq under a United Arab Kingdom. The idea of Hashemite control over most of the Middle East is influential in this thesis. It distances tribal East Bank Jordanians because it

[47] Martin Kramer, "The Forgotten Truth about the Balfour Declaration - Harvard University," Mosaic Magazine, June 5, 2017, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/martinkramer/files/forgotten_truth_balfour_declaration.pdf.
[48] Ali A. Allawi, "THE ARAB REVOLT I: CONSOLIDATING THE REVOLT," in *Faisal I of Iraq* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014).

puts the name and influence of the Hashemites above the rural, tribal populations. As Abdullah began his new role as Emir of Transjordan, he held strong ties with Great Britain throughout his reign and Britain held much of the power in their relationship.[49]

**Legitimizing Abdullah I**

Much focus is given to how Abdullah came to the throne in Transjordan because it highlights the strong influence of the West, specifically of Great Britain, in the creation of Transjordan as a state**.** But despite the British influence by means of the installation of the Hashemites in Transjordan, local tribes continued to dictate much of the economic, political, and social aspects of life through the power transition from the Ottoman Empire to Western states.[50] They were able to do so because tribes exist in hierarchies that legitimize them and garner them respect.[51] Despite this new beginning, age-old colonial practices were still at work behind Abdullah, as is evident through the means in which Abdullah became the Emir.

After the debate and correspondence over what would happen to the Middle East now that it was no longer under Ottoman rule, the British Mandate for Palestine was created by the League of Nations at the end of World War I. This gave administrative rights of Palestine and Transjordan to the British government, essentially allowing them to occupy the two territories. The British Mandate is the starting point for foreign control of Jordan and is the reason why tribes were put into the position of accepting the Hashemites and building an essential foundation for the regime's legitimacy. Although Abdullah I was Emir, British control negated much of his power, and he became just another piece in the West's attempt to control the Middle East. This breaks the misconception that the way Abdullah treated the tribes at the beginning of his reign was solely for his, and his regime's, own benefit. Abdullah coerced the pre-existing tribal

[49] Teitelbaum, Joshua.
[50] Yoav, Alon.
[51] Robins, Philip.

community**,** but it was by using British resources and having the threat of British force in cases of noncompliance.

Once Abdullah was put in place, legitimacy was of the utmost importance. The strong tribal presence was not used to being under the rule of a King and did not have a need for it, and British influence put the regime at risk of not being legitimized. At the time, tribespeople made up a majority of Transjordan and Abdullah had to present a reason for the tribes to want him there. But legitimacy is not that simple of a matter. The cultural blending that occurred in Jordan as a result of the fall of the Ottoman Empire made this endeavor even more complicated and difficult for Abdullah I and Great Britain.

Put simply, coercion was the answer to Abdullah's problem. He offered incentives such as tax exemptions and the ability to keep their land but also through the conscription and education of tribal youth through the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF). Tribe members were prioritized for government jobs, creating a preference of East Bank tribal, or Jordanians not of Palestinian origin, members for public sector work. Regardless of these new opportunities for tribe members, control was institutionalized through the beginnings of Bedouin Customary Law in 1924.[52]

Nevertheless, as Abdullah I continued the task of state building, he consulted tribal leaders throughout the process, some of whom he put in economic and political positions of power in return for their support.[53] Here is just one of the examples of Abdullah I setting a precedent for tribal support of the monarchy, even though it was not equal throughout the East Bank. In fact, by 1923, disapproval of the Hashemite regime rose to the level of rebellion that can be seen through the Adwan revolt. That year, the Balqa tribal confederacy attempted to

[52] Alon, Yoav.
[53] Arthur Day, *East Bank/West Bank: Jordan and the Prospects for Peace*, New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986.

revolt against the Hashemite regime on the basis of the harsh treatment of their people by the hands of King Abdullah I.[54]

The Balqa is a region in north Jordan and, today, is one of the twelve governorates, and many tribes, coined the Adwan tribes, exist here, but due to differences between nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes, rivalries erupted between them. The main rivalry in the Balqa was between the tribal confederacy of the Ajarma, Da'ja, Beni Hassan, and Beni Hamida and the tribal confederacy of the Beni Sakhr . The Beni Hassan and the Beni Sakhr are two of the largest tribes in Jordan, and their presence in Adwan revolt, even though it was unsuccessful, shows the complicated condition of Abdullah I's legitimacy at the beginning of his reign; it was a combination of a forced and cultivated legitimacy, giving the newfound loyalty of the East Bank tribes less weight particularly when given the opportunity to have the upperhand, such as in the case of the Adwan revolt. The revolt was quickly squelched by British forces, but the tribal rebellion was not quickly forgotten.[55]

**King Hussein**

After King Abdullah I's assassination in 1951 and the brief reign of his son King Talal, Hussein bin Talal rose to power in 1952. From King Hussein's first day on the throne until his death in 1999, Hussein is considered, from a Western perspective, to be a prominent mediator of Middle East conflicts. And from Jordan's loss of the West Bank during the Six Day War of 1967, and formal withdrawal in 1988, to the 1994 signing of the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, this establishes Jordan as an intermediary at the international level. This is particularly troubling for

[54] Yoav Alon, "The Balqā' Revolt: Tribes and Early State-Building in Transjordan," *Die Welt Des Islams* 46, no. 1 (2006): pp. 7-42, https://doi.org/10.1163/157006006776562219.

[55] Alon, Yoav

the tribal East Bankers of Jordan who saw these actions as neglecting domestic interests, specifically tribal interests such as public sector jobs and food subsidies.

A holistic view of tribal, Hashemite relations must include the rapidly increasing tensions within the Palestinian population in response to the actions of King Hussein. Specifically in regards to Jordan's custodianship of the West Bank. The Hashemite legacy of West Bank custodianship began in 1924 when the Supreme Muslim Council gave custodianship of Al-Aqsa to Sharif of Mecca, and father of Fasial and Abdullah bin Hussein, Hussein bin Ali. After 1948, Jordan held custodianship of East Jerusalem and annexed the West Bank, giving Jordan control of both banks and made official by the 1950 Unification of the Banks. But de facto control was lost in 1967 at the end of the Six Day War when the West Bank was occupied by the Israeli military. By 1968, there were over 350,000 displaced persons from the West Bank, and Jordan offered them refuge, enacting an "open-bridge" policy that allowed the free movement of people and goods between the West and East Bank. This policy benefited Israel as it "relieved congestion of the Palestinian Population on the West Bank".[56]

During this process, the Hashemite regime required "above all, the maintenance of strong bonds with the West Bankers". This was problematic for the East Bank tribes because the "strong bonds" caused East Bank priorities to be neglected as the regime's focus was on their relationship with Israel and not on helping East Bankers adjust to the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons suddenly amongst them. King Hussein referred to the West Bank as an "essential part of the Jordanian territory" and called the issue a question of right and reinstated himself as the representative of Palestinians. Meanwhile, Palestinian leaders within the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) stated that the destiny of the West Bank should be

[56] Adnan Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians, & The Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 139.

decided by its people. At its start in 1964, the PLO was led by Ahmad Al-Shuqairi with two main goals: creating a Palestinian entity and achieving Palestinian liberation.The answer to who gets to decide the fate of the Palestinian people is steadily thrown back and forth with both sides claiming the responsibility all the while East Bankers grow impatient as Hussein becomes more intertwined in West Bank and Israeli affairs.[57]

The PLO relocated to Jordan after the 1967 War and its Palestinian population threatened Hashemite legitimacy. Just a year before the war in 1966 King Hussein stated, "all hopes have vanished for the possibility of cooperation with this organization [the PLO] in its recent form".[58] In the late 1960s, leading up to the civil war between the Jordanian government and the PLO, otherwise known as Black September of 1970, there was already much fighting between the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF), Israeli Forces, and the Palestinian Fedayeen. By September 1970, the PLO progressively moved toward plans to overthrow the Hashemite regime developed.[59] As Jordan became more intertwined in Palestinian affairs, East Bank Jordanians felt the effects.

As previously mentioned, hundreds of thousands of displaced persons entered Jordan from the West Bank and this put massive tensions on East Bank Jordanians, and the line between the two banks started to blur. Some Palestinians say the Hashemites pushed a Transjordanian identity onto the West Bank, but other sources claim the goal was to implement a hybrid Jordanian identity for the two banks.[60] Regardless, neither side felt as if there was a cohesive identity between the two groups, especially as the PLO became more and more prominent.[61] There were even claims of "Jordan is Palestine" from the Israeli government who used this

[57] Abu-Odeh, Adnan.
[58] Abu-Odeh, Adnan.
[59] Abu-Odeh, Adnan.
[60] Laurie A. Brand, "Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, no. 4 (January 1995): pp. 46-61, https://doi.org/10.2307/2537757.
[61] Brand, Laurie A.

phrase as justification for expanding control over the West Bank and relocating Palestinians to the East Bank.[62] This claim simultaneously invalidated the Palestinian people and their right to the West Bank and other occupied land and mislabeled East Bank Jordanians who did not have Palestinian ties.

As Jordan became more intertwined in Palestinian affairs, East Bank Jordanians felt the effects. After the Black September Civil War, blame was cast onto Palestinians living there and resentment soon followed. The Black September fight was between the PLO and members of the Jordanian Armed Forces which, since its beginnings in the early 1920s, consists mainly, but not exclusively, of East Bank Jordanians.[63] In fact, Palestinian defections from the military spiked in the 1970s. Palestinians and East Bankers were literally fighting one another during a time when their identities were being forced together amidst the unification of the West and East Bank under Hashemite leadership. Once the West Bank was annexed, it was prohibited for "Palestine" to appear on government documents.[64] The blurring between the two banks was instigated by the insistence of Hashemite ownership of the West Bank and the surge of Palestinians coming to Jordan from the West Bank after its annexation by Jordan. As a result, the Hashemites are an easy group for East Bank Jordanians to blame for the economic and social tensions suddenly thrust upon them.

After the Black September War, many Jordanians moved to oil rich countries to benefit from the oil boom of the 1970s. The Jordanian mining industry consists of phosphate and potash and while they are influential to Jordan's economy, they are nowhere near as profitable as oil. For that reason, "worker remittances from Jordanian citizens flowed strongly to support new

[62] Arab Center Washington DC, "The 'Jordan Is Palestine' Idea Resurfaces Again," Arab Center Washington DC, November 12, 2021, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-jordan-is-palestine-idea-resurfaces-again/.
[63] Curtis Ryan, "CHAPTER V Identity Politics, Real and Imagined," in *Jordan and the Arab Uprisings Regime Survival and Politics beyond the State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).
[64] Brand, Laurie A.

investment in its industrial development and infrastructure".[65] When oil prices steeply declined in the 1980s, these remittances also decreased which negatively affected Jordan's economy. Political issues from the PLO were compounded by the economic issues brought forth from the oil industry. Al Rawashdeh and Maxwell write:

> With increasing tax revenues the Jordanian government at that time stimulated the economy by increasing public sector employment, expanding phosphate production and developing new manufacturing industries. This led to a reduced trade deficit as well as less poverty and inequality.[66]

By the 1990s, the Jordanian government dramatically reduced the amount of public sector jobs. When oil production decreased public sector employment became even more scarce; this made it even harder for tribal youth to find jobs as they were used to finding lucrative employment in the public sector.

In 1994 King Hussein signed the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, and it became clear that Jordan's progressing relationship with Israel has been leading up to this point. The peace treaty includes the acknowledgement of each country's sovereignty and recognized boundaries and creates provisions for economic cooperation such as eliminating all trade barriers and alleviating water shortages, amongst other agreements. The treaty angered West and East Bankers whose allegations of being under a Zionist regime were constantly undermined.[67] This negligence gives East Bank youth yet another reason to become frustrated with the regime and make them wonder whether a legitimate king would disregard their interests in such a way. With the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty arriving roughly two decades after the "Jordan is Palestine" misnomer by the Israeli

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[65] Rami Al Rawashdeh and Philip Maxwell, "Jordan, Minerals Extraction and the Resource Curse," *Resources Policy* 38, no. 2 (2013): pp. 103-112, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2013.01.005.
[66] Al Rawashdeh, Rami and Philip Maxwell.e
[67] "TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN." United Nations, New York *(Volume 2042 , I-35325*).

government, the treaty also gives Jordanians a reason to be skeptical of Israel's intentions behind its relationship with Jordan and question the sovereignty of their country.

**The Start of Economic Liberalization**

At this point in King Hussein's reign, the Hashemite regime began a period of rapid economic liberalization. Up until the 1980s, Jordan experienced a period of economic success, but it ended when the economy could no longer support the rapidly growing public sector and mountain of debt. In order to pay off these debts, Jordan began to take out loans through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but these loans had conditions that essentially forced the borrower's country to implement neoliberal economic policies that mirror those found in the West.[68]

The new neoliberal model is a stark contrast to the previous economic model enacted under King Abdullah I where Jordan played an interventionist role. Here, Jordan implemented import substitution policies, protectionist barriers to liberal trade, the nationalization of key sectors to the economy, subsidies to energy and housing, and widespread employment of the public sector.[69] The emphasis on the public sector greatly benefited East Bank Jordanians as their original role as Jordan's support base gave them many opportunities for government jobs. So when foreign investment and privatization increased with the arrival of IMF loans, East Bankers were seriously disadvantaged. With these loans came decreased food and oil subsidies that East Bankers relied on.[70] As they are considered to be the support base of Jordan, discontent and anger over this disadvantage accumulated over time as neoliberal policies increased with the preference of the economic elite over East Bank Jordanians.

[68] Momani, Bessma.
[69] Momani, Bessma.
[70] Momani, Bessma.

This is clearly seen through the 1989 bread riots that erupted after the Jordanian government cut wheat subsidies. The decision caused the price of wheat to immediately double, and this was not economically feasible for many East Bankers who relied on the subsidies. The lifting of all subsidies was a requirement of the IMF loans given to Jordan. It is clear how East Bankers make the connection between neoliberal policies and their inability to afford some of the most basic necessities of life.[71]

A large public sector required sufficient public infrastructure to go with it, and that includes government spending on education. Public sector workers were educated, urban members of the professional class, and they had average salaries that offered a comfortable lifestyle. By the late 1990s, the amount of Jordanian public and private universities and community colleges grew to eighty-two,[72] and the total percent of government expenditure on education reflects this increase. The World Bank data on government expenditure on education in Jordan starts in 1986, and 1996 and 1997 saw the largest expenditures with 21.6% and 18.4% respectively. It dipped to 8.1%, its lowest recorded, in 2010 and has stayed within 10% every year since.[73] Less money was put towards infrastructure that benefitted East Bank Jordanians professionally, as well as there being fewer employment opportunities in the public sector, this group had a harder time finding gainful employment in the public sector, and the unemployment rate skyrocketed. From 2008 to 2014, the unemployment rate stayed between 12.7% and 11.9%, but by 2017 it had reached 18.1%.[74]

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[71] Lamis Andoni and Jillian Schwedler, "Bread Riots in Jordan," *Middle East Report*, no. 201 (1996): p. 40, https://doi.org/10.2307/3012771.
[72] Momani, Bessma.
[73] World Bank, "Government expenditure on education, total (% of government expenditure) - Jordan," The World Bank Group, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GB.ZS?locations=JO.
[74] "Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force) (Modeled ILO Estimate) - Jordan," World Bank Open Data, accessed April 18, 2023, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=JO.

Meanwhile, the regime granted many wishes of the economic elite. Tax-exempt items, new investment laws, and other new taxation policies arrived in this period, benefiting the economic elite but not the average Jordanian citizen.[75] Economic decline is one of the leading causes of social unrest, and the soaring unemployment rates combined with the neglect of East Bank Jordanians by the hands of the regime, all the while implementing economic policies that would offer breaks to the economic elite, was the perfect catalyst for political activism by East Bank youth as they try to preserve their futures.[76]

King Abdullah II began his reign in 1999 and intensified the process of economic and political liberalization. This included "capitalist reforms to the state-driven economy and "disconnecting rural political interests from the royal center."[77] These reforms depended on the urban elite made up of wealthy businessmen who benefited from economic modernization, but this led to an even more diminished public sector. During the Arab Spring, the King made reforms in the political system including moving towards a constitutional monarchy and a proportional representation voting system, creating a National Dialogue Committee, banning the formation of political parties based on religion, and attempting to increase Palestinian participation in elections,[78] but these actions were not permanent and were changed soon thereafter. Political reforms such as the ones above are ineffective if they do not target issues of corruption within the government and, arguably, they are null if basic needs such as affordable food are not met. Eventually, this continuous passive action of King Abdullah II spurred political action from tribal youth participating in the Hirak Movement in the years after the Arab Spring.

**The Hirak Movement**

[75] Momani, Bessma
[76] Philip Barrett and Sophia Chen, "The Economics of Social Unrest - IMF F&D," IMF, accessed March 10, 2023, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2021/08/economics-of-social-unrest-imf-barrett-chen.htm.
[77] Yom, Sean L.
[78] Yom, Sean L.

The Hirak movement of Jordan is a political activism phenomenon, mainly of tribal, East Bank, Jordanian youth. Hirak first emerged in Jordan in 2011, at the precipice of the Arab Spring.[79] In Arabic, the word حراك, or Hirak, simply translates to "movement" in English, and this movement is a perfect example of the cumulation of East Bank unrest. The main Jordanian tribe associated with Hirak is the Beni Hassan, one of the largest tribes with over 200,000 members across north Jordan and twelve different clans.[80] The Beni Hassan are a semi-nomadic tribe and considered a "tribal confederation" as they are not originally related by blood.[81] Because of their close proximity to the Hirak Movement, they also are the main tribe of focus for this section.

It was members of Hirak who called for this reform to combat corruption within the political system and privatization in the private sector, such as the sale of the King Hussein Medical Center to foreign investors.[82] Despite the past two decades of modernization under King Abdullah II, protestors are still being arrested on charges such as criticizing the king and questioning the regime's intentions; in 2018, one protester was arrested due to a video of him asking Jordanian authorities, "What did you do in the past 20 years?"[83]

Hisham al-Saraheen, Abdullah al-Khalayleh, Khaled al-Khalayleh, and Abd al-Rahman are four Hirak activists who were arrested in 2019 on account of their political activism in Jordan. Their charges ranged from undermining the political regime and insulting the king and queen to inciting civil strife, but they were all members of the Beni Hassan tribal faction of the

[79] The Hirak movement of Jordan should not be confused with the Hirak movement of Algeria (2019-2021), which succeeded in pushing Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to resign**.**
[80] Muhammad, Ghazi
[81] Muhammad, Ghazi
[82] Yom, Sean L.
[83] "Jordan: New Arrests of Activists." Human Rights Watch, October 28, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/28/jordan-new-arrests-activists.

Hirak movement.[84] The Hirak are not the first group of tribe members engaging in political activism in Jordan, but they stand out due to their numbers - nearly forty East Bank tribal youth activist groups - and because of the differences between them and past East Bank generations; they generally abstain from anti-Palestinian rhetoric, do not demand reparations through government jobs and services, and they use the "political arena" to address economic issues.[85]

In previous years, the regime could pacify East Bank protestors by making impermanent changes and offering jobs in the public sector that East Bank Jordanians historically value. However, the protests have been consistent and are not diminished by these changes that offer no systemic solutions to corruption. This demonstrates an ideological switch between the two generations of East Bank tribe members. Since East Bank youth are not willing to accept the solutions offered to them because of corruption, their perception of the regime's legitimacy is negatively affected.

Since the Arab Spring, Jordan has seen an increase in protests, but there was never an existential threat to the regime as seen in other countries across the Middle East. That is until the alleged coup attempt in April of 2021 by Abdullah II's half brother Prince Hamzah.[86] He has since fallen out of favor with the royal family, but, historically, he was popular with East Bank tribes. Currently, the heir to the Jordanian throne is Crown Prince Hussein bin Abdullah, King Abdullah II's eldest son, born in 1994, but he has not always held that title.

When King Hussein died in 1999, Prince Hamzah, Abdullah's half brother, was named Crown Prince by the new King, his brother Abdullah II, but his reign only lasted five years, when Abdullah removed him from the role, and he later gave it to his son, Prince Hussein in

[84] "Jordan: New Arrests of Activists."
[85]. Yom, Sean L.
[86] Alex Ward, "Jordan's Royal Family Feud and Alleged Coup Plot, Explained," Vox (Vox, April 6, 2021), https://www.vox.com/22367819/jordan-coup-attempt-arrest-abdullah-hamzah.

2009. In April of 2021, Hamzah was placed on house arrest after being placed at the center of an alleged coup attempt and a year later in april of 2022 Prince Hamzah renounced his title as Prince, saying:

> Following what I have witnessed in recent years, I have come to the conclusion that my personal convictions which my father instilled in me, and which I tried hard in my life to adhere to, are not in line with the approaches, trends and modern methods of our institutions" and later, "I will remain as I have always been and as long as I live, loyal to our beloved Jordan (BBC News, 2022).

Throughout this eighteen year journey of Hamzah's role in the royal family, allegiances to the royal family, especially tribal allegiances, have evolved.

Since then, there has been an eruption of support for Prince Hamzah on social media, especially from tribal members. A bugged meeting room even captured evidence of tribal leaders attempting to organize support for Hamzah, making them involved in this alleged coup attempt.[87] This claim raises a few questions; firstly, if tribal leaders are directly involved in a coup attempt to dethrone a king they have a historic allegiance to, perhaps the difference in the perception of legitimacy amongst tribal youth versus tribal elders is not as stark as previously thought. Secondly, are tribal members supporting any one who is willing to challenge Abdullah II's authority or does Prince Hamzah have characteristics that are particularly well received by tribal members, specifically tribal leaders? Perhaps tribal leaders still feel a sense of allegiance to the Hashemites, just not Abdullah II, and they feel that a change, within the family, is necessary.

## Conclusion

Through this historical analysis, it is clear that there have been long term effects of the regime coercing and coopting the tribes into being the support base in 1921. The coercive

[87] Martin Chulov and Michael Safi, "Phone Intercepts Shine More Light on Jordanian Prince's Alleged Coup Attempt," The Guardian (Guardian News and Media, May 30, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/30/phone-intercepts-jordanian-prince-alleged-coup-attempt.

measures such as economic and political opportunities pushed the regime into creating an inflated public sector that the tribes quickly began to rely on. Despite these opportunities forged from coercion, tribal resistance developed and continued through the next century. The parameters of the tribes as a support base, their usage as a means of legitimacy, is evident from the international politics in the mid century and the way in which the regime quickly lost focus on the tribes. This analysis concludes with the rise of economic and political liberalization, started by King Hussein and continued with King Abdullah II, and the official focal switch from the tribes to the economic elite due to the economic prosperity this group is able to offer the regime. The result of which is political unrest and mass tribal movements that threaten the legitimacy of the regime and King Abdullah II himself.

The role of tribal youth in all of this is instrumental. Their relationship with the regime is like a see-saw going back and forth; sometimes tribes are prioritized by the regime and sometimes they are cast aside. The tribal youth of today have learned that the regime does not consistently support tribes in a way that reflects how the country's base of support, as they are often coined, should be treated. They differentiate themselves from previous generations by demanding reform through protests and other political action instead of by demanding political positions and governmental jobs. These groups respond differently to corruption because tribal youth believe the regime to be less legitimate and do not want to be involved in such a government.

## CHAPTER FOUR: PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY ANALYSIS

Public opinion in authoritarian regimes is difficult to navigate due to the legal ramifications that may follow sharing a point of view that does not align with the regime. Then there is the issue of preference falsification where respondents, while under social pressure, may misrepresent their preferences. Despite these obstacles, it was essential to use public opinion as a resource in this thesis. My hypothesis is dependent on knowing what people believe and who they trust, so I must know what people say in order to test this hypothesis. There are two main ways public opinion may be recorded: interviews and surveys. Of course, each has their strengths and weaknesses, but in this thesis breadth was the most important factor. Interviews sacrifice breadth for depth while surveys sacrifice depth for breadth. Breadth was important for the development of this thesis because it allowed different questions to be explored and for models to be rerun using different variables and interviews are much less efficient in this area. The public opinion survey used in this thesis is easily accessible, and this makes it a more attractive source of public opinion. Interviews in this field require international connections, permission from a review board, the ability to navigate a foreign language, and an excess of time.

Not only do they offer a voice to those who cannot freely share their opinions without reprimand, public opinion surveys collect essential demographic information such as household income, age, education level, and religion that can be used domestically as well as throughout the international community. Additionally, these questions are used as control variables which help reduce bias when determining how age and tribal identity affect political legitimacy. This method of analysis has been used in this thesis because of the wide range of survey topics concerning government issues and its inclusion of tribal identity. Additionally, it has the ability to offer statistical evidence that the other methods in this thesis do not offer.

If my hypothesis of young tribal members offering less support to the regime is correct, the survey results should reflect this by showing that performance satisfaction of the government is significantly lower among tribal youth. However, the statistical analysis I conducted from the results of the opinion survey does not support this hypothesis. It did not show any significant relationship between age, tribal identity, and dependent variables used as proxies used for political legitimacy. I will argue that the primary reasons for this outcome are the proxies for political legitimacy and the way the tribal identity question is phrased. They limited the respondents' answers by not asking specifically about political legitimacy and not asking tribal identity as a "yes" or "no" question.

**Sample: The Arab Barometer Survey**

The Arab Barometer is the largest, longest-standing repository of publicly available data on the views of people in the MENA region, and it offers a nationally representative sample of Jordanians. The first wave of surveys started in 2006 which makes it a relatively recent method of analysis, and Wave 1 (2006-2009) and Wave 4 (2016-2017) were used in my analysis. Waves 1 and 4 of the survey sampled 942 and 966 Jordanians, respectively. The waves utilized in this thesis provides a baseline of public opinion before and after the regime began more rigorous political and economic reforms in response to the Arab Spring protests and in the 2011-2012 Hirak movement. The 2006-2009 wave captures public opinion from 2006 to 2008, over a decade after the start of the neoliberalization of Jordan's economy, but, at the same time, the years preceding the Arab Spring. The 2016-2017 wave includes the years after the Arab Spring that align with the rise of the Hirak movement. That is not to say there were no political protests based on already existing tensions exacerbated by the regime. The period surrounding the Hirak

movement is influential because tribal youth are the subjects of this thesis, and how the regime reacts to their actions is of direct consequence to the results of this thesis.

**Outcome of Interest: Performance Satisfaction**

For this analysis, there are three main variables used to determine political legitimacy: **age**, **tribal identity**, and **political satisfaction** (the dependent variable). First, it must be stated that the Arab Barometer Survey is not a perfect measure of public opinion, no survey is, and this is particularly true for the subject matter of this thesis. This is because there are no questions in the survey asking about the royal family itself, instead of the government, or legitimacy. Therefore, certain variables were chosen to be used as legitimacy markers i.e. **performance satisfaction**[88]. Respondents rated their satisfaction on a scale of one to ten; one is completely unsatisfied and ten is very satisfied.

Performance satisfaction was chosen as a of the legitimacy markers for one main reason. It is vague; it does not ask specifically about the economy, elections, religion, or specific members within the government, which means respondents can apply it to the monarchy. Asking respondents to rate their satisfaction with the performance of the government allows them to take the monarchy into consideration, but it also prevents the interviewer from knowing whose performance exactly they are evaluating, or if they are taking a more general, holistic, approach to the question. Performance satisfaction is not a direct test of legitimacy in Jordan; this analysis was conducted using the best available data at the time. It is called a legitimacy marker because it is an imperfect measure.

[88] In my initial analysis, I included two more legitimacy markers in Wave 1 (political situation and always support government decisions) and one more legitimacy marker in Wave 4 (always supports government decisions). The results of those analyses did not differ enough from those of performance satisfaction to merit presenting them in this thesis.

**Independent Variables; Tribal Identity and Age**

The independent variables of this analysis are **age** and **tribal identity**. In the 2006-2009 wave the youngest respondent is eighteen and the oldest is ninety seven years old, and in the 2016-2017 wave the youngest respondent is eighteen and the oldest is ninety years old. In Wave 1, tribal identity is determined by isolating respondents who reported that tribe/family was the most important, or second most important, to them compared to other identifiers, which included: city/village, governorate, country, the Arab world, and the Islamic world etc.

Wave 4 asks respondents to choose an identity that they most closely relate to out of the previously mentioned characteristics. Interpretations of this variable create limitations of its use. Particularly because the variable is "tribe/family", or "your tribe or extended family" as it is written in Wave 4, and there is no way to determine whether respondents chose that variable because of the tribe or family component; this thesis depends on tribal affiliation. Additionally, the question is not whether the respondent is a part of a tribe or not but if the respondent views their tribal identity as the first or second most important characteristic. The respondent may be forced to forgo their tribal identity for the purposes of the survey if they feel their religious or national identity is stronger.

To reduce concerns of bias present within confounding variables, **interest in politics**, **monthly family income**, and **education level** were used as control variables in this analysis. Confounding variables affect both the independent and dependent variables, and all of these control variables are likely correlated with both tribal identity and performance satisfaction. Since the effect of these variables was accounted for, I know that they are not causing a false relationship between tribal identity and performance satisfaction.

**Explanation of Regression Models and Sample Sizes**

The analysis of the Arab Barometer Survey was conducted using Ordinary Least Square Regression (OLS). Separate regression models were run for each wave of the survey used in this thesis. In total, I created four models for each wave using performance satisfaction as the legitimacy marker. The first model represents the 2006-2009 wave and includes all of the control variables.[89] It is a full sample, and this means it includes all respondents, regardless of whether they chose "Jordanian", "Palestinian", "Other" , "Yemen", or "Arabia" for their country of origin.

The second model also comes from the 2006-2009 wave. It has the same variables but only represents respondents who chose their identity as "Jordanian" instead of "Palestinian" or any of the other options. This respondent pool is smaller but is a better, more accurate representation of the East Bank Jordanians that this thesis is focused on. It is understood that "Jordanian" is not a perfect proxy for "tribal", but, again, this study is done using the most applicable data from the survey.

The third and fourth models are from the 2016-2017 wave. They contain all of the previously mentioned control variables but include all respondents, not only ones who specifically identify as being Jordanian. Finally, the fourth model contains all of the control variables but only includes respondents from the Jordanian subgroup.

**Results and Discussion**

[89] For this analysis, I also developed models that did not have controls. I did not include those models because the results did not significantly vary from the results presented in this thesis. Additionally, it is always better to include the results that best reduce bias, which is the case with the models included here.

Table 1 depicts two OLS models from Wave 1 (2006-2009) and Table 2 depicts two OLS models from Wave 4 (2016-2017). Models 1 and 3 are the full samples and models 2 and 4 represent East Bank Jordanians. All models between the two tables show that, during Waves 1 and 4, age and tribal identity have no significant effect on performance satisfaction. This analysis included an interaction between age and tribal identity. Interactions help understand how independent variables, together, affect the dependent variable, which in this case is performance satisfaction. When an interaction is included in a regression model, it changes the way the constituent variables (age and tribal identity by themselves with no interaction) are interpreted. The age variable no longer includes all respondents. Instead, it only consists of the ages of non-tribal people, and tribal identity is only amongst eighteen year olds. The interaction was essential in this thesis because I am discussing tribal youth; not all tribal members and not every young person. Unfortunately, the interaction between age and tribal identity is also insignificant, and this result indicates no relevant difference between tribal elders and youth.

The education level amongst the respondents was significant in all models, and they show that it has a negative effect on performance satisfaction; as education level (the levels being illiterate, elementary, primary, secondary, college diploma - two years, BA, and MA or higher) increases by one unit performance satisfaction decreases by almost .30 in all cases. This means that as Jordanians become more educated they become less satisfied with the performance of the government. Since there was a correlation between education level and performance satisfaction, it is good that its bias was controlled for by using it as a control variable. Nonetheless, these models do not reveal any support for my hypothesis which predicted that tribal youth would be

less likely to be satisfied with the government's performance.

Table 1: Effect of Tribal Youth Identity on Performance Satisfaction (2006-2009)

| | **Model 1: Performance Satisfaction (Full Sample)** | **Model 2: Performance Satisfaction (East Bank Only)** |
|---|---|---|
| Constant | 7.09*** | 6.97*** |
| | (0.39) | (0.46) |
| Age | 0.05 | -0.03 |
| | (0.08) | (0.10) |
| Tribe is Important | -0.11 | -0.27 |
| | (0.35) | (0.41) |
| Age x Tribe is Important | -0.04 | 0.06 |
| | (0.12) | (0.14) |
| Monthly Family Income | -0.00 | -0.00 |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Education Level | -0.30*** | -0.27*** |
| | (0.06) | (0.07) |
| $R^2$ | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.03 | 0.02 |
| Num. obs. | 1029 | 793 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table 2: Effect of Tribal Youth Identity on Performance Satisfaction (2016/2017)

| | **Model 3: Performance Satisfaction (Full Sample)** | **Model 4: Performance Satisfaction (East Bank Only)** |
|---|---|---|
| Constant | 6.96*** | 7.19*** |
| | (0.40) | (0.52) |
| Age | -0.00 | -0.01 |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Tribe is Important | -0.24 | -0.40 |
| | (0.58) | (0.70) |
| Age x Tribe is Important | -0.01 | 0.00 |
| | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| Interest in Politics | 0.06 | 0.17 |
| | (0.08) | (0.09) |
| Monthly Family Income | -0.03 | -0.10 |
| | (0.16) | (0.20) |
| Education Level | -0.28*** | -0.30** |
| | (0.07) | (0.10) |
| $R^2$ | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.02 | 0.01 |
| Num. obs. | 974 | 665 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Figures 1 and 2 show the results from models 1 and 2 visually.[90] In particular, these figures show the interaction between age and tribal identity[91]. The shaded areas indicate the confidence interval which is very wide in this analysis. One of the reasons for this may be the small sample size. Model 2 has 793 total observations and model 4 has 665. Because the survey is a "national representation" and is not given to every Jordanian, not every single tribally affiliated Jordanian will be accounted for in the survey. It is unknown how representative the survey is of the actual tribal population and how likely tribal youth are to report tribe as "most important". The 0 represents people who did not select tribe as important while 1 represents

[90] Age in figure 1 is on a scale of 1 to 7 because respondents were divided into different age groups based on their answer. For example: 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, and 75+. 1 corresponds with 18-24, 2 corresponds with 25-34, and so on.

[91] The regression models that these figures are based on include the control variables.

those who did select tribe as important. Shown visually, it is clear that although the difference between the two is small, those who did select tribe as important report lower rates of performance satisfaction.

Figure 1: Effect of Age by Tribal Identity 2006/2009



Figure 2: Effect of Age by Tribal Identity 2016/2017




The public opinion survey analysis failed to support my hypothesis. There is no statistical evidence, with the methods used in this thesis, to support a connection between age, tribal identity, and a decrease in performance satisfaction i.e. political legitimacy. However, using this method, there was also no evidence to support that there is a connection between age, tribal identity, and an increase in performance satisfaction and therefore political legitimacy. If current literature that claims there to still be a reliable support base for the regime, within the tribal community, is correct there should be a clear, positive correlation between tribal identity and performance satisfaction. This is not the case. Due to the lack of data before 2006, it is also unclear, statistically, whether there was evidence of a positive correlation between age, tribal identity, and performance satisfaction before the 21st century and before the start of neoliberal

reforms to the economy. It is possible that even though the relationships presented here are insignificant if, in the past century, there was a strong significance that has since decreased over time. This is to say that the quality of the data should not overshadow the merits of the argument and restrict the possibilities of future research on this topic with improved data.

The results of this analysis are an example of why a multi-method approach to research is highly valuable even though it is underused. The results should not be taken at face value since the data is an imperfect representation of how tribal East Bank Jordanians perceive the legitimacy of the regime, and they must be supplemented with other methods of research.

## CHAPTER FIVE: SOCIAL MEDIA ANALYSIS

Social Media has several applications in contemporary research. It provides a space for breaking news before it makes its way to newspapers, academic journals, and books. Twitter threads and Facebook groups are fantastic ways for users to interact with one another and for researchers to obtain a better understanding of public opinion, and their archival capabilities make for a relatively easy to use research tool. Of course, social media has its advantages outside of academia.

In the past two decades, social media transformed from a means of simple communication amongst friends and family and into an exceptional place for community amongst complete strangers linked by similar interests. Social media revolutionized the way humans interact with each other, and, notably, provided a medium to challenge cultural norms by way of political dissent. In the case of the Hirak and other social movements in Jordan, their community took the form of political activism, and this was accomplished through platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. Users utilized the wide network of these platforms and their ability to reach all over the world, and suddenly anyone with internet access could watch the Arab Spring and other activist movements as it happened, without the influence of news organizations. The uprisings were coined the "Facebook Revolutions" and "Twitter Revolutions" due to the influence of these platforms.[92]

Although this is not an Arab Spring centered thesis, its link to social media is an apt example of what is still happening today, specifically within the Hirak movement of Jordan. There are two reasons as to why the phenomena occurring on these platforms are referred to as revolutions. Firstly, the act of rebellion, today, is completely different from its counterpart one

[92] Heather Brown, Emily Guskin, and Amy Mitchell, "The Role of Social Media in the Arab Uprisings," Pew Research Center's Journalism Project (Pew Research Center, December 31, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2012/11/28/role-social-media-arab-uprisings/.

hundred years ago. As the regime has changed, so have the ways to protest against it, and Jordanians can choose whether they want to participate in social and political activism virtually or in person. Secondly, the type of conversations happening on the sites, the change users are demanding, is its own revolution separate from the protestors on the street. The rules are different on social media, and users have far more freedom with what they are able to say depending on whether they attach their name to it.

Social media is a necessary component of modern research of the Middle East, but its scope is typically on the Arab Spring due to its large role in the revolution. The social media analysis chapter contributes to this thesis by providing more context to the historical analysis, literature review, and Arab Barometer Survey because it has the ability to fill in gaps that appear throughout the process of using the aforementioned methods. It also offers  a different method for researchers to analyze public opinion; they may only have imperfect surveys available to them and or are not able to conduct interviews. This thesis utilizes social media not only because it fills in the gaps of other methods, but also because, for some recent incidents, there are few research methods but social media, and the allure of anonymity entices users to be much more honest with their opinions of the regime than they would be otherwise.

The use of social media as a research method is recent but it is not unfounded, and it has many applications in research of the MENA region.  Researchers debate the onset of civilian journalists who are in competition with Arab news sources due to their ability to "dominate traditional media narratives" but also carry accusations of authentication.[93] Others, when considering the well known relationship of social media and the Arab Spring, put into question

[93] Maimon, Vered Maimon and Shiraz Grinbaum. "The Middle East and New Media: The Challenge and the Opportunity," Essay. In *Activestills: Photography as Protest in Palestine/Israel*, London: PlutoPress, 2016.

"how and why these ambitions and techniques resonated in their various local contexts".[94] There is also a focus on radicalization as a tool thanks to the mass communication capabilities, and opportunity of anonymity, of social media.[95] However, I believe one of the most relevant points amongst the broader literature is: "Because social media easily connects people very quickly with a wide audience, the synergy creates a movement en masse of like-minded persons. A leader is not needed."[96] Social media capitalizes on groupthink mentality, and this conflicts with the hierarchical structures of tribes that have an obvious leader who distributes responsibilities among tribe members.

This is how the social media generation differs from past generations and why young tribe members today have an advantage that older generations did not when facing political unrest. Young tribe members now have an easily accessible outlet that allows them to challenge both the hierarchy of the tribe and the ideology of the tribe, if it does not align with their own beliefs, while voicing their dissent against the regime all the while providing them with a community that offers support.

**Facebook and Twitter**

While all social media can be a place for community, sites such as Instagram and TikTok only have publicly available written conversation between users in comment sections. These conversations are typically brief with no real substance other than to show their like or dislike of a post, and it is very difficult to search the comment sections for key words and phrases. The focus that Facebook and Twitter have on writing one's thoughts down in long or short form blog style posts makes them the most valuable social media sources for this thesis.

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[94]Lisa Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 3 (n.d.): pp. 2-7.
[95] Robin Thompson, "Radicalization and the Use of Social Media," *Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no. 4 (2011): 167–90, https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.8.
[96] Thompson, Robin.

It should also be noted that 63% of Jordan's population is under the age of 30, meaning the stereotype that older generations use Facebook at higher rates than younger generations most likely does not apply.[97] Additionally, in recent years, Twitter has been largely utilized by academics and other professionals, changing the type of discourse, that is to say, there may be a higher percentage of political discourse on Twitter. On Twitter, this discourse is easily filtered by searching specific hashtags pertaining to tribes and government disapproval, but on Facebook, I searched for keywords within tribe groups pages.

**Twitter Hashtags & Content analysis**

In order to learn what hashtags are popular amongst Jordanians, particularly when voicing dissenting opinions, I first looked at all of the tweets that were generated from the hashtag #الأردن (#Jordan). From there, I collected a list of hashtags that were included in Jordanian tweets voicing dissent. Translated from Arabic, they are as follows: **#**JordanIsNotOkay**, #**DignityStrike**, #**ThePeopleWantTheFallOfTheRegime, #HungerRevolutiuon, #DownWithTheRegime, and #FreedomForPrisonersOfOpinion,

The most popular hashtags were #JordanIsNotOkay and #ThePeopleWantTheFallOfTheRegime. Although the #JordanIsNotOkay is general, it was repeatedly used when showing disagreement with the actions of the regime. In particular, it was used in response to the treatment of protestors and other politically active Jordanians that were arrested. For example, the hashtag often coincides with #MuhammadEnadAlFaye,who was wrongfully detained by the police and has yet to be released despite their promises to do so, but also other victims like #ColonelAbdulRazzaqAlDalabeh who was killed in a riot. In fact, this was a common occurrence; when seeing the timestamps of tweets with certain hashtags, there

[97] "Youth." UNICEF Jordan, November 6, 2022. https://www.unicef.org/jordan/youth.

were phases of activity and inactivity and they coincided with political phenomenons happening in Jordan at the time. If the government announced price increases, new taxes or a prominent member in a community was arrested or killed without cause, Twitter became much more active and these specific hashtags were used more often.

When using social media, it is important to remember its role in its users lives, especially in regards to Twitter. Yes, people use the platform as a way to update their friends and family about their lives, but it is also used as a space to speak out about politics, even in countries that limit freedom of speech, since it has established itself as a community. The value of the tweets collected for this thesis is not negated because of the limitations; the tweets are still accurate expressions of Jordanian viewpoints. So what do the tweets say?

**Analyzing Political Legitimacy Through Social Media**

As previously stated, the type of tweets used in this thesis usually coincides with political happenings, but the motivations behind the tweets still differ. For example, one tweet referred to protests occurring in front of the Israeli embassy in Amman, but called it the "Zionist entity's embassy" and later tied the Zionist entity's fall to the fall of the Hashemite regime in light of the "strong popular movement" found in Jordan.[98] The reference to the fall of the Hashemite regime signifies the deterioration of political legitimacy, but this tweet does not include any notion that this is the point of view of the tribes. But another tweet states "The Beni Hassam tribe gives three days to reveal the killer of Colonel Al Dalabeh. The government, representatives, and notables are not welcome to mourn."[99] Another says that the Jordanian people have "shattered the barrier of fear forever" while attached is the video of a tribe marching and chanting "We will not roll and we will not go around. Abdullah, you are responsible."[100] With youth being over half

[98] See Appendix B, Post B4
[99] See Appendix B, Post B1
[100] See Appendix B, Post B3

of Jordan's population and tribal members being another significant portion, tribal denial of legitimacy could be destructive to the regime.

The tweets above are indicative of Abdullah II' actions of the previous two decades. When Jordananians cast blame onto Abdullah they typically cite the following reasons: hunger, price increases in oil and food and unemployment. The economic liberalization period of the twenty-first century which decreased the size of the public sector and the amount of government subsidies for basic necessities led to protests on and off the street as is shown through these tweets. This period initiated the rise of the economic elite which was then followed by the rise of online revolutions. In person protests widely consist of East Bank youth, so it is reasonable to assume that these proportions will transfer to the online protests which makes social media a relevant place to search for political commentary written by East Bank youth.

Throughout the process of searching Twitter, the hashtag #الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام (#ThePeopleWantTheFallOfTheRegime) was the most effective in producing tweets that denounce the legitimacy of the regime in terms of quantity. The video of the tribe chanting, calling Abdullah responsible, contained this hashtag. This hashtag in particular, compared to hashtags of specific tribes or of popular movements, ensures that every user, in some form, wants the fall of the government; they do not think that Abdullah is capable and they want something better to replace him.

By searching for more specific keywords in the posts within this hashtag, such as tribe and Jordan, I was able to find useful tweets for this thesis, but they were few in number likely because users have not tagged them in a way compatible with keyword and hashtag searches. The video of the tribe for example, had the #الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام (#ThePeopleWantTheFallOfTheRegime) hashtag but did not list anything about tribes within the

actual tweet or subsequent hashtags. It could only be known to be a tribally affiliated protest because the name of the tribe was written as a caption on the TikTok video attached to the tweet.

I came across many situations such as this while using Twitter. Many of the tweets lacked specific detail about who was protesting, what they were protesting, or what they wanted the result of the protest to be. The occurrence of protests was always clear, but the context was not. I believe this is likely due to the personalized nature of social media; when one has a Twitter account completely tied to their own opinions, maybe even their own stream of consciousness, users may not feel obligated to explain their every word or thought. It is not necessary to explain your own thoughts while you think about them, so it may not occur to users to explain their thoughts once posted on social media. Even though it is a massive platform, with hundreds of millions of users, it is easy to forget when we are only confronted with our individualized timelines and feeds. Additionally, local audiences most likely already know the context of the protests, so users may not feel it necessary to provide it, and researchers are not a part of this target audience.

Despite this problem, it is important to remember the context of these political tweets. They occur most frequently in times of political unrest such as increases in food prices and taxes. Large movements disapproving actions like these naturally follow, and one of the largest, modern Jordanian movements opposing the government consists of the Beni Hassan tribe, due to its strong connection to the Hirak movement. So, when a video or picture of protests are tweeted with the hashtags #JordanIsNotOkay or #ThePeopleWantTheFallOfTheRegime, it is not unlikely that it is a tribal affiliated group, whether the tweet explicitly says so or not. This means that even though there is not a lot of direct evidence of tribal youth being active on social media the assumption can be made that they are present.

**Facebook & Content Analysis**

In this thesis, Facebook was utilized much differently than Twitter, particularly in terms of how I searched for relevant posts. First, I searched for pages with tribal affiliations, but there were multiple pages for the same tribe; for example, when searching for a Beni Hassan page, over ten results are generated that have the name Beni Hassan within the name of the page, so I selected pages based on popularity. But there is also the matter of the different classifications of pages. The three top pages for Beni Hassan on Facebook have three different page classifications: community, interest, and public figure. These classifications do not affect the capabilities of the page; they only act as a description for users to better understand the purpose of the page they are following. As this thesis is using social media because of its use as an online community, I mainly relied on the page that classifies itself as a community.

When searching Facebook posts on the Beni Hussan page, not all of the posts were about disagreements with government decisions or showings of political activism, because the pages share a wide variety of information. Likewise, when searching #JordanIsNotOkay on Twitter, not all of the posts were about the government and even less referenced the Hirak movement, tribal movements, or tribal identities. When searching for keywords on Twitter such as “tribe” or “Hirak”, not all of the results were about dissatisfaction with the government. Additionally, when relevant tweets were found that included references to tribes, the Hirak movement, and/or dissatisfaction with the government, it was difficult to uncover the age and tribal identity of the user, especially on Twitter. These were the difficulties faced when working with social media to fill the gaps from the Arab Barometer survey.

Unfortunately, Facebook groups are controlled more than Tweets. Both sites hold users accountable for a set of community guidelines such that help prevent cyberbullying, but Twitter

users are often only forced to reap the consequences of breaking those rules if another user reports them. On the other hand, Facebook pages have owners and monitors that can control what kinds of conversations take place in the group and can remove comments and posts when they deem it necessary. In fact, on Facebook pages, only the owner of a page is allowed to post content, but followers of the page are allowed to comment on the posts. And, sometimes, only the name of the owner is listed and users who are not friends with the individual on the site do not have access to the personal information and posts on their personal page. This is a disadvantage for evaluating public opinion towards a specific topic, but it is able to be used as a tool. The most popular pages will have up to hundreds of thousands of likes and follows, meaning that even though specific opinions cannot be posted, users are still signifying their support for the contest posted to the page. And, users are still able to leave comments on the posts and interact with others through them, often giving more clarity and insight to the posts made by the page owner. Understanding the mechanics of these groups and how their posts arrive as a final product before the user is an important element of using this kind of social media as a source.

Because the Facebook page is a community, it holds space for many different types of news and announcements. Some messages are congratulatory after the marriage or graduation of a tribe member and some are Quran verses meant to share inspiration or hope. But others are critical of the government or other Jordanians. They cited people who had fallen on hard times and had been neglected by the government and younger generations of Jordanians who they felt were not respectful to the older generations; Facebook showed a different, generational, perspective. Facebook posts in these groups are more likely to be long, multi-paragraph that were hard to understand, and were more likely to disparage Jordanian youth and reference their lack of

respect. But these posts occur alongside ones that shared Hirak protests and ridiculed government actions. Some Facebook posts reflected the instability of tribes as the regime's support base. Posts that thank tribal leaders, judges, or other government officials for visiting the tribe indicate that there is a focus on preserving relationships between tribes and with the regime. At the beginning of the 20th century, Abdullah I put tribal leaders in positions of power in order to coopt them, so this activity on Facebook is also indicative of an older way of thinking; in order for the social and political position of tribes to be secure, they need to be given positions in power. This implies that older tribal generations consider the regime to be more legitimate than tribal youth because they value governmental positions.

**Prince Hamzah: A Critical Juncture**

Over the past two years, political commentary on social media was not contained to the economic and political decisions of the regime; coup allegations tied to King Abdullah II's half brother, Prince Hamzah, intensified political discourse, particularly in regard to Prince Hamzah's innocence and the status of King Abdullah as the rightful leader of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Prince Hamzah was the heir to the throne from 1999 to 2004 until King Abdullah II rescinded the title and gave it to his son, Crown Prince Hussein bin Abdullah, in 2009.

During Prince Hamzah's time under house arrest, groups of Jordanians rallied around him, claiming his innocence and calling for him to be released. Under the hashtag #Freedom for Prince Hamzah on Twitter, there were countless posts of Prince Hamzah's picture, sometimes joined with his family, with multiple hashtags on each post, asking where Prince Hamzah is and declaring justice, peace, and freedom for him. These recent messages of support for Prince Hamzah follow years of demands for King Abdullah II's resignation. For years, Hamzah has shown himself to be more closely aligned with the values of the Jordanian people, particularly

East Bank Jordanians, even routinely visiting tribal leaders. In the tweets included under the "the people want down with the regime" hashtag, Abdullah II is frequently singled out by name as the fault of all of the economic problems, protestors do not blame the entire Hashemite family, or even predecessors of Abdullah II for inciting these problems. The corruption in the Jordanian government is systemic and has been a source of struggle for over one hundred years. Yet, there are many Jordanians who appear willing to start a new leaf with Prince Hamzah, despite his obvious connections to the Jordanian royal family.

Overall, Twitter contained a multitude of posts casting disapproval at the regime. If this thesis were only on public approval of the regime and the evolution of legitimacy in Jordan in general, I believe that Twitter, and social media in general would be a critical tool and be home to bounds of useful data. Unfortunately, due to the way users attach hashtags to their posts and the inability to reliably uncover demographic information on the users who do post relevant information, it is difficult to say the same regarding the evolution of legitimacy amongst tribal youth. As previously mentioned, the fact that the organizers of these protests are often tribally affiliated allows for the presumption of tribal affiliation with many of these tweets, but it cannot be known for sure.

After using two different social media platforms for this thesis, I realized that they would be used for two different purposes. Twitter displayed much more obvious showings of its users' dissent, but Facebook was more casual and less obvious. Instead of an intense, to the point, 100 character post of how much a user wanted Abdullah to be rid of the throne, Facebook users were more inclined to take their time. They would build a narrative using famous sayings or lines from the Quran, sometimes never reaching an obvious, or clear, conclusion, but merely sharing their musings on a certain topic. This made it much harder to understand the viewpoint of the posts,

but it did highlight the aforementioned generational gap between the two platforms and, therefore, the generational gap found within the tribes which brings to question the significance of age differences in regards to perceptions of legitimacy amongst tribal members.

The findings of the social media analysis do display the presence of a tribal population that is unsatisfied and angry with King Abdullah's economic and political decisions over the past two decades. It is clear that these decisions are related to the recent liberalization of the economy that has given preference to the economic elite and generate side effects that disproportionately affect East Bank youth. However, there was not significant enough evidence to state that a large portion of users signaling their support of Prince Hamzah are tribal youth. This does not disprove my hypothesis; in fact, due to the vast evidence found through the historical analysis, I have confidence that if there were fewer limitations to using social media as a method of analysis there would be more posts on the topic of regime legitimacy that could be positively connected to tribal youth.

## CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND THE FUTURE

Through historical, statistical, and social media analyses, this thesis establishes a foundation on two main ideas: the support base of the tribes was never strong enough to begin with because of the coercive measures used to gain support and the weaknesses of this support base resulted in weaknesses in the regime's legitimacy, in the eyes of tribal youth. This thesis attempted to prove that change in tribal identity over time negatively impacted the regime's legitimacy because of the ways in which the regime stopped offering support and opportunities that were part of the coercive measures used.

The results of this thesis prove there is evidence that East Bank youth are unsatisfied with the actions and proposed solutions of the regime and the ways in which East Bank tribes are reacting has evolved in recent years as neoliberal economic policies continued, benefitting the economic elite and putting East Bank youth at a disadvantage. This unrest was built upon the domestic tensions introduced by the regime in the mid century and the already existing strife between the Hashemites and the tribes that began at the end of World War I. However, the results from each research method are not unanimous. The historical analysis clearly ties together the actions of the regime with an increase in East Bank protests, but the results of the public opinion survey analysis are insignificant. However, it is important to note that this does not mean the hypothesis is disproven. The main takeaway is that the limitations of the analysis prevent any concrete observations from being made. The social media analysis, like its historical counterpart, shows a connection between the regime's actions and disapproval of the regime amongst tribal members, but, because of its limitations, the amount of tweets from tribal members is quite small so it is difficult to make generalizations.

The thesis contributes to the existing literature on political stability in Jordan, authoritarian legitimacy, and state and nation building. Jordan is not an "island of stability" and treating it as such draws attention away from the conditions that East Bankers are actively protesting. Many of the characteristics of an authoritarian legitimacy that exist in Jordan, but they are currently being challenged. In addition, this thesis contributes to the way methodology is chosen in this field. Through the various results found in this thesis, I have shown the importance of having a varied methodology. Having multiple methods is advantageous because they offer context for each other. For example, the historical analysis gave insight on what variables should be controlled for in the public opinion survey analysis, and the social media analysis made me rethink what kind of relationships tribal members had with other members of the monarchy.

The historical analysis demonstrates that the regime's legitimacy, in the eyes of tribal youth, was affected as tribe, regime relationships developed over time, and this change did happen because of the ceasing support offered by the regime, but it has not proved that the regime's legitimacy as a whole has been affected. As mentioned, there was a support base switch from the tribes to the economic elite, and this new, influential group not only offers a source of domestic legitimacy and economic prosperity but international legitimacy as foreign investment increases. The social media analysis adds support to this evidence, but the tribal impact on the regime's legitimacy seen through social media, and the way it was used by this thesis, is not concrete enough for the analysis to be used as evidence on its own. And as the statistical analysis results were insignificant they cannot be used to offer a conclusive answer.

Future research on the regime's legitimacy and how tribal youth have impacted is necessary as new data is posted onto social media everyday and there are other methods to use

social media as a research tool. I do not think that the Arab Barometer survey should be discarded for future research as it is obviously a wealth of information on public opinion in the Middle East. There are limitations to the Arab Barometer as there are with all surveys, but I believe that the limitations in this thesis that were specific to this research can be overcome. Future waves of the survey may be key to overcoming the present limitations and unlocking previously unknown information about tribal youth.

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## APPENDIX A

Regression Models

| | Performance Satisfaction V.1 |
|---|---|
| Constant | 5.56*** |
| | (0.26) |
| Age | 0.12 |
| | (0.08) |
| Tribe is Important | -0.09 |
| | (0.35) |
| Age X Tribe is Important | -0.00 |
| | (0.12) |
| $R^2$ | 0.00 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.00 |
| Num. obs. | 1060 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A1: Performance Satisfaction Full (06-09)

| | Performance Satisfaction V.3 (Jordan Only) |
|---|---|
| Constant | 5.72*** |
| | (0.31) |
| Age | 0.03 |
| | (0.10) |
| Tribe is Important | -0.27 |
| | (0.41) |
| Age X Tribe is Important | 0.09 |
| | (0.14) |
| $R^2$ | 0.00 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | -0.00 |
| Num. obs. | 816 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A2: Performance Satisfaction Jordan Only (06-09)

| | Performance Satisfaction V.4 |
|---|---|
| Constant | 4.62*** |
| | (0.46) |
| Age | 0.01 |
| | (0.08) |
| Tribe is Important | -0.01 |
| | (0.35) |
| Month Family Income | -0.00 |
| | (0.00) |
| Interest in Politics | -0.01 |
| | (0.08) |
| Education Level | -0.25*** |
| | (0.07) |
| Always Supports Gov Decisions | 0.94*** |
| | (0.10) |
| Age X Tribe is Important | -0.06 |
| | (0.12) |
| $R^2$ | 0.12 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.11 |
| Num. obs. | 942 |
| ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05 | |

Table A3: Performance Satisfaction Full with Controls (06-09)

| | Performance Satisfaction V.5 (Jordan only) |
|---|---|
| Constant | 4.61*** |
| | (0.54) |
| Age | -0.09 |
| | (0.10) |
| Tribe is Important | -0.22 |
| | (0.41) |
| Month Family Income | -0.00 |
| | (0.00) |
| Interest in Politics | 0.09 |
| | (0.10) |
| Education Level | -0.22** |
| | (0.07) |
| Always Supports Gov Decisions | 0.93*** |
| | (0.11) |
| Age X Tribe is Important | 0.03 |
| | (0.14) |
| $R^2$ | 0.11 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.10 |
| Num. obs. | 733 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A4: Performance Satisfaction Jordan Only with Controls (06-09)

| | Always Supports Gov Decisions V |
|---|---|
| Constant | 2.25*** |
| | (0.08) |
| Age | 0.05 |
| | (0.03) |
| Tribe is Important | -0.04 |
| | (0.12) |
| Age X Tribe is Important | 0.01 |
| | (0.04) |
| $R^2$ | 0.01 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.00 |
| Num. obs. | 1002 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A5: Always Support Government Decision Full (06-09)

| | Always Supports Gov Decisions V.2 (Jordan Only) |
|---|---|
| Constant | 2.24*** |
| | (0.10) |
| Age | 0.04 |
| | (0.03) |
| Tribe is Important | -0.03 |
| | (0.13) |
| Age X Tribe is Important | 0.03 |
| | (0.04) |
| $R^2$ | 0.01 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.01 |
| Num. obs. | 774 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A6: Always Support Government Decisions Jordan Only (06-09)

**Missing 2-3 and 2-4 because of p values**

| | Describe the Political Situation V.1 |
|---|---|
| Constant | 2.94*** |
| | (0.07) |
| Age | -0.02 |
| | (0.02) |
| Tribe is Important | 0.02 |
| | (0.09) |
| Age X Tribe is Important | -0.00 |
| | (0.03) |
| $R^2$ | 0.00 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | -0.00 |
| Num. obs. | 988 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A9: Describe the Political Situation Full (06-09)

| | Describe the Political Situation V.2 (Jordan Only) |
|---|---|
| Constant | 2.97*** |
| | (0.08) |
| Age | -0.03 |
| | (0.03) |
| Tribe is Important | 0.02 |
| | (0.11) |
| Age X Tribe is Important | 0.01 |
| | (0.04) |
| $R^2$ | 0.00 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.00 |
| Num. obs. | 761 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A10: Describe the Political Situation Jordan Only (06-09)

| | Describe the Political Situation V.3 |
|---|---|
| Constant | 2.15*** |
| | (0.13) |
| Age | -0.03 |
| | (0.02) |
| Tribe is Important | 0.00 |
| | (0.09) |
| Monthly Family Income | -0.00 |
| | (0.00) |
| Interest in Politics | 0.05* |
| | (0.02) |
| Education Level | 0.00 |
| | (0.02) |
| Performance Satisfaction | 0.09*** |
| | (0.01) |
| Always Supports Gov Decisions | 0.09*** |
| | (0.03) |
| Age x Tribe is Important | 0.01 |
| | (0.03) |
| $R^2$ | 0.15 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.14 |
| Num. obs. | 874 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A11: Describe the Political Situation Full with Controls (06-09)

| | Describe the Political Situation V.4 (Jordan Only) |
|---|---|
| Constant | 2.24*** |
| | (0.15) |
| Age | -0.04 |
| | (0.03) |
| Tribe is Important | 0.00 |
| | (0.11) |
| Monthly Family Income | 0.00 |
| | (0.00) |
| Interest in Politics | 0.07* |
| | (0.03) |
| Education Level | -0.01 |
| | (0.02) |
| Performance Satisfaction | 0.08*** |
| | (0.01) |
| Always Supports Gov Decisions | 0.06* |
| | (0.03) |
| Age x Tribe is Important | 0.02 |
| | (0.04) |
| $R^2$ | 0.13 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.12 |
| Num. obs. | 686 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A12: Describe the Political Situation Jordan Only with Controls (06-09)

| | Performance Satisfaction V.1.1 |
|---|---|
| Constant | 5.63*** |
| | (0.21) |
| Age | 0.00 |
| | (0.01) |
| Part of a Tribe | 0.06 |
| | (0.88) |
| Age x Part of a Tribe | -0.03 |
| | (0.02) |
| $R^2$ | 0.02 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.01 |
| Num. obs. | 1094 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A13: Performance Satisfaction Full (10-12)

| | Performance Satisfaction V.2.1 (Jordan Only) |
|---|---|
| Constant | 5.74*** |
| | (0.26) |
| Age | -0.00 |
| | (0.01) |
| Part of a Tribe | -0.59 |
| | (1.17) |
| Age x Part of a Tribe | -0.01 |
| | (0.03) |
| $R^2$ | 0.01 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.01 |
| Num. obs. | 673 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A14: Performance Satisfaction Jordan Only (10-12)

| | Performance Satisfaction V.3.1 |
|---|---|
| Constant | 4.47*** |
| | (0.41) |
| Age | -0.00 |
| | (0.01) |
| Part of a Tribe | -0.06 |
| | (0.83) |
| Education Level | -0.06 |
| | (0.05) |
| Monthly Household Income | -0.00 |
| | (0.00) |
| Interest in Politics | -0.15* |
| | (0.07) |
| Always Supports Gov Decisions | 0.84*** |
| | (0.08) |
| Age x Part of a Tribe | -0.02 |
| | (0.02) |
| $R^2$ | 0.14 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.13 |
| Num. obs. | 1030 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A15: Performance Satisfaction Full with Controls (10-12)

| | Performance Satisfaction V.4.1 (Jordan Only) |
|---|---|
| Constant | 4.72*** |
| | (0.51) |
| Age | -0.00 |
| | (0.01) |
| Part of a Tribe | -0.75 |
| | (1.14) |
| Education Level | -0.07 |
| | (0.07) |
| Monthly Household Income | -0.00 |
| | (0.00) |
| Interest in Politics | -0.14 |
| | (0.09) |
| Always Supports Gov Decisions | 0.75*** |
| | (0.10) |
| Age x Part of a Tribe | 0.00 |
| | (0.03) |
| $R^2$ | 0.11 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.10 |
| Num. obs. | 629 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A16: Performance Satisfaction Jordan Only with Controls (10-12)

| | Always Supports Gov Decisions V.1.1 |
|---|---|
| Constant | 2.31*** |
| | (0.08) |
| Age | 0.00* |
| | (0.00) |
| Part of a Tribe | 0.40 |
| | (0.34) |
| Age x Part of a Tribe | -0.01 |
| | (0.01) |
| $R^2$ | 0.01 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.00 |
| Num. obs. | 1110 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A17: Always Support Government Decisions Full (10-12)

| | Always Supports Gov Decisions V.2.1 (Jordan Only) |
|---|---|
| Constant | 2.41*** |
| | (0.10) |
| Age | 0.00 |
| | (0.00) |
| Part of a Tribe | 0.59 |
| | (0.45) |
| Age x Part of a Tribe | -0.02 |
| | (0.01) |
| $R^2$ | 0.01 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.00 |
| Num. obs. | 675 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A18: Always Support Government Decision Jordan Only (10-12)

| | Always Supports Gov Decisions V.3.1 |
|---|---|
| Constant | 2.02*** |
| | (0.16) |
| Age | 0.00 |
| | (0.00) |
| Part of a Tribe | 0.27 |
| | (0.32) |
| Education Level | -0.08*** |
| | (0.02) |
| Monthly Household Income | 0.00 |
| | (0.00) |
| Interest in Politics | 0.02 |
| | (0.03) |
| Performance Satisfaction | 0.13*** |
| | (0.01) |
| Age x Part of a Tribe | -0.01 |
| | (0.01) |
| $R^2$ | 0.14 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.13 |
| Num. obs. | 1030 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A19: Always Support Government Decisions Full with Controls (10-12)

| | Always Supports Gov Decisions V.4.1 (Jordan Only) |
|---|---|
| Constant | 1.86*** |
| | (0.20) |
| Age | 0.00 |
| | (0.00) |
| Part of a Tribe | 0.50 |
| | (0.44) |
| Education Level | -0.06* |
| | (0.03) |
| Monthly Household Income | 0.00 |
| | (0.00) |
| Interest in Politics | 0.08* |
| | (0.03) |
| Performance Satisfaction | 0.11*** |
| | (0.01) |
| Age x Part of a Tribe | -0.01 |
| | (0.01) |
| $R^2$ | 0.10 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.09 |
| Num. obs. | 629 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A20: Always Support Government Decisions Jordan Only with Controls (10-12)

| | Performance Satisfaction V.1.2 |
|---|---|
| Constant | 5.83*** |
| | (0.22) |
| Age | 0.00 |
| | (0.01) |
| Tribe is Important | -0.25 |
| | (0.58) |
| Age x Tribe is Important | -0.01 |
| | (0.01) |
| $R^2$ | 0.01 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.00 |
| Num. obs. | 989 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A21: Performance Satisfaction Full (16-17)

| | Performance Satisfaction V.2.2 (Jordan Only) |
|---|---|
| Constant | 6.04*** |
| | (0.28) |
| Age | -0.00 |
| | (0.01) |
| Tribe is Important | -0.32 |
| | (0.70) |
| Age x Tribe is Important | -0.00 |
| | (0.02) |
| $R^2$ | 0.00 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.00 |
| Num. obs. | 672 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A22: Performance Satisfaction Jordan Only (16-17)

| | Performance Satisfaction V.3.2 |
|---|---|
| Constant | 5.70*** |
| | (0.44) |
| Age | -0.00 |
| | (0.01) |
| Tribe is Important | -0.21 |
| | (0.57) |
| Interest in Politics | 0.06 |
| | (0.08) |
| Always Supports Gov Decisions | 0.47*** |
| | (0.08) |
| Monthly Household Income | -0.02 |
| | (0.16) |
| Education Level | -0.26*** |
| | (0.07) |
| Age x Tribe is Important | -0.01 |
| | (0.01) |
| $R^2$ | 0.06 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.05 |
| Num. obs. | 966 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A23: Performance Satisfaction Full with Controls (16-17)

| | Performance Satisfaction V.4.2 (Jordan Only) |
|---|---|
| Constant | 5.99*** |
| | (0.56) |
| Age | -0.01 |
| | (0.01) |
| Tribe is Important | -0.27 |
| | (0.68) |
| Interest in Politics | 0.15 |
| | (0.09) |
| Always Supports Gov Decisions | 0.48*** |
| | (0.09) |
| Monthly Household Income | -0.06 |
| | (0.19) |
| Education Level | -0.31** |
| | (0.09) |
| Age x Tribe is Important | -0.00 |
| | (0.02) |
| $R^2$ | 0.06 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.05 |
| Num. obs. | 660 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A24: Performance Satisfaction Jordan Only with Controls (16-17)

| | Always Supports Gov decisions V.1.2 |
|---|---|
| Constant | 2.59*** |
| | (0.08) |
| Age | 0.00* |
| | (0.00) |
| Tribe is Important | -0.10 |
| | (0.19) |
| Age x Tribe is Important | 0.00 |
| | (0.00) |
| $R^2$ | 0.00 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.00 |
| Num. obs. | 1471 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A25: Always Support Government Decisions Full (16-17)

| | Always Supports Gov decisions V.2.2 (Jordan Only) |
|---|---|
| Constant | 2.49*** |
| | (0.11) |
| Age | 0.00 |
| | (0.00) |
| Tribe is Important | -0.29 |
| | (0.26) |
| Age x Tribe is Important | 0.01 |
| | (0.01) |
| $R^2$ | 0.01 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.01 |
| Num. obs. | 833 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A26: Always Support Government Decisions Jordan Only (16-17)

| | Always Supports Gov decisions V.3.2 |
|---|---|
| Constant | 2.16*** |
| | (0.19) |
| Age | 0.00* |
| | (0.00) |
| Tribe is Important | -0.08 |
| | (0.23) |
| Interest in Politics | -0.01 |
| | (0.03) |
| Performance Satisfaction | 0.08*** |
| | (0.01) |
| Monthly Household Income | 0.00 |
| | (0.07) |
| Education Level | -0.01 |
| | (0.03) |
| Age x Tribe is Important | 0.00 |
| | (0.01) |
| $R^2$ | 0.05 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.04 |
| Num. obs. | 966 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A27: Always Support Government Decisions Full with Controls (16-17)

| | Always Supports Gov decisions V.4.2 (Jordan Only) |
|---|---|
| Constant | 2.03*** |
| | (0.24) |
| Age | 0.01 |
| | (0.00) |
| Tribe is Important | -0.28 |
| | (0.29) |
| Interest in Politics | -0.01 |
| | (0.04) |
| Performance Satisfaction | 0.08*** |
| | (0.02) |
| Monthly Household Income | -0.06 |
| | (0.08) |
| Education Level | 0.02 |
| | (0.04) |
| Age x Tribe is Important | 0.01 |
| | (0.01) |
| $R^2$ | 0.05 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.04 |
| Num. obs. | 660 |

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A28: Always Support Government Decisions Jordan Only with Controls (16-17)

**APPENDIX B**

Twitter Posts

Post B1

Post B2: Part 1

Post B2: Part 2




Post B3




Post B4

Post B5




Post B6




Post B7

Post B8

Post B9




Post B10

Post B11




Post B12

Post B13




Post B14




Post B15




Post B16

Post B17

Post B18

Post B19




Post B20




Post B21

جريمة موثقة: مليشيات علي بابا متلبسة بالفيديو وهي تلقي الغاز المسيل للدموع على بيوت قبيلة بني حسن التي ينتمي اليها الضابط المغدور الدلابيح،
#اضراب_الكرامة #الاردن #سلمية #الشعب_يريد_إسقاط_النظام
Translated from Arabic by Google
Documented crime: Ali Baba's militia red-handed, throwing tear gas at the homes of the Bani Hassan tribe, to which the murdered officer Al-Dalabeh belongs,
#الشعب_يريد_إسقاط_النظام #سلمية #الاردن #اضراب_الكرامة

Post B22

## APPENDIX C

Facebook Posts




Post C1

Post C2

Post C3

Post C4

Post C5




Post C6




Post C7

Post C8

قبيلة بني حسن الأردن
September 19, 2022 ·

بيان صادر عن قبيلة بني حسن

*(المدرسة)*

قال تعالى :- "وإن طَآئِفَتَانِ مِنَ ٱلْمُؤْمِنِينَ ٱقْتَتَلُواْ فَأَصْلِحُواْ بَيْنَهُمَاۖ فَإِنۢ بَغَتْ إِحْدَىٰهُمَا عَلَى ٱلْأُخْرَىٰ فَقَٰتِلُواْ ٱلَّتِى تَبْغِى حَتَّىٰ تَفِىٓءَ إِلَىٰٓ أَمْرِ ٱللَّهِۚ فَإِن فَآءَتْ فَأَصْلِحُواْ بَيْنَهُمَا بِٱلْعَدْلِ وَأَقْسِطُوٓاْۖ إِنَّ ٱللَّهَ يُحِبُّ ٱلْمُقْسِطِينَ" صدق الله العظيم

انطلاقا من الثوابت الوطنية للقبيلة المستندة الى القرآن الكريم و السنة النبوية الشريفة و الدستور الأردني والعادات و التقاليد لبت قبيلة بني حسن نداء الأخوة و لم الشمل بين الأهل و العشيرة الواحدة في منطقة شفا بدران على إثر الخلاف الذي أودى بحياة احد أفراد عشيرة الحجاج فقد قامت جاهة تضم شيوخ و اعيان ووزراء و نواب من القبيلة وكما هي عادات القبائل الأردنية حيث توجهت الى شفا بدران لأخذ عطوة اعتراف وفقا للعادات و التقاليد وكعادة القبيلة الأصيلة فقد تحملت في سبيل الله و الوطن و الملك وحيث ألت احداث مؤسفة من اعتداء سافر ومرفوض على الجاهة وبناء عليه فان *قبيلة بني حسن* تحمل كل شخص شارك في هذا التصرف الغاشم المسؤولية القانونية و العشائرية لما تم من احداث مؤسفة خلال تأدية واجب الاخوة في اخذ العطوة .

و اكراما لله والوطن و الملك فإن القبيلة تربأ عن الرد الذي يسيئ لأمن واستقرار الأردن الحبيب فقد رفضت الجاهة مخالفة الوثيقة المتعلقة بالجلوات و اصرت على تسجيل موقف بالالتزام بما تم الاتفاق عليه بخصوص الجلوة العشائرية التي اتفق عليها الأردنيون ورحبت بها عشائرنا الأردنية.

وانطلاقا من الثوابت الوطنية فان القبيلة تدعو جميع ابنائها لكظم الغيظ و التصرف كما كنا وما زلنا كبارا في اخلاقنا ووجودنا فقبيلة بني حسن *(المدرسة)*.

فقبيلة بني حسن التي خرجت النخبة وكانت اساسا في الحكمة و العزم وسطرت اروع صور الرجولة بتاريخ عظيم مليء بالشهامة و اجارة الملهوف واكرام الضيف لا يمكن نكرانه داخل الأردن وخارجه.

واذا تؤكد القبيلة ترجيحها لكفة العقل و الوطن وتطالب شبابها النشامى بالصبر والتحلي بالرجولة و التريث ليتمكن كبارها من الرد و التصرف بما تمليه علينا عاداتنا و تقاليدنا في اخذ الحق و رد الاعتبار.

Post C9: Part 1



The Almighty said: "And if two groups of the believers are killed, reconcile between them. If one of them desires, the other, then kill whomever you like, even

Starting from the national repentance of the tribe based on the Holy Quran, the Noble Prophetic Sunnah, the Jordanian Constitution, the customs and traditions of the daughter of the Bani Hassan tribe, the call of the brotherhood and the reunion between the families and the one clan in the area of Shifa Badran due to the dispute that led to the life of a member of the Hajj Clan, the time has come. It includes elders, eyes, ministers and deputies of the tribe, as it is the customs of the Jordanian tribes, where I headed to Shefa Badran to take a confession permit in accordance with customs and traditions, and as usual the original tribe, it has endured for the sake of God, the homeland and the king, and where unfortunate events of a traveler and rejected attack on the destination and built on it. The * Bani Hassan tribe * bears everyone involved in this treacherous act the legal and tribal responsibility for the unfortunate events that took place during the performance of the brothers' duty in taking the appeal.

In honor of God, the homeland, and the king, the tribe is raised from the response that offends the security and stability of the beloved Jordan. The party rejected the violation of the Glawat document and insisted on registering a position of commitment to what was agreed upon regarding the tribal exile agreed upon by the Jordanians and welcomed by our Jordanian tribes.

Based on the national repentance, the tribe invites all its children to reduce incitement and behave as we were, and we are still great in our morals and existence, so the tribe of Bani Hassan * (the school) *.

So the tribe of Bani Hassan, which came out the elite, and was based on wisdom and determination, and ruled the most wonderful pictures of manhood with a great history full of chivalry, and honoring the guest that can not be denied inside and outside Jordan.

And if the tribe confirms its swing to the limelight of reason and homeland, and demands its starch youth to be patient, be manly and tradition, so that their elders can respond and act upon what our habits and traditions dictate to us in taking the right and consideration.

Post C9: Part 2

Post C10




Post C11




Post C12: Part 1

An appeal to His Majesty King Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein, may God protect and protect him
Of happines
Sheikh Anad Mohamed Faiz Al-Sattam Al-Faiz the honorable
Calling out for his majesty
To be fair to the Hashemite family from the injustice that has happened on the land of Masarada as the land that was gifted by his father to the noble Hashemite family

As a result, the chase was strictly denied from their land, unlike the rest of the Bani Sakhr tribes that owned their villages.

We join our voice to the voice of the Sheikh and repeat the call to His Majesty, hoping for justice

Where is your Majesty the Opposition and Judgement
Judge what u deserve

For your information, Sheikh Enad Muhammad Al-Fayez is the son of the owner of dedication.
Ibrahim the safety of the trail

Post C12: Part 2

https://www.facebook.com/groups/2154317611396126/?ref=share_group_link
أهلاً وسهلاً بكم جميعاً بتشرفونا مجموعه القاضي العشائري الاردني الشيخ طراد مسلط الفايز ابو اكرم يسعى ليلا ونهارا في إصلاح ذات البين له كل الاحترام والتقدير

https://www.facebook.com/groups/2154317611396126/?ref=share_group_link
Welcome to all of you. We are honored by the group of Jordanian tribal judge Sheikh Tarad Maslat Al-Fayez Abu Akram who seeks day and night to reform the obvious, he has all respect and appreciation

Post C13

أخبار قبيلة بني صخر




Pursuit
They thank all the officials, the elders and the authorities who addressed the Royal Council and demanded fairness
And we are still waiting ?

Post C14

February 23, 2020 ·

....انتبه رحمة أبوك عالخط...
أبوك يطلب براءة ذمة فورا
لا تبخل علية وتركن على
(ولد صالح يدعوا له )
واعرف انك ولد صالح ومتدين والف نعم بك .
لكن ريح نفسك من كثر الدعاء لبوك وقراية الفاتحة وفطورات رمضان السنوية.

غلاة ابوك ومحبته عندك ؟؟
قم فورا ورح ل عبيد وزيد من الناس وبري ذمة ابوك منهم وادفع من ورثة ابوك وبعدين ادعي له عقب كل صلاة وان شاء الله تقبل دعوتك بعد البراءة والمسامحة من المظلوم او ابناءة.

أما حضرتك مركن ومجتهد تدعي
وانت قاعد تصرف من المال والورثة على كيفك ونسيت الحقوق اللي على ابوك.
ابوك ما فية له ذنب يذكر شاشة بيضاء .
بس اللي انت مطلع علية وتعرفه
من شرط راعي او اجار عامل او غيره
والملحقات الصغيرة هينه اذا خلصت عنه الكبائر ومن ميراثة لك.

هذا منشور عام وللعامة وانا اولكم
لكنني لم أجد لأحد حق عند رحمة والدي بل أكل حقة مرتين
الأولى : وزارة الزراعة الأردنية حرم من التقاعد
لخدمة 24 عام و تركناه .
والثانية : الارض وعلى أمل ان يرجع الحق
أو التعويض عنه .

Post C15: Part 1



.... NOTICE YOUR FATHER'S MERCY IS ON THE LINE...
Your father is pleading for immediate acquittal
Don't stingy on me and park on me
(A good boy, pray for him)
I know that you are a good and religious boy. A thousand blessings to you.
But relieve yourself from too much supplication for Buk, recitation of Al-Fatiha and annual Ramadan fast breaking.

Do you have your father's pride and love??
Stand up immediately and go to slaves and increase the people, and take your father's cover from them, and pay from your father's inheritance, and then pray for him after every prayer, and God willing, he will accept your prayer after the innocence and forgiveness of the oppressed or his children.

As for you, you are stationary and diligent in praying
And you are spending money and inheritance on your own, and you forgot the rights that your father has.
Your father is not guilty of mentioning a white screen.
But what you know about me
With the condition of a sponsor, a rented worker, or other
And the small accessories are easy if you get rid of the big ones and it is your inheritance.

This is a public publication and for the public, and I am the first one of you
But I did not find a right for anyone at my father's mercy, but I ate my right twice
The first: The Jordanian Ministry of Agriculture is forbidden from retirement.
24 years of service and we left it.
And the second: Land and in the hope that the truth will return
Or make it up for it.

Post C15: Part 2