

**Of Old Allies, New Threats, and an Impasse: A Case Study of Turkey's
Role in European Security Structures after the Cold War**

by Eli Jellenc

Thesis submitted to the Croft Institute for International Studies
at the University of Mississippi
May 2002

Table of Contents

Introduction	p. 1
Part I- The Promise and Perils of A New European Security Orientation	
Prologue	p.4
From Defense to Security	p.8
Europe's Southeastern Periphery: Sources of New Shared Threats	p. 15
Europe's New Turkish Bazaar	p. 32
Part II: European Security after the Cold War and the Decline of Defense	
Background	p.34
A New NATO	p.37
EU Efforts: Foundations of Turkish Exclusion	p.42
Part III: Turkey's Crippling Response to Exclusion and Europe's Justification	
The Response	p.48
Europe's Justification of Exclusion: Outlying Factors of Declining Security Cooperation	p.55
Conclusions	p.60

Tables and Graphs

Military Personnel of EU Member States + NATO Members Turkey, Norway, and the Visegard Three	p.14
Graphs of Manpower and Equipment Holdings of Selected Large European Military Powers vs. Iran, Iraq, and Syria	p.22
EU-OPEC Trade	p.26
Allied Contributions to ACE Rapid Reaction Corps	p.42
Defense Spending as % of GDP of the EU-15, Turkey, and the Visegard Three	p.50
Vote Distributions in the Turkish General Elections of 1995 and 1999	p. 57
Freedom House Score for Select EU Member-States, Candidates, Russia, and Macedonia	p.58

Introduction

In much of the recent literature concerning European Security structures and the transatlantic alliance, it is difficult to find a study, policy brief, or article which does not allude to problems in the development of autonomous European Union military capabilities arising from a political confrontation between the nations of the European Union and the Republic of Turkey. Most of the literature giving more than passing notice to this situation tend to explain the confrontation in terms of disagreement over specific policies but fail to appreciate the wider implications to scholarly understanding of alliance behavior. Thus, two questions are raised. What specific factors and conditions have led to the general degradation of security cooperation and the specific confrontation over EU access to NATO resources? What does this confrontation imply about the dynamics of the NATO alliance and alliances in general (e.g. the factors that warrant their creation and cause disintegration)?

One has only to look to the annals of the Siege of Vienna in the sixteenth century, the Anglo-Ottoman Alliance at Acre against Napoleon, another Anglo-Ottoman effort against Russia in the Crimea, or to the 'sick man' of World War I to realize that Turkey is a European power even if a cultural outsider. Considering this historical precedent, Turkey's crucial geostrategic value on Europe's southeastern flank, valuable contributions of Turkey to European common defense throughout the Cold War, and enduring importance of Turkey to NATO, strong foundations for Euro-Turkish security cooperation do indeed exist. Thus, this study will assert that the lack of cooperation between Europe and Turkey has resulted from the structural erosion and conscious subversion of fundamental factors conducive to alliance formation and cohesion. The

study will focus on the most commonly accepted reason for alliance formation—the presence of a mutually shared threat (or potential threats) to the territory, population, policy goals, economic wellbeing, or ideological interests of two or more nations.

This study will attempt to verify that the level of security cooperation between Europe and Turkey is dependent on the existence of and directly proportional to three causal factors. These are the quantity and “seriousness” (i.e. the coercive potential) of shared security threats, the level of economic interdependence between allies (i.e. the extent to which allies stand to gain from the economic wellbeing of another), and the harmony of allies’ political goals (especially in respect to security because an absence of harmony could cause friction in cooperative efforts). These causal factors are relevant to all alliances, but they are especially so for the European case, as their absence led to several major wars between the Great Powers in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries. Also the efforts after the end of World War II that brought about the European Communities were able to do so by increasing the positive presence of economic interdependence and political goal harmonization while the USSR provided the common threat.

After an analysis of policy, history, and statistical data, this study finds that, although Europe and Turkey share more security threats and economic interests than ever before, Euro-Turkish security cooperation has nonetheless declined. This has occurred because of a divergence in policy goals centered around the formation of an autonomous EU military capability and because of fundamental differences in security threat *perception* existing between Turkey and the EU. It will be argued that allies’ *perceptions* of these threats are of crucial importance. In short, even if a threat exists it must be

considered threatening by all allies to a roughly similar degree to demand cooperation against it.

Considering the huge number of factors involved in the dilemma, the unique nature of Turkey's case, and the notorious difficulty of quantifying "security," statistical analysis is of minimal help in determining how the Euro-Turkish relationship has changed. Nevertheless, data will be presented and compared on military expenditures, personnel statistics, equipment holdings, and some relevant economic figures to demonstrate the importance of Turkey to the EU and the nature of their shared interests. The majority of the analysis, however, will be a qualitative and empirical assessment of the contradictions in the Euro-Turkish relationship.

The analysis is divided into three main parts. The first part will analyze the shift in European strategy from collective defense to security while showing how Turkey's strategy remained oriented towards defense. Also in Part One, it will be seen that Turkey, while once an important asset to European defense, might have been the logical key to Europe's new security agenda considering the emergence of shared security threats and deepened economic cooperation between Turkey and Europe. In Part Two, it will be argued that Turkey has actually been ostracized from European security affairs and institutions as a result of the EU's new security ambitions and differing perceptions of security by both parties. In Part Three, the outlying factors of Turkish demographic and political incompatibility with the institutions and ideological base of the EU will be briefly discussed in terms of how they minimize the casual effect of political-goal harmony. Also in part three, it will be seen how Turkey's dissatisfaction with its diminished official role has generated a crippling dilemma at the heart of Europe's

nascent security structures.

The study will conclude by arguing that the Euro-Turkish impasse complicating, even hindering, developments in European security structures is rooted in the very nature of military alliances. To justify their creation, alliances require threats which are serious (i.e. possibly irresistible without allied support) immediate (i.e. highly probable in the near future) to two or more nations. Since these threats may supercede other political agendas, once the threats are vanquished, the resurgence of commitment to the prior political agendas can subvert the harmony of allies' policy goals. One needs to look no further than the hostilities that developed between the U.S. and USSR after the elimination of the shared Nazi threat in World War II for an illustration of this principle. With this in mind, the analysis begins with the status of security cooperation between Europe and Turkey (via NATO) at the time of the disintegration of their common threat, the Soviet Union.

Part I- The Promise and Perils of A New European Security Orientation

Prologue

From the early 1950's until 1991, defense of all non-neutral European nations west of Churchill's Iron Curtain was the sole responsibility of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with Turkey being the linchpin of defense on the southern flank. The United States, throughout the entire period, was the undisputed leader of this alliance and, thus, the primary guarantor of European defense. The singular enormous threat of an expansionist Soviet Union in possession of the largest conventional army the world has ever known sat poised just on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The entire alliance was established and organized to defend Western European territory and people from the Red

Army. This generated a static line of defense that required large numbers of men, tanks, and artillery to protect it. Throughout the Cold War, roughly 80% of NATO's forces were earmarked for static defense with the remaining 20% capable of mobile response.¹

The ally having the longest border with the USSR was the Republic of Turkey which joined the Alliance in 1952. Turkey's interest in allying with the West originated in the Republic's founding principle of westernization as well as the threat the USSR presented to Turkish security and interests in the surrounding region and the concurrent threat of communism to the politico-military ruling class. Considering the size of the Soviet army and its expansionist policy platform, the variable of a shared threat was strong promoting strong security cooperation through an alliance. Turkey proved an invaluable asset to the alliance as it was in possession of the second largest land army in NATO, numbering 630,000 men in 1985.² During the Cold War, Turkey defended one third of NATO's land boundaries by matching a full thirty divisions of the Red Army with its own military.³ Turkey also allowed U.S. tactical nuclear missiles to be stationed on its soil throughout the conflict and housed the headquarters of the NATO South-East Air Force Command at Incirlik Air Base in addition to forward early warning systems. In the Gulf War, Turkey sided with the U.S. and permitted the use of its airfields to decimate an Iraq that had been one of Turkey's largest trading partners the year before.⁴ Turkey's loyalty to the Alliance has been unquestioned, though her low development levels required vast amounts of the NATO infrastructure fund (only Germany received

¹ NATO Handbook 2001-2002 (online) Section: Changes in the Alliance
<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook>

² *The Military Balance 2001-2002*. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Oxford University Press. London. 2001. p. 299

³ "Turkey's Security and its Relations with NATO". Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2000.
<http://www.mfa.gov.tr>

⁴ Mathews, Owen. "Europe's Orphan". *Newsweek International*. April 22, 2002

more) and substantial military aid from the U.S. that benefited Turkey itself as least as much as it did NATO.⁵ The only problems Turkey has created for the Alliance revolve around the hostilities with Greece over Cyprus after a coup backed by the Greek colonels threatened the Turkish minority on the island in 1974. This issue remains unresolved.

Turkish support of the West during the Cold War was also due, in part, to the goals laid out by the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal (afterwards known as Ataturk- Father of the Turks). Having led the war for independence in the 1920's against Greece, Ataturk drew upon a nineteenth-century Ottoman tendency to lean westward (towards Europe) and forwards (towards modernity).⁶ This sentiment was well captured by one of the Ottoman Empire's leading intellectuals in the late nineteenth century. Ziya Gokalp once said, "There is only one way to escape these dangers, which is to emulate the Europeans... to equal them in civilization. And the only way to do this is to enter European civilization completely."⁷ In founding the Republic in 1923, Ataturk shaped the new nation-state around these sentiments as he implemented the Latin alphabet, banned the fez and headscarf, codified the secularization of the state, and based other legal codes on European models. Most importantly, he committed Turkey to the national goals of modernization and integration with the West, aspirations that have since shaped Turkish foreign policy more than any other force.⁸ These goals helped to harmonize Turkish and European ideological orientation and political goals which further facilitated security cooperation.

The other major Kemalist pillar was the indivisibility of the Republic. This would

⁵ Walker, Martin. "The Turkish Miracle". *Wilson Quarterly*. Aug. 2000. p. 82

⁶ Jung, Deitrich. "Turkey and Europe: Ongoing Hypocrisy?". Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. 2000.

⁷ *ibid.*

lead to an internal war in the 1980s as secessionist sentiments grew within the Kurdish population (20% of the total) in the southeast. Though Kemalism began as a form of authoritarianism, nominal democracy evolved by the end of World War II, making Turkey the world's only Muslim democracy—another ideologically harmonizing agency. The Turkish military's top brass became the defenders of Ataturk's legacy and also took a very deep role in politics in the tradition of their Ottoman Janissary (elite imperial guards) and Pasha (imperial general) predecessors.⁹

The Turkish military has been able to justify its political role by responding to the domestic instability fostered by several inept or corrupt governments, staging four coups in less than forty years. Each time, the government had demonstrated an inability to function and public order was in decay. Though the first three coups were violent, the fourth, in 1997, has been called a “virtual” or “post-modern” coup because the military merely recommended that the Islamist-led government step down. After restoring order, the military always reinstated democracy, held elections, and reaffirmed its position as the guardian of Ataturk's dream, albeit with a level of political involvement surpassing that of most democracies.¹⁰ Despite its internal difficulties, as a democracy with a powerful military and a long border with the USSR, Turkey proved a valuable ally to “The West” while enhancing its own level of security. It seemed throughout the Cold War that, though Turkey remained somewhat undeveloped in economic terms, it might indeed meet the goals of its founder. However, the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union brought about drastic changes in Europe's security environment and balance-of-

⁸Rouleau, Eric. "Turkey's Dream of Democracy". *Foreign Affairs*. Nov./Dec. 2000. vol. 79, no. 6. pp.103-104

⁹ *ibid.* p. 102

¹⁰ "Last Line of Defense". *The Economist*. vol. 355, issue 8174. p.13

power structures that would redefine the threats to and interests of Europe and Turkey. For the most part, security threats interests were shared by both actors, since each entity was menaced by the same threats. However, the new security threats fostered a change in Europe's perception of security, while Turkey's perception changed little. This divergence of perceptions had the same effect as the elimination of shared threats and, thus, served to undermine Euro-Turkish Security cooperation.

From Defense to Security

The primary reason for shifts in European strategic security policy involves the fundamental changes in threats and threat perception brought about by the end of the Cold War. In fact, a new strategic outlook began to form in the late 1980s when the Soviet Union began to abandon its hard-line expansionist platform while Gorbachev began to implement political and economic reforms. Since the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, developments in the military dimension of European Union policy and the transatlantic alliance accelerated and have since resulted in a shift from a condition of unified collective defense to one of consensual collective security.

The differences between security and defense, for the purpose of this analysis, are as follows: defense involves the marshaling of military and, less extensively, economic agency, by a national or multinational actor, for the purposes of safeguarding the integrity of sovereign territory or population; security involves the more complex employment of military, political, diplomatic, and/or economic agency for the broader purposes of safeguarding any national interests at home or abroad. This definition is a rough adaptation of the one employed by Geoffrey Lee Williams in his article, "The Future of NATO and the Transatlantic Alliance in the Twenty-First Century" and has been used in a more or less similar fashion by NATO and EU analysts.¹¹

These changes in European perceptions are, it will be shown, a reaction to developments in the security environment of Europe itself. However, Turkey continued to see its most immediate threats from Greece, Iraq, Iran, and Syria as traditional defense issues. Thus, its military posture and strategic goals were no longer in total harmony with Europe's. Specifically, Europe's outlook and goals were changing on a fundamental level from defense to security while the only substantial change in the defense-oriented

¹¹Williams, Geoffrey Lee. "The Future of NATO and the Transatlantic Alliance in the Twenty-First Century" in Douglas Eden, ed., *Europe and the Atlantic Relationship*. St. Martin's Press, New York. 2000. p.40

Turkish outlook involved Turkey's increased capacity for regional power projection. This aspect will be discussed at greater length later. For now, our focus remains on Europe's strategic reorientation.

The originally unifying immediate threat of a powerful and expansionist Soviet Union has vanished and thus uncovered many latent threats which are of smaller scale, of greater diversity, and generally lie on Europe's periphery. These include international terrorism, organized crime syndicates, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), ethnic conflict/humanitarian crises, disruption of resource flows (oil in particular), and less purely military problems of political and economic instability broadly classified as "state erosion" (both of which can generate destabilizing refugee/economic migrant flows). Among these, only WMD proliferation and certain manifestations of terrorism constitute concrete defense-related threats to European Union member states' territory and population; all others fall under the security category.¹²

Thus, Europe is no longer pressed (for the time being) to consider any immediately threatening defense issue, like the USSR's overwhelming conventional forces were once considered to be. The primary concerns of leaders, policy makers, military analysts, and academics have consequently become increasingly focused on the reorganization, modernization, and affordability of military institutions and less on the security threats themselves. The threats that are recognized have been drawn into focus by the demands for regional stability by the EU as it continues to expand its economic presence in (thus, deepening dependency on) Eastern and Central Europe as well as the Caucasus/Caspian Basin. The main regions of security concern (to be explained below) are the Balkans, the Trans-Caucasus, and the Middle East, each being either on the

periphery or entirely outside of Europe's technical geographic and cultural boundaries and at the forefront of Turkey's strategic purview.¹³ The threatening results of these new security issues range from increased levels of nonpolitical violence (in the case of organized crime) to massive, destabilizing, and costly refugee flows (in the case of ethnic conflicts and socio-economic decay), to increased public insecurity and diminishing levels of diplomatic confidence and effectiveness (regarding WMD proliferation).

In a discussion of these types of threats, it is essential to note that Turkey has had extensive experience in dealing with every category of security threat mentioned here. In fact, Europe's new security threats really were not that new to Turkey. Its experiences with terrorism and ethnic conflict are intertwined in the fifteen-year (beginning in 1984) campaign against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).¹⁴ The conflict was conducted mostly in southeastern Anatolia, the Kurdish heartland, and resulted in an estimated 37,000 deaths and as many as 350,000 displacements, most of them suffered by Kurds. The terrorist attacks on Istanbul (in 1978) and Ankara (1982) led to the military campaign and other such attacks persisted throughout the conflict.¹⁵ The Turkish intelligence apparatus, in 1999, was successful in locating and capturing PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan in Ethiopia, where he had been hiding in a Greek embassy after having been expelled from Syria and refused asylum in Italy. This success bears testimony to the effectiveness of Turkish anti-terrorism intelligence entities. Though the armed conflict in Anatolia proved brutal, a virtual conclusion had been reached by Turkish armed forces around the time of Ocalan's capture as other PKK leaders agreed to press their demands

¹²ibid. p. 44

¹³ Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Touchstone, New York. 1997. pp. 26-7

¹⁴ IISS Chart of Armed Conflict. 2001

politically.

Turkish experience with organized crime stems from the position of Turkey as the major European gateway of the heroin trade coming from Central Asia. Although the problem persists as levels of demand increase in Europe, the experience gained from fighting the organized crime syndicates behind the trade is valuable for any such action in the future. Increased police cooperation between Turkish narcotics police and Interpol could be a mutually beneficial arrangement for both parties, if only to facilitate learning through comparative analysis of strategies and to initiate some sort of cooperation against a shared threat.

Concerning WMD proliferation, Turkish soil has been within range of Iraqi SCUD missiles for over a decade and also borders Iran, which is developing its own missile technology with Russian and Chinese assistance. While the status of chemical and biological weapons programs in these countries is not known exactly, Turkey's proximity makes it much more vulnerable than Europe to these threats and thus necessitates greater interest in preventing proliferation of these technologies. Though the threat exists for both Europe and Turkey, Turkey is more vulnerable, thus, disharmony between the security goals of each entity increases.

Finally, concerning political instability, Turkey has been part of quite a rough neighborhood since Ottoman times. This still applies today as Turks are faced with pockets of Kurdish separatists hiding in northern Iraq, Armenian irredentist claims to territory ceded nearly a century ago, and refugee flows from Azerbaijan as a result of the fighting with Armenia in Nagorno-Karabagh. Despite her insecure surroundings, it is remarkable to note that the only armed conflicts in which Turkey has fought since the

¹⁵ibid.

founding of the Republic were against the Greeks in Cyprus (briefly) in 1974, in its own territory against the Kurds, and as part of multilateral operations with NATO or adjoining security organizations.¹⁶ Such a marked absence of war with its neighbors is evidence of the ability of Turkey to thrive successfully in an unstable environment long filled with the types of problems only now gaining the attention of Europe. Thus, concerning the new types of security issues that Europe has begun to address, it is clear that these problems are anything but new to Turkey, and that its experience in dealing with them could be invaluable to a Europe that has, thus far, shown little competence in employing effective response measures to these threats.

One reason for Europe's slow adaptation to new security threats is that attempts at resolution demand entirely different mechanisms than were needed for European territorial defense in the Cold War. Old notions of containment, deterrence, and *détente* do not translate into the new security environment, nor do large, static, conscript-dependent armies focused on territorial defense such as were the norm in Europe proper and in Turkey during the Cold War. Thus, the shift in strategic orientation resulted in new modalities of force posturing. It has been generally accepted by most members of the western strategic community that the new types of threats demand responses from relatively small, rapidly mobile, and highly professional forces that are equipped with and proceeded by smart weapons and backed by efficient and dependable supply systems, complete air superiority, and the essential command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) systems.

Specifically, the vital systems of modern forces are headquarters and command capacity, state-of-the-art communications, intelligence collation and analytical capacity,

¹⁶ SIPRI Database of Armed Conflict. <http://www.sipri.org>

and overwhelming air-power supported by suppression of enemy air defense systems (SEADs).¹⁷ These elements of a modern military have been termed “force-multipliers” by virtue of their unparalleled ability to efficiently and successfully direct and protect smaller forces with greatly increased capacity. The value of these systems was confirmed in the striking success of the U.S. in the Gulf War in 1990-1991. In contrast, their marked absence from the European forces in Bosnia and, later, in Kosovo highlighted the drastic need for modernization and reorganization in Europe’s military forces. Europe’s old defense-based military structures were denounced as obsolete on both sides of the Atlantic as new security threats began to take precedence. This is reflected in NATO’s troop reductions and abolition of conscription by Germany, France, and Spain (see table below).¹⁸

**Military Personnel of EU
Member States + NATO
Members Turkey, Norway,
and the Visegrad Three (in
1000s)**

	<u>1985</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1999</u>	<u>2000</u>
Belguim	91.6	63	41.8	39.3
Denmar	29.6	27	24.3	21.8
k				
France	464.3	409.6	317.3	294.4
German	478	367.3	332.8	221
y				
Greece	201.5	367.3	332.8	159
Italy	385.1	322.3	265.5	250.6
Lux.	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8
Neth.	105.5	70.9	56.4	51.9
Norway	37	33.5	30.7	26.7
Portugal	73	50.7	49.7	44.7
Spain	320	206.5	186.5	166
Turkey	630	503.8	639	609.7

¹⁷ *The Military Balance 220-2002*. p. 284

¹⁸ *The Military Balance 2001-2002 and 1996-1997* in “NATO Annual Report of Allied Contributions to Common Defense”. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p00-107e.html>

UK	334	254.3	212.4	212.5
Czech		92.9	58.2	57.7
Hungary	106	74.5	43.4	43.8
Poland	319	283.6	240.7	217.3
Austria	54.7	51.3	40.6	40.5
Finland	36.5	31.2	31.7	31.7
Ireland	13.7	13	11.6	11.5
Sweden	65.7	64	53.1	52.7

Source: *The Military Balance 2001-2002 and 1996-1997* in “NATO Annual Report of Allied Contributions to Common Defense”.
<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p00-107e.html>

For Turkey, territorial defense against Kurdish separatists, Iraq, Iran, and Syria remained at the forefront of strategic thought. Turkey’s old threats became Europe’s new ones. The difference between Europe and Turkey in respect to these forces is that European territory is not in danger, only its interests. To see that Turkey underwent no substantial shifts in threat perception or strategic orientation, one has only to regard the 1995 Turkish Defense Statement which reads in part, “...it would not be an overstatement to claim that the major factors affecting Turkey’s defence (sic) policy and doctrine have remained the same over decades.”¹⁹ The divergent security perceptions and strategic orientations of Europe and Turkey thus fostered different policies and political goals which further compromised the incentive for security cooperation. It is important to emphasize that Turkey and Europe face the same threats, but the severity and probability of the potential impacts are different and are, thus, perceived differently. However, before we delve into to nature of strategic policy reorientation, it is helpful to first look at the sources of these new security threats to understand just why Turkey is so important to Europe and vice versa. It is necessary to note that only short to medium-term threats are of interest here due to the lack of validity concerning highly speculative assessments in the long term.

Europe’s Southeastern Periphery: Sources of New Shared Threats

When considering the most likely sources of threats to European and Turkish security, the Balkans, Caspian Basin, and Middle East win by default, as brief analysis of other possibilities will demonstrate. Russia should first be considered because of its sheer military potential, historical tendencies towards competition with Europe and Turkey, and prospects for regional resource and influence competition. However, it should not be considered too deeply. The prospects of a Russo-European conflict in the near to medium-term are very weak indeed. Russia is presently concerned with quite a few domestic political and economic problems that inhibit any possibilities of devoting costly resources into a competition against a non-threatening EU that has the potential to be an invaluable trading partner. Furthermore, Europe has neither the capacity nor the motive to consider engaging in hostilities with Russia, from whom the EU buys the lion’s

¹⁹Mayall, Simon V. “Turkey: Thwarted Ambition”. INSS National Defense University, Washington. 1997. p.78

share of its oil and natural gas.²⁰ Any undesirable competition, however unlikely, would necessarily be preceded by a considerable period of tension building and force mobilization. Moreover, such a situation would be a reincarnation of the former Soviet defense-related threat and would be well within the present abilities of NATO to deter.

It is also important to note that Russia's less than amicable relationships with Iran, Azerbaijan, and other nations of concern to Europe and Turkey provide a compelling incentive for the Russians to ally themselves with any powers opposing the economic and security interests of its Muslim neighbors to the south. Indeed, the recent deepening of security ties between the Russian Federation and NATO for the "War on Terrorism" (i.e. war on pariah states and anti-western armed groups in the Muslim world) embodied in the Rome Agreement of May 2002 supports the logic of a Russo-European (including Turkey) security alliance of convenience. Although Turkey itself is the southern neighbor with the most potential for becoming a power-rival, Russia has no short-term interest in provoking hostilities with Turkey, not least of all because it is evident to Russia that NATO could curtail any hostile notions considered by the Turks but would also support Turkey if hostilities grew into conflict.

North Africa also holds potential security concern to Europe when one considers the terrorist organizations present, the possibilities of Libya seeking nuclear technology, and the intense bitterness brought about by French involvement in the violent conflict in Algeria.²¹ However, generally increasing trade relations and investment flows within the framework of the promising Euro-Mediterranean Partnership help to preclude any possibility of hostilities. For example, foreign direct investment from Europe to the Mediterranean Partnership Countries (mostly North African nations) has increased from 445 million euros in 1992 to 5.020 billion euros in 2000.²² Of course, North African states would not wish to impede the influx of these funds. Lack of sufficient motives and military means, not to mention the geographic obstacle of the Mediterranean, also hinder any real threat from this area.

The only immediate threats to the security of Europe are to be found to the southeast: the Balkans, the Trans-Caucasus, and the Middle East. The Balkans have been a source of security concerns since the Soviet Union collapsed, giving new life to old conflicts over ethnicity and nationalism that had long been suppressed by the dominance of a superpower, totalitarian domestic communist regimes, and a half century of ideological face-offs. These tragic conflicts are not only unacceptable violations of the human rights of the victims involved (at least to Western eyes), but they also generate massive, costly, and socially destabilizing refugee flows of which the nations of the EU are the primary recipients. The regionally destabilizing effects of these conflicts are exactly the types of situations that prompted the EU to reorient its security identity. The inability of Europe to react to these problems effectively was one of the main factors that increased the pace of EU efforts to develop credible forces of its own.²³ Considering the relative lack of Turkish economic interest, Turkey's involvement in the Balkans appears

²⁰Energy Information Administration. "Regional Indicators: European Union"
www.eia.doe.gov/regions/EU p.1

²¹*The Military Balance*, non-state armed group chart. p.339-41

²²Passerini, Paolo & Luis Biedma. "EU Trade and Investment with Mediterranean Partner Countries: towards a better partnership?". *Statistics in Focus*. Eurostat. 2002. p. 5

²³ Aybet, Gulnur. "The Development of the CESDP: Military Capabilities and Institutional Arrangements". *Conference Presentation*. Turkish Foreign Policy Institute. Ankara. 2000. p.2

to be more of a matter of former imperial nostalgia and prestige paired with ethnic and cultural sentimentality. Specifically, the geographic proximity of the region to Turkey prompted its military leaders to follow, as a matter of principle, Ataturk's strategic maxim "Peace at home, peace in the world." Turkey's history of involvement with the region dates to the early Ottoman invasions, and there was widespread public support for Turkey to be involved because the Balkan Muslims share some ancestry, culture, ethnicity, and history with the Turks. Turkey has supported the interests of Muslim minorities in this region throughout the 1990s and has been heavily involved in the peacemaking and peacekeeping missions there.²⁴ Turkish leaders have pointed to the lack of concern for these minorities by European militaries in the operations there citing the example of NATO-led intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo to diffuse hostilities between Christian and Orthodox entities while ignoring the plight of ethnic Albanians who are predominately Muslim.²⁵ It must be noted that this accusation is a bit of a stretch because the NATO forces did indeed show concern for the Albanian minority if only at the urging of Turkey.

Turkey was also a leading force in the formation of the Multinational Peace Force South-East Europe (MPFSEE), which is the security aspect of the EU-backed South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP).²⁶ This organization also includes Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, and Romania, with the U.S. and Slovenia acting as observers. (Note: the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested that the SEECP had nothing to do with the EU; this is a blatant falsehood). The Turkish military's desire to reinforce its indispensable niche in the European security environment also encourages its involvement and gives Turkish officials a chance to demonstrate the continued pursuit of deeper Western involvement.

In sum, Europe perceived threats in terms of huge refugee flows and instability. Turkey perceived a chance to enhance its "image" considering its role as an aspiring regional stabilizer and its ethnic and historic ties to the region while Europe experienced a genuine threat in the form of refugee flows. It can be seen here that the security of Europe and Turkey has been compromised by the same threats, albeit to differing degrees and in different ways. Since none of these threats are as overwhelming or urgent as the former Soviet menace, Europe and Turkey have been given maneuvering room to press their interests in responding (or not responding) to these threats. Thus, the threats are perceived differently and differing perceptions often lead to differing strategic policy goals and responses with some negative consequences for alliance stability.

Similar ethnic conflicts have been occurring (albeit on a smaller scale) in the Trans-Caucasus region. The former Soviet states of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia have experienced growing levels of ethnic violence and outright military action from time to time. Georgia has continually had problems with Abkhazian separatists and continues to allow a Russian military presence, and more recently OSCE and Turkish missions, on its soil as an obstacle to conflict with the separatists.²⁷ Though the six-year territorial conflict ended in 1994, tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan still run high over the status of the Nagorno-Karabagh region, and the refugee flows generated by this remain a

²⁴see chart of NATO involvement

²⁵ Hodge, Carl L. ed. *Redefining European Security*. Garland, New York. 1999. p.252

²⁶"Turkey's Security and its Relations With NATO. Paragraph 6.2.1

²⁷ *The Military Balance 2001-2002*. p.31

concern to Turkey and Europe. The generation of refugee flows towards Europe are not so much the problem here as is the destabilizing effect of conflict on the region itself. As the area is reckoned to sit atop the second largest proven oil reserve on the planet, with substantial amounts of natural gas to go along, regional stability is a concern to Europe because of the European interest in the energy reserves there. The region's proven oil reserves total 1.213 billion barrels, with 1.178 billion of these belonging to Azerbaijan. There are also 4.7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, with Azerbaijan in possession of 4.4 trillion cubic feet.²⁸ The proximity to Europe makes the region the prime candidate to be one of Europe's main suppliers of oil and natural gas for years to come.

Turkey has very important interests in this region as well and has allied itself with the Azeris because of shared cultural heritage and to express discontent with the Armenian claims to Turkish territory. Having absorbed many of the nearly one million Azeri refugees generated by the conflict over Nagorno-Karabagh also gives Turkey incentives to promote peace in the region.²⁹ Turkey has also been embarrassed by Armenian international legal action attempting to hold modern Turks accountable for Ottoman genocidal activities in Armenia during World War I. Turkey obviously competes with Russia for influence in this region, which is valuable to both countries because of the energy resources but is also a situation to be handled with caution. The Russians' strong ties to Armenia are no comfort to the Turks. Likewise, rhetorical Turkish support of Muslim Chechen rebels is equally vexing to Moscow.

If Turkey is able to become the de facto regional hegemon in this area, it could greatly increase the likelihood of securing profitable energy transport deals through its territory. This paramount interest is evident in Turkey's involvement with the Russian Bluestream project and its attempts to secure the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline deal backed by BP-Amoco and other Western investors.³⁰ The pipeline, worth about \$2.9 billion, would run from the Azeri capital on the Caspian Sea, through Georgia and Turkey, to a terminus in the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.³¹ Indeed, Turkey is investing much time and money to assure its place as a main energy corridor from the new reserves in the Caucasus/Caspian Basin to the expanding markets in Europe. Again, the threats are one and the same, but since Turkey's perceptions of interest differ from Europe's, the strategic orientation of each entity has evolved differently in respect to those interests with divisive consequences for security-based cohesion. Still, the interests of Europe and Turkey are in greater harmony in the Caucasus than in (as will be seen) the Middle East. Thus, if a crisis of a military nature arises in the Caucasus, cooperation would be more likely than in the Middle East.

Potentially, the most threatening concern to Europe (though less immediate than the other two) is the Middle East. In this area, economic and demographic causes of instability are indeed present but are eclipsed by the much more menacing politico-military threats. This fact alone provides a significant explanation of growing EU interest in the area. The security threats from the region may not be immediately threatening to

²⁸Energy Information Administration. "Country Analysis Brief: Caucasus Region". 2001.
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caucasus.html>


²⁹ Bir, Gen. Cevik. "Turkey's Role in the New World Order: New Challenges". National Defense University INSS. *Strategic Forum*. No. 135. Feb. 1998. p.2

³⁰Gartner, Heinz, Adrian Hyde-Pierce and Erika Reitner. *Europe's New Security Challenges*. Lynne Rienner, Boulder. 2001. p. 331


³¹Energy Information Administration. "Country Analysis Brief: Turkey". p.2

Europe, but their potential severity cannot be overlooked. Iran, Iraq, and even Syria are in possession of military might rivaling all but the most powerful European powers (see series of charts on next page). Refugee flows from this region are of less concern in the short term to Europe but Turkey has already felt the destabilizing effects of Kurdish flows from Iraq after Desert Storm.


Source: The Military Balance 2001-2002




Source: The Military Balance 2001-2002



Source: The Military Balance 2001-2002




Artillery Holdings of Largest European Military Powers vs. Iran, Iraq, and Syria



***including 5000 mortars**


Source: The Military Balance 2001-2002

Armored Combat Vehicle Holdings of Largest European Military Powers vs. Iran, Iraq, and Syria



Source: The Military Balance 2001-2002

Main Battle Tank Holdings of Largest European Military Powers vs. Iran, Iraq, and Syria




Source: The Military Balance 2001-2002

Economic and energy interests in the Middle East are also quite important for the time being since the region possesses nearly 40% of the planet's proven oil reserves.

Though Europe consumes far less gas than the U.S. (16% global share as opposed to 25%), Britain is the only nation in the EU which is a net exporter of oil.³² This means that Europe is far more dependent on imported energy resources than even the U.S.³³ For instance, in 2001, 90 billion euros worth of oil was imported to Europe with about 45% of that coming from OPEC states. This percentage is actually a drop from the 55% share of OPEC in 1995.³⁴ With this, the OPEC nations are Europe's third most important source of "extra-EU" oil after Russia and Norway (extra-EU mentioned because Britain is the largest supplier overall).³⁵ Europe's concern over OPEC energy resources was made evident by the French and British involvement (albeit a small one next to the U.S.) during the Gulf War and by the WEU minesweeping operation in 1987 mobilized to prevent the disruption of tanker traffic in the Persian Gulf.³⁶

WMD proliferation in the Middle East is another major concern to Europe. Iraq was proven to have possessed chemical and biological weapons during and after the Gulf War, which it was not afraid to use, even against its own population. It is officially unknown whether such weapons are still possessed though the possibility is strong. Iraq and Iran have both been pursuing nuclear capabilities and missile delivery systems. Syria, also suspected of having chemical weapons, test-fired an Iraqi SCUD near an area where a Turkish-Israeli joint aviation exercise was taking place. In addition, this region is also the source of much of the international terrorism that threatens the West, housing seventeen of the thirty-eight non-state groups (nine of thirty-eight being in Northern Ireland) operating in Europe or within 1,000 kilometers of its technical geography. These groups are all active with the exception of the PKK in Turkey and collectively number over 52,000 individuals.³⁷ On this note, the evolution of U.S. policy since September 11 has increased the potential for conflict in this region substantially. The determination of the U.S. to oust Saddam Hussein through military action seems resolute, though the EU (minus Britain) is not supportive of this strategy.

The member states of the EU have, for the most part, much more amicable relations with the Muslim Mid-East nations, not least of all because of Europe's tendency not to support Israel with the ardor of the U.S. Moreover, the EU opposes the U.S. embargo on Iran and Iraq and, while it has no great love for Saddam Hussein, the EU and individual European governments have attempted to usher Iran back into the fold of legitimate nations.³⁸ There is also a substantial and growing trade relationship between the EU and the nations of OPEC, with EU imports from OPEC nations growing by 102% from 1995 to 2000 with exports growing 62% (see graph below).³⁹



(sic). *External Trade News Releases.*

³⁷ *The Military Balance*, pp. 306-8

³⁸ Gartner et. al., p. 333

³⁹ Allen, Tim. "EU Trade with OPEC". *Statistics in Focus*. Eurostat. 2002.

Source: Allen, Tim. “EU Trade with OPEC”. *Statistics in Focus*. Eurostat. 2002.
www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat

Nevertheless, if a war ensues, the chances for a breakdown of regional stability would multiply exponentially as a power vacuum develops and the flow of oil becomes disrupted. Also to be considered is the fact that the armies of Iran, Iraq, and Syria rival those of the combined forces of the EU member states in number and, though to a lesser degree, in capabilities.⁴⁰ The ongoing trend of a popular resurgence in political Islam in all corners of the Muslim world necessitates that the long-term strategic aspect be further considered in any comprehensive strategic plan. At present, no single Islamic state could successfully wage a conventional campaign against the EU, much less against NATO, but one must consider the possibility of a pan-Arabic or pan-Islamic alliance forming around an emerging “core-state” or “lead-nation” at some point in the future, as speculated by Huntington in his “Clash of Civilizations.”⁴¹ It must be noted that the prospects for a pan-Arabic military mobilization against Europe are virtually nil in the short to medium term due to the increasing returns on trade and the disunity of Middle-Eastern states. Still, the balance of power in the Middle East is quite important to Europe because, if one dominant core-state began to exert suzerainty over the others, Europe could find itself in a dire rivalry against a militarily and demographically powerful opponent over resources and influence in the areas between them (i.e.- the Balkans and Caucasus and Mediterranean basin). Indeed, Huntington points to the mutual recognition of a nascent “societal cold war” by Muslim and Western intellectuals and leaders.⁴²

Just this type of rivalry has occurred more than once in history with consequences still felt today. Furthermore, the possibilities for a future Euro-Arabic rivalry are distressingly strong considering current conditions. To see the possibilities one has only to look to the demographic growth of the Arab world, trends of xenophobia in several key European states as a result of migration from the Mid-East/North Africa, the power-structure status-quo orientations of the two entities (Europe as a defender, the Arab world as a challenger), the value of resources (e.g. Caspian oil and Mediterranean routes) in the areas between Europe and the Mid-East, and the incompatibilities of the societal and religious foundations of each entity (i.e. Christianity vis a vis Islam and Western liberal democracy contra Shari’a law). All of these issues present very real long term threats.

Turkey’s security outlook for the Mid-East region, of which it is generally considered one of the most important components, is much more complex because of the more immediate dangers faced. As the largest military power, Turkey is a vital element of the balance of power in the region, although the figures are quite comparable (refer to graphs of European and Middle-Eastern holdings). It also has the most developed, non-oil-based economy and the largest population.⁴³ Its relations with Iran, Iraq, and Syria are neither hostile nor amicable-- they are uncertain. These neighbors tend to view Turkey with suspicion because of its Western orientation, secular regime, and loyalty to NATO (especially during the Gulf War).⁴⁴ Iraq and Syria’s dependence on the waters of

⁴⁰ *The Military Balance 2001-2002*

⁴¹ Huntington, p. 210-217

⁴² *ibid*, p. 212

⁴³ *The Military Balance*. pp. 73, 132, 134, 147

⁴⁴

the Euphrates and Tigris rivers (respectively) have, in the past, generated disputes with Turkey, which controls the headwaters of both.⁴⁵ Turkey has begun construction one of the most ambitious hydropower projects in history and is building enough dam volume to withhold substantial amounts from Iraq and Syria should tensions ever erupt into conflict.⁴⁶

Syria had also been the refuge of Abdullah Ocalan during the last years of the PKK insurgency and allowed PKK rebels to attack Turkish positions from its soil, a condition that nearly incited a war between Syria and Turkey in 1998. Cross-border Kurdish attacks also occurred from Iraq after the Gulf War though it was not so much of a government sanctioned issue there as a power vacuum. The increased levels of these attacks on Turkish soil at that time are an oft cited example (usually by Turkish officials) of how any EU or NATO military action near Turkey would affect its security interests.⁴⁷ Iraq even turned a blind eye to Turkish attacks on PKK positions in its territory.

Relations with Iran have reportedly worsened in the past few years, and recent Turkish policy supports this. A condemnation of Iran was included in the anti-Islamic legislation suggestions from Turkey's powerful National Security Council on Feb. 28, 1997 which reads, "X. Iran's efforts to destabilise Turkey's regime should be closely watched. Policies that would prevent Iran from meddling in Turkey's internal affairs should be adopted." This is a reflection of Turkey's belief that Iran is the primary exporter of destabilizing, radical Islam into its country.⁴⁸ Considering the near evenly matched military potentials of these nations (Syria being an exception as its forces have dwindled in the past decade), even a relatively trivial dispute could become catastrophic.⁴⁹ Yet again, similar threats but differing perceptions of them (in this case with the exception of energy resources) exist side by side and facilitate the divergent strategic orientations of Europe and Turkey in respect to their separate interests. In the case of the Middle-East, such disharmonious strategies could ironically lead to a crisis so large that Turkey and Europe would be called upon to reaffirm their allied status for the purpose of territorial defense once again.

Thus it is evident that, were the EU ever to decide to undertake any type of military operation in this region, Turkish interests would also be at stake. It is worth mentioning that Turkey is in close proximity to 13 out of the 16 most likely spots for EU or NATO engagement.⁵⁰ This being the case, considerable negotiations with Turkey would naturally be needed. Therefore, it is perplexing that Europe would wish to exclude Turkey from the development of EU security strategy for Turkey's backyard. Still, in light of the disharmony caused by differing threat perceptions and divergent security orientations, the erosion of security cooperation is seen to be less irrational.

Nevertheless, Turkey is particularly ardent on the subject of exclusion and often points out the phenomenon of numerous Kurdish non-state armed groups increasing their

⁴⁵Kugler, Richard L. *NATO Military Strategy for the Post Cold War Era: Issues and Options*. RAND, Santa Monica. 1992. Fig. 14.

⁴⁶http://www.metimes.com/2K1/issue2001-15/reg/turkish_politicians_should.htm

⁴⁷Terriff, Terry, Mark Webber, Stuart Croft, and Jolyon Howorth. "European Security and Defense Policy after Nice". Royal Institute of International Affairs *Briefing Paper* no. 20. RIIA. London. 2001. p.4

⁴⁸http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/junior/note_10.htm

⁴⁹ *The Military Balance*, p. 147

⁵⁰ "Turkey's Security and its Relations with NATO", paragraph 5.2

activity in and around Turkey after the Iraqi army was decimated by Desert Storm.⁵¹ Concerning the feasibility of any future European military action in the regions of concern, security cooperation with a Turkey that feels “left out” until it is needed would be much less desirable than dealing with an included ally that considers such cooperation mutually beneficial. This sentiment is shared by Seyom Brown. He states, “If a pattern of heavy cooperation between countries fails to produce what either or both had been led to expect would be the result, there may be great bitterness and much less room for compromise...”⁵²

The necessity of Turkish cooperation is drawn into sharper focus as one begins to consider the military infrastructure of Turkey, most of it having been supplied by NATO. In fact, only Germany received more of NATO’s infrastructure fund than the \$5.2 billion that has been granted to Turkey since 1953. Turkey’s contributions to the infrastructure fund amount to a paltry \$340 million over the same time period.⁵³ This funding has gone into everything from harbors to roads to numerous airfields. Recalling the importance placed on air superiority by NATO and the EU, use of the Turkish infrastructure, not to mention its considerable air power and air defenses, would be an invaluable asset to any operation in the three regions of concern. The need of a strong forward position is especially valuable Europe (as opposed to the U.S.), whose air and sealift capabilities, at present, are acutely insufficient to undertake a large operation and are likely to remain so for nearly a decade until the realization of the Airbus 400-M project circa 2008.⁵⁴ In the Balkans or the Caucasus, the possibility of the need for a naval presence in the Black Sea would require Turkish cooperation for letting warships pass through the Bosphorus.

It is worth mentioning again that the level of Turkish experience in dealing with the new generation of security threats would also be helpful. Only Britain and Spain have comparable experience in dealing with terrorism, while no EU nation has as much experience with modern ethnic conflict. Indeed, there is evidence that the Turkish command in Anatolia during the insurgency began to adopt a strategy of winning the hearts and mind’s of the locals at roughly the same time that NATO saw fit only to lob huge bombs at targets in Kosovo with decidedly undesirable consequences among the opinions of locals.⁵⁵ Still another asset is the extent of the Turkish military’s relationships with the militaries of these other areas, especially the Caucasus/Caspian basin. Roughly 2300 students from this area had graduated from Turkish military universities, as of 1998, while 1700 remained enrolled.⁵⁶ In any conceivable operations in the three areas, rapport with the national militaries concerned, to be employed or exploited, would be crucial. Indeed, armies from the Assyrians to the Romans to the U.S. in Afghanistan and countless others have employed natives in campaigns far from home.

But the question still remains, “Why would Europe not seek more Turkish involvement?” This question becomes even more puzzling after considering the increased trade and investment activity between the EU and Turkey. This is a crucial point because, since the inception of what is now the EU, its member-states have sought

⁵¹ Terriff, et. al., p. 4

⁵² Brown, Seyom. *The Casues and Prevention of War*. St. Martin’s. New York. 1987. p.66

⁵³ Turkish armed forces website. <http://www.tsk.mil.tr>

⁵⁴ *The Military Balance*, p. 287

⁵⁵ Peterson, Scott. “Turk Tack on Kurds: Kinder Gentler War”. *Christian Science Monitor*. vol. 90, issue 46. 2/2/98. p. 6

⁵⁶ Bir, Gen. Cevik. “Turkey’s Role in the New World Order”. p.3

to foster deepened economic relations (through increased trade and single-market formation) as a prerequisite for the security community. The paradox is that Turkish security cooperation with Europe declined while trade and investment were increasing mutually and the foundations of a single market were being laid. Since this is counter to the original thesis of this study, it must be argued that the independent variable of economic interdependence is either subordinate to another variable or is only applicable after some threshold of interdependence. There is also the possibility that the thesis is in fact correct but that only Turkey can be considered dependent on the EU but not the EU on Turkey. This could be the subject of another study. The increased economic activity is examined in greater detail in the next section.

Europe's New Turkish Bazaar

Throughout the 1990s, while Europe and Turkey's security interests began to merge even more congruently than in the Cold War, so did their economies. Although the early years of the 1990s saw increased levels of trade and foreign direct investment (mostly from Europe to Turkey), major relationship-building measures did not begin in earnest until 1995. During that year, the EU laid out the Barcelona Process for the development of its Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Members of the partnership include, besides Turkey, Syria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Maghreb countries, and the Mashrek countries. As a member, Turkey is entitled to aid from the EU's MEDA program, the financial element of the EMP.

Turkey has been the largest recipient of EU aid from this arrangement. Between 1996 and 1999, Turkey received roughly 376 million euros, with 100 million euros going towards education alone and 55 million towards reproductive health.⁵⁷ This level of aid is a clear signal of European desire for a healthy economic relationship and frees up resources for the Turkish government to dispense in other ways. In 2000, 310.3 million euros were allocated to Turkey under the MEDA II agreement.⁵⁸ This aid is primarily intended to augment socio-economic development and to facilitate the emergence of a friendly business environment. Turkey proved quite receptive to the Mediterranean Initiative's goal of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by 2010. Turkey had a large part in developing the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone (begun in 1992) which would, through Turkish efforts at institutional wrangling, eventually form part of the now existent Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area.

In another development in 1995 (a very big economic policy year for Turkey), the EU extended the offer of a free-trade agreement to Turkey. After an eager acceptance, trade relations between Turkey and the EU increased dramatically with the balance of payments remaining in Europe's favor until 2000. Foreign direct investment from EU countries also increased sharply.⁵⁹ By 2001, Turkey was Europe's sixth largest trading partner and the second most important trading candidate-state behind Poland.⁶⁰ The EU quickly became Turkey's most important trading partner, counting for just over half of total Turkish imports and exports. In 1999, when Turkey was extended official candidate status, the Turkish leadership was brought under the direct tutelage of Brussels to facilitate the adaptation of Turkey's economy to be competitive in the EU and to elevate

⁵⁷Annual EU Commission report to the Council on the MEDA Program. Brussels. 2000. p. 53-4

⁵⁸ *ibid.*, p. 54

⁵⁹ Turkish Treasury Statistics. <http://www.treasury.tk.gov/ybs.homecountrying.htm>

⁶⁰ Allen, Tim. "Turkey and the EU". p. 1

social conditions. The growth potential of the Turkish market is also remarkable. A youthful population, skilled entrepreneurial class, and location on the “new Silk Road” make Turkey a very promising emerging market. That is, however, if its leaders and the IMF can steer the economy past the current financial crisis that began with a liquidity crisis in November 2000 and worsened in February 2001 when the government was forced to float the Turkish Lira.⁶¹ Nevertheless, Turkey’s economy still showed signs of growth, and its economic ties to the EU continued to develop.

Considering increases in investment, trade, and development aid, it would seem that the Euro-Turkish relationship has a solid foundation from which to develop especially in light of the shared interests discussed in the last section. Indeed, economic relationship-building and merging of interests of this exact flavor were the original unifying forces of the EEC long before dreams of union entered the picture. So, to follow logic behind the formation of the EU, the economic cooperation and shared interests that led to the formation of the EU should theoretically apply to the accession of, or at least to strong security cooperation with, Turkey. As reasonable as this would seem in light of the EU’s historical precedent, security cooperation has not matured to a stable state as of yet.

This brings us back to the question of security perception, the one crucial difference between European and Turkish strategic cultures and their fundamental assumptions of the just use of force. On this note, it has been the practice of the EU to promote a favorable security atmosphere through economic cooperation, institutional relationships, and the mutual pursuit of stability through political instruments and human rights-based values.⁶² Turkey, on the other hand, still perceives security problems as situations to be deterred and defended against by the ultimate authority of force. Thus, as Europe took an inclusive, civilian, and economically-based approach to answering the new security threats to the southeast, Turkey continued to build up its military. Of course, Turkey has made progress in regional economic initiatives, and the EU has been involved in displays of force, but the guiding forces behind the security perceptions of each entity are indeed different. In respect to the original thesis, this implies that threat perception carries a greater weight as a variable than economic cooperation. Thus, having seen the incentives for cooperation and contradictory perceptions of how to cooperate, the analysis now turns to an examination of the dynamics of the transatlantic alliance’s strategic reorientation that led to the partial exclusion of Turkey from European security structures and how such a chain of events led to the current dilemma.

Part II: European Security after the Cold War and the Decline of Defense

Background

As mentioned earlier, during the Cold War, Western European nations were militarily concerned with a menace to the east and the occasional conflict in a former colony. The Soviet Union was also the primary concern for Turkey, but it was also threatened by tensions between Iran and Iraq, a Fundamentalist Revolution in Iran, Syrian water disputes, and Cyprus to name but a few. After 1990, several of those problems gained the attention of Brussels and the national governments. The Gulf War comes to

⁶¹Energy Information Administration. “Country Analysis Brief: Turkey”. www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/turkey.html. p.1

⁶²Cornish, Paul & Geoffrey Edwards. “Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy”. *International Affairs*. V. 27 no.3. Blackwell, London. 2001.

mind as a powerful example to Europe of its new issues. Moreover, new conflicts arose between Europe and Turkey (geographically speaking) in the Balkans. However, many of the security threats to Europe, in the Balkans for instance, posed no real direct threat to the U.S., which had been responsible for the lion's share of Europe's security. Of course, the destabilization of the region would affect U.S. allies' economies and social systems, which would indirectly brush against U.S. interests, but the impact would be negligible on the latter. It became evident that a mechanism was needed that would allow the U.S. to remain active in European security in case serious problems emerged, but that would also facilitate the suppression of peripheral security threats by the EU nations interested without official U.S. involvement. The U.S. also required Europe's nominal political support for some of its far-flung military actions throughout the world.

Although 'defense' of Europe regressed from the concerns of EU and U.S. policy makers, such activity, it has been almost unanimously agreed, will remain the primary responsibility of NATO. To quote Terriff et. al., "The inclusion of 'defence' (sic) in its title notwithstanding, ESDP [explanation to follow] is not about defence as such since this remains the principle responsibility of NATO."⁶³ This is the good news and satisfies the need of keeping the U.S. in Europe "just in case." Notwithstanding, NATO and the EU, because of the growing gap of interests, have both responded to the new 'security' environment with similar models of how European military solutions should be evaluated and employed. The models began to diverge on the question of the EU's autonomous ability to act. Specifically, NATO (in sync with U.S. interests, by and large) has developed the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) model, while the EU has been in the process of developing the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) under the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the second pillar of the EU under the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties.

At this point it is helpful to trace the development of ESDP and NATO's diverse post-Cold War security arrangements in order to understand the framework from which our Turkish dilemma has arisen. An extensive explanation of why NATO and the EU pursued different security policies is not particularly relevant to the effects that such policies had on Turkey. It will suffice to say that though NATO and the EU agree on the types of threats, where they would likely originate, and what types of forces would be needed for response, they disagree on how much autonomy the EU should have over responding to these threats apart from NATO. In this equation, EU autonomy equals distance from NATO and, thus, Turkey also. As will be seen, Turkey's agency and strategic importance within NATO has been preserved and even enhanced in some areas, but has been relegated to a lower status within the EU's nascent security model than was offered to the Turkish Republic just a few years ago. The dynamics of this last statement will be explained in the next two sections.

A New NATO

Beginning around the end of the Cold War, NATO's shift in purpose from collective defense to collective security was an answer necessitated by the classical strategic principle that an alliance disintegrates without a common threat to necessitate its cohesion. The strategy was to make NATO into an organization that could respond to any security threats in or around Europe (some would say globally). NATO was also interested in expanding its influence into the former Soviet Republics, including Russia,

⁶³ Terriff, et. al., p.2

for the purposes of stabilization. The first step, which occurred at the 1990 London Summit, was redefining its mission to include crisis management, humanitarian intervention, and peace enforcement among other security-related operations in NATO's new defense posture:

39. At the London Summit, the Allies concerned agreed to move away, where appropriate, from the concept of forward defence towards a reduced forward presence, (...). The changes stemming from the new strategic environment and the altered risks now facing the Alliance enable significant modifications to be made in the missions of the Allies' military forces and in their posture.

41. In peace, the role of Allied military forces is to guard against risks to the security of Alliance members; to contribute towards the maintenance of stability and balance in Europe; and to ensure that peace is preserved. They can contribute to dialogue and co-operation throughout Europe by their participation in confidence-building activities, including those which enhance transparency and improve communication...

42. In the event of crises which might lead to a military threat to the security of Alliance members, the Alliance's military forces can complement and reinforce political actions within a broad approach to security, and thereby contribute to the management of such crises and their peaceful resolution. This requires that these forces have a capability for measured and timely responses in such circumstances...⁶⁴

Soon after, NATO's first activities as a "security" oriented organization were the establishment of more inclusive new international organizations (or strengthening of existing ones) aimed at promoting dialog, transparency, and cooperation in European security affairs, though some of these entities expanded to the borders of China.

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) was created to extend NATO (and therefore U.S.) influence into Eastern Europe and has come to be thought of as a finishing school for future NATO members ever since NATO began its enlargement process (the most obvious and official means of increasing its sphere of influence). The PfP has 24 partners, including all of the former Soviet republics except for Russia. NATO has extended many privileges of membership to PfP members as incentive, but obviously excludes Article 5 guarantees (collective defense).⁶⁵ The purpose of the organization is to encourage military cooperation between NATO and PfP members for non-Article 5 operations focusing on crisis management, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian intervention.⁶⁶ The PfP, in its first operational showing, was a major element in the Bosnian Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) phases of the operation there.

These efforts at military cooperation are generally thought of as relationship-building mechanisms. However, another important goal is to distribute the costs of crisis management missions among more nations. This is necessary when one considers the

⁶⁴ *Defense Capabilities Initiative* of 1990 NATO London Summit www.nato.int/docu/london1990

⁶⁵ Gartner et. al., p. 134

⁶⁶ Yost, David S. "NATO Transformed". United States Institute of Peace. Washington, D.C. 1998. pp. 402-

extensive budgetary cuts and troop demobilization underway in Europe after the Cold War. Multinational military cooperation became, to many analysts of post-Cold War security, an economic necessity, as well as a diplomatic instrument for legitimizing the use of force. To further enhance multinational legitimacy, the political arm of the PfP is the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (North Atlantic Cooperation Council until 1997) was established in 1991 and now includes all of the NATO nations, all of the former Soviet republics (with Russia), and six former members of the Eastern Bloc. In general, it provides PfP members with more rapport-building opportunities and deeper relations with NATO members and each other on matters including, but not limited to, security.

These innovations by NATO planners reflect the change in strategic thinking undergone after the Cold War and serve as a very weak, voluntary institutional framework for security cooperation. Turkey's role as the southeastern security powerhouse in NATO was entirely preserved through the formation of these institutions. In fact, Turkey's linguistic, cultural, and ethnic ties to nations in the Caucasus and Central Asia provided the Turks with an enhanced position to act as a regional stabilizer. Turkey was afforded opportunities to liaise with its neighbors in the Caucasus and Central Asia and to develop rapport between military officials in the large security organizations under NATO's strategic reorientation. A PfP training school was even opened in Turkey, and Turkish diplomats also took on the tasks of managing the NATO Embassy Contact Points in six Caucasian and Central Asian countries.⁶⁷ These are only the most cosmetic of NATO's efforts at adapting to a new European security environment, though deeper efforts followed.

In 1994, NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) worked together to create the idea of a Combined Joint Task Force. This concept was intended to promote interoperability of European NATO and PfP forces under the authority of the WEU. The forces were tagged to have access to NATO personnel, materiel, and planning systems on a basis of need and availability. This seems, at face value, a concession of NATO responsibilities to the WEU, but the latter's dependence on the resources of the former left the WEU as a suppliant. Such a situation was agreeable to Turkey because it provided Turkey an official voice in all aspects of European security. In 1996, NATO launched the concept of ESDI. This was, in part, another manifestation of the old burden-sharing debate that had been grumbled over in the halls of the Pentagon and the U.S. Capitol from time to time. It was also a reaction to the announcement of the CSFP as the second pillar of the EU in the Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force in 1993. ESDI sought to allow the European Allies "to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance" while ensuring that this process occurred within NATO and under U.S. supervision, again providing reassurance to Turkish leaders.⁶⁸ Also in 1994, NATO launched its Mediterranean Dialog concept to promote cooperation among southern European, Middle Eastern, and North African nations (soon to be followed by the EU's Mediterranean Partnership). Turkey was a key member of the dialog and the key to balanced security in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁶⁹


In the mid-90s, NATO also began preparations to form the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps. This state-of-the-art security organization was supposed to be a monument to the

⁶⁷"Turkey's Security and its Relations with NATO". section II. 6

⁶⁸Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, Berlin, June 1996. *NATO Review*. Vol. 44, issue 4

⁶⁹"Turkey's Security and its Relations with NATO". section II. 5

new security orientation of NATO, drawing its strength and expertise from the best of the Western world, including one Turkish national mechanized infantry division out of twelve total national divisions, three integrated divisions, and a number of detachable brigades (See graph on next page).⁷⁰ It is an interoperable, quickly deployable (as the name suggests) multinational force trained to respond to all types of non-article 5 crises. The ACERRC proved valuable to the success of the Bosnia and Kosovo missions, during which its headquarters provided the operational headquarters.



Source: “NATO Annual Report of Allied Contributions to Common Defense”. See www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p00-107e.html

The occasion of NATO involvement in the Balkans vindicated the merit of the organization’s continued existence and its capacity for adaptation to the new security environment.⁷¹ However, it also caused an embarrassing and potentially destabilizing situation among European leaders who grew to loathe their inability to act decisively and effectively without the United States, and among U.S. leaders who would have preferred not to have risked the lives of their soldiers in situations that were outside U.S. interests. Though the U.S. may have not wished to participate, Turkey seized the opportunity to once again demonstrate its commitment to NATO and to demonstrate its resolve to act as a regional stabilizer. Today, Turkey maintains a presence of 940 soldiers in the Balkans out of a NATO total of about 30,000.⁷² Though Turkish presence is comforting in light of the Muslim minority in the area, Turkey’s contribution to the forces is well below its proportion of total forces in NATO.

In 1999, in the midst of the Kosovo Crisis, NATO presented its New Strategic Concept at the Washington Summit. This document included an affirmation of the EU’s

⁷⁰ Smith, Martin A. *NATO in the First Decade After the Cold War*. Kulwer Academic. Dordrecht. 2000. p. 34 (footnote 70 in source cites *Jane’s World of Defense 1995*. Couldson: Jane’s 1994, p. 20-3)

⁷¹ Carpenter, Ted Galen. *NATO Enters the 21st Century*. Frank Cass Publishing. London. 2001. p. 22

⁷² *The Military Balance 2001-2002*. p. 75

prerogative to act, calls for close cooperation between NATO, the WEU and EU on security matters, and a statement of readiness to provide an EU led operation with resources and planning.⁷³ The inclusion of readiness implies that NATO will be “ready” to aid the EU once the Turkish leadership quits using its national veto in NATO (all NATO members have the ability to veto decisions which affect the entire alliance) to leverage the EU in the negotiations over membership and involvement in the security structures formed by the EU itself. Why this veto has been used is explained below.

EU Efforts: Foundations of Turkish Exclusion

The contributions of the EU to the new security environment began later than those of NATO but brought about changes in the security environment of greater relevance. The EU’s new security policies, rooted in its aspirations of autonomy from NATO, have increased its potential ability to act but has done little in creating new capabilities as of yet. The process has also served to isolate other non-EU NATO states and none took more offence than Turkey. As will be seen, such isolation has been ill received and has not benefited the EU or Turkey.

The resurrection of the WEU in 1984 began as an attempt to respond to the burden sharing argument within the old Cold War structures. After the Soviet disintegration, the WEU quickly began to address the shift to the new security environment in laying out the “Petersburg Tasks”, first presented in the 1992 Bonn Ministerial Meeting, as an assessment of which types of actions would require responses from Europe. These tasks continue to provide the goals to be achieved by the EU’s military projects (closely resembling the strategic concept of NATO) and include humanitarian and rescue operations, a wide range of peacekeeping activities including crisis management, and the extended deployment of forces for peacemaking activities.⁷⁴

As stated earlier, however, the WEU was heavily dependent on NATO for operational capability. As the United States began to withdraw troops after the fall of the USSR (from about 300,000 to around 100,000 by the turn of the century), European leaders became increasingly concerned about their own abilities to defend themselves and to press their interests closer to home.⁷⁵ However, to decrease dependence on the U.S. was to decrease dependence on NATO. To move away from NATO meant changing the relationship with Turkey.

The establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar (CFSP) in the Maastricht Treaty was Europe’s initial response to the troop withdrawals. As an intergovernmental pillar, the CFSP was supposed to provide all EU members with one coherent voice representing their individual interests in global affairs that would be eventually backed with credible military force. Throughout the mid-1990s, Europe struggled to define its strategic objectives with a WEU dependent on NATO as its only functioning security apparatus. Indeed, consensus among the member-states proved difficult, especially considering the fact that traditionally-Atlanticist Britain and NATO-skeptic France held the two most capable and credible militaries (though least in the EU. Though Germany possessed the largest numbers of military personnel and highest gross expenditures, its capabilities, constitutional constraints, and credibility were not enough to push forward any security initiative. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 made the first

⁷³Transcript of NSC Washington Summit. <http://www.nsc.gov/docs/summit/wash99>

⁷⁴Gartner et. al. p. 131

⁷⁵Hodge, p. 252

official call for ESDP, but it would take a consensus between Britain and France before any progress could be made.

In 1998, the Franco-British joint declaration at the St. Malo Summit made the first official call for an autonomous EU security apparatus. With this critical threshold crossed, the pace of ESDP development drastically increased at subsequent EU Council Summits in Cologne, Helsinki, Fiera, and Nice. In 1999, Kosovo added fuel to the fire as the U.S. entered the conflict bearing 80% of the \$11 billion cost and flying 70% of the sorties against enemy targets.⁷⁶ It became evident during Kosovo that the EU indeed had the resources to respond to relatively small crises (if given a little help from U.S. airlift and C3I systems). The more crucial problem was that the EU lacked the political will to assemble these forces, create a strategy, and then mobilize the effort in an effective manner.⁷⁷ If this obstacle was to be overcome, suitable institutions and procedures to facilitate action would be needed. However, since consensus in the EU proper is no easy task to begin with, the prospect of including other relevant states (e.g. Turkey) was not a viable option.

The movement towards CSFP gained momentum at the June 1999 Cologne Summit, where the framework for an institutional structure of the ESDP was proposed and more progress followed. At Helsinki that same year, a Headline Goal for the formation of a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) was determined. This goal was for a force of 50,000-60,000 troops capable of undertaking the full range of Petersburg Tasks to be deployable within 60 days, sustainable for up to one year, and available no later than 2003.⁷⁸ At the Capabilities Commitment Conference (CCC) the following November, EU nations collectively pledged 100,000 troops, 400 aircraft, and 100 ships. After the ERRF initiative had been announced, Turkey offered to contribute 5,000 troops to the force but only on the condition of equal involvement in all areas of decision making and planning which was refused. It should be noted here that many analyses of the feasibility of the ERRF's headline goal being met on time is highly unlikely. The Military Balance suggests that even the forces contributed at the CCC are insufficient.⁷⁹

At the Nice Summit in December 2000, the institutional structure of ESDP was presented. The central decision-making entity is the Political and Security Committee at the ambassadorial level (remember that CFSP is an intergovernmental pillar). The PSC, having reached operational status, has been required to meet with the North Atlantic Council of NATO six times per year or more in times of crisis. The duties of the PSC include advising the EU Council on security affairs, coordinating efforts of EU security entities, liaising with NATO and the accession candidates (including Turkey), and overseeing the political aspects of military action. The European Union Military Committee (EUMC), at the Chiefs of Defense level, is directly responsible to the PSC and operates as an advising body. These committees are primarily decision-making bodies. Their information comes from the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the third entity defined at Nice (but not officially created until a month later along with the EUMC).⁸⁰ It is responsible for status of forces assessment, security threat assessment, and strategic

⁷⁶Chalmers, Malcolm. The Atlantic Burden Sharing Debate". *International Affairs*. vol. 27 no. 3. Blackwell, London. 2001. p. 135 ; IISS Chart of Armed Conflict. 2001.

⁷⁷ Williams, Geoffrey Lee in Eden, ed., p. 42

⁷⁸*The Military Balance*, p. 283-286

⁷⁹ "NATO and ESDP". *NATO Fact Sheets*. www.nato.int/docu/fasctsheets

⁸⁰ Terriff et. al., p. 2

planning. In short, it is the workhorse. These new institutions provide a “single institutional framework” to facilitate the EU’s “autonomous capability” for action. In order to avoid redundant institutional overlap with the WEU, integration of the WEU into the EU began in November 2000 and is nearing completion at the time of this writing. A small staff in Brussels remains responsible for maintaining the relevance of the collective defense agreement (Article 5 of the 1948 Brussels Treaty) and contacts with NATO on this matter.⁸¹

The intent of the EU was summed up in the December 2000 presidency report from Brussels which reads in part, “The European Union has confirmed its intention of itself assuming the crisis-management function of the WEU.”⁸² This implies that the collective defense element of the WEU will remain tied to NATO. The fact that the WEU had been relieved of its security maintenance functions and the exclusive institutionalization of ESDP is one of the main factors behind the dilemma with Turkey. The EU is very protective of its “single institutional framework” for security and demands ardently that it not be compromised. This complicates the security relationship with Turkey even further because Turkey’s role (along with the other non-EU NATO states) in the institutions of the WEU, and thus European security, has been reduced to a consultative situation. Even that type of inclusion depends on whether the decision-making committees decide that Turkish interests are indeed at stake and Turkey decides to contribute forces or allow use of equipment/infrastructure platforms. This is the foundation of the dilemma. Turkey, in response, has chosen to use leverage on the EU (in the form of the NATO veto) on this issue by blocking access to essential NATO resources such as intelligence gathering systems, air/sea lift, and command capacity, among others.⁸³

Despite all of the progress the EU has made in building an autonomous defense capability, a credible and functioning ERRF will remain a dream on paper unless Turkey allows access to the NATO resources that the EU cannot realistically produce within the next decade, much less by the 2003 deadline. According to Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, “We [Europe] could double our capabilities as they stand and still not be able to do very much on our own.”⁸⁴ The only way Europe could independently acquire the needed resources and planning systems would be to increase spending levels that have been declining throughout Europe since 1990 (see chart). Barring the onset of a serious crisis, a spending increase is highly unlikely as neither leaders nor the public support such measures.⁸⁵

But is there no way the EU could muddle through without NATO materiel and planning? The answer is both yes, because national forces (i.e. the UK’s, France’s, and possibly Germany’s) could respond alone to low level Petersburg Tasks, and no, because the upper range of the Petersburg Tasks would require more resources and planning capabilities than the EU could produce in a decade at current levels of spending.⁸⁶

Though the NATO 1999 Defense Capabilities Initiative found no less than 58 deficiencies in the current European force structures, the most debilitating absences are in

⁸¹Goodby et. al., p. 79

⁸²Draft Presidency Report of the European Council. Brussels. 2000. www.europa.eu.int

⁸³Terriff et. al., p. 3

⁸⁴Carpenter, p.52

⁸⁵ibid., p. 52

⁸⁶*The Military Balance*. p. 284

the force multiplier category with C3I (especially intelligence) systems and air/sealift being the most recognized.⁸⁷ It has also been estimated that the 100,000 some odd troops that have been contributed by national governments to the ERRF will not be enough to sustain a high-end-Petersburg Task for one year. The Military Balance suggests that 180,000 is a safer estimate.⁸⁸ Thus it is evident that the EU needs Turkish support to realize its goals in the existing security institutions. However, this is entirely contingent on the retraction of the Turkish veto on access to these resources. The retraction is contingent on an acceptable agreement on Turkish involvement in EU defense structures.

Part III: Turkey's Crippling Response to Exclusion and Europe's Justification

The Response

It is no surprise that Turkey should be less than enthusiastic about its place in the new security architecture and generally unwilling to acquiesce while the EU forges new security structures of which Turkey has no official decision-making capacity. Since 1990, Turkey's voice in European security affairs has been reduced every few years by EU policy. As can be seen from the assessments of NATO and EU contributions to the security structures above, Turkey retained its equality throughout NATO's reformation. Geography made Turkey a key player in the formation of NATO's new identity. In sum, Turkey contributed forces to the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, is an integral part of the Combined Joint Task Force concept, is a key element of NATO's Mediterranean Dialog, and fought under NATO's banner in Bosnia, Albania, and Kosovo. Turkish leaders even considered their nation an example to be followed in terms of military spending levels, modernization efforts, and experience in the types of conflict deemed to be of importance to NATO's new strategy. Indeed, most European nations spend less than 2% of their GDP on defense while Turkey spends over 5%, making it the highest spender in terms of GDP percentage (see chart below). This is a reflection of the deeply involved role of the military in Turkish politics and of the different of perceptions (therefore goals regarding) security that Turkey continues to exhibit. Levels of spending were also inflated by the war in Anatolia with the PKK. The IISS estimated the conflict to have cost roughly \$1.5 billion a year.⁸⁹

**Defense Spending as % of GDP of
the EU-15, Turkey, and the
Visegard Three**

	<u>1985</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1999</u>	<u>2000</u>
Belguim	3.0	1.7	1.4	1.4
Denmar	2.2	1.9	1.6	1.5
k				
France	4.0	3.3	2.8	2.6
German	3.2	2.0	1.6	1.6
y				
Greece	7.0	5.7	4.8	4.9
Italy	2.3	2.1	2.0	1.9
Lux.	0.9	1.2	0.8	0.8
Neth.	3.1	2.1	1.6	1.9

⁸⁷ibid., p. 292-3

⁸⁸ ibid., p. 285

⁸⁹ IISS Chart of Armed Conflict

Norway	3.1	3.1	2.2	1.8
Portugal	3.1	2.6	2.1	2.2
Spain	2.4	1.6	1.3	1.3
Turkey	4.5	3.2	5.2	5.2
UK	5.2	3.4	2.5	2.4
Czech		2.6	2.2	2.2
Hungary	7.7	1.6	1.6	1.7
Poland	8.1	2.5	2.0	2.0
Austria	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.8
Finland	2.8	2.0	1.3	1.3
Ireland	1.8	1.2	0.9	0.7
<u>Sweden</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.2</u>
Average	3.6	2.4	2.1	2.0

Source: *The Military Balance 2001-2002 and 1995-1996*

But while NATO preserved the Turkish voice, the EU seemed to ignore it. In 1989, the Turkish application for EU candidacy submitted in 1987 was turned down on grounds of necessary EU internal restructuring before any more candidates would be considered.⁹⁰ Any feeling of rejection was compounded as Turkey watched the EU embrace former Eastern Bloc enemies and eagerly usher them to the front of the accession queue. Granted, many Turkish officials did not completely understand that the EU's Enlargement debate was an effort to increase stability in these nations as well as to prevent eventual German domination. Furthermore, until Turkey received its own accession invitation, many Turkish leaders failed to realize just how non-European Turkey was and that its presence (not to mention the development gap) in a consensus based EU would be destabilizing. They did, however, believe that their contributions to European defense had not been appreciated. Thus, we turn again to the question of perception. It seems that Europe perceived a need to stabilize the nations in Central and Eastern Europe before negotiating the huge Turkish question. Judging by its decision to frustrate Europe through using the national veto in NATO (the veto power is held by all

⁹⁰ Rouleau, Eric., p. 100

nations over decisions of such importance as access to NATO resources), Turkey perceived a Europe that had no intention of including the Republic in EU security affairs.⁹¹ Therefore, the safest bet for Turkey was to cling to NATO. RAND analyst Ian O. Lesser acknowledges that this fact could even put pressure on U.S.-Turkey relations.⁹²

With the resurrection of the WEU, Turkey was offered a place as an Associate Member, which carried with it the right to be represented in all committees except the crucial Security Committee and WEU Council, both open only to full members. It also meant that Turkey was only to be involved in military action if its interests were deemed to be at risk by the WEU. Turkey would also be able to take some part in planning the operation if it were permitted to contribute forces. However, she would have no access to the bodies that would actually decide whether to intervene or not. In short, Turkey would be involved in the ‘decision shaping’ stages but not in the ‘decision making’ stages. Though failing to afford Turkey an equal position, such an arrangement was at least acceptable to Turkey’s leaders. Even this somewhat reduced status was further eroded with the inception of ESDP and the subsequent absorption of the WEU by the EU because, under the new arrangements, Turkey’s Associate Membership was powerless in the new decision making and assessment bodies.⁹³ By 1998, Turkey’s chances for military involvement with EU initiatives were virtually reduced to bilateral prospects. This means that Turkey, while once a key European defender, was now officially less influential in European security affairs than Luxembourg, a military dwarf, and Finland, a former Eastern Bloc enemy. Exclusion of Turkey was due, in large part, to unresolved

⁹¹ Lesser, Ian O. *Mediterranean Security: New Perspectives and Implications for U.S. Policy*. RAND. Santa Monica. 1992. p. viii

⁹² *ibid.*

⁹³ Aybet, Gulnur. p.3-5

issues with Greece over Cyprus, airspace, and uninhabited rocks in the Mediterranean that prompted the Hellenic Republic to exercise a firm policy of blocking EU cooperation with Turkey. Tensions thawed, however, over the course of 1999 when Greece and Turkey showed unprecedented cooperation in disaster relief efforts following two large earthquakes (one in each country).⁹⁴

Still, Greece was not alone in its reservations about Turkey. At the 1997 Luxembourg EU Summit, Premier Claude Juncker was quoted as saying that he would not “sit at the same table as a bunch of torturers.”⁹⁵ It was widely agreed that the Turkish question had been poorly handled at the Summit. In 1999, at the EU Helsinki summit, Turkey was extended candidate status in the EU thanks to the thaw in tensions with Greece, a reorientation of Germany’s stance, and substantial lobbying by the U.S. This would place Turkey in a better position for security cooperation than before, but it was still not given a voice in the decision making process. The Presidency Report of the Helsinki Summit reads,

The Union will ensure the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with NATO and its non-EU members, other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU as well as other prospective partners in EU-led crisis management, with full respect for the decision-making autonomy of the EU

⁹⁴Walker, p. 72

⁹⁵ ibid., p. 76

and the single institutional framework of the Union. With European NATO members who are not members of the EU and other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU, appropriate structures will be established for dialogue and information on issues related to security and defence policy and crisis management. In the event of a crisis, these structures will serve for consultation in the period leading up to a decision of the Council.⁹⁶

Much to the chagrin of Brussels, Turkish policy makers found such arrangements of “consultation” and “appropriate structures” insufficient and continued expressing discontent in news articles, policy documents, and with the crucial NATO national veto of allowing the EU to use NATO resources. The Turkish leadership often cites similarities in interests like regional stability and energy resources, its old Cold War loyalty, and its unique claim to being a Muslim democracy to justify deserving decision-making powers. The EU often cites the Cyprus issue, human rights abuses, political instability, economic crises, and military involvement in politics to exclude Turkey. In this rhetoric, distinct perceptual discrepancies can be discerned in regard to strategic culture. In practice, EU strategic leadership may be said to perceive security as a function of cooperation and alignment of values and practices. Turkey, on the other hand, may be said to perceive security as a function of interest seeking, territorial defense, and power projection. On many of the assertions made by the EU and Turkey regarding one another, both sides are justified and the statements they make are true if somewhat generalized and dramatized. The Turks are vexed by the EU’s inability to appreciate their military strength, services rendered, internal cohesion concerns, and uniquely problematic security situation. Europe is equally frustrated by the Turks’ inability to appreciate the inviolability of individual rights and the importance of civilian control of the military.

In sum, this is the nature of the dilemma. Each side has produced reasonable arguments (in its own opinion) to denounce the policies of the other because the EU and Turkey each perceive security in a distinct way that contradicts key elements of the other’s perceptions and strategies. Thus, for all of its hard work, the European

⁹⁶ 1999 EU Helsinki Summit, *Presidency Report*. www.europa.eu.int/

Union (still lacking the capacity for effective military power projection) has actually worsened the security situation in the southeast periphery by alienating Turkey. For its part, the Republic of Turkey is still no closer to gaining a seat at the decision making table than before. This situation continues to frustrate both parties' security strategy formation (the EU's because it cannot develop desired operational capability; Turkey 's because it's voice has been muffled in European security affairs). Since the EU has demonstrated its inability to respond to relatively small threats near its borders, and the security-based cohesion of Turkey and the rest of Europe has degraded (as evidenced by the impasse in question), if this situation is not resolved, it could welcome a would be opponent to exploit the conditional disunity.⁹⁷ Then again, if such a crisis erupted, it is even more probable that Europe and Turkey would bury their grievances and cooperate, even at the expense of the political agendas that currently supercede maximized security collaboration. Indeed, it is the absence of an immediate threat (though existing ones are serious) that affords the two entities the luxury of disagreeing with one another. Disagreements do, indeed, abound from the direction of Brussels in respect to political, cultural, and demographic factors that EU policymakers have been able to cite in order to resist Turkish demands for inclusion.

Europe's Justification of Exclusion: Outlying Factors of Declining Security Cooperation


In the introduction, it was implied that same factors which led to a condition of mutually acceptable security cooperation in Europe among EU nations would lead to a similar situation between those nations and Turkey. However, this condition has not been achieved. Thus, since economic cooperation and shared interests could not bind the two entities into a cooperative security arrangement, there must be some outlying factors preventing cooperation. After further research, it was discovered that Turkey's chronic political instability, its immense size, and its distinctly non-European culture have hindered its inclusion in European institutions. Still, Turkey's size, economy, location, and power in NATO were the key factors that kept Europe concerned with the relationship between them at all. Turkey is just too big to ignore, but too different to embrace completely. In other words, the independent variables are in opposition to one another to such a degree that security cooperation has come to be schizophrenic. Europe would not wish to embrace a nation with the volatile and

⁹⁷ Brown, Seyom. P. 67

patronage-based political culture present in Turkey but cannot afford to make an enemy out of it by producing disillusionment.⁹⁸ Though thorough investigations of these problems would require a completely different study, they will be addressed briefly.

Concerning the political arena, the instability in Turkey's political situation is the result of a divided, corrupt, and inept political class that is not only having a difficult time of consolidating a working liberal democracy, but cannot agree on whether the "liberal" part is desirable. The most popular and important civilian political elites are, for the most part, Western-looking modernizers. Among these are President Ahmed Sezer, Finance Minister (and former World Bank vice president.) Kemal Dervish, and Foreign Minister Ismail Cem. However, their ability to bring about any real reform is hampered by a National Assembly divided between others like themselves, right-wing nationalists who favor a pan-Turkic foreign policy over a European one, supporters of the traditionally powerful military-industrial complex and, until June 2001, a sizeable block of Islamists positioned along a broad spectrum of views ranging from progressive acceptance of a secular order and human rights reform to hard-liners wishing to impose a Shari'a based legal system. The voting behavior of Turks in the 1990s seem to mirror this fragmented party system (see chart).

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 65



* RRP not represented in 1999 due to failure to overcome 10% hurdle
 Source: Aliriza, Bulent & Zeno Baran. “The April 18th Elections: Stability Remains Elusive”. *The Turkish Update*. May 10th, 1999. Center for Strategic and International Studies; Turkish State Institute for Statistics

It is interesting here to note the shift of votes away from the major parties in 1995 to 1999, especially from the Republican People’s Party (RRP: founded by Ataturk himself and traditional partner of the military). It is also important to note that the most successful parties in the last elections, the Islamist Virtue Party and Welfare Party (after the VP was banned in 1997) were the parties furthest separated from the traditional political ruling class institutions of government and the military. The lack of a sufficient majority to govern could imply disillusionment of voters with the main parties because nearly one fifth of the Turkish populace now is not represented in the Grand National Assembly. Also, power is far from centralized, and the rule of law is questionable in some areas, such as human rights. Though torture is illegal in Turkey, the practice continues according to Amnesty International, the EU, and the U.S. State Department. There are also severe restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly, and the press. Freedom house gives Turkey a lower index score than any EU member-state or candidate and that is only one point higher than Russia. Furthermore, the index has grown worse in the past few years (see table below).

Freedom House Score for Select EU Member-States, Candidates, Russia, and Macedonia

Year	Turkey	Spain	Slovakia	Slovenia	Russia	Poland	Portugal	Lithuania	Macedonia	Latvia
1972-73	3,4,PF	5,6,NF	-	-	-	6,6,NF	5,6,NF	-	-	-
1973-74	2,4,PF	5,6,NF	-	-	-	6,6,NF	5,6,NF	-	-	-
1974-75	2,3,F	5,5,PF	-	-	-	6,6,NF	5,3,PF	-	-	-
1975-76	2,3,F	5,5,PF	-	-	-	6,6,NF	5,3,PF	-	-	-
1976-77	2,3,F	5,3,PF	-	-	-	6,6,NF	2,2,F	-	-	-

1977-78	2,3,F	2,2,F	-	-	-	6,5,N	2,2,F	-	-	-
1978-79	2,3,F	2,3,F	-	-	-	6,5,P	2,2,F	-	-	-
1979-80	2,3,F	2,2,F	-	-	-	6,5,P	2,2,F	-	-	-
1980-81	5,5,PF	2,3,F	-	-	-	6,4,P	2,2,F	-	-	-
1981-82	5,5,PF	2,3,F	-	-	-	5,4,P	2,2,F	-	-	-
1982-83	4,5,PF	1,2,F	-	-	-	6,5,N	1,2,F	-	-	-
1983-84	4,5,PF	1,2,F	-	-	-	6,5,P	1,2,F	-	-	-
1984-85	3,5,PF	1,2,F	-	-	-	6,5,P	1,2,F	-	-	-
1985-86	3,5,PF	1,2,F	-	-	-	6,5,P	1,2,F	-	-	-
1986-87	3,4,PF	1,2,F	-	-	-	6,5,P	1,2,F	-	-	-
1987-88	2,4,PF	1,2,F	-	-	-	5,5,P	1,2,F	-	-	-
1988-89	2,4,PF	1,2,F	-	-	-	5,5,P	1,2,F	-	-	-
1989-90	3,3,PF	1,1,F	-	-	-	4,3,P	1,2,F	-	-	-
1990-91	2,4,PF	1,1,F	-	-	-	2,2,F	1,2,F	-	-	-
1991-92	2,4,PF	1,1,F	-	2,3,F	3,3,P	2,2,F	1,1,F	2,3,F	-	2,3,F
1992-93	2,4,PF	1,1,F	-	2,2,F	3,4,P	2,2,F	1,1,F	2,3,F	3,4,PF	3,3,PF
1993-94	4,4,PF	1,2,F	3,4,PF	1,2,F	3,4,P	2,2,F	1,1,F	1,3,F	3,3,PF	3,3,PF
1994-95	5,5,PF	1,2,F	2,3,F	1,2,F	3,4,P	2,2,F	1,1,F	1,3,F	4,3,PF	3,2,F
1995-96	5,5,PF	1,2,F	2,3,F	1,2,F	3,4,P	1,2,F	1,1,F	1,2,F	4,3,PF	2,2,F
1996-97	4,5,PF	1,2,F	2,4,PF	1,2,F	3,4,P	1,2,F	1,1,F	1,2,F	4,3,PF	2,2,F
1997-98	4,5,PF	1,2,F	2,4,PF	1,2,F	3,4,P	1,2,F	1,1,F	1,2,F	4,3,PF	1,2,F
1998-99	4,5,PF	1,2,F	2,2,F	1,2,F	4,4,P	1,2,F	1,1,F	1,2,F	3,3,PF	1,2,F
1999-00	4,5,PF	1,2,F	1,2,F	1,2,F	4,5,P	1,2,F	1,1,F	1,2,F	3,3,PF	1,2,F

2000-01	4,5,PF	1,2, F	1,2,F	1,2,F	5,5,P F	1,2,F	1,1,F	1,2,F	4,3,PF	1,2, F
----------------	--------	-----------	-------	-------	------------	-------	-------	-------	--------	-----------

Key to Acronyms: F- Free, PF- Partially Free, NF- Not Free

The European nations selected in the table above were chosen because they represent the most drastic improvements and show that changes can be made in a brief period; other EU members all score 1.2 or less and have since 1972. Historically-totalitarian Russia and conflict-stricken Macedonia were included because they aptly help illustrate the severity of human rights situation in Turkey

Source: Freedom House online database at www.freedomhouse.org

All of the aforementioned political factors are often cited by the EU officials as reasons why Turkey cannot be allowed to join for some time to come.

The government is also constrained by the heavy and longstanding influence of the military. The top Turkish generals, along with the armed forces as a whole, hold a very prestigious place in Turkish society and garner a consistent amount of public support. The military is also a powerful economic actor controlling no less than two huge conglomerates. Furthermore, the 1982 Constitution was written in the wake of a violent coup under the military's supervision. The constitution affords a very involved role to the top generals through the powerful National Security Council (NSC). This body consisted of the Head of the Turkish General Staff, respective heads of each armed forces branch, and another general acting as General Secretary, as well as the President of the Republic, Prime Minister, and the Finance, Interior, and Foreign Ministers. In 2001, as part of a Constitutional reform package to move closer to the EU's Copenhagen Criteria for membership, the number of civilian officials on the NSC was increased to nine, although a quantitative advantage is of little importance, since the committee reached decisions by consensus.

Regardless of its institutional roles, the Turkish military has the legacy of four coups over the last forty years to affirm its relevance. The first three were violent and came after intense periods of civil unrest brought on by the inability of politicians to

maintain order. In the first two, the former heads of state were executed. The most recent, in 1997, has been dubbed a “virtual” coup because the military merely demanded that then Prime Minister Erbakan and his Islamist Welfare Party step down. Though the generals cited various reasons, it is widely held that the coup occurred because the Welfare Party was too Islamist and the generals feared that the secular base of the Republic was threatened. Recent developments in the government’s stance on transparency and accountability of the military have resulted in constitutional reform initiatives (manifested in amendments in 1997) and votes in the national assembly (in the summer of 2002), thereby suggesting that political involvement of the military is at least being discussed out in the open and opposed. To quote Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, “it [Turkey] must free itself of this [national security] syndrome... or we will miss the EU train.”⁹⁹ Despite this, the military remains the most popular institution in opinion polls. “It is about the only thing in the country that works,” laments an individual interviewed by *The Economist*.¹⁰⁰

On the subject of culture and Turkey’s exclusion, many experts have expressed the thought that Turkey may never obtain member status in the EU precisely on cultural grounds. This further complicates the security cooperation issue as an unrealized candidacy could produce divisive disillusionment on both sides. Though Turkey has been involved in Europe’s affairs since the sixteenth-century Ottoman conquest, it has never been “European.” On the topic of Turkey’s membership, former Chancellor of Germany, Helmut Kohl was quoted as saying that the EU was a “Christian club” and has not stood alone in such a view.¹⁰¹ It is hard to foresee the consequences of an EU with population which is 20% Muslim and ethnically divided moreover. Specifically, there are almost as many Kurds in Turkey as there are people in Holland (13 million vs. 15 million respectively). Religion and ethnicity aside, Turkey’s 67 million inhabitants would constitute the second largest population in the EU (behind Germany) but may become the largest in a generation or two. Were it inducted tomorrow, the effect on the European Parliament’s seat distribution would be catastrophic. Its area is nearly twice the size of any EU member’s. It has a

⁹⁹ “Blast and Counterblast”. *The Economist*. vol. 360 issue 8235. 8/18/2001. p. 40-41

¹⁰⁰ “Last Line of Defense”. *The Economist*. vol. 335 issue 8174. Special Section. P. 13-14

¹⁰¹ Walker, Martin. p. 76

formidable economy (the world's sixteenth largest), but the wealth is unevenly distributed. In 2000, GDP stood at around \$210 billion, but GDP per capita was only \$6,400.¹⁰² This places Turkey in an awkward position as an EU candidate. It has the largest GDP of any candidate, but the per capita is only higher than Romania and Bulgaria, both on the lower end of the candidacy roster. Nearly 40% of the population still survives by subsistence agriculture and pastoralism. Since there is free movement of workers in the EU, it is unlikely that Brussels would facilitate a situation involving a massive, unimpeded flood of poor Turkish workers into the richer nations. Though these figures and scenarios might have Eurocrats cringing, the EU could not legally exclude Turkey from membership on these grounds; not that they need to for the foreseeable future.

Conclusions

This paper has argued that differing perceptions of how to address security concerns and under what circumstances a nation can legitimately use force have been a source of disagreement between the EU and Turkey. The shift from defensive strategy to security strategy in Europe was incompatible with the traditional realist balance-of-power/territorial-defense oriented strategic outlook of Turkey. Subsequent restructuring of European security policy and supporting institutions had the side effect of alienating the Turks and was justified by the demographic, political, and cultural incompatibilities of Turkey with the EU institutions and norms. Not accepting this justification, Turkey retaliated with a debilitating veto of EU access to NATO resources in NATO's Planning Committee; a response which frustrated the EU's security ambitions. It has also been shown that the two entities share the same threats though to differing degrees and under different assumptions concerning appropriate responses. However, it was an essential aim of this study to shed light on *what* has been at the heart of the impasse obstructing mutually beneficial cooperation in the Euro-Turkish security relationship. As it turns out, the Euro-Turkish alliance suffers from the same syndrome that has historically caused the dissolution of all successful alliances in peacetime—the lack of an immediate threat and

¹⁰²Evin, Ahmet O. "Turkey and Europe: Nebulous Nature of Relations". Turkish Foreign Policy Institute.

the resulting ability of allies to seek their own interests at the expense of their partners. In such a situation, old grievances that were once overlooked for the sake of alliance stability become less admissible and shared interests become an incubator for competition.

At present, most scholars and officials, especially those in Europe, seriously doubt that Turkey could ever be assimilated into EU institutions without compromising the stability of the Union. It seems reasonable that Europe could be using Turkey's EU candidacy like the carrot in front of the horse. This analysis has suggested that the EU can neither afford to include Turkey, nor can it afford to alienate the Turks entirely, if only for Turkey's importance in security matters. However, it could be in the EU's interests to use Turkey as a "buffer-state" between the "European project" and the war torn areas to the southeast. A policy of nominal inclusion in the EU enlargement process but which lacks any real potential for eventual Turkish EU membership could be one element of a policy aimed at keeping Turkey as a buffer-state. In addition to the buffer-state argument, it is reasonable to conjecture that (judging by Europe's reluctance to totally exclude Turkey from security affairs), should a serious and immediate crisis arise, deeper and mutually acceptable security cooperation would follow. Europe has already used this schizophrenic strategy in trying to keep the U.S. in Europe "just in case". Such reasoning is supported by the findings of this study in terms of the hierarchy of causal factors.

As can be seen, Turkey and Europe have increased their level of economic cooperation (interdependence to Turkey) but security cooperation was not strengthened by integrating their economies. This suggests that the economic causal factor of security cooperation is of lesser importance than the other two, or that, in order to be of equal importance, economic cooperation must have passed some threshold (which could be the

subject of another study). Neither Europe nor Turkey place guarding against present security threats as high on their respective lexically prioritized political agendas as the USSR had been twenty years ago. As a result political goals have replaced guarding against threats as the number one priority for both Europe and Turkey.

Since a common threat is the necessary precondition for an alliance to form, the disappearance of a threat, historically, has been the deathknell of alliances and disintegration has usually followed. In this case, one threat has been exchanged for others, but the failure to appreciate the seriousness of those threats because of a perceived absence (however temporary) of immediate danger has had the effect of diminishing the cohesion of two essential elements to security in Europe-- a sort of semi-disintegration. The European Union perceives political goals of enlargement, stabilization of nation in Eastern Europe, and deepening of the single institutional framework of the Union to be of more immediate concern than the security threats it shares with the Turks. Turkey perceives its political goals of resolution of domestic issues, responses to current economic and political crises, and the maximization of its role in the EU (i.e. membership) to require more urgent concern than those aforementioned threats.

Though the two entities may indeed be correct and prudent in their prioritizing, the resultant security agendas of each has produced a schism which compromises the integrity of European security architectures. The consequences have already generated problems for Euro-Turkish security as the two entities use their mutual need for one another as pressure levers and incentives against one another in diplomatic wrangling. NATO and other alliance structures have also been exploited by Europe and Turkey to gain favorable bargaining positions from which they can pursue their own ends.

The absence of an immediate threat, however conditional, has generated the impasse examined in this study. The process began with the ideological shift away from defense to security, was followed by the restructuring of European security architectures to imbue Europeans with more responsibility, and stands today as the problems of Turkish inclusion or exclusion. In the realm of security, it appears, the only true loyalties are the necessary ones and that although Europeans and Turks cooperate economically and in other areas, it can be seen that security cooperation depends most on shared threats, not on cooperation in other areas.

Bibliography

- “NATO Annual Report of Allied Contributions to Common Defense”. 2000. See www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p00-107e.html
- 1999 EU Helsinki Summit, Presidency Report.
- Aliriza, Bulent & Baran, Zenyo. “The April 18th Elections: Stability Remains Elusive”. *The Turkish Update*. May 10th, 1999. Center for Strategic and International Studies; Turkish State Institute for Statistics.
- Allen, Tim. “EU Trade with OPEC”. Eurostat- Statistics in Focus. 2002. www.europa.eu.int/eurostat/
- Allen, Tim. “Turkey and the EU”. Eurostat. 2001. www.europa.eu.int/eurostat/
- Aybet, Gulnur. “The Development of the CESDP: Military Capabilities and Institutional Arrangements”. *Conference Presentation*. Turksih Foreign Policy Institute. Ankara. 2000
- Bir, Gen. Cevik. “Turkey’s Role in the New World Order: New Challenges”. National Defense University INSS. *Strategic Forum*. no. 135. February 1998
- Brown, Seyom. *The Causes and Prevention of War*. St. Martin’s. New York. 1987.
- Carpenter, Ted Galen. *NATO Enters the 21st Century*. Frank Cass Pub. London. 2001.
- Chalmers, Malcolm. “The Atlantic Burden Sharing Debate”. *International Affairs* v.27 #3. Blackwell. London. 2001.
- Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, Berlin, June 1996. NATO Review. Vol 44 issue #4.
- Cornish, Paul & Edwards, Geoffrey. “Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy”. *International Affairs* v. 27 #3. Blackwell. London. 2001.
- Draft Presidency Report of the European Council. Brussels. 2000. <http://europa.eu.int>
- Energy Information Administration . “Regional Indicators: European Union”. US Department of Energy. www.eia.doe.gov/regions/EU
- Energy Information Administration. “Country Analysis Brief: Caucasus Region”. U.S. Dept. of Energy. 2001. www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caucasus.html
- Energy Information Administration. “Country Analysis Brief: Turkey”. U.S. Dept. of Energy. www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/turkey.html
- EU Commission. Annual EU Commission Report to the Council on the MEDA Program. Brussels. 2000.
- Eurostat. <http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/>
- Evin, Ahmet O, “Turkey and Europe: Nebulous Nature of Relations”. Turkish Foreign Policy Institute. www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/ing/books/aevin_01.html
- Freedom House online database www.freedomhouse.org/
- Gartner, Heinz, Adrian Hyde-Pierce and Erka Reiter. *Europe’s New Security Challenges*. Lynne Rienner. Boulder. 2001.
- Hodge, Carl L. ed. *Redefining European Security*. Garland. New York. 1999.
- http://www.metimes.com/2K1/issue2001-15/reg/turkish_politicians_should.htm
- <http://www.tsk.mil.tr/>
- Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations”. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, MA. 1995.
- Ian O. Lesser. *Mediterranean Security: New Perspectives and Implications for US Policy*. RAND. Santa Monica . 1992.

- IISS Chart of Armed Conflict. 2001
- Jung, Deitrich. "Turkey and Europe: Ongoing Hypocrisy?". Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. 2000.
- Kugler, Richard L. *NATO Military Strategy for the Post Cold War Era: Issues and Options*. RAND. Santa Monica. 1992.
- Matthews, Owen. "Europe's Orphan". *Newsweek International*. April, 22. 2002.
- Mayall, Simon V. "Turkey: Thwarted Ambition". INSS National Defense University. Washington, 1997.
- NATO Fact Sheet on WEU. www.nato.int/docu/factsheet/WEU
- *NATO Handbook* (online version) www.nato.int/
- Passerini, Paolo & Luis Biedma. "EU Trade and Investment with Mediterranean Partner Countries: towards a better partnership?". *Eurostat, Statistics in Focus*. Luxembourg. 2002. <http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/>
- Rouleau, Eric. "Turkey's Dream of Democracy". *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 79, no. 6. Nov/Dec 2000.
- SIPRI database of armed conflict www.sipri.org
- Smith, Martin A., *NATO in the First Decade After the Cold War*. Kulwer Academic. Dordrecht. 2000.
- Terriff, Terry, Mark Webber, Stuart Croft, and Jolyon Howorth. "European Security and Defense Policy After Nice". Royal Institute of International Affairs. *Briefing Paper* no. 20. RIIA. London. 2001.
- *The Economist*. "Blast and Counterblast". Vol. 360 issue 8235. 8/18/2001.
- *The Economist*. "Last Line of Defence". Vol. 355, Issue 8174.
- *The Military Balance 2001-2002*. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Oxford University Press. London. 2001.
- Transcript of National Security Council's Washington Summit. www.nsc.gov/docs/summits/wash99
- "Turkey's Security and its Relations with NATO". Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2000. www.mfa.gov.tr
- Turkish Treasury Statistics <http://www.treasury.tk.gov/>
- Walker, Martin. "The Turkish Miracle". *Wilson Quarterly*. Aug. 2000.
- Williams, Geoffrey Lee in Eden, Douglas ed. *Europe and the Atlantic Relationship*. St. Martin's Press, New York. 2000.
- www.nato.int/docu/london1990
- Yost, David S. *NATO Transformed*. United States Institute of Peace. Washington D.C., 1998.