MAINLAND CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES

by
Anthony K. Yuen

A thesis submitted to the faculty of The University of Mississippi in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College and the Croft Institute for International Studies.

University, Mississippi
May 2008

Approved by

_____
Advisor: Dr. Gang Guo

_____
Reader: Dr. Peter Frost

_____
Reader: Dr. Kees Gispen

Table of Contents

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Note: All figures and tables were created with SPSS 16.0 using data from the “1993 Survey on Social Mobility and Social Change in China” conducted by Shi Tianjian. See the Bibliography entry under “1993 Survey” for additional information.

THE INTRODUCTION

The Importance

The United States and China. There is something unique about the two countries, or perhaps, something special about juxtaposing the two.

The two schools of thought in international relations have differing but useful explanations as to why the pairing is special. Idealists, who believe in the merits of international cooperation as a means to overcome anarchy in the global system, would claim that what makes this pairing unique is the relationship between the two. They argue that the U.S.-China relationship is one potent for interaction and cooperation in our current environment of globalization. Realists, who believe that the anarchy in the global system is driven by each and every state's competing self-interests and therefore cannot be overcome, would beg to differ. They assert that it is the power transition that the two – the United States as the dominant power and China as the rising power – are undergoing and all the foreboding consequences entailed in that which makes the coupling stand out. Both approaches to Sino-American relations have been discussed widely among academics and policymakers (Mahbubani, 2005, 49; Garver, 1999, xi; Hutton, 2006, 5, 324-330; Deng and Wang, 2005, 1; Ikenberry, 2008, 23; Li, Rex, 2004, 24).

Whichever view one subscribes to, it is undeniably important that in order to make more informed decisions on how to manage the trans-Pacific relationship, there is a need to understand how the other side perceives the United States, what attitudes it holds towards it, and why. Power transition theory maintains that a rising power will challenge the dominant power if in fact the rising power is dissatisfied with the current system. Should we be able to assume that the power transition theory does hold true in describing the relations between China and the United States, then determining whether or not a serious conflict between the two could occur depends on, in no small part, ascertaining what Chinese sentiment towards the United States and the current world order is and why. Understanding how the Chinese see the United States would also further enable governments on both sides of the Pacific to make better decisions in how they interact with each other and how to better structure the international system while staving off the propensity for conflict.

In order to coexist, there must be trust. In order to have trust, there must be understanding. I sincerely hope that this thesis may serve as a positive contribution to the regretfully little literature that is available on the subject of Chinese perception of the United States, and, in doing so, help increase understanding between the people of the United States and China.

The Research Questions

In an effort to increase understanding of mainland Chinese perception of the United States, a key aspect of the nature of the U.S.-China relationship, this thesis poses two questions:

1) On an individual level, how do mainland Chinese perceive the United States?

2) What factors, on an individual level, help explain mainland Chinese attitudes towards the United States?

Organization of the Thesis

Relative to the second, the first question is easy to answer. How a person thinks is usually expressed in what he/she says and how he/she acts. The degree to which that is accepted or rejected among his/her peers testifies to how popular that sentiment is. The evidence comes from polls, interviews, and publications, but also from what people are doing. Are they protesting or boycotting? Are education and business exchanges strong? Is there a fair amount of travel between the two countries? If people like something, it shows, and if people do not like something, it shows.

The more difficult question is the second one, why? Attitudes do not magically come into existence. Nor are there any genes that naturally dictate one's sentiments at birth. They are developed over time, drawing upon certain factors and circumstance and driven by certain forces with the contribution of certain players to ultimately determine their leanings. The goal of this thesis is to determine how mainland Chinese feel about the United States on an individual level and what factors can help explain that disposition.

The focus of this thesis, then, is on the micro level. But in order to determine how individual Chinese feel on this level, it is necessary to develop an understanding of the nature of Chinese attitudes at the macro level. The strategy that this thesis takes is to look at the big picture so as to truly understand the small picture. In analyzing Chinese sentiments at the macro level, there are a couple questions that this thesis will attempt to answer. Are there

patterns or trends evident in the Chinese sentiments in the context of the history of Sino-American relations? What observations can be made about Chinese perception of the United States at the macro level that would be helpful in determining how and why these attitudes function at the micro level?

The organization of this thesis reflects the aforementioned strategy, beginning with the macro level and from there moving to the micro level. The macro level section places Chinese attitudes towards the United States in the context of the history of Sino-American relations. We are interested in how attitudes shift as a result of key events and/or changes in foreign policy. The micro level section investigates how, on an individual level, Chinese attitudes correlate with other personal attributes, characteristics, behaviors, beliefs, etc., doing so with cross tabulation and regression analysis of a nationwide survey of political attitudes in China conducted between 1993 and 1994. With the integration of these parts, this thesis hopes to reveal a holistic picture of Chinese attitudes towards the United States and help answer how mainland Chinese perceive the United States and why.

The Theoretical Framework

"Mainland Chinese attitudes towards the United States," is a topic that, while crucially important to the United States' foreign policy formulation, is deceivingly simple yet, in all actuality, incredibly complicated. I have discovered that when posed with the topic "Mainland Chinese attitudes towards the United States," most Americans reach a conclusion quickly and without much hesitation, "They hate us."

It is an easy enough answer. It is simple and straightforward, and there is no need to deal with the messy details. That is the danger in writing on a topic such as this one. The explanations, the analysis, the multifaceted conclusions are, though laboriously shaped with much care, ultimately no competition for an easy-to-understand one sentence conclusion.

And so, given the topic's complexity, it is necessary to approach the relevant questions systematically, with a framework in mind that can provide order and simplify what at times appears to be an incomprehensible amorphous mass of informational tidbits. That is what purpose of the theoretical framework; it provides that much needed organized approach.

This thesis will approach the question of how mainland Chinese perceive the United States and why with the following theoretical framework as a guide:

The Theoretical Framework

- socialization influences values
- similar values produce greater affinity
- affinity results when there are benefits to be gained
- perception of threat effects resentment

Socialization influences values. A large part of how we, as human beings, think is derived from our environment. Who we are, who we interact with, what we do, where we live, when we lived there, all have some bearing on what we hold to be important to us, what we value in life. Our values, then, are constantly being developed, using our experiences to shape their form. These values, in turn, provide the lens through which we see and understand the world around us. How people grow up affects what is important to them.

Similar values produce greater affinity. It is natural for two people with similar ideas to develop a sense of connection with each other. This is especially true with regard to values. Holding the same things to be important, and thereby interpreting the world in an analogous

way, greatly increases the likelihood of mutual attraction and the possibility of cooperation. People whose values are alike find more to like about each other.

Affinity results when there are benefits to be gained. It is one of the most basic assumptions of the social sciences; people prefer what is advantageous to them. People like it when there is something in it for them and, consequently, tend to like whoever it is that is providing it for them. In the end, people will seek what is good for them from who can give it to them because doing so is necessary for their survival.

Perception of threat effects resentment. When threatened, a defense mechanism is triggered causing people to dislike whatever it is that is putting them at risk and whoever it is that is responsible for doing so. It is much more difficult to like a competitor because he/she places the chances of victory at risk. When the stakes are higher, so too is the degree of dislike. It is this part of human nature that provides the motivation to defend oneself and continue to survive.

Chinese Nationalism and its Relevance to Chinese Perception of the United States

The Importance of Nationalism

The People's Republic of China only came into being in 1949, and yet in spite of this late entrance into the world stage and the disastrous missteps it endured under early Communist Party leadership, China has done amazingly well for itself in recent decades. Of the sixteen nations that can boast a gross domestic product (adjusted for purchasing power parity) greater than one trillion US dollars, China is the third newest nation, just ahead of South Korea and

India (United States, 2008). It is this newness and this quick rise that makes China so much more of a variable than other nations. People naturally worry that China may be susceptible to unstable influence (read: nationalism) making it more of an uncertainty than it already is in the international system (Zheng, 2000, 93). That is why Chinese nationalism matters. Chinese Nationalism has been commonly discussed and researched in recent years not because it is a new phenomenon to China or even that its effect in China is especially unique compared to other nations, but instead because China's place in the world order is of growing importance, so too are the driving factors of its foreign policy.

What They Mean When They Say "Nationalism"

What is nationalism? Before setting out a definition as to how nationalism should be understood in this paper, it is important to understand the word as it is used in Chinese. Nationalism in Chinese direct translates to *guojia zhuyi*, *guojia* meaning nation and *zhuyi* meaning "-ism." This translation underscores the importance of a nation or nations in general and is actually very similar to the dictionary definition of "nationalism" according to Merriam-Webster, "loyalty and devotion to a nation; especially a sense of national consciousness exalting one nation above all others and placing primary emphasis on promotion of its culture and interests as opposed to those of other nations or supranational groups." Another translation is *minzu zhuyi*, *minzu* meaning race or nationality depending on the context and *zhuyi* again meaning "-ism." Unlike the first translation, *minzu zhuyi* underscores the importance of the nationality rather than the nation and the people rather than the land or the government.

China as a nation, in the Western sense of the word, is very much a latecomer. It was not even a century ago when China first evolved from its imperial government to a more "modern style" of governance, and it is entirely arguable that it was not until the 1930's that China could claim to have any sense of national unity under such a government. The Chinese people and their culture, however, are by no means new. With somewhere in the neighborhood of four thousand years of history, the Chinese civilization rightly claims its spot as one of the world's oldest. It is here that the distinction between *guojia zhuyi* and *minzu zhuyi* becomes apparent. To have pride in a nation that is not more than several decades old (i.e. *guojia zhuyi*) is very different from having pride in a people whose culture has spanned several millennia (i.e. *minzu zhuyi*). Western notions of nationalism tend to emphasis a nation, as with *guojia zhuyi*, but Chinese nationalism tends to emphasis a people and its culture, as with *minzu zhuyi*. And so in the Chinese literature on nationalism, the terms that is more often used is not *guojia zhuyi* but instead *minzu zhuyi*. The latter captures the people, the culture, and the history and thereby stirs greater emotion and passion.

That being said, when using the term "Chinese nationalism" in this paper, I am referring to *minzu zhuyi* and not *guojia zhuyi*. As far as this paper is concerned, the terms "Chinese nationalism" and *minzu zhuyi* are considered synonymous and interchangeable in their usage.

Understanding Nationalism with Chinese Characteristics

Culture and history are vitally important elements of Chinese nationalism. China was a civilization long before the concept of the modern nation-state, and thereby nationalism, came into being in the middle of the seventeenth century with the Peace of Westphalia. Ancient China was held together not by its government or its borders, but by the perceived superiority

of Chinese culture. Indeed governance of China changed hands more times in history than anyone really wishes to count and the concept of national borders was much more flexible than what it is understood to be today, and yet despite this, Chinese civilization persisted throughout history. The cohesive force that held China together was a type of "ancient nationalism," it is what Chinese historians refer to as "culturalism" (Xu, 1998, 235; Townsend, 1996, 2). That is not to say that there was not a sense of loyalty to a government, a race, or a clan, but ultimately this was peripheral. Different races and different clans could assume control of China so long as they accepted Chinese culture. Culture is the only element that remained consistently unchallenged in its importance (Townsend, 1996, 2). Traces of culturalism can still be found today. The Chinese term *huaren*, a word in very common usage, roughly translates to Chinese people in English. What is interesting about this expression is that all culturally Chinese people are considered Chinese, irrespective of their race, religion, nationality, or their permanent residence. That is, ethnic and religious minorities in China (*shaoshu minzu*), Chinese descendants (*huayi*) and Chinese nationals abroad (*huaqiao*) are, like Chinese of Chinese heritage with Chinese citizenship living in China, *huaren*.

Culturalism, which had survived since at least 221 B.C., began to show cracks in the middle of the nineteenth century. With both sides asserting its superiority over the other, it was no surprise that encounters with the West became more and more unpleasant, eventually turning hostile. A series of wars ensued, each of which China would find itself on the losing end, and each time China would have to cede a portion of its sovereignty (Gries, 2004, 46-47). The Opium Wars, the Sino-Japanese War, and the Boxer Rebellion all took their toll on Chinese pride, but more importantly their confidence in its cultural preeminence. The unifying element

of everything Chinese was beginning to unravel. It was in this environment of confusion, uncertainty, and turmoil that "modern" nationalism positioned itself to succeed culturalism (Townsend, 1996, 2-3). Mostly rooted in anti-imperialism and equal standing for China on the world stage, nationalism gave the Chinese a common ideal to come together and struggle for (Xu, 1998, 235). History's role in nationalism becomes apparent here, in the indignation and humiliation bred from a century's worth of exploitation.

Minzu zhuyi is neither the culturalism that preceded it nor the Western concept of nationalism that many assume it is, but rather an intricate combination of the two. It is the longing for all of the glory that China had, the anger that resulted when that was stripped away, and the belief that the new China, in its "modern" nation-state form, can rectify those injustices and return China to its rightful place in the world order.

Consequently the end aim of Chinese nationalism is not the acquisition of national power (*guoli*), but rather international status. Military prowess and economic preponderancy, while important, are merely means to an end. What China truly seeks is the respect from the international community and from world powers that it feels it is currently lacking. China fears that it is of an "outlier social standing vis-à-vis the great power group circle around the United States" (Deng Yong, 2005, 53). Higher international status is in part measured by greater international support for the One China Policy (*yige Zhongguo zhengce*) and by the smaller the degree at which other countries view China as a threat (Deng Yong, 2005, 53). This latter criterion is both interesting and telling because it challenges the Machiavellian idea that fear is power. The Chinese line of thinking assumes that the less others fear a rising China, the more they accept it as a member of the international community capable of offering positive

contributions. This acceptance facilitates continued expansion in traditional measures of power, most especially economic growth, in turn further elevating China's international status. In doing so, China may right the wrongs committed against it and make China great once again, thus realizing the very objective that Chinese nationalism is in pursuit of.

Nationalism versus Anti-Americanism

It is important to mention that there is a fundamental distinction between Chinese nationalism and Chinese anti-Americanism that is sometimes lost, especially in popular thinking. Whereas it is true that the two are related and at times complementary, but to equate one with the other is, put simply, incorrect. Anti-Americanism is the antagonism of that which is of the United States (e.g. the American people, culture, policies). Nationalism lacks this innate antipathy towards another country, or any inherent outward disposition for that matter. At its most basic level, nationalism is a positive sentiment towards one's own nation and people as opposed to a negative sentiment towards another nation. And so while it may have appeared that nationalism and anti-Americanism were synonymous during the darker hours of the U.S.-China relationship (e.g. the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the 1990's), there were, in all actuality, two separate phenomena, both feeding into the other. More answers as to why nationalism and anti-Americanism shared this mutually supportive relationship, and therefore became seemingly synonymous, will follow in the subsequent discussions.

Nationalism's Relevance to this Thesis

Understanding what nationalism is, what it is not, and how it is used in this paper places the following discussions of Chinese perceptions on the macro and micro level into perspective.

It provides a lens through which one may better understand what happened, why it happened, and what effect it had on Chinese attitudes towards the United States.

THE MACRO LEVEL:

CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HISTORY OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Ally, foe, enemy of a shared enemy, liberator, potential colonizer, business partner, indeed there are not many roles that the United States has not played in its dealings with China. Consequently, the last hundred years or so of relations between China and the United States can be best described as a rollercoaster with as many ups as downs and as many steep drops as sharp inclines.

In The Beginning

We will begin our story of Sino-American relations more than a century and a half ago. Having pried open the gates of a once isolationist China, the British paved the way for decades of abuse and exploitation at the hands of the preeminent imperial powers of the time, marking the beginning of a "century of humiliation" (*bainian guochi*) (Hutton, 2006, 59; Gries, 2004, 45-47). Humiliated with China's inability to stand up against foreign aggression, especially after China's embarrassing loss to the Japanese in 1895, many Chinese elites became weary of the old ways and the traditional systems and began to look to the West for as a source of inspiration (Lieberthal, 2004, 25). Interested in learning about everything Western, from the

sciences and military technology to governing systems and religion, the more reformed minded pushed through any policies and measures that could somehow reverse the tragic course of decline that China was currently on. Some of these policies entailed sending Chinese boys and young men to take part in academic exchange programs in the United States for several years.

The experience of these students left them with mixed impressions. On the one hand, many of them were awed by the sharp contrast between American wealth and Chinese poverty (Zhang, 2002, 12). They were impressed with just how advanced the United States was and ashamed of just how backward China was (Zhang, 2002, 12). Exchange students were impressed that their American counterparts encouraged academic exchange with the Chinese (despite the fact that it was the American share of the Boxer Indemnity that was largely responsible for the funding), promised to uphold the American Open Door Policy, and, during Woodrow Wilson's presidency especially, at least in rhetoric, espoused national self-determination, equality, world justice, and global cooperation (Zhang, 2002, 22-23). And many Chinese elites revered George Washington, considering him a ruler of Confucian morals on a level of greatness with some of China's most esteemed emperors (Wong, 1996, 208).

What was unfortunate was the unfavorable impressions that many Chinese students went home with. Racial prejudice, ethnocentrism, the passage of Chinese exclusion immigration laws, the treatment of Chinese laborers, and cultural differences took their toll on many students and on Sino-American relations (Zhang, 2002, 12 – 20; Li Hongshan, 1998, 146). In fact, American immigration policies that discriminated against the Chinese were so destructive that in 1905 members of the business and academic communities in China launched a boycott of American imports to protest those measures (Wang Guanhua, 2001, 1). Well

received by the Chinese populace and quite damaging to U.S. economic interests, the boycott was a triumph for the Chinese (Wang, 2001, 172-173).

While this was perhaps the most serious and blatant display of dissatisfaction with the American government of the time, it was not the only one. Affiliation with the powers that were carving up China certainly hurt Americans in the eyes of the Chinese. Americans enjoyed special privileges made possible by Chinese concessions and did their part to protect the unequal treaties that they were party to. Though, Americans were seen as somewhat less barbaric than the other Westerners, in part because they did not control colonies in China and were "reluctant" to use force against the Chinese (Wong, 1996, 207). Even so, Americans, along with all other Westerners, still found themselves victim to violence when the Boxer Rebellion broke out at the turn of the twentieth century.

A Common Enemy: Japan

The vast majority of the populace held a general attitude of resentment towards the United States from the end of the Qing dynasty until the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in the 1930's. In a rather ironic way, both the Chinese and the Americans owe the Japanese a debt of gratitude. For one, it was Japanese aggression that finally unified the Chinese people. Traces of patriotism and nationalism became evident as soon as the Chinese realized that militarily they were inferior to Japan and the Western powers. It was outside pressure that solidified the idea of a Chinese nation. That is indeed why the vast majority of Chinese students studied abroad, so that they could learn the secrets of the West to come back and save China (Zhang, 2002, 12) (Li Hongshan, 1998, 160).

This feeling of pride in being Chinese can also be said to have been responsible for the May Fourth movement. The Chinese were outraged by with the Treaty of Versailles that ended World War I. The agreement stipulated that the Shandong province, a colony of Germany before the war, was to be ceded to Japan rather than returned to China. The Chinese, led by academics and intellectuals, took to the streets in protest of the injustice. The May Fourth movement is important because it is a testament to both the strength of nationalism among the Chinese, especially in the context of what was perceived to be foreign encroachment, and also the reformist fervor that was taking hold of China's academics (Lieberthal, 2004, 30).

Japanese aggression may also be "credited" for the temporary quelling of hostilities between Communist and Nationalist factions during the first part of the Chinese civil war as both sides temporarily laid to rest their differences so as to engage a common threat, the Japanese. If nothing else, World War II proved beyond a reasonable doubt to Chinese elites that a divided China, a description apt for China since the latter part of the Qing dynasty, would not be able to stand up against a foreign belligerent. It is often the case that, when faced with an outside threat, groups are more likely to set aside their differences, accentuate their similarities, and come together to counter that threat. This was exactly what happened in China. The war changed how the Chinese saw themselves; it gave them not necessarily an identity, but rather a painful commonality. In a sense, by invading China, the Japanese unified the Chinese. The scars from the "War of Resistance against Japan" (i.e. World War II's Pacific theatre) run so deep that even today, it is a subject that can, has, and will continue to stir up a remarkably strong sense of a unified Chinese patriotism.

Furthermore, though the Americans had been long sympathetic to the Chinese plight at the hands of the Japanese, it was the bombing of Pearl Harbor that solidified the alliance between the United States and China in the end. Fighting alongside the Allied powers against the Japanese earned the Chinese a great deal of respect from the Americans but also from other European powers. In 1943, both the British and American governments not only voided their extraterritorial rights and unequal treaties with China, but, with the ratification of the Cairo Declaration, asserted that Manchuria, Taiwan and the Pescadores should be returned to China following Japan's unconditional surrender. In the same year the United States government revised its previous immigration policy towards China, and the Russian government recognized China as "one of the 'Big Four'" (Zhang, 2002, 23-24). The Chinese, after toiling with an ailing dynasty, years of warlordism, vicious political infighting between the Communists and the Nationalists, and fourteen years of repelling the Japanese, were to become true members of the international community, a victorious independent nation to be proud of. Chinese nationalism was thriving. Sino-American relations reached a high that had never been attained prior.

After World War II

But, as the saying goes, what goes up must come down. In the decade after World War II, pro-US sentiment in China took a quick dive. In the interlude between the end of the Second World War and the start of the Korean War, two primary points of tension emerged among the two sides. The first and perhaps most obvious was the strong American backing that was given to the Nationalist government. While the elites in the Nationalist government welcomed the

political, economic, military, and material support of the US government, the vast majority of the populace, who were anti-Nationalists, was concerned about the relationship and of American involvement in Chinese affairs. Irritated that the US was infringing upon Chinese sovereignty, intellectuals and fervently nationalistic Chinese grew quickly irritated with the very visible presence of Americans, particular American soldiers, in China's urban centers (Zhang, 2002, 39). Immediately after the surrender of the Japanese, the Chinese people found themselves dragged into war yet again, the same civil war that had been put on hold to fight Japan. By 1947, American aid to the faltering Nationalist government seemed to be doing more harm than good. Ineptitude and blatant corruption in the Nationalist government was preventing American assistance from having any real effect. In addition the Communists used American aid as evidence that the Nationalists were peons to an imperialist power, one that could only be expelled by an anti-imperialist force like the Communist Party (Hutton, 2006, 67-68; Zhang, 2002, 119-121). When the Nationalists eventually succumbed to the Communists and reestablished themselves on the island of Taiwan, the US intervened to protect the island from Communist invasion. The Taiwan "problem" has, to this day, remained one of the most divisive issues in Sino-American relations.

Support for the Nationalist government was but half of the problem. As US policy towards Japan shifted from the three D's (demilitarization, democratization, and decentralization) to the five R's (reconstructing the economy, restraining labor, rehabilitation individuals, rearming the military, and realigning Japan with the West and the Free World) in the hope of utilizing Japan against the perceived threat of Communist expansion, the American government gradually lost favor with the Chinese. At best the Chinese saw the American

reconstruction of Japan as a reflection of America's relationship to China. That is, if America was using Japan only as a tool against the Soviets, as the Chinese believed they were, then China too was but a mere pawn in a rivalry between the superpowers (Zhang, 2002, 123). At worst the Chinese saw it as the revival of a militaristic enemy that could once again threaten the national existence of China (Zhang, 2002, 123). Many Chinese saw the defense treaty between the United States and Japan as concrete evidence that the United States was intent on remilitarizing Japan so as to contain and bully China (Liu Yawei, 1998, 192; Cheng, 2005, 2-6).

Korea and Vietnam

By middle of 1950, things had gone from bad to worse for Sino-American relations. The United States had not only found that it had backed the losing side in the Chinese civil war, but that its intervention was necessary in Korea, a peninsula of strategic and historical importance to the Chinese. Whether it was grave miscommunication, serious misinterpretation of resolve, or fatal overconfidence, American forces failed to heed Chinese warnings not to advance to the Yalu River. Believing it necessary for national security, international status, and the worldwide Communist movement, the Chinese leadership called up "volunteers" from China's People's Liberation Army to aid the North Koreans in October of 1950. With China's resolution to engage the United Nations and the United States on the Korean peninsula came a full mobilization of China's propaganda machine. The "'Resist America, Aid Korea' (*KangMei YuanChao*)" political campaign to garner support for the war at the expense of the United State's domestic image by boosting Chinese nationalism was well-received by the majority of

the Chinese populace (Gries, 2004, 56). An excerpt from the afterword of a campaign booklet captures the spirit and type of content of that appeared in propaganda of the time:

> [America] is heaven for a handful of millionaires and hell for countless millions of poor people. It is a paradise for gangsters, swindlers, hooligans, special agents, fascist vermin, profiteers, debauchers, and so on and so forth – all the dregs of humanity. It is the place where reaction, darkness, cruelty, decadence, corruption, debauchery, the oppression of people by people, cannibalism, and all the evils in the whole world today are produced or originate. It is an exhibition ground for all the crimes humanity can commit. It is a living hell – ten, a hundred, a thousand times worse than any hell the cruelest writer can describe. The countless evil phenomena produced there are more than the human mind can image. No one of good conscience can help but wonder how human spiritual civilization could sink to such a level! (qtd. in Arkush and Lee, 1989, 245-246).

Perhaps most tragic was that during this campaign, the distinction between American people and the American government was lost; both were equally evil (Zhang, 2002, 149). Five years after Japan's surrender, many of the same Chinese and American soldiers who had found themselves fighting alongside each other as comrades in World War II, now found themselves fighting against each other as enemies in Korea. The United States had, within a decade after World War II, turned Japan from foe to friend, but, turned China from friend to foe.

After the Korean War, not much changed. Mutual distrust, imperfect information on Sino-Soviet relations, and ideology kept the two nations apart. In fact, for a considerable duration of the Cold War, there were more Americans traveling to the moon than to China. Popular attitudes towards the United States remained just as cold and bitter as official relations with the United States. Not that it really mattered. Between 1953 and 1969, most Chinese, including Mao himself, were too absorbed in domestic matters, such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, to be too concerned with the United States (Liu Yawei, 1998, 224).

And so, while propaganda posters and party rhetoric may have urged every good Chinese to be prepared to fight off the American imperialist swine, the vast majority of Chinese were probably too occupied simply doing their best to not be caught in the Hundred Flowers Campaign, stave off famine during the Great Leap Forward, and steer clear of the bloodshed during the Cultural Revolution.

In any event, the governing elite saw the United States as a threat to its national security as much as their American counterparts saw China as a part of the global Communist threat endangering the Free World. Involvement in Vietnam on both sides underscored this point. The Chinese, in response to what they considered American aggression, came to the aid of the North Vietnamese while the Americans came to the aid of the South Vietnamese in reaction to what was considered Communist aggression. Consequently the Chinese endeavored to stop the Americans from expanding the war into North Vietnam or China, but also tried to prepare for the contingency that deterrence might fail. They did so by overtly deploying Chinese logistical and auxiliary military support to the North Vietnamese, engaging American military units that entered North Vietnamese or Chinese territory, establishing military installations in close proximity to the Chinese-Vietnamese border, and developing a massive industrial complex known as the Third Front deep in China's interior, so as to minimize its vulnerability to American strike (Garver, 1983, 108-111). It was tacitly but clearly understood by both the Chinese and the Americans that should the United States invade North Korea or otherwise successfully overturn the North Korean regime, the United States would quickly find itself engaged in an all-out war with China (Liu Guoli, 1998, 396).

New Enemies, New Friends: The Sino-Soviet Split and US-China Rapprochement

Towards the end of the 1960's, the Chinese government had more pressing concerns than the Americans. As the Kremlin grew ever more dissatisfied with China's divergence from the Soviet-led Communist path, Chinese-Soviet relations correspondingly became increasingly strained. Tensions since the end of Stalin's reign, especially between Mao and Khrushchev, became increasingly apparent (Hinton, 1976 ,22). When the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 in accordance with the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Chinese began to worry that they might be next. Military engagements between Chinese and Soviet forces on the border separating the two countries in 1969 signaled a clear break in the relationship, making it very apparent that the Communist world was not the monolithic entity that analysts had it assumed it was at the outset of the Vietnam War (Liu Guoli, 1998, 390-391, 400; Hinton, 1976, 25).

The Sino-Soviet split was a godsend for the United States. The break opened the possibility of normalizing relations with China, thereby magnifying the pressure placed on the Soviet Union. The Chinese too, saw this window of opportunity and, with the possibility of a Sino-Soviet war looking more and more likely, was unwilling to take on both of the world's superpowers simultaneously (Liu Yawei, 1998, 225). In order to facilitate a gradual withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, the Nixon administration decided in 1969 to decrease American involvement in Southeast Asia, halt patrols of the Taiwan Strait, permit limited economic interaction with China, and open up channels of direct and indirect communication with China (Liu Yawei, 1998, 216-217). These moves were very much welcomed by the Chinese (Liu Yawei, 1998, 216-217). Though Nixon's decision to expand the Vietnam War into Cambodia did prove to be something of a road bump, for the most part, relations between the United

States and China improved rather quickly between 1969 and 1972 (Liu Guoli, 1998, 401). To everyone's surprise, in April of 1971, the U.S. table-tennis team was invited to play in mainland China, only more bizarre was a visit to China by President Nixon himself ten months later. By early 1972, the United States and China had found common ground on several issues with each other regarding the nature of their relationship and their roles in the international system, which they documented in the Shanghai Communiqué. During May of 1973, American and Chinese "liaison" offices were set up in Beijing and in Washington, DC in hopes of bringing about an eventual normalization of bilateral relations. This end was accomplished with the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, which established formal diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China on January 1, 1979.

The shift of Chinese public opinion of the United States during rapprochement was a gradual one that ran parallel to government foreign policy thinking. As the Chinese government became less worried about direct American aggression towards the United States, so too did the Chinese people. The idea of Americans as an imperialist bully that loomed over China slowly lost ground with the Chinese (Hinton, 1976, 26). Even though the Chinese government was in something of a dilemma, not being in particular good terms with either of the world's super powers, the Chinese leadership did not want itself to be perceived as weak. And so, because of the dire need of a détente with the United States to permit China to focus on the Soviet threat, the elites in Beijing justified the about-face in its relations with the United States by suggesting to the public that the Chinese government was dealing with Washington from a position of strength, rather than weakness. At least according to explanations given to

the people at the time, the Americans needed China, rather than the other way around. From the lens of the Chinese, Nixon's decisions to reduce American involvement in Southeast Asia, end naval patrols of the Taiwan Strait, and open up to China were attempts to reconcile with China by recognizing the United States' past mistakes (Hinton, 1976, 30-31).

However the public felt about the United States, most accepted rapprochement. Part of the reason behind this was the persuasiveness of Chinese propaganda and the party line. More importantly, however, was the significant impact that the effects of the Cultural Revolution had on the average Chinese's worldview. Because of the constant power struggle within the Communist Party, the party line shifted often and dramatically during the Cultural Revolution. People were punished for going against the party line one day, punished for going with the party line another day, punished for at one time going against the party line before the party line changed, it was all so confusing. By the end, there were few that escaped unscathed.

When it did end, most were content with leading their own private lives, focusing on improving their own wellbeing, and staying out of politics. And so while it is difficult to say whether the majority of Chinese populace did or did not support normalization of Sino-American relations, it came be said with some degree of certainty that they did not want to oppose it out of fear of repercussions. Even if there were those at the local level who were willing to adamantly challenge China's new policy towards the United States, as unlikely as it may be, their would-be primary advocate at the elite level, Lin Biao, died in a plane crash in 1971 (Hinton, 1976, 39).

The Lost Years

Before the 1970's, both the United States and China's primary concerns were overwhelming domestic. The United States was dealing with opposition to the Vietnam War and China was dealing with the Cultural Revolution. In order to resolve these problems, both countries attempted to alleviate pressure on the international stage. As it turned out, rapprochement of U.S.-China relations was an option that was mutually beneficial to both sides. It is, then, their domestic situations that created an environment which made possible the rapid revival of Sino-American relations (Hinton, 1976, 66). But, when things changed domestically for both countries after the early 1970's, bilateral relations changed as well.

For the Americans, the trouble began in the very early morning hours of June 17, 1972, when five men were arrested at the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate Hotel. The fallout from the incident kept the Nixon administration and the American public occupied for the next two years. Nixon's successor, Gerald Ford, was unable to salvage the Republican Party's image and in the 1976 presidential elections, Democrat Jimmy Carter was victorious. Meanwhile, the Chinese had their own leadership problems. The Chinese Communist Party found itself rearranging and cleaning house for two years after Mao Zedong passed away in September of 1976. In that time, Mao's wife and the rest of the Gang of Four were removed from power allowing Hua Guofeng, Mao's chosen successor, to come to power in late October. In effect, he was to continue the policies and guidelines set forth by Mao. But he soon fell out of favor with the CCP elites and was overtaken in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping, who favored a new direction for the CCP and China.

And so while there is evidence to suggest that Sino-American relations turned somewhat cold during the 1970's on the elite level, the majority of people on either side of the Pacific probably did not even notice (Hinton, 1976, 63-64, 77). Domestic affairs took precedence for both the Chinese and the Americans, a theme that underscores the nature of Sino-American relations, especially after Mao.

Deng and his Opening Up Reforms

When the political turmoil finally subsided, it was Deng that emerged as China's new leader. Along with his rehabilitation and rise to power, came new reforms for China, the first of which were the economic reforms, such as the "Four Modernizations" (*Si ge Xiandaihua*) and the "Opening Up Reforms" (*Gaige Kaifang*). Together the reforms signaled the institutionalization of a new type of socioeconomic structure, "socialism with Chinese characteristics" (*Juyou Zhongguo Tese de Shehuizhuyi*). The significance of these changes on Sino-American relations was enormous. The "Opening Up Reforms" allowed more exchange between the two countries than had been seen since "liberation" in 1949. Students, tourists, investors, and business people from both sides now had the opportunity to step foot on once forbidden lands. Accounts from those who made the journey indicate that many were impressed with the level of technological achievement that had been reached in the United States, while at the same time intrigued by the American attachment to ideals of individualism and faith in religion (Wang Ruoshui, 1989, 259-269).

Even Deng found his way to the United States in the first months of 1979, making him the first leader of the People's Republic of China to formally visit the U.S. The visit was a great

success. Pictures of Deng at the Kennedy Center being "serenaded" with the song "Getting to Know You", in a cowboy hat at a Texas rodeo, visiting an aircraft production facility in Seattle, paying his respects to Martin Luther King at his burial place in Georgia, and toying with a space shuttle simulator at NASA's headquarters in Houston, all did a great deal for the public image of both Deng and relations between the United States and China (Marlay and Neher, 1999, 66; Schoppa, 2006, 371). Sino-American relations, as Deng himself put it, "had entered into a new phase" (Xiong, 2006, 290).

Deng was right. For the next ten years, relations between the United States and China were probably warmer than most people had expected they could be. A series of bilateral agreements strengthened cooperation and exchange at every level and in every field, government-related or otherwise. The two governments were working with each other to tackle international problems, business people on both sides were looking for new opportunities, and Chinese and American students were learning from each other. The fact that by 1988 the Chinese student population was the single largest foreign student body in the United States is a testament to the success of efforts to increase exchange between the two countries (Li Hongshan, 2005, 50). As was the case before, as relations continued to prosper on the official level, so followed relations on the popular level. "Strong pro-American sentiment permeated Chinese society in the 1980s" (Li Hongshan, 2005, 49).

By the end of the 1980's, things could not have looked better for U.S.-China relations. For one, Beijing lucked out when George H.W. Bush came to office. If nothing else, Bush was a known quantity to the Chinese. The Chinese knew Bush. He had served as the Chief of the United States Liaison Office in China from 1974 to 1976 as an informal ambassador to the

Chinese government and was Vice President when he visited China again in 1985. But more than knowing Bush, their interactions with him had been quite pleasant. Bush was especially fond of China and had made it a priority on his foreign policy agenda. He visited the mainland just a little over a month after taking the presidency, breaking presidential precedent to do so by visiting Asia before Europe (Lampton, 2001, 17). Bush aptly summarized feelings on both side of the Pacific during a brief address at Chongmenwen Christian Church in Beijing on February 26, 1989:

> Today the relationship between China and the United States is good. We are launching satellites together. The students of both countries study at each other's great universities. And Chinese and Americans enjoy the cultural treasures of both nations. We compete against each other on the athletic field and in the economic arena, but we compete as friends (Bush, 1989).

Things would soon change and not for the better.

Those Ugly Days of June

The Tiananmen Square Massacre, more conservatively referred to in China as the Tiananmen "Incident" (*LiuSi* or *Tiananmen Shijian*), was, unequivocally, a major turning point in Sino-American relations. The differences in describing relations before June 1989 and after are so strikingly different that it is almost hard to believe one is describing relations between the same two countries. In a matter of hours, everything that had been so painfully fought for over the last decade or two by both sides simply fell apart.

To this day, a shroud of mystery hangs over a great many of the details about what exactly unfolded in the first days of June 1989. What is known is that during student demonstrations in the summer of 1989, things began to spiral out of control. When the

imposition of martial law failed to have any effect, PLA infantry and mechanized units were deployed to disperse the demonstrators. Whether it was the protestors or the military that initiated the engagement is unclear, but what was clear was that protestors and military personnel alike found themselves under attack. Protestors used anything that could be thrown, from rocks to Molotov cocktails. The soldiers, armed for combat, applied lethal force. Things quickly grew chaotic, with some reports indicating that either during the crackdown or in its aftermath, PLA forces began to engage not just protestors, but also each other (State Department, 1989). The consequences were terrible. Depending on the source consulted, estimates for the number of deaths (including both those of civilian and PLA soldiers) range anywhere from a couple hundred to several thousand. Why it happened or the exact details as to what happened are not nearly important to our discussion as what effect it had internationally after the fact.

The outcry was loud, fierce, and condemning. Leaders the world over expressed their denunciation of the Chinese government's handling of the crackdown. The United States was no exception. Congress was especially infuriated, calling for strong action to be taken against China and its leadership. The Bush administration was caught between the hope of isolating the Tiananmen incident from Sino-American relations and the need to respond firmly to appease voices on the home front (Lampton, 2001, 21-22). In the months and years that followed all the way up to the end of his presidency, Bush attempted unsuccessfully to rehabilitate relations, doing so against the wishes of many in the domestic political arena (Lampton, 2001, 27). As then Secretary of State James Baker noted in his memoirs, "For the remainder of 1989 – and indeed the rest of the Bush presidency – the Chinese relationship

essentially treaded water. Any real chance for forward motion died along with the demonstrators in the square that fateful June evening" (Baker, 1995, 112).

The Chinese did not respond very kindly to the criticism. They insisted that Tiananmen was an internal affair (Baker, 1995, 106). To make matters worse, many felt that the United States had been involved, directly or indirectly, in the student movement (Lampton, 2001, 28). Many, including Deng himself, felt that Tiananmen could not have happened without the explicit support of pro-democracy governments in the West (Wang Jianwei, 1998, 262). They believed that it was a crusade against China and that the West was trying to undermine the Chinese government (Xu, 1998, 238). China's elite believed that China's political independence as a sovereign nation was under attack (Wang Jianwei, 1998, 262). There are those that believe, even today, that students found assistance from the Central Intelligence Agency in orchestrating the demonstrations. The fact that one of the Chinese leadership's greatest irritants, Fang Lizhi, an outspoken dissident who was believed to have been connected to the movement, had been granted asylum in the American embassy after the violence began in June certainly did not help matters (Baker, 1995, 106-107).

Hardliners along with the more conservative elements within the Chinese government put pressure on Deng Xiaoping to stand firm in the face of foreign criticism and endorse the decisions made by military commanders in dissipating the protests (Lampton, 2001, 28). And so while Deng, like Bush, wanted to protect the progress that had been made in the U.S.-China relationship from the Tiananmen fallout, neither had much, if any, latitude to make the concessions necessary to improve relations without seeming soft on the other and further upsetting already tense domestic audiences. Privately Deng was, it has been rumored, very

upset that the crackdown was so bloody and drew so much attention, but could not express his dissatisfaction publicly (Marlay and Neher, 1999, 65). Deng knew that the damage from Tiananmen threatened U.S.-China relations, but also the reforms for which he had pushed so hard. In the end, Deng decided that it was better to appear firm but cruel than sympathetic but weak. And so whatever reservations he had about how the Tiananmen incident unfolded, he kept away from the public, and stood his ground:

> The US berates us for suppressing students. But when they handled domestic student unrest and turmoil, didn't they send out police and troops to arrest people and cause bloodshed? They were suppressing students and the people, but we are putting down a counter-revolutionary rebellion. What qualifications do they have to criticize us? (Marlay and Neher, 1999, 65).

The portrayal of the United States by the state-run Chinese media before and after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 is also telling. US condemnation of China's handling of the incident obviously effected a negative response from the government and even the population, most of whom are, to this day, not entirely aware of what actually happened at Tiananmen Square. Prior to the event, the mainstream media's coverage of the United States was relatively positive, but afterwards, the tune changed considerably, taking a noticeably more negative tone (Hong Junhao, 1998, 111-112). It was not that what was reported was fallacious, but instead that coverage concentrated on more negative topics and overly dramatized what would otherwise be relatively normal topics, for example: "'The American Way of Life Leads to Drugs', 'Gambling: Another Form of Pollution in the United States', and 'The Forgotten Child Laborers of the United States'" (Hong Junhao, 1998, 111-112).

Things were not simply tense on the government to government level, American public opinion of China went from 72% of Americans either having a "very favorable" or "favorable" opinion of China in February 1989 down to 34% in August 1989 (Lampton, 2001, 385). The American people were appalled by the brutality with which the Chinese quelled a movement, which, at least from the American standpoint, was advocating something as pure and righteous as democracy. In the days and months that followed, human rights groups, Chinese student dissidents, and other interest groups played their part to pull the American public onto their side (i.e. against the Chinese government). American attention, however, soon had other distractions. The fall of the Berlin Wall later in the year, along with the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union and a stunning victory in the First Gulf War soon drew American public attention away from China.

The Chinese shared the same degree of agitation but for very different reasons. The Chinese populace, who had been denied most of the relevant information about the protests by information control mechanisms within the Chinese government, did not understand why the international community and the United States were so insistent on interfering in China's domestic affairs. The high level of government censorship within the country meant that the overwhelming importance of the Tiananmen "Incident" was simply lost upon the majority of Chinese people because they either did not know it happened or, if they did, assumed that it was a relatively small incident. And so when the criticism and punitive action from the international community and the United States began rolling in, the Chinese were understandably irritated. The government needed only to feed the masses' vexation, and it did. State media and rhetoric encouraged antipathy towards the United States (Xu, 1998, 238-239).

When the Americans punished China with a series of political and economic sanctions, reviews of China's Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status, and opposition to the 2000 Olympic Games being held in Beijing, the Chinese became incensed (Li Hongshan, 2005, 50). What was painfully ironic was that Chinese intellectuals, a demographic that the United States thought they were supporting by denouncing government handling of Tiananmen student protests, also grew suspicious and even hostile towards the United States (Lampton, 2001, 28). To say that the two sides misunderstood each other would be a gross understatement.

The fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, changed Sino-American relations in two considerable ways. First and foremost, U.S. relations with China became less strategic in nature; after all, there was no common threat for them to ally against anymore (Garver, 2005, 203). Secondly, the perceived ideological victory over the Soviet Union injected an overwhelmingly confident sense of pride and elation that in turn asserted itself in the way that the United States dealt with China. And so, while the two sides had been able to look past their ideological differences since rapprochement, ideology reemerged as a central issue in their relationship. This became very apparent during and after 1989 when friction on human rights issues, especially those related to freedom of religion and democracy, began to cause sparks (Zi, 2004, 239). If anything, Tiananmen heightened American resolve to "change" China, and "help" it come out of the "darkness" of tyranny and communism that "plagued" it. George H.W. Bush's perceived softness on China and his unwillingness to confront Beijing on human rights or democracy as strongly as many back home would have liked cost him a great deal of support, even among those within his party. And so while it was "the economy, stupid," that cost him his reelection bid in 1992, his China policy certainly did not help.

The Clinton Years: Learning From Mistakes, 1993-1998

Though President Clinton is often lauded for bolstering America's image internationally, especially in comparison with his successor, his two terms in office were arguably the rockiest years the U.S.-China relationship had experienced since rapprochement. Part of this was inherited from the previous administration, which, four years after the fact, was still trying to contain the damage from Tiananmen. But a fair amount, if not most, of the tension was not inherited from the Bush years. During Clinton's eight years, there were at least five significant road bumps: a) the human rights link to the Most Favored Nation trade status (1993), b) the Taiwan crisis (1994-1996), c) Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization (April-November 1999), d) the suppression of the Falungong movement (April 1999) and e) the NATO air campaign in Yugoslavia (1999).

Because Clinton had attached special importance to human rights during his presidential campaign against incumbent George Bush, he was destined to run into a fair amount of friction with China. The MFN dilemma was but the first of such troubles. In May 1993, President Clinton issued Executive Order 128590, effectively making the renewal of MFN trade status dependent on its human rights record. It was a clear reversal of the MFN policy towards Chinaas implemented by Bush, who did not believe that linking MFN status with human rights would result in "progress on human rights, arms control, or trade", but instead "weaken [Chinese] ties to the West and further repression" (Bush, 1992). The Executive Order was, in essence, an ultimatum, one that China's leaders could not accept without appearing to have caved in to Western demands (Gries, 2005, 105-106). A year later, it appeared that Bush was right. On May 26, 1994, Clinton reversed his decision. Despite American dissatisfaction with

China's human rights record, the United States could simply not forgo the economic opportunities that would simply be lost to America's competitors if MFN status was not renewed (Lampton, 2001, 44-45).

At about the same time that Clinton rescinded his Executive Order, one of America's old allies started to make waves. Desperate for recognition as at least a semi-legitimate nation in the international community, Taiwan had elected Lee Teng-hui (*Li Denghui*). After taking office, Lee adopted a controversial "'flexible' and 'vacation' diplomacy" strategy, wherein Lee would seek out as many opportunities as possible a) to travel abroad in either an official or unofficial capacity and b) to participate in functions hosted by international organizations (Lampton, 2001, 46). The goal was to at increase Taiwan's international legitimacy as a player on the world stage (Lampton, 2001, 46). Of the countries that Lee intended to visit was, it should be of no surprise, the United States. Lee's first attempt was in May 1994, when he scheduled a stop in Hawaii. The attempt was unsuccessful. The State Department decided not to permit Lee to leave the airport, fearing that doing so would send the wrong message to Beijing. Many politicians in Washington denounced the decision, and opening the door for Lee's second trip to the United States in June 1995. If Lee's layover was a worry for the State Department in 1994, his second trip was a nightmare. This time Lee was not stopping in the U.S. en route to another destination; this time the destination was the U.S. The visit was seemingly innocuous. Lee was to visit and make an address at an alumni reunion at Cornell University, his alma mater.

The PRC leadership took action to make it clear that it was not amused. The response was two-pronged, intended to send a clear message to Taiwan, but to the United States as well. Beijing recalled its ambassador to the United States in mid-June and then delayed approval of

the new U.S. ambassador to China (Lampton, 2001, 52). The message to Taiwan was much louder. A month after Lee's visit, the PLA began noticeably large-scale military exercises near the Taiwan Strait, inclusive of missile tests and amphibious landings. A second set of exercises was conducted in March of 1996 and included more missile and live-fire tests, but this time with the armaments landing much closer to Taiwan than in the first set of exercises. Washington protested loudly to the Chinese and dispatched two carrier battle groups to the vicinity. Both sides were flirting with brinkmanship. It was a situation becoming more dangerous, more quickly than either side expected or wanted.

Recognizing the danger of actual conflict inherent in their actions, American and Chinese leaders took a step back and engaged each other in a series of dialogues. Learning from the misevaluations and underestimations that made the Taiwan crisis possible, the two sides agreed on a "constructive strategic partnership," one that was formalized during Jiang Zemin's visit to the United States in 1997. The United States and China agreed to take the necessary precautions to avoid the mistakes and missteps that had been made during Clinton's first term, and to strive for a lasting cooperation with the Chinese. Part of this entailed what became known as Clinton's "Three No's" policy, whereby the United States would not support Taiwan's independence, the idea of one China and one Taiwan, and Taiwan's membership in any international organizations where statehood was a prerequisite. The idea was to minimize the dangerously volatile catalyzing effect Taiwan could have on Sino-American relations. In the years after the Taiwan crisis, the government-to-government relationship gradually improved. All evidence seems to suggest that Jiang and Clinton had a relatively strong working relationship with each other during this time. Jiang's successful visit to the United States was reciprocated

by Clinton in 1998, when he visited China for nine days in June, a visit which was also considered a success. The two found common ground on a variety of issues, among which were nuclear policy and human rights (Zheng, 2000, 100).

The Clinton Years: Not Yet In the Clear, 1999

The progress in the relationship that had been achieved in the three years after the Taiwan Straits crisis, however, was soon to be dashed in the fateful year of 1999. The first of many points of tension began that spring. The US-led NATO intervention in The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in March 1999 marked the second human rights-related predicament for China and the United States. China was necessarily opposed to international intervention into what it considered the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation, regardless of the human rights situation. If the international community was allowed to assert itself into Yugoslavia, then Taiwan or Tibet could be next, and China simply could not permit that to happen. Despite successfully blocking a UN incursion, China was unable to stop NATO from taking its own initiative. Relative to the big picture, this disagreement seemed relatively minor. This, however, was only when things started to deteriorate.

High-level exchanges were scheduled in the beginning of the next month to finalize an agreement that would allow China to join the World Trade Organization. At great cost to the CCP leadership's support within the Party, China reluctantly agreed to a list of concessions in order to guarantee their entry into the WTO (Lampton, 2001, 58). But the Clinton administration had domestic troubles of its own. He was worried that he would not be able to garner sufficient congressional support to see the agreement through and, even if he were able

to push the agreement through Congress, he would lose the labor voting bloc, which opposed Chinese ascension into the WTO, that Al Gore needed for the upcoming 2000 election (Lampton, 2001, 58). Clinton backed out of the agreement. The Chinese were more than unpleased.

Then, later in April, the relationship was tested a fourth time, and the timing could not have been any more inopportune. Nearly ten years after Tiananmen, the semi-political, semi-religious Falungong movement managed to organize one of the most successful demonstrations in PRC history right outside CCP national headquarters. Nervously awed by the group's ability to organize with such effectiveness and worried about the group's political aims, CCP leadership took action to forcibly pacify the demonstrations and illegalize the movement. Though the Chinese leadership claimed its actions were necessary for national stability, it raised doubts to China's already questionable commitment to human rights, adding fire to the already heated WTO debate (Lampton, 2001, 56-59). Human rights groups, Chinese dissidents, and various interest groups, indeed many of the same who had protested the Tiananmen crackdown, applied pressure on Washington. It was the third time since 1993 that human rights-related issues had strained the U.S-China relationship.

But none of the prior developments held a candle to what happened next. On May 7, the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was bombed by precision-guided munitions from an American B-2 bomber, claiming the lives of three Chinese nationals and injuring nearly two dozen more. The United States claimed it was an accident, but China alleged it was intentional. Deliberate or otherwise was of little consequence. A terrifying whirlwind of anti-Americanism spread throughout China among the many who were outraged by the murder of three of their own. From the Chinese perspective, it was as if the United States had intended to gradually repress

China by way of a series of humiliations, with each one more insufferable than the last. The bombing of the Chinese embassy was the last straw; the Chinese people were no longer to be held back any longer by American hegemonism. Demonstrations exploded around China and they enjoyed wide support. One 2000 survey reported that of the 557 university students surveyed, 64.3 percent of them participated in some type of demonstration (Li Hongshan, 52, 2005).

After the bombing, the United States immediately went into damage control mode. The Clinton administration issued a series of both formal and informal apologies to the Chinese people and its leaders. Towards the end of June, the United States prepared a compensation package to cover for the physical damages done to Chinese property and Chinese citizens. It is also of no coincidence that just a few months after the bombing, the United States and China finally reached an agreement on Chinese membership into the WTO, an agreement that was more or less the same in content as the offer made in April that had been rejected (Lampton, 2001, 62).

The Chinese government was initially unmoved. The Chinese did not accept formal apologies from Clinton, suspended dialogues on a range of issues from human rights to WTO accession, denied previously permitted American military access to Hong Kong, and not only encouraged Chinese protests against the United States, but facilitated them (Lampton, 2001, 59-61). Yet, slowly but surely the situation normalized, making the November agreement on WTO membership for China possible.

The Clinton Years: Public Perception during the 1990's

Generally speaking, Chinese opinion of the United States during the 1990's, much like official relations, reached low points unseen since the 1970's. It was during this time that the distinction between nationalism and anti-Americanism disappeared. Antagonism for the United States pervaded through every level of Chinese society, from the government to the intellectuals down to the public (Xu, 1998, 236).

Polls conducted during this time reflected this reality. One survey conducted in 1995 reported that nearly 60% of young people chose the United States as the country they looked least favorably upon and nearly 90% considered it the nation that was the least friendly nation towards China (Li Hongshan, 2005, 50). Conducted in 1995 and 1997, Yu Gouming's survey showed that about 75% of Beijingers surveyed "considered the United States […] either [a] 'threatening' or the 'most threatening'" country (Chen Jie, 2001, 255). Another survey conducted by Shi Tianjian in 1988 and again in 1996 revealed that the percentage of Beijing residents surveyed that either "like[d]" or "like[d] very much" the United States dropped from 48% to 23%, with those that "dislike[d]" or "dislike[d] very much" jumping from 14% to 27% (Zheng, 2000, 116). Shi also conducted nationwide survey between 1993 and 1994 with the help of the People's University of China's Social Survey Research Center. This survey observed that about 50% of those surveyed either "dislike[d]" or "dislike[d] very much" the United States with only 25% who "like[d]" or "like[d] very much" the United States. The People's University of China's Public Opinion Research Institute's survey conducted in Beijing in November of 1999 found that about 75% of respondents felt that the United States "has hostile intentions against [China's] vital interests and security" and that about 85% felt that the United States "has the

military and/or economic power that poses a real and immediate danger to [China]" (Chen Jie, 2001, 255-256, 262).

Chinese publications painted a similar picture. Most telling was a best-selling book written by five young Chinese authors and published in 1996 that sold 400,000 copies in the first four months and two million copies by the end of 1996 (Xu, 1998, 241; Zhao, 2004, 69). The book, entitled *China Can Say No* (*Zhongguo Keyi Shuo Bu*), specifically criticized American policy towards China and asserted that China should say "no" to the pressure and demands that the West was placing on China and "no" to American policies of Chinese "containment" (Li Hongshan, 2005, 52; Zhao, 2004, 69). The authors asserted that "the nineteenth century was the century of humiliation for the Chinese. The twentieth century has been the century that the Chinese experienced all kinds of sufferings in the mankind … the twenty-first century will be the century for the Chinese to restore its glory" (Song et al. qtd. in Zhao, 2004, 69). The book was so popular that the authors came out with a sequel in the same year, *China Still Can Say No* [*Zhongguo Haishi Neng Shuo Bu*] and a series of other "say no" books followed (e.g. *How China Can Say No* [*Zhongguo Heyi Shuo Bu*], *Chinese Currency Can Say No* [*Renminbi Keyi Shuo Bu*]) (Zhao, 2004, 69). But the "say no" books were by no means the only books critical of the United States and its policy to be published during that time. A "hot pick" list of books critical of U.S. China policy released in just that same year alone included: "*China-U.S. Military Confrontations: Before and After* (*ZhongMei Junshi Duikang: Qianqian Houhou*) by Hong Yonghong, Zhou Hubin, Chen Xiaohong, and Yang Yuemei; *The Grand Portrait of Sino-American Contests* (*ZhongMei Duikang Da Xiezhen*) by Chen Feng, Zhao Xingyan, Huan Zhaoyu, Yang Mingjie, and Yuan Xiqing; *The Oceanic Wind: The Game Rules of the Two World Class Nations*

(*Dayang Jifeng: Liangge Shijie Daguo De Youxi Guize*) by Xi Laiwang and 15 other authors; *Stop Taiwan from Independence: No Promise on Not Using Force* (*Ezhi Taidu: Bu Chengnuo Fangqi Wuli*) by Zhang Shan and Xiao Weizhong, and *Containing China: Myth and Reality* (*Ezhi Zhongguo: Shenghua Yu Xianshi*) by Sun Keqin and Cui Hongjian" (Li Hongshan, 2005, 51).

How did Chinese attitudes towards the United States turn so sour so quickly? Of course it can be argued that it was merely miscalculations and misunderstandings in an uncertain domestic and international climate that spurred a fateful and unfortunate turn of events. This rationale, however, ignores the key catalysts that permitted Chinese impressions of the United States to deteriorate to the extent with the speed that it did.

Two things in particular occurred during the very last years of the 1980's and then the 1990's that provided the catalyst for an unfortunate turn in Sino-American relations and Chinese perception of the United States. The first was the fall of the Soviet Union, the significance of which was somewhat similar and yet very different for the Americans and the Chinese. For the Americans, victory over the former Soviet Union validated U.S. ideological superiority. Consequently Americans grew more confident in their efforts to export American values and systems (e.g. democracy, capitalism) abroad. Ironically, the Chinese saw the fall of the Soviet Union also as a type of ideological victory. The Chinese succeeded in their implementation of Communism where the Soviets had failed. For evidence of this, one needed to look no further than the "miraculous" growth in China's economy.

The translation of this triumph spirit into a way of thinking and later, policy, had worrisome ramifications for the U.S.-China relationship. A reminiscent international situation and prevailing ideological leanings in the United States made the prolongation of the Cold War

mindset justifiable. China was a rapidly rising power that could boast the world's largest standing army and, perhaps worst of all, was governed by communists with little regard for human rights or democracy. The shoe fit almost too easily. China was the new Soviet Union and as such it became the United States' new public enemy (Zi, 2004, 240). Concern at the popular level was echoed by policymakers and academics. Believing that the Chinese threat was real, there was much discussion as to how China could be successfully contained in the same way that the USSR had (Zi, 2004, 240). This idea that China could be "contained" and somehow pressured into a "peaceful evolution" whereby its communist tendencies could be worn away, not surprisingly, greatly offended Chinese sensibilities. The Chinese were not the Soviets, and it was not entirely apparent that Americans realized that.

Secondly, the tragedies in Rwanda, Kosovo, and Darfur increasingly shook Americans and convinced many that if there was a morally justifiable need to intervene into the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation, then so be it (Power, 2002, 503). As a result, the concept of sovereignty began to change in the United States and in the Western world among not just activists and academics, but among policymakers as well. The Chinese were less enthusiastic about this change. For a significant portion of the age of imperialism, it had been Chinese sovereignty that had been encroached upon and violated. In the eyes of the Chinese, sovereignty was understandably important, and the idea of foreign intervention without regard for it brought back painfully bitter memories (Zi, 2004, 240).

And so, when the Clinton administration linked human rights with MFN trade status, when human rights activists protested Beijing's bid for the Olympics, when demonstrators advocated Tibetan independence from China, when concerned Americans called for a change in

China's One Child Policy, and when Darfur activists objected to Chinese investment in Sudan, the two sides came away with very different impressions. However altruistic the Americans thought they were being, to the Chinese, it appeared as though the United States, having secured its place as the sole superpower, was intent on pursuing hegemonic policies to hold China down (Chen Shengluo, 2003, 10). The Americans believed that they were advocating for what was morally right and hoped that their actions would be seen as an incentive for China to improve itself. Of course the Chinese did not see it as such, but rather as interference into Chinese domestic affairs, impeding China's opportunities for further growth and success (Sutter, 2000, 47).

Radically different interpretations of developments during the 1990's, such as the ones highlighted above, led to mutual misunderstanding, and mutual misunderstanding to mutual resentment. The more Americans grew suspicious and hostile towards China, the more those attitudes stirred similar Chinese opinions. Indeed, American opinion of China during Clinton's administration can hardly be characterized as "friendly." Americans, especially after the Taiwan incident, were worried about China. The idea of China as a competitor, if not an enemy, slowly became accepted by the American populace. Finding movies, books, even video games where China was painted as America's rival was not at all an arduous task during the 1990's. The Chinese were well aware of this. Articles like Charles Crauthammer's "Why We Should Contain China" and Samuel Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations?" found themselves cited in Chinese publications as evidence that the United States saw China as an enemy and was intent on treating it as such (Li Hongshan, 2005, 52; Gries, 2004, 40-41; Xu, 1998, 244).

The rapid deterioration of Sino-American relations and the sharp decline in Chinese impressions of the United States cannot simply be blamed on unfortunate mishaps. The tense environment of distrust and hostility allowed events like the embassy bombing to spiral out of control with the rapidity that they did. Large-scale misunderstanding caused Chinese and American public sentiments to become more hostile, which in turn constricted the range of policy options that both sides' governments could take. As a result, when disaster struck, neither side had much room to maneuver out of the predicament, and things quickly took a turn for the worst.

The Macro Conclusion

By placing Chinese perceptions of the United States in the context of the history of Sino-American relations, we can make conclusions to help reveal the nature of Chinese perceptions towards the United States. These general observations will help us formulate hypotheses on how these sentiments function on an individual level, hypotheses than can be evaluated in the micro level analysis to follow.

Below are the observations that can be made about Chinese perceptions of the United States at the macro level. They are organized within the structure of the theoretical framework.

Socialization influences values

Two important factors in the Chinese socialization process are a) exposure to the media and b) education attainment.

The setup of the Chinese system of governance affords the Chinese Communist Party great latitude in how they interact with the media. Although publicly Chinese newspaper

editors may vehemently disagree with the assertion that the Chinese media is being suppressed by government censorship, incidents such as the closing of the Chinese journal, *Freezing Point* (*BingDian*) and the dismissal of some of its senior editors and an investigative reporter by the Chinese government in early 2006 strongly suggests the contrary. Heuvel and Dennis assert that the leanings of the media in Communist countries tend to correspond largely with the foreign policy of those countries. That is to say, the whether the media will portray another country in a positive, negative, or neutral light depends on whether such a bias is fitting to the political needs of the government (Heuvel and Dennis, qtd. in Hong Junhao, 1998, 111-112). That is not to say that the stories that are printed or reported on are inaccurate or untrue, but rather that more of a certain type of story will be prevalent in the media (Heuvel and Dennis, qtd. in Hong Junhao, 1998, 111-112). It is, then, the sudden prevalence of certain types of stories in the Chinese media that can induce shifts in Chinese public opinion.

Education has always played a fundamental role in China, largely because of the influence of Confucianism in Chinese culture. One needs but a brief review of Sino-American relations to see that it is often the intellectuals who lead popular movements in China. From the May Fourth Movement to the protests after the 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade it is easy to see that intellectuals and academics play an undeniably important part in the formulation of Chinese attitudes. Their leadership in these movements, many with an anti-American temperament, may give the impression that intellectuals themselves are anti-American. This is not the case. Chinese intellectuals are not anti-American, rather they are highly nationalistic. It is here that the distinction between nationalism and anti-Americanism is critically important. Chinese intellectuals do not hate the United States. Acutely aware of the

painful history that their country endured during its "century of humiliation," they long for China to return to its once held position of greatness. It is only when American actions and interests conflict with this end that the intellectuals target the United States. In fact, I argue that because they were socialized in an education system that has been heavily influenced by the America education system and places American education in great esteem, intellectuals are actually inclined to be partial to the United States.

Similar values produce greater affinity

China's Opening Up Reforms opened China to the whole new range of opportunities for economic development, but also to an influx of foreign cultures and ideas. It is this exposure to these cultures and ideas that have created an environment wherein these cultures and ideas could be accepted, consciously or subconsciously. As a result, Western ideas about democracy and religion have grown in popularity in China since the Opening Up.

Having not lived through the darker hours of Sino-American relations and being most able to conform and adapt in the new fast paced environment, Chinese youth are most exposed to these foreign influences and are thereby most likely to accept the new values that these foreign cultures and ideas offer. Today the younger generations of China look abroad to define, among other things, their fashion, music tastes, hobbies.

Because the Opening Up has allowed to American values and the American lifestyle to take root in China, especially among the youth, there is greater possibility that Chinese people will these influences as part of their life and thereby be more likely to look favorably towards the United States.

Affinity results when there are benefits to be gained

While the effects that the influx of culture and ideas had on China are important, it was the economic effects that the designers of the Opening Up Reforms had in mind when the initiated those policies. In this regard, the Opening Up had changed China in two ways, it changed the Chinese mindset and it created more opportunities.

The Chinese before the Opening Up had been indoctrinated to despise material selfishness and instead sacrifice oneself for the good of the nation. The Opening Up completely changed this mindset. Deng encouraged the Chinese to pursue their material self interests, arguing that by bettering themselves, they were bettering the country. "To get rich is glorious," he said. As a result of this change, the image of the United States changed as well. Under Mao, the United States was often looked as a hellhole of inequity driven by capitalist exploitation, but after the Opening Up, the United States became a model of success. The prosperity and luxuries that Americans enjoyed were no longer considered evil, but rather something to strive for.

In addition to changing how the Chinese saw the world, the Opening Up also provided a multitude of new opportunities for the Chinese to pursue. Foreign development in China and business opportunities abroad were the most apparent of these opportunities, but opportunities for students to study abroad and opportunities for travelers to visit foreign destinations were also created after the Opening Up. Businesspeople wanted to travel to the United States for economic gain, students wanted to travel to the United States to learn in the American education system, and tourists wanted to travel to the United States to see what life was like in that far off country. Because the United States became a model of success, American became a place where people wanted to go to in order to pursue their dreams.

Perception of threat effects resentment

The Chinese perception of threat stems from two causes.

The first is China's inferior national economic and military capability vis-à-vis the United States. The Chinese are very much aware of their nation's weakness in comparison with the United States and it gives them a reason to feel threatened by the United States.

Weakness alone, however, does not produce this feeling; it merely provides an environment where it is possible to feel threatened. What solidifies this feeling of endangerment are the ideological differences between the United States and China that cause tension points in Sino-American relations. In recent years, the United States has, at times, been quite forceful in its promotion of democracy and human rights. Feeling as though their sovereignty and political independence was under threat, the Chinese became defensive and highly nationalistic.

In such an environment, it is easy to become tense or even hostile. It should be no surprise then that these feelings of endangerment forced the Chinese to look very unfavorably at the United States.

THE MICRO LEVEL: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SHI TIANJIAN SURVEY

Introduction to the Micro Level

A Note about Surveys

Surveys are one the best tools available to understand public sentiment regarding a certain topic at a given point in time. Straight and to the point, surveys force the respondent to directly answer the questions that are of interest to the researcher. With these answers one can create a snapshot of how people feel. But, like pictures, surveys cannot reveal what is not captured in that snapshot, one cannot assume that a person in a picture wore the same blue shirt the day after the picture was taken. Likewise, one cannot assume that because Chinese on the mainland feel a certain way, that those in Hong Kong also feel that way, or that because sentiments in 1993 leaned in one direction, then the same would be true even two years later. The data and its analysis only have meaning within the parameters established when the survey was conducted. Understanding these limitations is a prerequisite to fully grasping the wealth of information that is offered via survey analysis.

Surveys in China

Nationwide surveys on political issues in China are, for a number of reasons, exceedingly difficult to find. First, there is the logistical nightmare of attempting to create a representative

sample of a nation that happens to be the world's most populous and one of the largest in terms of land area. The list of potential impediments to a successful survey goes on longer than most are willing to listen to. From the lack of anything resembling accurate government records to numerous geographic challenges, surveying in China is, in a word, difficult. That is not to mention the tight controls that the government has on anything and everything that is considered sensitive to the nation's and/or Party's interests. It is because of these obstacles that there is such a great value placed on the surveys that do exist.

Introduction to the Shi Tianjian Survey

Shi Tianjian, an associate professor of political science who specializes in comparative politics at Duke University, conducted, in conjunction with the People's University of China's Social Survey Research Center (*Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Shehui Diaocha Zhongxin*), one of the more recent, reliable, and comprehensive surveys of mainland Chinese political attitudes entitled "Survey on Social Mobility and Social Change in China" ("*Shehui Bianqian yu Shehui Yishi*"). The survey, which was conducted between September 1993 and June 1994, employed a "stratified multistage area sampling procedure" to select a sample representative of the adult population (i.e. over the age of 18) "residing in family households" in the People's Republic of China (excluding Tibet and Taiwan) (Shi Tianjian, 2001, 416). Shi utilized the data from his survey in a publication entitled "Cultural Values and Political Trust: A Comparison of the People's Republic of China and Taiwan" that appeared in the July 2001 issue of *Comparative Politics* (Shi Tianjian, 2001). The introduction to his survey that appeared in the aforementioned publication may be found in Appendix I. The complete survey questionnaire in

both its original Chinese and English translation versions may be found online at the source listed as "1993 Survey."

Each variable that will be mentioned in the discussion that follows is derived directly from a certain question in the Shi Tianjian survey. The underlined number and letter combinations that appear in parenthesis besides each variables throughout the micro level analysis indicates the question number that the variable is associated with (e.g. (110B)). Should it be of any interest, the exact wording of the English translation of these questions associated with the variables below may be found in Appendix IV using these question numbers.

The Survey's Relevance to This Study

This survey offers researchers a rare glimpse into mainland Chinese political sentiment during the time in which it was conducted. It is useful for this study because it not only asks the respondents how they feel about the United States, but it also asks them a number of other questions that could prove useful in determining what explanatory variables possibly contribute to the aforementioned feelings. The ultimate goal, then, is to use the data from this survey to create a regression model that can control the effect of other factors while the effect of a certain variable on the dependent variable (i.e. Chinese perception of the U.S.) is ascertained. This, in turn, will show whether or not the data supports the hypotheses stated below.

Hypotheses

Using the theoretical framework as a guideline and based upon conclusions made in the macro level analysis, there is evidence to support that attitudes towards the United States will tend to be more favorable by those who are:

- more supportive of democracy and democratic principles
- more educated
- younger
- more informed
- more exposed to foreign media
- less exposed to domestic media
- benefited from economic reforms
- more confidence in the Chinese government

More supportive of democracy and democratic principles. The United States has long strived to be the beacon of the free world. George W. Bush's presidential administration has made the global promotion of democracy a centerpiece in its foreign policy. At least part of the reasoning behind this is that democracies will create future governments friendly to the United States and that like-minded people, or, perhaps more correctly, people who hold similar values, inherently find a sense of rapport in their commonality. Accordingly those who support democracy and its principles should be more likely to exhibit affinity with the United States than those who do not.

More educated. There have been a couple ways to explain why it is that with more education, Chinese are more likely to look favorably at the United States.

The first explanation points to the high degree of influence that American education has on the Chinese education system and those that are part of it. Especially at the higher levels of the education system (i.e. high school, undergraduate, and graduate), there is a certain degree of respect and admiration for the United States' education system. This esteem stems from the relative availability of educational resources, the comparatively liberal nature of the American higher education system, and the contrast in the range of opportunities after the successful completion of an upper-level education program between the United States and China (Chen Shengluo, 2003, 15-16). In the same way that Americans expect good students to go to Ivy

League schools, the good students in China do not stay in China to study, but leave, usually for the United States or Great Britain (Chen Shengluo, 2003, 17). Indeed, traditionally many of the professors at China's best universities earned their degrees in the United States or Great Britain (Cheng Shengluo, 2003, 22). This influence that American education has over the Chinese education system, and thereby those who go through it, suggests that the more education one has attained in such a system, the more likely he/she is to look favorably towards the United States.

The second explanation is a slight variation of Gamson and Modigliani's "enlightenment model," which suggests that "with increasing knowledge and sophistication, people are more likely to reject belligerent policies" (Gamson and Modigliani, 1966, 187-188). Instead, Sun Yinian, a professor of Sino-Japanese history at the Harbin Institute of Technology, suggests that with increasing education comes greater reasoning skills and more sophistication in the processing of ideas. Thus with more education, there is greater likelihood that one will use reason (*lixing*) rather than emotion (*ganqing*) in the determination of his/her attitudes. Emotion-driven evaluation tends to lead to sharp bursts of extreme sentiment that vacillate greatly depending upon the influence of new developments, even relatively insignificant ones. Reason-driven evaluation, in contrast, is less likely to be significantly swayed by smaller developments because it is well conceived and grounded in firm arguments and is therefore more durable. Why then should greater reason be partial to favorable attitudes towards the United States? This is because if international relations is approached from the vantage point of reason, conflicts between states are understood not as a struggle between right and wrong, but rather as a disagreement of national interests. Understanding that the United States is

neither intrinsically good nor bad and, furthermore, is a necessary partner for China if it is to develop further allows a greater likelihood of actually liking the United States. It is for this reason that the more education one has, the more likely he/she is likely to look favorable towards the United States.

Younger. To characterize the change that China has experienced in the past hundred or so years as "dramatic" would still be an understatement. Consequently gaps of understanding between generations in China are exceedingly difficult to bridge. Those that did not witness China's years of resistance against the Japanese, the civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists, the Korean War, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, or the Opening Up Reforms can never fully comprehend the experiences of those who did. The quickening of the pace of change in China today has made this gap even wider. Because the Opening Up Reforms has drastically improved the standard of living and exposure to the world, latter generations of Chinese have grown up and been socialized in a China where traditional tea shops can be found next door to Western fast food chains, where American hip hop is just as easy to find on the radio as Chinese folk songs, where food stores offer delicacies from New York as well as Shanghai. The younger generations subconsciously accept the presence of foreign influences and the intricate way in which China is entangled in a global community. The older generations, on the other hand, do not understand this. For those that grew up before the Opening Up and spent most of their lives believing in China's ability to be self-sufficient and independent, the China of today is quite a change, perhaps an unwelcomed change. It should then be expected that the younger one is, the more he/she has been will accept rather than

reject foreign influences and, consequently look favorable toward foreign countries rather than unfavorable.

Less exposed to domestic media. It has been posited in other studies that exposure to "political communications" tends to promote conformity to the mainstream political leaning contained within that information (Chen Jie, 2001, 259-260). Because the domestic media is largely, if not exclusively, controlled by government and the Chinese Communist Party, greater exposure to domestic media should increase adherence to the Party line and government policies. That being said, tensions on the government-to-government level between the U.S. and China were high in 1993. Consequently the state media, beginning in January of that year, began to verbally "attack" the United States government (Xu, 1998, 239). Official relations did not improve, and therefore state media did not cease its assaults, until sometime after the Taiwan Straits crisis ended in 1996. This means that the domestic media (read: state media) would have been very aggressive towards the United States during the entire time that data for this survey was being collected, which was from September 1993 to June 1994. It should therefore be expected that the less one was exposed to domestic media, the more likely he/she was to have favorable views of the United States.

More exposed to foreign media. Those that are more exposed to foreign media are also, in turn, more exposed to foreign values, ideas and culture. Because of the prevalence of American values, ideas, and culture in mainstream international culture, more exposure to foreign ideas and culture will also tend to entail more exposure to American values, ideas and culture (Chen Shengluo, 2003, 20). With greater exposure comes greater chances of

acceptance. Therefore, those that are more exposed to foreign media should also be more likely to hold favorable views of the United States.

Benefited from economic reforms. Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms in the late 1970's changed China in nearly every way imaginable. It not only changed the outdated state-planned economic system, but also the mindset of the Chinese people. Longing for the material things in life were no longer shunned as they once were under Mao, but rather were encouraged. In Deng Xiaoping's own words, "To get rich is glorious" (*zhifu guangrong*). This new emphasis on improving the nation and one's own situation in tangible, hard economic terms also changed the Chinese worldview. The developed nations, most especially the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan, were no longer evil capitalist pigs, but were objects of envy and models for success. Those, then, that have gained from economic reforms should be more supportive of China's newfound economic direction and the new mindset. Thereby those who have benefited from economic reforms should also be more inclined to look favorably on the United States because, with the possible exception of the American political system, the U.S. is the advanced and developed nation that the new China hopes to become.

More confidence in the Chinese government. With greater confidence in one's own government and his/her nation's capabilities, there is less of a perceived threat from external sources. This has been a hypothesis put forth and supported in several studies concerning China as well as general threat perception theory (Chen Jie, 2001, 259). The more assured one is in the military, economic, and political power of his/her own country, the more like he/she is to feel less threatened by foreign threats (Chen Jie, 2001, 261). And whereas a decrease in perceived threat does not necessarily constitute greater affinity for that outside source, there is

undeniably greater room to look favorably on a nation when he/she is not threatened by it. Accordingly, the greater confidence one has in his/her own government and his/her nation's capabilities, the more likely he/she is to feel less threatened, and the more likely he/she is to look favorably upon the United States.

Methodology

Before any statistical analysis could be conducted, the Shi Tianjian survey was reviewed for questions relevant to this study. Of course the most important question in the survey was that which asked whether or not the respondent liked the United States (*Nin xihuan buxihuan xiamian zhexie guojia? Meiguo*) (110B). Because this study is not only interested in how mainland Chinese feel about the United States, but also what explanatory variables could potentially help explain that sentiment, the survey's impressive variety of questions on a range of subject matters was quite helpful. Based upon the assumption that basic demographics, socioeconomic status, socialization, and political attitudes play some role in determining one's perception of foreign countries, questions were categorized within those headings into the following subsets: basic demographics, education, media exposure, financial and economic situation, personal politics, confidence in China, attitudes towards democracy, attitudes internal reform, attitudes towards foreign countries, interpersonal factors, and miscellaneous. There were 199 variables from these questions that were considered relevant to this study, falling into the following four broad categories: basic demographics, socioeconomic status, socialization, and political attitudes. Of these questions, those that were considered most relevant and most representative of the categories that were being examined were selected for

statistical analysis. A complete breakdown of the classification of questions relevant to this study may be found in Appendix II and III.

Having reviewed the survey and classified the questions, I began statistical analysis, starting with the most basic operations and, building on that, tackling the more difficult ones. First I created a frequency distribution with the question of whether or not the survey respondents liked the United States.

From there cross tabulation operations were conducted to evaluate whether or not the stated hypotheses were correct by determining what effect, if any, the various explanatory variables had on the dependent variable (i.e. sentiment towards the United States). In order to conclude whether or not there was any effect, the chi squared statistics was first analyzed to see whether or not the cross tabulation was statistically significant at the 0.05 level (using a two-sided test) and, if it indeed was, then whether or not any discernable trend could be derived from it. With some cross tabulations the chi squared statistic was adequately large enough but no real trend was apparent or, with other cross tabulations, a very strong trend was evident in the data but the chi squared statistic was too low to be considered statistically significant; when the data exhibited either of these types of cases (i.e. that either the chi squared statistic or trend was insufficiently significant), that cross tabulation was classified as inconclusive.

Knowing what variables were most significant in the cross tabulations greatly helped in the process of selecting variables with strong explanatory power for the regression analysis. The idea was to reduce the number of variables in the regression model so as to avoid the possible problem of collinearity between highly related variables within a category.

Finally, several regression models were constructed with the variables that had been selected from the cross tabulations. After checking whether they were statistically significant or not, the partial regression coefficients of the variables were used to determine what effect that independent variable had on the dependent variable holding all other variables constant and therefore whether or not that variable's effect supported the hypothesis with which it was associated.

A Chinese View of America: The Basic Frequency Distribution



Figure 1: Frequency Distribution, Respondents' Impressions of the United States

Preliminary analysis of the data revealed that 49% of respondents stated that they either disliked (*bu tai xihuan*) or disliked very much (*hen bu xihuan*) the United States compared with the 25% that stated they either liked (*xihuan*) or liked very much (*hen xihuan*) the United States.

As can be seen in Table 1, when asked the same question about other countries, 46% of respondents stated they disliked or disliked very much Japan and 30% stated they either liked or liked very much Japan (110C). 48% disliked or disliked very much Russia while 17% liked or liked very much Russia (110A). Germany was disliked or disliked very much by 45% of respondents, but liked or liked very much by 18% (110D).

Table 1: Distribution Comparison of Respondents' Impressions of Foreign Countries

	Dislike Very Much	Dislike	Like	Like Very Much	No Response
United States	19.9%	29.2%	21.0%	3.9%	26.0%
Japan	21.7%	24.5%	25.5%	4.7%	23.7%
Russia	17.2%	31.0%	15.4%	1.9%	34.6%
Germany	17.9%	27.5%	15.7%	2.2%	36.6%

The Influence of Various Explanatory variables: Cross Tabulations

It is most fitting to explain the influence of the various explanatory variables on perception of the United States in terms of the aforementioned hypotheses that are being tested.

More supportive of democracy and democratic principles. In order to evaluate this hypothesis, four variables were analyzed: whether or not too many parties bring chaos (43J), whether or not it is necessary to expand democracy now (81C), whether or not it is good for more and more people to voice their opinions about government policies (111O), and whether or not the respondent's country's political system is the best in the world (61Q).

Cross tabulations of "too many parties," "expand democracy now, " and "best political system" had sufficiently significant chi squared values to warrant further analysis. Of these, cross tabulation analysis from all of these variables exhibited trends strong enough to be considered for this study.

With the "too many parties" variable, the trend was that the more one disagreed with the idea that too many parties would bring chaos, the more likely he/she was to like the United States. With the "expand democracy now" variable, the trend was that the more one agreed with the idea that it was necessary for democracy to be expanded now, the more likely he/she was to like the United States. With the "best political system" variable, the trend was that the more one agreed with the statement that the Chinese political system is the best in the world, the more likely he/she was to like the United States.

Table 2: Crosstab, Too Many Parties Bring Chaos

% within TOO MANY PARTIES BRING CHAOS

		LIKE UNITED STATES				
		DISLIKE VERY MUCH	DISLIKE	LIKE	LIKE VERY MUCH	Total
TOO MANY PARTIES BRING CHAOS	STRONGLY DISAGREE	20.0%	43.3%	36.7%		100.0%
	DISAGREE	21.2%	39.3%	33.2%	6.3%	100.0%
	AGREE	26.2%	39.6%	28.8%	5.5%	100.0%
	STRONGLY AGREE	35.8%	44.8%	17.9%	1.5%	100.0%
Total		24.6%	39.7%	30.2%	5.6%	100.0%

Table 3: Crosstab, Expand Democracy Now

% within EXPAND DEMOCRACY NOW						
		LIKE UNITED STATES				
		DISLIKE VERY MUCH	DISLIKE	LIKE	LIKE VERY MUCH	Total
EXPAND DEMOCRACY NOW	STRONGLY DISAGREE	75.0%		25.0%		100.0%
	DISAGREE	26.6%	45.6%	22.2%	5.7%	100.0%
	AGREE	25.4%	39.9%	29.3%	5.4%	100.0%
	STRONGLY AGREE	22.4%	33.3%	36.2%	8.0%	100.0%
Total		25.4%	39.7%	29.3%	5.6%	100.0%

Table 4: Crosstab, Our Political System is Best

% within OUR POLITICAL SYSTEM IS BEST						
		LIKE UNITED STATES				
		DISLIKE VERY MUCH	DISLIKE	LIKE	LIKE VERY MUCH	Total
OUR POLITICAL SYSTEM IS BEST	STRONGLY DISAGREE	.0%	16.7%	66.7%	16.7%	100.0%
	DISAGREE	15.9%	38.8%	39.0%	6.3%	100.0%
	AGREE	28.8%	40.6%	25.7%	4.9%	100.0%
	STRONGLY AGREE	42.0%	38.4%	16.7%	2.9%	100.0%
Total		26.5%	39.9%	28.5%	5.2%	100.0%

Both variables support the hypothesis that those who are more supportive of democracy and democratic principles will tend to hold more favorable attitudes towards the United States.

More educated. In order to evaluate this hypothesis, two variables were analyzed: education attained by years (132) and education attained by level (133).

Cross tabulations of "education by years" and "education by level" both had sufficiently significant chi squared values to warrant further analysis. Of these, cross tabulation analysis from both variables exhibited trends strong enough to be considered for this study.

With the "education by years" variable, the trend was that the more years one had been educated, the more likely he/she was to like the United States. With the "education by level" variable, the trend was that the higher the level of education one attained, the more likely he/she was to like the United States. This trend was even more evident when the "evening college" was ignored, but was still present even with that category.

Table 5: Crosstab, Education by Level

% within EDUCATION BY LEVEL w/o

		LIKE UNITED STATES				
		DISLIKE VERY MUCH	DISLIKE	LIKE	LIKE VERY MUCH	Total
EDUCATION BY LEVEL w/o	ELEMENTARY SCHOOL	27.2%	38.2%	29.3%	5.3%	100.0%
	LOWER MIDDLE SCHOOL	21.9%	39.7%	34.0%	4.3%	100.0%
	UPPER MIDDLE SCHOOL	15.4%	41.7%	35.8%	7.1%	100.0%
	EVENING COLLEGE	8.7%	34.8%	52.2%	4.3%	100.0%
	COLLEGE	12.1%	36.2%	48.3%	3.4%	100.0%
	GRADUATE SCHOOL			100.0%		100.0%
Total		21.8%	39.4%	33.5%	5.3%	100.0%

Both of these variables support the hypothesis that those who are more educated will tend to hold more favorable attitudes towards the United States.

Younger. In order to evaluate this hypothesis, one variable was analyzed: age (114). This variable was treated to categorize ages into groups of ten years. That is, ages 10 to 19 were grouped in a "less than 20" category, ages 20 to 29 in a "20" category, 30 to 39 in a "30" category, and so on, resulting in nine categories to accommodate ages 18 to 93. Doing this reveals a great deal more with cross tabulation analysis of the age variable, than if the data were to be kept in its continuous form.

Cross tabulations of the age variable had a sufficiently significant chi squared value to warrant further analysis. The age variable also exhibited trends strong enough to be considered for this study.

With the age variable, the trend was that the younger one was, the more likely he/she was to like the United States.

Table 6: Crosstab, Age

% within Age Categories 1

		LIKE UNITED STATES				
		DISLIKE VERY MUCH	DISLIKE	LIKE	LIKE VERY MUCH	Total
Age Categories 1	< 20	28.6%	35.7%	31.4%	4.3%	100.0%
	20's	18.6%	40.0%	33.1%	8.4%	100.0%
	30's	25.9%	38.2%	31.3%	4.5%	100.0%
	40's	28.9%	42.0%	25.0%	4.2%	100.0%
	50's	38.8%	37.2%	21.1%	2.9%	100.0%
	60's	37.6%	48.0%	13.3%	1.2%	100.0%
	> 70	50.6%	28.7%	19.5%	1.1%	100.0%
Total		26.9%	39.4%	28.4%	5.3%	100.0%

This variable supports the hypothesis that those who are younger will tend to hold more favorable attitudes towards the United States.

More informed. In order to evaluate this hypothesis, seven variables were analyzed: whether or not the respondent knew the name of President of the United States (19A), whether or not the respondent knew the name of the President of the Russia (19B), whether or not the respondent knew the name of the Chinese Prime Minister (19C), whether or not the respondent knew the name of the Chairperson of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (19D), whether or not the respondent knew the name of the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (19E), whether or not the respondent knew the

name of the leader of the Taiwanese "government" (19F), and whether or not the respondent felt that he/she really understood the political problems that his/her country currently faces (43A).

Cross tabulations of "US President", "Russian President," "Chinese PM," "Chair Stnd Cmt," "CCP General Sec," "Taiwan President," and "understand political problems" all had sufficiently significant chi squared values to warrant further analysis. Of these, cross tabulation analysis from the first six variables (i.e. all except "understand political problems") exhibited trends strong enough to be considered for this study.

The "US President", "Russian President", "Chinese PM", "Chair Stnd Cmt", "CCP General Sec", and "Taiwan President" variables all exhibited the same trend, which was that if one knew the name of the position in question, he/she was more likely to like the United States.

Table 7: Crosstab, Knows US President's Name

% within US President z1						
		LIKE UNITED STATES				
		DISLIKE VERY MUCH	DISLIKE	LIKE	LIKE VERY MUCH	Total
US President z1	Incorrect	29.9%	38.2%	26.2%	5.7%	100.0%
	Correct	16.7%	43.7%	35.6%	4.0%	100.0%
Total		26.9%	39.4%	28.4%	5.3%	100.0%

Table 8: Crosstab, Knows Russian President's Name

% within Russian President z1						
		LIKE UNITED STATES				
		DISLIKE VERY MUCH	DISLIKE	LIKE	LIKE VERY MUCH	Total
Russian President z1	Incorrect	29.5%	38.8%	26.1%	5.6%	100.0%
	Correct	19.1%	41.3%	35.2%	4.5%	100.0%
Total		26.9%	39.4%	28.3%	5.3%	100.0%

Table 9: Crosstab, Knows Chinese PM's Name

% within Chinese PM z1						
		LIKE UNITED STATES				
		DISLIKE VERY MUCH	DISLIKE	LIKE	LIKE VERY MUCH	Total
Chinese PM z1	Incorrect	37.4%	36.1%	21.3%	5.2%	100.0%
	Correct	21.3%	41.2%	32.1%	5.3%	100.0%
Total		26.9%	39.4%	28.4%	5.3%	100.0%

Table 10: Crosstab, Knows Chair of Standing Committee's Name

% within Chair Stnd Cmt z1						
		LIKE UNITED STATES				
		DISLIKE VERY MUCH	DISLIKE	LIKE	LIKE VERY MUCH	Total
Chair Stnd Cmt z1	Incorrect	29.5%	39.1%	25.6%	5.7%	100.0%
	Correct	16.6%	40.5%	39.3%	3.7%	100.0%
Total		26.9%	39.4%	28.3%	5.3%	100.0%

Table 11: Crosstab, Knows CCP General Secretary's Name

% within CCP General Sec z1						
		LIKE UNITED STATES				
		DISLIKE VERY MUCH	DISLIKE	LIKE	LIKE VERY MUCH	Total
CCP General Sec z1	Incorrect	35.0%	36.2%	23.2%	5.5%	100.0%
	Correct	22.6%	41.0%	31.1%	5.2%	100.0%
Total		26.9%	39.4%	28.4%	5.3%	100.0%

Table 12: Crosstab, Knows President of Taiwan's Name

% within Taiwan President z1						
		LIKE UNITED STATES				
		DISLIKE VERY MUCH	DISLIKE	LIKE	LIKE VERY MUCH	Total
Taiwan President z1	Incorrect	28.6%	39.9%	26.1%	5.5%	100.0%
	Correct	18.2%	37.1%	40.2%	4.6%	100.0%
Total		26.9%	39.4%	28.3%	5.3%	100.0%

Table 13: Crosstab, Understand Political Problems

% within UNDERSTAND POLITICAL PROBLEMS						
		LIKE UNITED STATES				
		DISLIKE VERY MUCH	DISLIKE	LIKE	LIKE VERY MUCH	Total
UNDERSTAND POLITICAL PROBLEMS	STRONGLY DISAGREE	41.1%	30.1%	21.9%	6.8%	100.0%
	DISAGREE	27.3%	37.5%	30.1%	5.1%	100.0%
	AGREE	20.6%	43.1%	29.9%	6.4%	100.0%
	STRONGLY AGREE	30.8%	46.2%	17.3%	5.8%	100.0%
Total		25.7%	39.3%	29.5%	5.6%	100.0%

The aforementioned six variables support the hypothesis that those who are more informed will tend to hold more favorable attitudes towards the United States.

More exposed to foreign media. In order to evaluate this hypothesis, one variable was analyzed: the frequency that the respondent listened to foreign radio in the previous week (7B).

The cross tabulation of this variable showed that the chi squared value was not significant at the 0.05 level (its significance was 0.078). This may be largely attributed to the extremely small number of those who listened to foreign radio with any degree of frequency (only 84 of 2257 had listened to foreign radio once or more in the previous week).

Despite this, there was an interesting trend that was present with this variable. It seems that the more often one listened to foreign radio, the more likely he/she was to like the United States. However, because the variable is not statistically significant, this trend cannot be used as evidence to support the hypothesis that those are more exposed to foreign media will tend to hold more favorable attitudes towards the United States.

Table 14: Crosstab, Listened to Foreign Radio News Last Week

% within LISTENED FOREIGN RADIO NEWS LAST WEEK

		LIKE UNITED STATES				
		DISLIKE VERY MUCH	DISLIKE	LIKE	LIKE VERY MUCH	Total
LISTENED FOREIGN RADIO NEWS LAST WEEK	NONE	26.3%	39.8%	28.6%	5.2%	100.0%
	ONCE OR TWICE	20.5%	36.4%	43.2%	.0%	100.0%
	A FEW TIMES	25.0%	39.3%	28.6%	7.1%	100.0%
	EVERY DAY	8.3%	16.7%	66.7%	8.3%	100.0%
Total		26.1%	39.6%	29.1%	5.2%	100.0%

Less exposed to domestic media. In order to evaluate this hypothesis, three variables were analyzed: the frequency that the respondent listened to domestic radio in the previous week (7A), the frequency that the respondent watched television news in the previous week (10), and the frequency that the respondent read the newspaper in the previous week (11).

Cross tabulations of the "listened domestic radio," "watched TV news," and "read newspaper" variables all had sufficiently significant chi squared values to warrant further analysis. Of these, there were no variables that exhibited trends strong enough to be considered for this study. With all the variables, whether one was more or less exposed to the media did not seem to have any significant influence on whether he/she was more or less likely to like the United States.

Table 15: Crosstab, Listened to Domestic Radio News Last Week

% within LISTENED DOMESTIC RADIO NEWS LAST WEEK

		LIKE UNITED STATES				
		DISLIKE VERY MUCH	DISLIKE	LIKE	LIKE VERY MUCH	Total
LISTENED DOMESTIC RADIO NEWS LAST WEEK	NO	28.1%	37.9%	28.3%	5.7%	100.0%
	ONCE OR TWICE	19.1%	47.2%	27.1%	6.5%	100.0%
	A FEW TIMES	22.8%	46.1%	26.9%	4.1%	100.0%
	EVERY DAY	23.0%	38.2%	36.1%	2.7%	100.0%
Total		26.1%	39.6%	29.1%	5.2%	100.0%

Table 16: Crosstab, Watched TV News Last Week

% within WATCHED TV NEWS LAST WEEK						
		LIKE UNITED STATES				
		DISLIKE VERY MUCH	DISLIKE	LIKE	LIKE VERY MUCH	Total
WATCHED TV NEWS LAST WEEK	NONE	34.8%	33.8%	24.0%	7.5%	100.0%
	ONCE OR TWICE	25.6%	44.0%	22.9%	7.5%	100.0%
	A FEW TIMES	20.4%	45.5%	31.4%	2.7%	100.0%
	EVERY DAY	23.0%	38.6%	33.9%	4.6%	100.0%
Total		26.3%	39.5%	28.7%	5.5%	100.0%

Table 17: Crosstab, Read Newspaper Last Week

% within READ NEWSPAPER LAST WEEK						
		LIKE UNITED STATES				
		DISLIKE VERY MUCH	DISLIKE	LIKE	LIKE VERY MUCH	Total
READ NEWSPAPER LAST WEEK	NONE	29.9%	39.9%	24.8%	5.5%	100.0%
	ONCE OR TWICE	14.3%	42.4%	39.2%	4.1%	100.0%
	A FEW TIMES	18.7%	37.9%	34.6%	8.8%	100.0%
	EVERY DAY	17.5%	38.0%	39.3%	5.2%	100.0%
Total		25.6%	39.7%	29.2%	5.6%	100.0%

The variables analyzed do not support the hypothesis that those who are less exposed to domestic media will tend to hold more favorable attitudes towards the United States.

Benefited from economic reforms. In order to evaluate this hypothesis, one variable was analyzed: how the respondent feels his/her economic situation is now compared to five years ago (29). Cross tabulations of this variable showed that the chi squared value was not significant at the 0.05 level (its significance was 0.510). In addition, there was no discernable trend present with this variable.

Table 18: Crosstab, Family's Economic Situation Compared to 5 Yrs Ago

% within FAMILY'S ECON COMPARED 5 YRS AGO

		LIKE UNITED STATES				
		DISLIKE VERY MUCH	DISLIKE	LIKE	LIKE VERY MUCH	Total
FAMILY'S ECON COMPARED 5 YRS AGO	WORSE OFF	26.2%	39.8%	29.3%	4.7%	100.0%
	ABOUT THE SAME	28.9%	41.2%	24.0%	5.9%	100.0%
	BETTER OFF	26.6%	39.0%	29.4%	5.1%	100.0%
Total		26.9%	39.4%	28.4%	5.2%	100.0%

This variable does not support the hypothesis that those that benefited from economic reforms will tend to hold more favorable attitudes towards the United States.

More confidence in the Chinese government. In order to evaluate this hypothesis, seven variables were analyzed: whether one should trust and obey the government because it serves our interest (43D), whether one should unconditionally support the government's decisions without thinking of one's own interests (43P), the respondent's impression of government officials in general (58G), whether top government officials are like the head of the big family and their decisions should be followed by all (61L), whether or not the CCP and the government can manage the country, meaning that we do not need to get involved (81E), how many corrupt cadre there are in the government (84), how many incompetent cadre there are in the government (85).

Cross tabulations of the "unconditional support for the government," "impression of government officials," "government officials like family head," "party/ government can manage country," and "corrupt cadres" variables had sufficiently significant chi squared values to warrant further analysis. Of these, cross tabulation analysis from the "impression of government officials", "government officials like family head", and "party/government can manage country" variables exhibited trends strong enough to be considered for this study.

With the "impression of government officials" variable, the trend was that the worse one's impression of the government was, the more likely he/she was to like the United States. The "government officials like family head" and "party/government can manage country" variables both exhibited similar trends, which is that, respectively, the more strongly one disagreed with the statements that government officials are like the family head and that the CCP/Chinese government can manage China, the more likely he/she was to like the United States. But it should also be noted here that with these two variables, an overwhelming majority of respondents "agreed" with the statements. In fact 74% agreed that government officials are like the family head and 67% agreed that the CCP/Chinese government can manage China. And so while these two variables did share the same trend, they also shared this same characteristic, which could have influenced this trend.

Table 19: Crosstab, Impression of Government Officials

% within IMPRESSION OF GOVT OFFICIALS

		LIKE UNITED STATES				
		DISLIKE VERY MUCH	DISLIKE	LIKE	LIKE VERY MUCH	Total
IMPRESSION OF GOVT OFFICIALS	1	22.4%	35.3%	35.3%	7.1%	100.0%
	2	23.8%	36.9%	33.2%	6.1%	100.0%
	3	23.3%	38.9%	32.2%	5.6%	100.0%
	4	24.4%	42.2%	28.8%	4.6%	100.0%
	5	25.1%	43.4%	25.4%	6.1%	100.0%
	6	41.5%	30.0%	23.7%	4.8%	100.0%
Total		26.2%	39.7%	28.6%	5.4%	100.0%

Table 20: Crosstab, Government Officials Are Like Family Head

% within GOVT OFFICIALS LIKE FAMILY HEAD						
		LIKE UNITED STATES				
		DISLIKE VERY MUCH	DISLIKE	LIKE	LIKE VERY MUCH	Total
GOVT OFFICIALS LIKE FAMILY HEAD	STRONGLY DISAGREE	25.0%	25.0%	50.0%	.0%	100.0%
	DISAGREE	14.1%	44.0%	38.1%	3.9%	100.0%
	AGREE	28.9%	39.2%	26.3%	5.7%	100.0%
	STRONGLY AGREE	41.7%	24.0%	27.1%	7.3%	100.0%
Total		26.2%	39.4%	29.0%	5.3%	100.0%

Table 21: Crosstab, Party/Government Can Manage Country

% within PARTY/GOVT CAN MANAGE COUNTRY						
		LIKE UNITED STATES				
		DISLIKE VERY MUCH	DISLIKE	LIKE	LIKE VERY MUCH	Total
PARTY/GOVT CAN MANAGE COUNTRY	STRONGLY DISAGREE	29.4%	11.8%	52.9%	5.9%	100.0%
	DISAGREE	20.0%	38.5%	35.0%	6.6%	100.0%
	AGREE	29.1%	40.2%	25.9%	4.8%	100.0%
	STRONGLY AGREE	38.5%	32.3%	27.7%	1.5%	100.0%
Total		26.7%	39.2%	28.8%	5.2%	100.0%

Table 22: Crosstab, Corrupt Cadres

% within CORRUPT CADRES						
		LIKE UNITED STATES				
		DISLIKE VERY MUCH	DISLIKE	LIKE	LIKE VERY MUCH	Total
CORRUPT CADRES	MOST	29.2%	37.9%	26.2%	6.6%	100.0%
	QUITE A FEW	22.3%	38.3%	33.5%	5.9%	100.0%
	MINORITY	23.2%	43.1%	29.3%	4.3%	100.0%
	NONE	54.2%	12.5%	16.7%	16.7%	100.0%
Total		24.9%	40.3%	29.4%	5.4%	100.0%

In any event, all of the significant variables do not support the hypothesis that those who are more confident in the Chinese government will tend to hold more favorable attitudes towards the United States. Actually these variables suggest the opposite, which is that the less

confident one is in the Chinese government, the more likely he/she will hold favorable attitudes towards the United States.

Testing the Hypotheses with a Regression Model

The micro level analysis culminates with the construction and evaluation of a regression model to test the aforementioned hypotheses. The cross tabulation analyses in previous section, while useful for preliminary testing, are unable to hone in on any given target variable's effect on the dependent variable because it cannot control the effects of other variables. Therein lies the strength of regression analysis. Because regression models can control the effect of other variables, it is easy to pinpoint exactly what effect, if any, the target variable has on the dependent variable, and thereby derive a more sound conclusion to each hypothesis. Table 23 and Table 24 are two models that were constructed using the variables that, after the cross tabulation analyses, were considered to have the greatest explanatory power. Table 23 is a full regression model and Table 24 is a more compact, simplified version of Table 23. The analysis of the full regression model may be found below, organized in terms of the aforementioned hypotheses.

Table 23: Regression Model, Full Model

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	2.705	.300		9.006	.000
	TOO MANY PARTIES BRING CHAOS	-.069	.041	-.046	-1.685	.092
	EXPAND DEMOCRACY NOW	.177	.057	.085	3.126	.002
	OUR POLITICAL SYSTEM IS BEST	-.206	.043	-.139	-4.725	.000
	EDUCATION BY YEARS	.021	.009	.091	2.419	.016
	AGE	-.006	.002	-.106	-3.499	.000
	US President z1	-.033	.076	-.018	-.427	.670
	Russian President z1	-.146	.076	-.081	-1.928	.054
	Chinese PM z1	.039	.067	.021	.593	.554
	Chair Stnd Cmt z1	.081	.064	.042	1.263	.207
	CCP General Sec z1	.037	.065	.019	.574	.566
	Taiwan President z1	.045	.070	.022	.644	.520
	UNDERSTAND POLITICAL PROBLEMS	.016	.041	.011	.390	.697
	LISTENED FOREIGN RADIO NEWS LAST WEEK	-.051	.058	-.025	-.878	.380
	LISTENED DOMESTIC RADIO NEWS LAST WEEK	-.006	.023	-.008	-.251	.802
	WATCHED TV NEWS LAST WEEK	.002	.021	.003	.105	.917
	READ NEWSPAPER LAST WEEK	.015	.026	.021	.582	.560
	FAMILY'S ECON COMPARED 5 YRS AGO	-.048	.038	-.034	-1.268	.205
	IMPRESSION OF GOVT OFFICIALS	.036	.019	.055	1.909	.056
	GOVT OFFICIALS LIKE FAMILY HEAD	-.044	.049	-.027	-.887	.375
	PARTY/GOVT CAN MANAGE COUNTRY	-.025	.047	-.016	-.541	.589
	CORRUPT CADRES	-.040	.028	-.040	-1.416	.157

a. Dependent Variable: LIKE UNITED STATES
b. n = 1324
c. $R^2 = 0.76$; Adjusted $R^2 = 0.61$

Table 24: Regression Model, Compact Model

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	1.878	.195		9.641	.000
	EXPAND DEMOCRACY NOW	.142	.049	.067	2.886	.004
	EDUCATION BY YEARS	.037	.006	.160	5.707	.000
	AGE	-.006	.002	-.108	-4.285	.000
	US PRESIDENT	.009	.028	.008	.322	.748
	LISTENED FOREIGN RADIO NEWS LAST WEEK	.005	.056	.002	.083	.934
	WATCHED TV NEWS LAST WEEK	-.004	.017	-.006	-.234	.815
	FAMILY'S ECON COMPARED 5 YRS AGO	-.036	.033	-.025	-1.077	.282
	IMPRESSION OF GOVT OFFICIALS	-.014	.016	-.020	-.856	.392

a. Dependent Variable: LIKE UNITED STATES
b. n = 1750
c. $R^2 = 0.56$; Adjusted $R^2 = 0.52$

More supportive of democracy and democratic principles. There were three variables in the regression that were used to measure this hypothesis: "too many parties," "expand democracy now," and "best political system." Regression analysis revealed that "too many parties" was not statistically significant at the 0.05 level, but that both "expand democracy now" and "best political system" were significant at the 0.01 level.

The partial regression coefficient of the "expand democracy now" variable shows that, holding all other factors constant, the more the respondent agreed with the statement that democracy needed to be expanded now, the more likely he/she was to like the United States. The partial regression coefficient of the "best political system" variable shows that, holding all other factors constant, the less the respondent agreed with the statement that China has the best political system in the world, the more likely he/she was to like the United States.

The "expand democracy now" variable supports the hypothesis that those who are more supportive of democracy and democratic principles will be more likely to look favorable towards the United States. The "best political system" variable also supports this hypothesis by demonstrating that those who feel more threatened by the effects of democracy are more likely to look unfavorably towards the United States.

More educated. There was one variable in the regression that was used to measure this hypothesis: "education by years." Here the "education by years" variable was used instead of the "education by level" or the categorized version of the "education by years" variable because the "education by years" variable in its continuous form offers the greatest amount of variation, and is thus most useful in regression analysis. Regression analysis revealed that "education by years" was significant at the 0.05 level.

The partial regression coefficient of the "education by years" variable shows that, holding all other factors constant, the more education the respondent received in terms of years, the more likely he/she was to like the United States.

The "education by years" variable supports the hypothesis that with greater education, one is more likely to look favorably towards the United States.

Younger. There was one variable in the regression that was used to measure this hypothesis: "age." Regression analysis revealed that "age" was significant at the 0.01 level.

The partial regression coefficient of the "education by years" variable shows that, holding all other factors constant, the younger the respondent was, the more likely he/she was to like the United States.

While the "age" variable does support the hypothesis that the younger one is, the more likely he/she is to look favorably towards the United States, the small magnitude of the regression coefficient does leave some room for reservations as to how much effect age really has on Chinese attitudes towards the United States

More informed. There were seven variables in the regression that were used to measure this hypothesis: "US President", "Russian President," "Chinese PM," "Chair Stnd Cmt," "CCP General Sec," "Taiwan President," and "understand political problems." Regression analysis revealed that none of these variables were significant at the 0.05 level.

Because none of the variables used in the regression analysis were statistically significant, there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that the more informed one is, the more likely he/she is to look favorably towards the United States.

More exposed to foreign media. There was one variable in the regression that was used to measure this hypothesis: "listened foreign radio." Regression analysis revealed that this variable was not significant at the 0.05 level.

Because this variable was not statistically significant, there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that the more exposed one is to foreign media, the more likely he/she is to hold favorable views towards the United States.

Less exposed to domestic media. There were three variables in the regression that was used to measure this hypothesis: "listened domestic radio," "read newspaper," and "watched TV news." Regression analysis revealed that none of these variables were significant at the 0.05 level.

Because none of the variables used in the regression analysis were statistically significant, there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that the less exposed one is to domestic media, the more likely he/she is to hold favorable views towards the United States.

Benefited from economic reforms. There was one variable in the regression that was used to measure this hypothesis: "econ compared 5 years ago." Regression analysis revealed that this variable was not significant at the 0.05 level.

Because this variable was not statistically significant, there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that the more one benefited from economic reforms, the more likely he/she is to like the United States.

More confidence in the Chinese government. There were three variables in the regression that was used to measure this hypothesis: "impression of government officials," "government officials like family head," "party/government can manage country," and "corrupt cadres." Regression analysis revealed that none of these variables were significant at the 0.05 level.

Because none of the variables used in the regression analysis were statistically significant, there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that the more confident one is in the Chinese government, the more likely he/she is to look favorably towards the United States.

THE CONCLUSION

1) On an individual level, how do mainland Chinese perceive the United States?

It seems as though the statement, "they hate us," has some merit, granted "hate" is a bit too strong, but for the most part, Chinese people do have a generally unfavorable view of the United States. Indeed, qualitative and quantitative resources at the macro and the micro levels all suggest, quite convincingly, that most mainland Chinese dislike the United States. Polls conducted in China, publications written by the Chinese (both popular and academic), and personal interviews mostly support that assertion.

But if this were true, if mainland Chinese really did dislike the United States, then how is it that uncountable numbers of Chinese apply for visas into the United States each year? How is it that NBA stars are debatably just as well known in China as they are in the United States? How is it that China's youth are as infatuated with American popular music as teens here in the U.S.? How is it that American cars are more popular in China than in the United States? How is it that American fast food restaurants are every bit as common in China's cities as they are in the United States? Why is it that the frequency distribution from Figure 1 showed that respondents disliked the United States more so than the other three countries and yet still liked the United States more than two of the other three? The explanation that the Chinese do not

like the United States is simply, well, too simple. There is more to this sentiment that cannot be ignored.

In attempting to answer these questions, a personal anecdote comes to mind. I have a habit of starting up conversations with strangers in China, mostly to test my Chinese fluency, but also because of a genuine interest in what they have to say about the world as they see it. When I was in Chengdu, China in the fall of 2007, I found myself in one of those conversations, chatting with a taxi driver on a way to one of the local tourist traps. After a while he asked me where I was from.

I told him, "America."

He burst out, "America is great! Americans are very wealthy! There is a lot of land in America and not a lot of people! Not like China, China is poor, too many people, and not enough space."

His praise for the United States, especially the material luxuries that Americans enjoy, went on and on until somehow we stumbled upon the topic of Iraq. Rarely has a conversation turned so unpleasant so quickly.

"What are you Americans doing in Iraq?! Do you think you're the world police? That you can just interfere in other people's affairs?! That's the problem with your government, it does whatever it wants and nobody can tell it what to do. Why does the United States treat China like an enemy? What do you Americans have to fear?!"

Shocked by the sudden turn in the conversation, I was taken aback. The next ten minutes of the ride was marked with an unbearable feeling of trepidation on my part. I will admit that I have often felt that my life was in serious danger in the passenger seat of a Chinese

taxi cab, but it tends to be because of the driver's life-endangering driving decisions and not because of his/her impressive but frightening zeal with respect to the shortcomings of American foreign policy.

It's a Love-Hate Thing

The exchange is relevant because it reveals an interesting quality of Chinese attitudes towards the United States. They are two sided. That is, there is both a feeling of love and hate for the United States within most every Chinese person; the two seemingly opposing feelings somehow manage to coexist on an individual level.

The idea that America is a land of wealth and opportunity has managed to catch on in China. "America," to many Chinese, is a place far, far away where, unlike China, people are few and land is abundant, where jobs are not only easier to find but also less demanding, where people are not only able to provide for their families' basic necessities, but also well off enough to enjoy life's extravagant luxuries. Even people who have never traveled outside their small locality or village believe this. And so I found that my taxi driver quite aptly summarized the Chinese view of this vague idea of America in one brief sentence, "America is a great place."

The other side of the coin is less pleasant. My driver also revealed that there is a distinct and critical difference between "America" and "American government and policy" in Chinese perception. In recent years, American policies have been regarded with a fair amount of contempt in China but also throughout the world. Chinese have criticized American policy and American policymakers as everything from arrogant, narrow-minded, and war-loving to hegemonic, nosy, uncompassionate, and just plain stupid. Criticisms have alluded to the U.S. involvement in everywhere from Iraq and Palestine to Taiwan and Tibet. Occasionally these

critiques will take reference to America's domestic problems, including the 2000 election, the school shootings, and Katrina. The underlying theme in this resentment is something along the lines of if the United States government cannot attend to its own affairs successfully, it has no right to assert itself in the affairs of others.

The Short Answer

On an individual level, the Chinese both hate and love the America at the same time. This stems from a duality in the way that they perceive the United States. While they are passionate in their dislike of American government and American policy, the Chinese still admire the United States for how wealthy and advanced it is. The opposing feelings of love of American success and hate of American government can be found to exist in each individual Chinese.

2) What factors, on an individual level, help explain mainland Chinese attitudes towards the United States?

We return again to our guide, the theoretical framework, to organize the conclusions of this thesis.

The Theoretical Framework

- socialization influences values
- similar values produce greater affinity
- affinity results when there are benefits to be gained
- perception of threat effects resentment

By placing Chinese perceptions of the United States in the macro-level context of the history of Sino-American relations, several observations can be made about the nature of these perceptions, offering clues as to how attitudes function on a micro level, (i.e. at individual level).

These observations were then quantified to the extent that that was possible and tested statistically with data available from a nationwide survey conducted in 1993 and 1994 so that it could be clearly ascertained what the role of individual factors were in Chinese attitudes towards the United States. The conclusions offered below are thus a fusion of the conclusions at the macro and the micro level. They are organized according to the theoretical point with which they are associated with. There is, of course, a fair amount of overlapping in how the observations from the macro level and the hypotheses from the micro level fit into the theoretical points. For example, the role of education in China has at least some relation to each of the four points. In such cases, the conclusion was placed with the theoretical point(s) that was most logical and most suitable.

Socialization influences values

The way that people are socialized influences their values and thereby their view of the world. In the context of Chinese perceptions of the United States, this statement is relevant because both a) exposure to the media and b) the attainment of education are means of socialization that should, theoretically, influence how Chinese see the world and the United States.

Historically the Chinese Communist Party has played a very sizeable role in guiding public opinion via the instruments of mass communication at their disposable. State control of nearly all mediums of the news and considerable government restriction of the dissemination of sensitive information (read: censorship) through any medium, be it the news or the internet or published books, has put the government in a particularly privileged position to influence the way its people think and sway Chinese disposition towards foreign countries. Facilitation of

Chinese indignation towards the United States after Tiananmen, the embassy bombing, and the spy plane incident are strong evidence of how the state may use the media to curve public opinion against the United States, whereas the rapid revival of Sino-American relations during the 1970s provides equally strong evidence of how the state may use the media to curve public opinion in favor of the United States.

At the individual level, however, the role of Party and the government in shaping Chinese perceptions of the United States via the domestic media is not entirely clear. Both cross tabulation and regression analysis failed to find any significant link between exposure to domestic media and the leanings of Chinese sentiment towards the United States. In that same vein, cross tabulation and regression analysis also failed to detect any clear relationship between exposure to foreign media and Chinese attitudes towards the United States.

The influence of the American education system on the Chinese education system is historically deep and far-reaching. Very early on in the history of the Sino-American relationship, Americans promoted educational exchange between the United States and China and helped established many educational institutions that still exist in China today. The fact that the Chinese education system today is at least partially modeled after the American education system is a testament to American influence on Chinese education.

Therefore, it would be expected that the longer one has been exposed to such a system, the more inclined he/she would be to look favorably towards the United States. Both cross tabulation and regression analysis did confirm that there is a clear and definite positive relationship between the amount of education attained and how positive one's views are towards the United States.

Similar values produce greater affinity

People with similar values and ideas see the world in a similar light and, as a result, are more likely to find more to like about one another. At the macro level, the wide-ranging effects of China's Opening Up Reforms have created an environment potent for the mingling of Western and Eastern values. By permitting foreign economic development, China has also allowed the influx of foreign cultures and ideas, among which is the notion of democracy.

These alien influences have taken their strongest roots in China's younger generations. Because they are the least restrained by China's history and most able to adapt to the new rapidly changing environment, China's youth are at the forefront of this new China and are thus most exposed to the incoming foreign cultures and ideas. The popularity of American pop culture and the Western lifestyle among the younger generations of China certainly validate this claim.

In order to translate the effect of the Opening Up to the micro level, the effect of age and democracy on Chinese perceptions of the United States were assessed. Both cross tabulation and regression analysis verified that these two variables had a relationship with how mainland Chinese perceive the United States. According to the data, the younger and more opened one is to democratic ideas, the more likely he/she is to like the United States.

Affinity results when there are benefits to be gained

People prefer what is advantageous to them. Just as in the previous theoretical point, the effects of the Opening Up are paramount here as well. Reforms under Deng provided new opportunities for education and for economic gain.

After the Opening Up, the brightest and most diligent students had the opportunity to study at the best institutions in the world. For students, the United States became a dream destination. Students were attracted by American educational institutions that, in addition to being some of the best in the world, had an enviable liberal learning environment and could boast state of the art facilities. This is true even today. Indeed, the Chinese student population has been and remains one of the largest foreign student bodies in the United States.

The Opening Up also changed Chinese attitudes towards materialism. Encouraged to get rich and live well by Deng, the United States became a model of success. America was, at least in their minds, a place of opportunity and wealth, where everyone enjoyed an incredibly high living standard and did not have to worry about putting food on the table. Studies drawing from polls and interviews confirm that the large relative economic disparity between the United States and China has created an image of America that has become an icon of success for many Chinese.

The variables of education and economic benefit were used to quantify these phenomenons so that the effect of the educational and economic aspects of the Opening Up could ascertained on the micro level. As mentioned earlier, the cross tabulation and regression analysis of the education variable revealed that the more education one attained, the more likely he/she was to like the United States. Cross tabulation and regression analysis of economic benefit, however, was inconclusive. The data did not exhibit a clear statistically significant trend to support the hypothesis that the more one benefited from economic reforms, the more likely he/she was to like the United States.

Perception of threat effects resentment

People dislike when they are being threatened and the source that is threatening them. We are therefore interested in the source that the Chinese perceived to be threatened by and why they are threatened by it. Polls in recent year prove that the Chinese are threatened by the United States, perhaps more so than any other country. Part of this fear stems from ideological differences between the two nations on issues of democracy, human rights, and sovereignty while another part derives from the economic and military inferiority of China vis-à-vis the United States.

Both of these factors are measured in the micro level analyses. The role of ideology and the perceived ability of China to counter threats can be measured with the democracy variable and the confidence variable, respectively. Cross tabulation and regression analysis does show that the more one believes that too many parties will bring chaos to China, the more likely he/she is to dislike the United States. The analyses could not substantiate, however, that one's confidence in the Chinese government had any relationship with his/her attitudes towards the United States.

The Short Answer

Overall, observations at the macro level and statistical analysis at the micro level clearly and definitively suggest that there is a strong relationship between how mainland Chinese perceive the United States and the explanatory variables of a) education, b) age, and c) attitudes towards democracy. The more educated, the younger, and the more open one is to democracy, the more likely he/she is look favorably upon the United States. China's Opening Up and the nature of the Chinese education system provide good explanations as to why these three variables have the effect that they do on Chinese attitudes towards the United States.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

"1993 Survey on Social Mobility and Social Change in China." Unpublished raw data. *The China Archive: An Archive of Data on China & China-U.S. Relations*. 2003. Texas A&M University. 10 April 2008. <http://chinaarchive.tamu.edu/portal/site/chinaarchive>.

Arkush, R. David and Leo O. Lee, eds. *Land Without Ghosts: Chinese Impressions of America from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present*. Berkeley: U of California Press, 1989.

Baker, James A. *The Politics of Diplomacy: Evolution, War and Peace 1989-1992*. New York: Putnam, 1995.

Bush, George H.W. (1989, February 26). Remarks presented at Chongmenwen Christian Church, Beijing, China.

Bush, George W. "China's MFN Status." Letter to the House of Representatives. 2 March 1992.

Chen, Jie. "Urban Chinese Perception of Threats from the United States and Japan." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 65.2 (Summer, 2001): 254-266.

Chen, Shengluo. "Two Americas: How Chinese College Students View The United States." *Chinese Education and Society* 36.6 (November/December 2003): 7-31.

Cheng, Manhong. "MeiRi anbao tongmeng yu taiwan wenti" ["The U.S.-Japanese Security Alliance and the Taiwan Issue"] Xinshehui (2005): 2-6.

Deng, Yong. "Better Than Power: 'International Status' in Chinese Foreign Policy." *China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy*. Eds. Deng Yong and Wang Fei-ling. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005. 51-72.

Deng and Wang. Introduction. *China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy*. Eds. Deng Yong and Wang Fei-ling. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005.

Gamson, William A. and Andre Modigliani. "Knowledge and Foreign Policy Opinions: Some Models for Consideration." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 30.2 (Summer 1966): 187-199.

Garver, John W. "China and the Revisionist Thesis." *Looking Back on the Vietnam War*. Eds. William Head and Lawrence Grinter. New York: Praeger, 1983. 105-117.

---. "China's U.S. Policies." *China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy*. Eds. Deng Yong and Wang Fei-ling. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005. 201-243.

---. Foreword. *In The Eyes of the Dragon*. Eds. Deng Yong and Wang Fei-Ling. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999.

Gries, Peter Hays. *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy*. Berkeley: U of California Press, 2004.

---. "Nationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy." *China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy*. Eds. Deng Yong and Wang Fei-ling. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005. 103-120.

Hinton, Harold C. "Peking-Washington: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United States." *The Washington Papers* 4.34 (1976).

Hao, Yufan. "Introduction: Influence of Societal Factors: A Case of China's American Policy Making." *China's Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and Chinese American Policy*. Eds. Hao Yufan and Hao Yufan. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2005. 1-17.

Hong, Junhao. “Media and U.S.-China Relations: An Analysis on Some Theoretical Aspects.” *Image, Perception, and the Making of U.S.-China Relations*. Eds. Li Hongshan and Hong Zhaohui. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1998. 101-119.

Hu, Jintao. (2006, April 21). “Jieshao ZhongHua wenming” [“An Introduction to the Chinese Civilization”]. Remarks presented at Yale University, New Haven, CT.

Hutton, Will. *The Writing On The Wall: Why We Must Embrace China as a Partner or Face It as an Enemy*. New York: Free Press, 2006.

Ikenberry, G. John. “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive.” *Foreign Affairs* 87.1 (January/February 2008): 23-37.

Lampton, David M. *Sam Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations 1989-2000*. Berkeley: U of California Press, 2001.

Li, Hongshan. “Introduction: Image and Perception in U.S.-China Relations.” *Image, Perception, and the Making of U.S.-China Relations*. Eds. Li Hongshan and Hong Zhaohui. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1998. 1-14.

---. “Recent ‘Anti-Americanism’ in China: Historical Roots and Impact.” *China’s Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and Chinese American Policy*. Eds. Hao Yufan and Hao Yufan. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2005. 41-67.

---. “The Unofficial Envoys: Chinese Students in the United States, 1906-1938.” *Image, Perception, and the Making of U.S.-China Relations*. Eds. Li Hongshan and Hong Zhaohui. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1998. 145-168.

Li, Rex. “Security Challenge of an Ascendant China: Great Power Emergence and International Stability.” *Chinese Foreign Policy*. Ed. Zhao Suisheng. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp, Inc., 2004. 23-57.

Lieberthal, Kenneth. *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform*. 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2004.

Liu, Yawei. “Mao Zedong and the United States: A Story of Misperceptions, 1960-1970.” *Image, Perception, and the Making of U.S.-China Relations*. Eds. Li Hongshan and Hong Zhaohui. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1998. 189-232.

Mahbubani, Kishore. “Understanding China.” *Foreign Affairs* 84.5 (September/October 2005): 49-60.

Marlay, Ross and Clark Neher. *Patriots and Tyrants: Ten Asian Leaders*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999.

Power, Samantha. *A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Harper Collins, 2002.

Schoppa, R. Keith. *Revolution and Its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History*. 2nd ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc., 2006.

Shi, Tianjian. “Cultural Values and Political Trust: A Comparison of the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan.” *Comparative Politics* 33.4 (July 2001): 401-419.

State Department. “China: Descent Into Chaos.” Secretary of State’s Morning Summary for June 6, 1989. 1989. <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/documents/19-01.htm>.

Townsend, James. “Chinese Nationalism.” *Chinese Nationalism*. Ed. Jonathan Unger. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp, Inc., 1996. 1-30.

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. “The World Factbook.” 20 March 2008. 20 March 2008. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html>.

Wang, Guanhua. *In Search of Justice: The 1905-1906 Chinese Anti-American Boycott*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001.

Wang, Jianwei. “China’s Perception of the Post-Cold War International Environment.” *Interpreting U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations: China in the Post-Cold War Era*. Eds. Li Xiaobing, Hu Xiabo, and Zhong Yang. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1998. 257-272.

Wang, Ruoshui. “A Glimpse of America.” *Land Without Ghosts: Chinese Impressions of America from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present*. Eds. R. David Arkush and Leo O. Lee. Berkeley: U of California Press, 1989. 259-265.

Wong, K. Scott. “The Transformation of Culture: Three Chinese Views of America.” *American Quarterly* 48.2 (1996): 201-232.

Wu, Xinbo. “Four Contradictions Constraining China’s Foreign Policy Behavior.” *Chinese Foreign Policy*. Ed. Zhao Suisheng. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp, Inc., 2004. 58-65.

Xiong, Zhiyong. *Bainian ZhongMei guanxi* [*A Century of China-US Relations]*. Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe [World Affairs Press], 2006.

Xu, Guangqiu. “Anti-American Nationalism in China since 1989.” *Image, Perception, and the Making of U.S.-China Relations*. Eds. Li Hongshan and Hong Zhaohui. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1998. 233-254.

Zhang, Hong. *America Perceived: The Making of Chinese Images of the United States*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002.

Zhao, Suisheng. “Chinese Nationalism and Pragmatic Foreign Policy Behavior.” *Chinese Foreign Policy*. Ed. Zhao Suisheng. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp, Inc., 2004. 66-88.

Zheng, Yongnian. “Nationalism, Globalism, and China’s International Relations.” *China’s International Relations in the 21st Century*. Eds. Hu Weixing, Chan Gerald, and Zha Daojiong. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 2000. 93-116.

Zi, Zhongyun. “The Clash of Ideas: Ideology and Sino-U.S. Relations.” *Chinese Foreign Policy*. Ed. Zhao Suisheng. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp, Inc., 2004. 224-241.

Zweig, David and Bi Jianhai. “China’s Global Hunt for Energy.” *Foreign Affairs* 84.5 (September/October 2005): 25-38.

APPENDICES

Appendix I: An Introduction to the 1993 TIANJIAN SHI SURVEY

Shi Tianjian, an associate professor of comparative politics at Duke University, conducted, in conjunction with the People's University of China's Social Survey Research Center, a survey of mainland Chinese political attitudes entitled "Survey on Social Mobility and Social Change in China" ("Shehui Bianqian yu Shehui Yishi"). Shi utilized the data from his survey in a publication entitled "Cultural Values and Political Trust: A Comparison of the People's Republic of China and Taiwan" that appeared in the July 2001 issue of *Comparative Politics* where he offered the following introduction to his survey:

> "Data for the PRC come from a survey conducted between September 1993 and June 1994 in cooperation with the Social Survey Research Center of the People's University of China. The sample represents the adult population over eighteen years of age residing in family households at the time of the survey, excluding those living in the Tibetan Autonomous Region. A stratified multistage area sampling procedure with probabilities proportional to size measures (PPS) was employed to select the sample.
>
> The Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) employed the sample design were counties (*xian*) in rurual areas and cities (*shi*) in urban areas. Forty-nine counties and eighty-five cities were selected as the primary sampling units. The secondary sampling units (SSUs) were townships (*xiang*) and districts (*qu*) or streets (*jiedao*). The third stage of selection was geared to villages in rural areas nad neighborhood committees (*jueweihui*) in urban areas; 551 villages and neighborhood committees were selected. Households were used at the fourth stage of sampling.
>
> Retired high school teachers were employed as interviewers for most of the survey. Before the interviews began, letters were sent to all the sampling spots to check whether there were any changes in addresses. All invalid addresses were removed from the sampling frame; the majority of noncontacts was thereby eliminated. The project scheduled interviews with 3,425 people, and 3,287 of the prospective respondents contacted by interviewers answered our questions, for a response rate of 94.5 percent." (Shi, Cultural Values and Political Trust - 2001, 416).

Appendix II: QUESTION CATEGORIZATION of the 1993 Tianjian Shi Survey

*****Attitudes towards the United States and Japan: 110B, 110C (respectively) *****

Basics:
Geographical socialization (where they grew up before age of 18): 1, 116
Age: 114
Gender: 113

Education:
Educational background: 132-133

Media Exposure:
Media exposure: 7-14

Financial and Economic Situation:
Income: 31, 33, (161 + 162 + 163 + 165 / 160 for rural), (164 / 160 for urban)
Perception of economic situation: 27-30, 64, 118

Personal Politics:
Activity/Interest in politics: 15-18, 20, 38, 41, 44, 49, 51-57, 87, 91, 92, 99, 123, 135, 137, 138
Knowledge of (and perception of knowledge) political affairs: 19, 43A, 43F, 81O
Perception of political standing: 78A, 107
Party membership: 134
Importance of issues: 101 (esp A, B, C, D, F, G, J), 102

Confidence in:
Confidence in government: 38A, 38B, 38D, 38F, 38H, 38J, 41A, 41B, 41D, 41F, 41H, 41J, 43D, 43K, 43P, 58 (esp G), 60, 61J, 61L, 61Q, 81E, 81H, 81S, 84, 85
Confidence in the military: 58B

Democracy:
Attitudes toward democracy and democratic principles: 43J, 43N(?), 61O(?), 81C, 108, 111O
Exposure to democratic methods: 46, 47, 48, 50-57

Attitudes toward Internal Reform:
Attitudes toward economic reform: 79, 80, 95
Attitudes toward political reform: 96

Attitudes toward Foreign Countries/Entities:
Attitudes toward Taiwan: 97
Attitudes towards Russia: 110A
Attitudes towards Germany: 110D

Interpersonal Factors:
Parents' education: 145, 146, 150, 151

Misc.:

Appendix III: Relevant Question List of the 1993 Tianjian Shi Survey

Q#	Question Description	# options/var type/options	Categorization
1 –	place lived longest before 18	4, ordinal, city size	basic demographics: geography
7A –	listen to domestic radio last week	4, ordinal, frequency	socialization: media exposure
7B –	listen to foreign radio last week	4, ordinal, frequency	socialization: media exposure
8 –	(if yes to domestic) radio or wired speakers	3, nominal, type	socialization: media exposure
9 –	(if yes to foreign) what foreign stations	open, nominal	socialization: media exposure
10 –	watch TV news last week	4, ordinal, frequency	socialization: media exposure
11 –	read newspaper last week	4, ordinal, frequency	socialization: media exposure
12A –	(if yes newspaper) info type read: practical	2, nominal, yes or no	socialization: media exposure
12B –	(if yes newspaper) info type read: policy	2, nominal, yes or no	socialization: media exposure
12C –	(if yes newspaper) info type read: politics	2, nominal, yes or no	socialization: media exposure
12D –	(if yes newspaper) info type read: art, sport, entertain	2, nominal, yes or no	socialization: media exposure
13 –	heard through grapevine: econ, politics, society	2, nominal, yes or no	socialization: media exposure
14 –	discussed via grapevine	2, nominal, yes or no	socialization: media exposure
15 –	talk about political of natl affairs	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity/interest
16A –	talk to whom: relatives	2, nominal, yes or no	pol attitudes: activity/interest
16B –	talk to whom: friends	2, nominal, yes or no	pol attitudes: activity/interest
16C –	talk to whom: colleagues	2, nominal, yes or no	pol attitudes: activity/interest
16D –	talk to whom: neighbors	2, nominal, yes or no	pol attitudes: activity/interest
16E –	talk to whom: club or group members	2, nominal, yes or no	pol attitudes: activity/interest
16F –	talk to whom: CCP or Youth League members	2, nominal, yes or no	pol attitudes: activity/interest
16G –	talk to whom: unit leader	2, nominal, yes or no	pol attitudes: activity/interest
17 –	definitely shouldn't talk to some about politics	2, nominal, yes or no	pol attitudes: activity/interest
18 –	(if yes) who?	open, nominal	pol attitudes: activity/interest
19A –	who is current US president	open, nominal	pol attitudes: knowledge of politics
19B –	who is current Russian president	open, nominal	pol attitudes: knowledge of politics
19C –	who is current PM of China	open, nominal	pol attitudes: knowledge of politics
19D –	who is current Chairman of NPC Stnd Cmt	open, nominal	pol attitudes: knowledge of politics

Q#	Question Description	# options/var type/options	Categorization
19E –	who is current General Sec of CCP	open, nominal	pol attitudes: knowledge of politics
19F –	who is current leader of Taiwan	open, nominal	pol attitudes: knowledge of politics
20 –	interested in national affairs	4, ordinal, degree of	pol attitudes: activity/interest
27 –	family's economic situation category	5, ordinal, econ class	socioeconomic: perception of econ sit
28 –	family's social position	5, ordinal, social class	socioeconomic: perception of econ sit
29 –	econ sit better than five years ago	3, ordinal, worse to better	socioeconomic: perception of econ sit
30 –	econ sit will be better five years from now	3, ordinal, worse to better	socioeconomic: perception of econ sit
31 –	(if urban) avg monthly expenditure per person	open, continuous	socioeconomic: income
33 –	(if rural) avg annual expenditure of family	open, continuous	socioeconomic: income
38A –	resolve problem: expressed opinion to leader	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity & confid. in govt
38B –	resolve problem: asked other leader to intervene	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity & confid. in govt
38D –	resolve problem: complained to authorities	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity & confid. in govt
38F –	resolve problem: complained to Congress deputy	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity & confid. in govt
38H –	resolve problem: wrote letter to govt office	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity & confid. in govt
38J –	resolve problem: reported to complaint bureau	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity & confid. in govt
41A –	resolve problem: expressed opinion to leader	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity & confid. in govt
41B –	resolve problem: asked other leader to intervene	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity & confid. in govt
41D –	resolve problem: complained to authorities	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity & confid. in govt
41F –	resolve problem: complained to Congress deputy	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity & confid. in govt
41H –	resolve problem: wrote letter to govt office	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity & confid. in govt
41J –	resolve problem: reported to complaint bureau	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity & confid. in govt
43A –	think understand political problems well	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: knowledge of politics
43D –	should trust and obey govt	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: confidence in govt
43F –	think am as well-informed as most people	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: knowledge of politics
43I –	should not talk politics, others criticize	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: fear of govt
43J –	too many political parties bring chaos	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: democracy
43K –	trend of thought to spread among public	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: confidence in govt
43N –	broaden democracy affect stability	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: democracy
43P –	should support govt w/o own interests	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: confidence in govt
44 –	would oppose harmful govt regulation	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
46 –	elections held in unit or village	2, nominal, yes or no	pol attitudes: democratic methods
47 –	(if yes) what type of elections	2, nominal, choice or no	pol attitudes: democratic methods

Q#	Question Description	# options/var type/options	Categorization
48 –	have opportunity to vote	2, nominal, yes or no	pol attitudes: democratic methods
49A –	attended meeting to meet candidate	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity/interest
49B –	persuaded others to attend meeting	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity/interest
49C –	nominated candidate on own initiative	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity/interest
49D –	recommended candidate when leaders solicited	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity/interest
49E –	persuaded others to nominate a candidate	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity/interest
49F –	persuaded others whom to vote for	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity/interest
49G –	persuaded others whom not to vote for	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity/interest
49H –	complained about elections	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity/interest
49I –	persuaded others to boycott	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity/interest
50 –	’92 local PC elections: with or w/o candidate choice	2, nominal, yes or no	pol attitudes: democratic methods
51 –	voted in the ’92 elections	2, nominal, yes or no	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
52 –	(if no vote) why did not vote	9, nominal, reasons + other	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
53 –	(if voted) why voted	6, nominal, reasons + other	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
54 –	why vote for that candidate	8, nominal, reasons + other	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
55A –	’92 elect: attended meeting to meet candidate	4, ordinal, frequency	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
55B –	’92 elect: persuaded others to attend meeting	4, ordinal, frequency	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
55C –	’92 elect: nominated candidate on own initiative	4, ordinal, frequency	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
55D –	’92 elect: recommend candidate when leaders solicit	4, ordinal, frequency	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
55E –	’92 elect: persuaded others to nominate candidate	4, ordinal, frequency	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
55F –	’92 elect: persuaded others whom to vote for	4, ordinal, frequency	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
55G –	’92 elect: persuaded others whom not to vote for	4, ordinal, frequency	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
55H –	’92 elect: complained about elections	4, ordinal, frequency	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
55I –	’92 elect: persuaded others to boycott	4, ordinal, frequency	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
56 –	anyone tried to persuade you whom to vote for	2, nominal, yes or no	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
57A –	The candidate	2, nominal, yes or no	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
57B –	Colleagues	2, nominal, yes or no	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
57C –	Friends	2, nominal, yes or no	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
57D –	Someone prestigious	2, nominal, yes or no	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
57E –	Someone close to unit leaders	2, nominal, yes or no	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
57F –	CCP or Youth League member	2, nominal, yes or no	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
57G –	Work unit leader	2, nominal, yes or no	pol att.: activity & democratic methods

Q#	Question Description	# options/var type/options	Categorization
57H –	Same clan or clan branch	2, nominal, yes or no	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
57I –	Other	2, nominal, yes or no	pol att.: activity & democratic methods
58B –	Impression of PLA	6, ordinal, bad to good	pol attitudes: confidence in military
58G –	Impression of government officials	6, ordinal, bad to good	pol attitudes: confidence in govt
60 –	government gives equal treatment	2, nominal, yes or no	pol attitudes: confidence in govt
61B –	better not to get involved in politics too much	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: fear of govt
61D –	govt system fits country's conditions best	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: fear of govt
61J –	decisions of govt officials are always right	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: confidence in govt
61L –	top govt officials' decisions should be followed	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: confidence in govt
61O –	if PC interfere, it will be hard for govt to be effective	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: democracy
61Q –	our political system is best in the world	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: confidence in govt
64 –	current income reasonable	2, nominal, yes or no	socioeconomic: perception of econ sit
78A –	own political leaning	6, ordinal, leftist to rightist	pol attitudes: perception of pol standing
78C –	father's political leaning	6, ordinal, leftist to rightist	socialization: parents' politics
79 –	political reform is too fast or too slow	3, ordinal, fast to slow	pol attitudes: economic reform
80 –	pace of change in society, too fast or too slow	3, ordinal, fast to slow	pol attitudes: economic reform
81C –	necessary to expand democracy in country now	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: democracy
81E –	govt manage country well, we no need involve	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: confidence in govt
81H –	govt officials can sacrifice individual to serve	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: confidence in govt
81O –	consider myself capable of participating in politics	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: knowledge of politics
81S –	Center's decisions are always correct	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: confidence in govt
84 –	how many corrupt cadres in govt	4, ordinal, number of cadre	pol attitudes: confidence in govt
85 –	how many incompetent cadre	4, ordinal, number of cadre	pol attitudes: confidence in govt
87 –	would complain if leaders damage your interests	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
89 –	criticized govt, worried someone would report	4, ordinal, degree of concern	pol attitudes: fear of govt
90 –	criticized leaders, concern someone would report	4, ordinal, degree of concern	pol attitudes: fear of govt
91A –	approve: refuse pay taxes	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
91B –	approve: demonstrating	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
91C –	approve: striking	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
91D –	approve: obstructing traffic	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
91E –	approve: damage public property to protest	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
91F –	approve: storming govt offices	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest

Q#	Question Description	# options/var type/options	Categorization
91G –	approve: public mocking of leaders	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
91H –	approve: carrying out work slow down	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
91I –	approve: signing a petition	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
91J –	approve: writing big character posters	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
91K –	approve: finding someone to beat up leaders	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
92A –	do or done: refuse pay taxes	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
92B –	do or done: demonstrating	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
92C –	do or done: striking	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
92D –	do or done: obstructing traffic	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
92E –	do or done: damage public property to protest	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
92F –	do or done: storming govt offices	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
92G –	do or done: public mocking of leaders	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
92H –	do or done: carrying out work slow down	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
92I –	do or done: signing a petition	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
92J –	do or done: writing big character posters	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
92K –	do or done: finding someone to beat up leaders	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
95 –	should restrict private enterprise	2, nominal, yes or no	pol attitudes: economic reform
96 –	should speed political reform	2, nominal, yes or no	pol attitudes: political reform
97 –	use force to stop Taiwan from independence	3, nominal, yes or no	pol attitudes: toward Taiwan
99 –	would try to influence leaders for favorable decision	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: activity/interest
101A –	important: protect the environment	4, ordinal, degree of import.	pol attitudes: importance of issues
101B –	important: strengthening natl. defense	4, ordinal, degree of import.	pol attitudes: importance of issues
101C –	important: inequality b/t rich and poor	4, ordinal, degree of import.	pol attitudes: importance of issues
101D –	important: protecting consumers' rights	4, ordinal, degree of import.	pol attitudes: importance of issues
101E –	important: attacking crime	4, ordinal, degree of import.	pol attitudes: importance of issues
101F –	important: price control	4, ordinal, degree of import.	pol attitudes: importance of issues
101G –	important: encourage develop private enterprise	4, ordinal, degree of import.	pol attitudes: importance of issues
101H –	important: population control	4, ordinal, degree of import.	pol attitudes: importance of issues
101I –	important: housing problem	4, ordinal, degree of import.	pol attitudes: importance of issues
101J –	important: open to the outside world	4, ordinal, degree of import.	pol attitudes: importance of issues
102A –	most important issue	9, nominal, issues	pol attitudes: importance of issues
102B –	2nd most important issue	9, nominal, issues	pol attitudes: importance of issues

Q#	Question Description	# options/var type/options	Categorization
102C –	3rd most important issue	9, nominal, issues	pol attitudes: importance of issues
107 –	extreme leftist or rightist more harmful	2, nominal, left or right	pol attitudes: perception of pol standing
108A –	harmful extremist: make speech	2, nominal, permit or no	pol attitudes: democracy
108B –	harmful extremist: teach thinking	2, nominal, permit or no	pol attitudes: democracy
108C –	harmful extremist: write articles	2, nominal, permit or no	pol attitudes: democracy
110A –	like or dislike Russia	4, ordinal, degree of like	pol attitudes: toward Russia
110B –	like or dislike America	4, ordinal, degree of like	pol attitudes: toward America
110C –	like or dislike Japan	4, ordinal, degree of like	pol attitudes: toward Japan
110D –	like or dislike Germany	4, ordinal, degree of like	pol attitudes: toward Germany
111O –	good when more expression views on govt decisions	4, ordinal, degree of agree	pol attitudes: democracy
113 –	gender	2, nominal, gender	basic demographics: gender
114 –	age	open, continuous	basic demographics: age
116 –	birthplace	open, nominal	basic demographics: geography
118 –	economic level of area living in	5, ordinal, poor to rich	socioeconomic: perception of econ sit
123 –	talk to friends about politics	4, ordinal, frequency	pol attitudes: activity/interest
132 –	years of formal education completed	open, continuous	socialization: educational background
133 –	education level achieved	6, ordinal, level of schooling	socialization: educational background
134 –	political affiliation	4, nominal, organizations	pol attitudes: party membership
135 –	(if CCP org) held which office	open, nominal	pol attitudes: activity/interest
137 –	member of trade union or women's association	2, nominal, yes or no	pol attitudes: activity/interest
138 –	(if yes) leader of the organization	2, nominal, yes or no	pol attitudes: activity/interest
145 –	years of formal education of father	open, continuous	socialization: parents' education
146 –	education level of father	7, ordinal, level	socialization: parents' education
147 –	political affiliation of father	3, nominal, organizations	socialization: parents' politics
148 –	(if CCP) held office? which?	open, nominal	socialization: parents' politics
150 –	years of formal education of mother	open, continuous	socialization: parents' education
151 –	education level of mother	7, ordinal, level	socialization: parents' education
152 –	political affiliation of mother	3, nominal, organizations	socialization: parents' politics
156 –	years of formal education of spouse	open, continuous	socialization: spouse's education
157 –	education level of spouse	7, ordinal, level	socialization: spouse's education
158 –	political affiliation of spouse	3, nominal, organizations	socialization: spouse's politics
160 –	how many people have an income in family	open, continuous	socioeconomic: income

Q#	Question Description	# options/var type/options	Categorization
161 –	(for rural) agricultural production income earned	open, continuous	socioeconomic: income
162 –	(for rural) non-agricultural income earned	open, continuous	socioeconomic: income
163 –	(for rural) sideline production income earned	open, continuous	socioeconomic: income
164 –	(for urban) total income earned	open, continuous	socioeconomic: income
165 –	total year-end bonuses of whole family	open, continuous	socioeconomic: income
169 –	served in PLA	2, nominal, yes or no	socialization: military participation
170 –	years in military	open, continuous	socialization: military participation
171 –	military officer at platoon level or higher	2, nominal, yes or no	socialization: military participation
172 –	cultural revolution family origin class label	open, nominal	socialization: issues of class
173 –	cultural revolution personal class status	open, nominal	socialization: issues of class
174 –	persecuted or classified for historical problems	2, nominal, yes or no	socialization: issues of class
175 –	family persecuted or classified for hist. problems	2, nominal, yes or no	socialization: issues of class

Appendix IV: Questions used in Statistical Analysis from 1993 Shi Tianjian Survey

7A. Did you have a chance to listen to news broadcasts on a domestic radio station last week?

3. Nearly every day
2. A few times
1. Once or twice
0. No
7. [Do not read] Not applicable
8. [Do not read] Don't remember

7B. Did you have a chance to listen to news broadcasts on foreign radio last week?

3. Nearly every day
2. A few times
1. Once or twice
0. No
7. [Do not read] Not applicable
8. [Do not read] Don't remember

10. Did you have a chance to watch TV news last week?

3. Nearly every day
2. A few times
1. Once or twice
0. No
7. [Do not read] No TV
8. [Do not read] Don't remember

11. Did you read the news in a newspaper last week?

3. Nearly every day
2. A few times
1. Once or twice
0. No
7. [Do not read] Not applicable
8. [Do not read] Don't remember

19A. Do you know who is the current President of the United States?

1. [Do not read] Correct
0. [Do not read] Don't know

19B. Do you know who is the current President of Russia?

1. [Do not read] Correct
0. [Do not read] Don't know

19C. Do you know who is current Prime Minister of our country?

1. [Do not read] Correct

0. [Do not read] Don't know

19D. Do you know who is the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in our country?

1. [Do not read] Correct
0. [Do not read] Don't know

19E. Do you know who is the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party?

1. [Do not read] Correct
0. [Do not read] Don't know

19F. Do you know who is the current highest leader of the Taiwan authorities?

1. [Do not read] Correct
0. [Do not read] Don't know

29. Comparing your family's economic situation to five years ago, is it somewhat better now, somewhat worse, or about the same?

3. Better off
2. About the same
1. Worse off
8. [Do not read] Don't know

43. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements?

A. I think I understand well the major political problems our country faces.

4. Strongly agree
3. Agree
2. Disagree
1. Strongly disagree
8. [Do not read] Don't know
9. [Do not read] No answer

D. We should trust and obey the government, for in the last analysis it serves our interests.

4. Strongly agree
3. Agree
2. Disagree
1. Strongly disagree
8. [Do not read] Don't know
9. [Do not read] No answer

J. Too many political parties in a country will bring chaos.

4. Strongly agree
3. Agree
2. Disagree
1. Strongly disagree

8. [Do not read] Don't know
9. [Do not read] No answer

P. People should unconditionally support the government's decisions without thinking about their own interests.

4. Strongly agree
3. Agree
2. Disagree
1. Strongly disagree
8. [Do not read] Don't know
9. [Do not read] No answer

58. [Show the card] Please take a look at this card. It has six grades. Six means very good, one means very bad. Please select one of the six grades to show your impression of each of the following institution.

G. Government officials in general

1	2	3	4	5	6

8. [Do not read] Don't know
9. [Do not read] No answer

61. Do you agree strongly, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements:

L. Top government officials are like the head of a big family. Their decisions on national issues should be followed by everyone.

4. Strongly agree
3. Agree
2. Disagree
1. Strongly disagree
8. [Do not read] Don't know
9. [Do not read] No answer

Q. Our country's political system is the best in the world.

4. Strongly agree
3. Agree
2. Disagree
1. Strongly disagree
8. [Do not read] Don't know
9. [Do not read] No answer

81. We would like to know your opinions on the following statements. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?

C. It is now very necessary to expand democracy in our country.

4. Strongly agree
3. Agree
2. Disagree

1. Strongly disagree
8. [Do not read] Don't know
9. [Do not read] No answer

E. The Communist Party and the government can manage the country well; we don't need to get too involved.

4. Strongly agree
3. Agree
2. Disagree
1. Strongly disagree
8. [Do not read] Don't know
9. [Do not read] No answer

84. How many corrupt cadres do you think there are in government organs at various levels in our country?

1. Most of them are corrupt
2. Quite a few are corrupt
3. Only a minority are corrupt
4. None of them are corrupt
8. [Do not read] Don't know
9. [Do not read] No answer

85. How many incompetent cadres do you think there are in government organs at various levels in our country?

1. Very many
2. Many
3. Not many
4. None
8. [Do not read] Don't know
9. [Do not read] No answer

110. Do you like or dislike the following countries?

A. Russia

4. Like very much
3. Relatively like
2. Do not much like
1. Dislike very much
8. [Do not read] Don't know

B. The United States

4. Like very much
3. Relatively like
2. Do not much like
1. Dislike very much
8. [Do not read] Don't know

C. Japan

4. Like very much
3. Relatively like
2. Do not much like
1. Dislike very much
8. [Do not read] Don't know

D. Germany
4. Like very much
3. Relatively like
2. Do not much like
1. Dislike very much
8. [Do not read] Don't know

111. We would like to know your opinions on the following statements. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?

O. It is a good phenomenon when more and more people express their individual views on government decisions.
4. Strongly agree
3. Agree
2. Disagree
1. Strongly disagree
8. [Do not read] Don't know
9. [Do not read] No answer

114. How old are you this year? (Actual years [not counting nominal first year in traditional Chinese way of counting])

_____ years old

132. How many years of formal school education have you completed?

_____ years
99. [Do not read] No answer

133. (If formal schooling is more than 5 years) What educational level did you achieve?
1. Elementary school graduate
2. Lower middle school graduate
3. Upper middle school, vocational school, or technical school graduate
4. Evening college, staff and workers' college, TV college, correspondence college graduate, or passed the adult self-study examination
5. Fulltime college or technical college graduate
6. Graduate school degree
7. [Do not read] Not applicable
9. [Do not read] No answer