Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my thesis advisor Dr. Miguel Centellas for allowing me to spend endless hours questioning him. I would like thank Dr. Kees Gispen and Dr. Gregory Love for taking the time out of their schedules to read this. I would also like to thank all of those who made my undergraduate education possible my professors, my family, Dr. Bob Haws, and last but far from least Dr. Saron Sarthou
# Table of Contents

## I. Chapter One: Introduction
- a) Intro. ................................................................. 4
- b) Research Question and Rationale. ........................................ 6
- c) Case Selection and Research Design ...................................... 6
- d) Outline .................................................................... 8

## II. Chapter Two: Literature Review ........................................ 10
- a) Concepts .................................................................. 10
- b) Political Parties/Party Systems ......................................... 11
- c) Populism ................................................................... 13
- d) Military ...................................................................... 15
- e) Economic Development/Income Inequality ......................... 15

## III. Chapter Three: Histories of Chile and Uruguay .................... 18
- a) Political Parties ......................................................... 19
- b) Populism ................................................................... 26
- c) Military-Civil Relations ............................................... 31
- d) Economy .................................................................... 35

## IV. Chapter Four: Data & Analysis ............................................ 40
- a) Research Design ......................................................... 40
- b) Dependent Variable ..................................................... 41
- c) Independent Variables .................................................. 43
  - i. Electoral Volatility ..................................................... 43
  - ii. ENPP (Effective Number of Parties) and Party Polarization ... 45
  - iii. The gaining of political power through non-democratic methods: Rate of Coup D’états ......................................................... 47
- d) Testing the Hypothesis .................................................... 48
  - i. Party Systems .......................................................... 49
    - Extent to Which the Party System is Institutionalized ............ 49
    - Extent of Party Rootedness .......................................... 50
    - Legitimacy .................................................................. 53
    - Organizations Matter ................................................. 54
  - ii. Populism ................................................................. 57
  - iii. Civil-Military Relations ............................................. 59
  - iv. Economic Distribution .............................................. 61

## V. Chapter Five: Conclusion ..................................................... 63
- a) Weaknesses ............................................................. 66
- b) Future Research ........................................................ 69

Bibliography ........................................................................ 70
Chapter One: Introduction

The question that this thesis is meant to answer is: What factors have caused democratic support for Chile to be lower than democratic support in Uruguay? As shown by the Latinobarometro\(^1\) these two countries have shown differing rates of support for democracy. The remaining chapters of this thesis will attempt to give a better understanding of how this phenomenon has occurred by looking at the social, political, and economic institutions developed in these two countries throughout the twentieth century. This chapter introduces my question by explaining why and how I came up with my question for this thesis, its design, and gives a brief outline of the rest of the thesis. It is a project to which I have devoted much time to explain, and which like all good explanations needs more.

On my return to the U.S. after living for a year in Uruguay, I found myself thinking about my experiences abroad and knew I wanted to continue building on my experiences from the country. To avoid being unproductive and simply looking back at my old photos from Uruguay and talking about when I would return, I decided to revisit the country intellectually by using my experience abroad to complete my thesis. In comparison to other Latin American countries there has been little research carried out on Uruguay, and I would like to participate in changing this. My interest in comparing Chile to Uruguay came about when I began reading of the protests occurring in Chile, which were at times becoming violent and subsequently suppressed by the

\(^{1}\) To measure this level of support I have used results from the Latinobarometro’s survey question A101: Support for Democracy which uses the Linz question to survey citizens of Latin American countries. The question is stated as follows: Which of the following statements do you agree with most? -4 Not asked, 0 No answer, 1 Democracy is preferable to any other kind of Government, 2 Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one, 3 For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non-democratic regime, 8 Don’t know.
military. The images from these protests were not something that I had become familiar with when hearing about how Chile’s democratic consolidation was one of the “success-stories” of Latin American politics.

While the protests in Chile seemed to escalate, I began hearing fellow students, who studied abroad in Chile, talk of how common it was for schools or various businesses in Chile to be closed due to protests. I continued to think this was not the case at all for Uruguay, where most activity seen from protests are hand-painted posters and banners outside of the country’s university, never with people under them. From time to time the bus or taxi drivers go on strike, but this would rarely close down schools or businesses. I also learned from the Latinobarometro that from 1995 until 2010 Uruguay’s support for democracy among its citizens has been significantly higher than that of Chile, and not only that but for the most part the average rate of support for democracy among all Latin American countries is higher than Chile’s between 1995 and 2010. This made me wonder what could explain this phenomenon in Chile, which has been one of the Latin American countries most highly regarded as being a consolidated democracy since the end of its recent era of dictatorship.

This paper is to explain why these countries could differ in their support for democracy, especially if Chile is often used to exemplify one of Latin America’s success stories of democratic consolidation, whereas Uruguay is rarely mentioned. Both countries fell to the control of military regimes in 1973 due to similar economic and social crises occurring throughout Latin America, and returned to democracy in the third wave. So, why have their societies not reacted to these political developments, and changes in a similar manner?

**Research Question and Rationale**
The research question for this thesis is ‘What factors have caused democratic support for Chile to be lower than democratic support in Uruguay?’ They have both had similar histories, originating from Spanish colonies, having both experienced civil wars and wars against neighboring countries after the fall from power of the Spanish crown. Throughout the twentieth century they both dealt with many of the same social and economic crises, such as the leftist movement and the rise of the left. So, what is it that has made these countries differ from each other in relation to their support for democracy?

This topic is one of importance, because as long as democracies are developing, having knowledge of what has worked in the consolidation of democracy, as well as other institutions, will be beneficial in understanding what may or may not work for these developing countries. This thesis is not claiming that democracy is the best possible form of government for every country, but for countries that want to develop consolidated democracies, research investigating this question could be of use to them. As we have seen in the Arab Spring, several countries are currently attempting to develop into consolidated democratic states, so by looking at studies explaining why democracy has received more support in one country than another could be of use to them in the consolidation of their democracies.

Case Selection and Research Design

The research design, and selection of cases in this thesis is based on ‘Most Similar Systems’ design. This research design compares cases that contain “a maximal number of similar characteristics while having a minimal number of not shared characteristics.”\(^2\) The researcher then utilizes the unshared characteristics between the similar cases as explanatory variables to create an analysis of the variations between these cases. I have chosen Chile and Uruguay as my

\(^2\) Przeworski 1982, 33
two most similar cases because of their dictatorships which both began in 1973. These dictatorships within these two countries were very similar. Both dictatorships were caused by a buildup of social, economic, and political problems of which neither political system was able to deal with at the time. They both experienced an upsurge of leftist groups, including the urban guerrilla groups that were inefficiently dealt with by the political system, due in large part to its polarization, and inability to make decisions. This political immobility led to military juntas in both countries, which controlled political power in both countries repressively, eliminating parties and violating human rights. Eventually these two countries transitioned back into democratic regimes.

Chile’s transition back to democracy occurred five years after Uruguay’s, with new parties that were not as prevalent before the dictatorship, and a new constitution drafted during the 1970s-80s dictatorship which is currently used as Chile’s constitution. Uruguay’s transition to democracy took a different route than did Chile’s. It not only occurred earlier, but it returned to using the constitution drafted by Uruguay’s democracy prior to the dictatorship. Another similarity between these two countries is that they were both democratic states prior to these dictatorships, and after their dictatorships found themselves transitioning back to democracies.

This thesis will look back at the development of these two countries political/social institutions to explain their differences throughout the twentieth century. The limitation of this research strategy is that observations and theories produced by a ‘Most Similar Systems’ design are important when one wants to apply these explanations to new cases.\(^3\) The problem of applying the theories produced by this method to different cases is not really a problem for scholars of social science, “because rather than explaining phenomena as accurately as possible

\(^3\) Przeworski 1982, 32-34
in terms relative to specific historical circumstances, theories produced by the social sciences should attempt to explain phenomena wherever and whenever they occur.

Using the research design of ‘most similar systems,’ this thesis will show that the main difference of stability of the party systems within these countries can be used to explain their citizens’ different rates of support for democracy. This explanation of how the party systems of these countries, one more stable than the other, have developed over time to create a more stable political system in one country than in the other. Because this is the main difference of these two countries, it has been used in the explanation developed by this thesis to help clarify why their citizens have developed different respects for democracy.

Outline

The remainder of this thesis will be divided into four chapters: the literature review, discussion of cases, data and analysis, and the conclusion. Each chapter contains several sections. In the second chapter, the literature review, I will explain the key concepts that are necessary to understand this thesis, and how these concepts are defined by various scholars. This chapter will explain how party systems, populism, civil-military relations, and economic distribution, and will state why I believe these aspects are useful to addressing my research question.

The third chapter of this thesis is the discussion of Chile and Uruguay. This chapter will discuss these cases in depth, and in context, giving the reader a better understanding of them. Looking in detail at these two countries during the twentieth century up until their falls to authoritarian regimes in 1973. The chapter will discuss their party systems their forms of populism, their military, and their economies.

---

4 Przeworski 1982, 17
The fourth chapter, data and analysis, will first identify the dependent and independent variables, which I use to explain the dependent variable, through quantitative measurements, seeing how these variables connect to the theoretical framework discussed in chapter two. I will then explain how these variables will be operationalized in this study. The last section of this chapter, the test hypothesis, will look at the relationships between the dependent and independent variables, using the results to state whether or not these relationships are consistent with my hypothesis.

The final chapter is the conclusion. The first section of this chapter will use the results explaining how they relate the research design and theoretical framework of this project, and how they answer my question. It also will discuss how these results help the reader better understand the cases used in this thesis. The second section will be used to discuss the limitations and obstacles confronted in this research. I will conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of my findings for future research.
Chapter Two: Literature Review

Concepts

Support for democracy, the dependent variable for this thesis, is important for the consolidation of democracy. It is a common belief among scholars that the consolidation of a stable democracy needs to be accompanied by popular support. Democracy is not consolidated until it is agreed upon by all political actors as ‘the only game in town.’\footnote{Bratton 2001, 447; Linz and Stepan 1996, 15} As a factor for understanding the consolidation of democracy, in relation to states, organizations, etc. wanting to implement a democracy or democratic process it is important to better understand why people do or do not support democracy. To explain the fluctuations in this dependent variable I use the histories of party systems, populism, civil-military relations, and economic inequality as the independent variables, which through my research design of ‘most-similar-systems’ shows these variables as being major differences between the two cases, and therefore explanatory of their different outcomes in relation to the dependent variable.\footnote{Przeworski 1982, 33}

The understanding of ‘why’ is important for future groups hoping to develop or implement various institutions. When advancing institutions and expecting certain outcomes, such as how to develop a consolidated democracy supported by its citizens, it is beneficial to first look at where other past attempts succeeded or failed democratic development so as to have a better idea of what works and what does not work. Without learning from others’ mistakes and successes and solely relying on explanations developed by rational choice theories, we throw out
experience which could be explained by historical processes and developments of such institutions, giving us some explanation of the ‘why.’

**Political Parties/Party Systems**

The level of stability of a party system indicates the level of stability of a democracy. A country with a high level of party stability will tend to have a high level of democratic stability, and vice versa. Using Scott Mainwaring’s criteria for stable party systems is what is used to determine whether or not the party system of Chile, and that of Uruguay are stable. There are four main factors used in this criterion that include patterns of competition, party rootedness in society, legitimacy given to parties, and party organizations matter. Patterns of party competition in a society’s political party system display to what extent parties are institutionalized, carrying steady numbers of support from election to election. A party system with steady levels of party competition\(^7\) shows that it is difficult for new parties to emerge in the party system, which displays the extent of party competition regularity in that system. Party competition can be measured in several ways, two of these including electoral volatility, and a country’s effective number of political parties.\(^9\) Electoral volatility is a measurement telling what percentage of party support changes from election to election between parties. A country with higher levels of electoral volatility shows more change in support for the party system’s parties between elections. The other rate of measurement to display competition patterns is that of effective number of political parties. This is a measurement of how many parties carry electoral 

\(^7\) Dix 2012, 34  
\(^8\) Steady levels of party competition being that number of voters for party does not fluctuate.  
\(^9\) Mainwaring 1998
significance in a party system. The higher this number is the more likely it is for party polarization to occur, and party coalitions to be necessary to win elections.\textsuperscript{10} Much like electoral volatility if these numbers, referring to numbers produced by electoral volatility and effective number of parties, fluctuate from election to election it indicates that these parties are poorly rooted in their societies.\textsuperscript{11} That is because when these numbers are high they show that the ties between citizens and parties are not very strong, making it less likely for one to predict who will be the main political actors for elections, or in politics in general, demonstrating low levels to which the parties are institutionalized and rooted. The next criterion is the legitimacy given to parties to carry out political activities. When a party is not thought of as being legitimately able to carry out its political responsibility other actors tend to be given the opportunity to carry out these responsibilities which opens up the opportunity for non-democratic regimes, such as authoritarian leaders, and military juntas, to gain power.\textsuperscript{12} Legitimacy is measured later on in this thesis by looking at the rate of coups in both countries. The fourth criterion is that party organizations matter, meaning that parties are not controlled by a small group of individuals but rather it is the party organization that is in control of its actions, ideology, and so forth.\textsuperscript{13} As you will read in the fourth chapter of this thesis the party systems of both Chile and Uruguay differed from one another in all aspects of Mainwaring’s criteria of a stable party system throughout the twentieth century.

\textsuperscript{10} Mainwaring 1995, 28; Rose 2009, 21
\textsuperscript{11} Mainwaring 1998, 72
\textsuperscript{12} Mainwaring 1998
\textsuperscript{13} Mainwaring 1998, 70
Populism

Populism, a term often used vaguely, describes a type of political strategy that can differ from case to case. Its significance “varies in meaning from context to context and from author to author.”\(^\text{14}\) The word’s use is so contested by scholars that some authors have advocated abandoning the term all together.\(^\text{15}\) However by eliminating this term altogether explaining or referring to such social phenomenon as Peronismo or Ibáñismo, to express their differences from other political strategies would be difficult. Rather than eliminate such a vague, and controversial term some scholars find it more beneficial to provide a minimal definition to specify all political phenomena they believe to be populist, and then specify the differing cases that fall under this term by placing them into sub categories.\(^\text{16}\) The blanket definition used, in this thesis, to describe the term populism is:

“It is a political strategy in which the ruler is an individual personalistic leader, not a group organization which rests on the power capability of numbers, not special weight. It is a political phenomenon which emerges when personalistic leaders base their rule on massive yet mostly uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of people.”\(^\text{17}\)

This definition is minimal enough to describe the variety of populist movements, while excluding non-populist political strategies.

The two categories used in this thesis to describe my two cases, Chile and Uruguay will be those of authoritarian populism and democratic populism. The authoritarian populists tend, when in power, to be more injurious to a country’s democratic development having a military background or use military force, and supporting wealthy elite land owning classes over the

\(^{14}\) Dix 2012, 29  
\(^{15}\) Weyland 2001, 1  
\(^{16}\) The minimalist definition I have chosen for this thesis is that provided by Kurt Weyland, and the Subcategories to specify, and explain the differences of populism between my cases is that of DiTella which divides it in to categories to of these being democratic populism and authoritarian populism.  
\(^{17}\) Weyland 2001, 18
poorer classes. Authoritarian populists have tended to focus on surrounding themselves with high-ranking officers, and members of the traditional-landowning-upper-class-elites, placing them in leadership positions. As I will explain later in this thesis, by putting, or rather continuing, these groups in leadership positions Chile prolonged its unequal distribution of resources, which prevented its democracy from stabilizing. A second major feature of this category, which I will go more in-depth on in the fourth chapter of this thesis is that of support for these leaders. The support used to help this type of populist gain power also tends to come from uninstitutionalized organizations/coalitions, which historically have not out lived the leader they organized to support. These type of shallow rooted, uninstitutionalized forms of support are, as I have said in the party systems section of this chapter, harmful to a party system’s stabilization.

The democratic populist however is a more benign form of populism in reference to the development of a stable democracy, putting career politicians, professionals, and intellectuals into leadership roles as opposed to military officials, as well as promoting social welfare systems to benefit the lower classes. These leaders that democratic populists tend to appoint (career politicians, professionals, intellectuals) have been inclined to incorporate the poorer, previously unincorporated classes by redistributing resources, creating more public benefits, making “such representation appear to have been more ‘authentic’” in terms of democratic representation than that of authoritarian populism. As I will discuss in the fourth chapter of this thesis the democratic form of populism helps to explain how Uruguay consolidated its democracy earlier than that of Chile, which helped develop its more stable party system than that of Chile’s.

---

18 Dix 2012, 45
19 Dix 2012, 43
20 Dix 2012, 33, 45, 47
21 Dix 2012, 34
Military

Civil-military relations is an indicator of a government’s ability to effectively carry out its administrative tasks, whether they be dealing with economic or social issues. When a government finds itself unable to deal with such tasks successfully windows of opportunity tend to open in which the military is able to step in and carry out these military tasks.\(^2^2\) When a democratic country finds its military stepping into politics consistently it is an indicator of that democracy being unstable, and unable to carry out its governing tasks, giving enough legitimacy to the military to rule.\(^2^3\) The fourth chapter of this thesis will discuss how civil-military relations of both Chile and Uruguay compare, and how this helps to explain their differing opinions of democracy.

Economic Development/Income Inequality

My discussion on both countries’, Chile and Uruguay’s, economies is about their distribution of resources. Many scholars acknowledge that economic distribution has an effect on a society’s political dynamics. Lipset argued that the poor were not equipped for democracy because of their general lack of education and exposure to its political norms, which in turn helps to explain why democracies are not as stable in underdeveloped and developing countries.\(^2^4\) Another explanation on the correlation between economics and politics was Przeworski and Limongo’s demonstration of how poorer countries have been more likely to have unstable democracies, specifically those with a per capita GDP of $6,055 or less.\(^2^5\) If this distribution does not meet some sort of equilibrium between the desires of the lower/poorer classes and the

\(^{2^2}\) Brooker 2009, 96
\(^{2^3}\) Mainwaring 1998, 78
\(^{2^4}\) Przeworski 2008, 2
\(^{2^5}\) Przeworski 2008, 5
elite wealthy classes then democracy is a risk of failing.\textsuperscript{26} This becomes especially true when either side has the opportunity to assert power through such form as dictatorship.\textsuperscript{27}

Income inequality refers to the distribution of a society’s wealth among its citizens, and can lead to levels of polarization unhealthy for a stable democracy. Polarization can be dangerous for democracy because it indicates a party system’s inability to come to agreements between different interests groups, which is an important part of democracy in order for a party/political system to be able to decide on important issues. “Polarization is detrimental for democracy because it turns easily into violent fights for monopolization of the state.”\textsuperscript{28} Levels of polarization between poor and elites tend to increase with higher rates of income inequality, which in turn leads to the political camps representing these groups to fight for the “monopolization of state power…Class cleavages turn easily into enmities, when separated by such factors as economic resources in which case compromise is unlikely.”\textsuperscript{29} In short high levels of inequality, which lead to polarization, make it difficult for a party/political system to function becoming unstable.\textsuperscript{30} In contrast to economically unequal societies, those that possess a large middle class with resources more evenly distributed have eased such group enmity.

They have done so by making the divisions between the polarized sides in a more economically divided society less ‘sharp,’ (or less polarized) making democratic transfers of power occur more smoothly.\textsuperscript{31} As I will go on to discuss both Chile and Uruguay differ in their levels of wealth distribution among their citizens. The former differs in that it has historically had a higher level of income/wealth inequality and the later differs because of its relatively low

\textsuperscript{26} Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, 939
\textsuperscript{27} Przeworski 2008, 9
\textsuperscript{28} Welzel 2009, 79
\textsuperscript{29} Welzel 2009, 78
\textsuperscript{30} Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, 957
\textsuperscript{31} Welzel 2009, 79
level of income inequality. A discussion of these countries’ levels of income inequality would help to show why their party systems have differed, Chile’s being that it has tended to be more polarized, and contain more leftist parties representing the poorer classes, and Uruguay’s party system having two ‘catch-all parties,’ and not really having any place for leftist parties representing the lower classes until the last half of the twentieth century.

Latin American societies’ economic inequality have been described as an institution left over by their colonizers, which in some cases were strengthened through the industrialization/urbanization processes, such as in Chile, while in other countries these institutions promoting inequality were weakened, such as in the case of Uruguay. I will go on to further discuss these two countries’ developments of differing rates of equality through institutions in the following chapter. The European colonies settled extract goods have been known to develop institutions, which carried on after these countries’ independence. One example of this type of institution developed is that of the hacienda system developed in Chile and Argentina in colonization, which carried on after both of these countries’ independence. I will discuss both Chile and Uruguay’s levels of economic equality and how they relate to both countries support for democracy in the following chapters.
Chapter Three: Histories of Chile and Uruguay

Though often presented with a rosy view, Chile’s experience in the 20th century has resembled that of the more stereotypical Latin American experience whereas Uruguay’s has been quite unique. Throughout the twentieth century Chile saw higher levels of dissatisfaction towards its government as shown in the relatively frequent coups in relation to Uruguay, which saw only one, its coup in which elections through its traditional system were not used to chose the leader. Also throughout the twentieth century Chile saw higher levels of party polarization, which led to its immobility several times which was not nearly as much of a problem in Uruguay. However this is not to say that these two countries were not similar. Uruguay and Chile’s political system’s institutions date back to their colonization by Spain. After gaining their independence, they both found themselves defending their borders from their more powerful neighbors. Throughout the twentieth century both countries dealt with the same types of phenomena such as economic, great depression, the oil shocks, etc. They both found themselves dealing with these similar problems through economic protectionists manners, such as import tariffs. These methods of dealing with such problems lead them to similar socio-political crises, such as urban guerrilla movements lead by students, and middle class members of both societies, to which both party systems responded in a similar way, by polarizing, becoming immobile, and therefore unable to react. These problems led to coups in the same year, 1973, and eventually military-led non-democratic regimes in which human rights were suppressed. The rest of this chapter will focus on the differences between these two countries political institutional development prior to the 1973 coups.
The Political Parties

Though Chile and Uruguay’s party systems both found themselves dealing with similar problems, as mentioned before, throughout the twentieth century, they did so in differing ways. Chile’s party system saw new parties materializing constantly, giving each election a whole new look as to who the main parties and competitors were, and who had the most support. Many of these new parties were leftist parties organizing the working class, of which Uruguay did not really experience.32 Uruguay’s party system on the other hand saw little to no change for the first sixty years of the twentieth century, of which the Colorado party dominated the majority. In Uruguay’s case it was not until the sixties when a new party with significant electoral power emerged, which did not win the presidency until after its dictatorship. This section gives a more in depth look as to how the party systems of these two countries have differed.

Chile

Chile has traditionally had a more inchoate party system that has lacked stability. This has been shown the extent of the party system’s institutionalization, rootedness, and legitimacy among its political actors, which I will demonstrate in this brief history of the Chile’s party system, and even further discuss in the following section. In the early twentieth century the political system moved from that of a parliamentary system to a presidential system. This shift saw the carryover of party polarization from the old system, which made parties less institutionalized and rooted, and led to their existence in an electoral system that, according to Sartori and Duverger, was not the normal environment such a multitude of parties, nor

---

32 One explanation for Uruguay’s lack of leftist parties is in the populist section of this chapter.
materialization of new previously nonexistent parties and party actors normally seen in the parliamentary system.

With the transition to the presidential system in the 1920s the country’s party system found itself continuing its high number of effective parties indicating then necessity of coalition building for presidential candidates to succeed. This was accompanied by a high level of party polarization that the country’s party system had experienced throughout its history and would continue to experience for the remainder of the twentieth century. Along with this high rate of party polarization, Chile, like many Latin American countries, experienced a leftist movement with an influx of leftist parties during this period which magnified the party system’s polarization. These leftist parties split up the lower classes by dividing them into different parties, making it difficult for them to form coalitions and combat traditional elites.\textsuperscript{33}

One of the first major coalitions of leftist parties went by the name of Frente Popular, developed in order to prevent the fascist trend of the 1930s.\textsuperscript{34} This coalition led to the leftist parties’ first period of control of Chilean politics from 1938 until 1952. This unity did not last for long and soon experienced the polarization to which Chilean parties/coalitions seem to have been prone. By 1941 the Frente Popular was so fragmented that it was no longer able to support its party leaders. This was magnified by the end of WWII and the beginning of the Cold War, and the leftist coalition soon found itself divided in a manner indistinguishable by party lines.\textsuperscript{35}

Like many Latin American countries, Chile found itself in a political and social crisis beginning in the 1950s. With this crisis the country once again experienced a flood of new parties, one of those being the Christian Democratic Party. Within one year after its founding, the Christian Democratic Party received twenty percent of the vote in the presidential election of

\textsuperscript{33} Collier And Sater 2004, 177
\textsuperscript{34} Rector 2003, 145
\textsuperscript{35} Collier and Sater 2004, 242
1958. The following elections of 1964 marked the election of the first presidential candidate, Eduardo Frei, from the Christian Democratic Party, however due to party polarization Frei was unable to implement many of the policies with which he campaigned. By the time Frei was able to pass any policies the Christian Democrats had split into two main factions, one believing that economic growth was the country’s main priority, and the other believing it was social development through land distribution, and workers salaries, which led to the demise of this party’s control of Chile’s politics.

Also similar to other Latin American countries, including Uruguay, Chile experienced a guerrilla movement in response to the Cuban Revolution. Between 1965 and 1973 extreme leftist groups formed such as the MIR, made up of students and working/middle-class Chileans. These groups carried out demonstrations of social and political change some peaceful, and some violent. Inspired by the Cuban Revolution this movement began with a fifty-day boycott protesting the university system’s curriculum and administration. This boy-cot was successful in creating a domino effect of leftist groups trying to go outside of the country’s traditional political system, therefore questioning its legitimacy, to render “justice.”

At times these demonstrations were violent such as the San Miguel takeover, which was a “Rural Revolution,” of farmhands attempting takeovers of estancias in Chile’s countryside. These events accompanied a rebirth in the leftist parties’ political dominance, though not dominant by much, of Chile. In 1970 the former coalition of the Frente Popular was realigned under the name Unidad Popular, by the Radical, Socialist, and Communist parties, in order to support Salvador Allende who campaigned stressing a need for political change within Chile, resembling that of the Cuban Revolution through the Nationalization of large industries, and

---

36 Rector 2003, 165
37 Rector 2003, 165
expansion of public benefits. In 1973 Allende died during a coup d’état against his administration carried out by the military and political parties in opposition to his policies.\textsuperscript{38} After the coup d’état in 1973 parties continued polarizing when rival factions blamed one another to the military takeover.\textsuperscript{39} After the transition to democracy in 1990, though its party system made progress in carrying out democratic decisions however since then the effective number of parties has continued to grow, as I will explain in the following chapter.

\textit{Uruguay}

Though like Chile, in that during the nineteenth century it experienced a violent civil war, Uruguay’s party system developed into one that was much more stable throughout the twentieth century due to its parties’ institutionalization, rootedness in society, and legitimacy among its political actors. I will now discuss Uruguay’s party’s system’s development throughout the twentieth century, and give a couple of reasons that will help explain its stability, which will include a description of the development of its two institutionalized “catch-all parties,” as well as its electoral system known as Ley de Lemas, which provides an explanation of how this party system has been more stable than that of Chile’s.

At the turn of the 20th century Uruguay’s party system transitioned from one with two warring sides, which had fought a civil war throughout the nineteenth century, to a stable system in which two “catch-all parties,” known as the Blancos and Colorados, dominated the country’s political system through the more democratic system of voting. Much of this transition has been attributed to one of Uruguay’s more well known, and cherished politicians Jose Batlle y

\textsuperscript{38} Constable 1993, 17; Rector 2003, 174
\textsuperscript{39} Rector 2003, 182
It was during Batlle’s first term as president that these two groups, the Blancos and Colorados, agreed to cease their long violent civil war when the Colorados, agreed to give the Blancos a certain amount of political power over various departments within the country. Though the members of these two groups were fairly equal and had traditionally dominated the political scene the Colorados had an upper hand on the Blancos due to several reasons, which I will discuss later in this section.

Prior to Batlle’s first term in office these two parties were more like warring groups with little political ideology, and had no real way of differentiation between one another except for the ribbons worn around their hats. The Colorados wore a red ribbon while the Blanco’s carried a white ribbon. The civil war between these two groups was over where the country’s political power should be. The Colorados wanted the power to be centralized, while the Blancos believed it should be dispersed across the country making the districts more autonomous. The ideologies of these two parties began to solidify during Batlle’s first term when his administration was able to better unite the Colorados into a party with internal democratic functions. The Colorado party became the more progressive of the two parties during Batlle’s terms in office, which I will further explain in the next section of this chapter.

During the development of these two parties the Colorados were put at an advantage in two ways which are both due to their location. The first is that the Colorado party was able to organize more easily due to its members being located mainly in Uruguay’s capital city of Montevideo while the makeup of the Blanco party was dispersed across the countryside. Because of the majority of Colorados and its sympathizers being so centralized they were able to organize

---

40 Panizza 1997, 667, 670
41 Fitzgibbon 1954, 127
42 Fitzgibbon 1954, 143, 148
43 Fitzgibbon 1954, 143, 144, 148
more easily during their development, unlike the Blancos, which due to obstacles, such as
distance, were unable to organize as easily.

The second advantage to the Colorado party was also due to its location. By its members
being concentrated in the capital, which was also the country’s main port, it was able to more
easily convert the immigrants flooding into the country through the port around the turn of the
century. This inundation of immigrants into Uruguay with no inherited political quarrels,
accompanied with the social policies of Batlle’s administration, led to a rise in the number of
members in Colorado party supporters. This accompanied with the country’ rapid urbanization
also gave the Colorados an upper hand. Due to the civil war Uruguay saw a different
concentration of power than that of Chile. Where as Chile’s Political and Economic Elite of the
countryside continued to maintain a certain amount of power and control among Chileans living
and working on their plantations into the twentieth century, Uruguay’s rural elite lost much of its
control during the civil war due to the destruction of their plantations amid the warring sides
centralizing the country’s political power even more in Montevideo, the country’s capital.

Though the traditional parties of Uruguay took on political ideologies during Jose
Batlle’s first term in office, they did not necessarily take on unified ideologies. They were
instead “catch-all parties,” containing factions with many different and sometimes conflicting
ideologies within the parties, causing “party lines to be difficult to hold in congressional
debates.”

The political immobilization caused by the lack of defined lines of ideology was one
of the main contributors to the 1970s coup. When faced with the economic and social crises of
the 1960s the parties were unable to act in a productive manner due to conflicting ideas within
the parties. Members of the same party, whether they be Colorado or Blanco, had conflicting

---

44 Fitzgibbons 1954, 149 “Each party has its conservatives, and its liberals”
ideas of whether or not to react to the military “rupture,” which intensified the social and economic disorder.\(^{45}\)

Like in many Latin American countries during the 1960s a leftist movement emerged in Uruguay, with the party coalition, Frente Amplio, along with the guerrilla group known as the Tupamaros. This type of organization gave the left a significant electoral force in the early 1970s before the dictatorship, but did not have a presidential electoral victory until 2005 when Tabaré Vázquez was elected into office, and then again in 2010 with Jose Mujica. The reason I have gone so far back in Uruguay’s party system’s history is to demonstrate how rooted in society its parties are. With the exception of the rise of the Frente Amplio, Uruguay’s party system has been consistently dominated by two catch-parties for over a century, and even though the Frente Amplio has emerged to be the party currently in control, the Blancos and Colorados continue to carry a lot of weight in the country’s political arena.

An explanation for these parties’ rootedness in Uruguayan society could be seen as being forced through the organization of the country’s voting system, known as the Ley de Lemas. First introduced in the 1920s, a process which continues today, the Ley de Lemas is a of selection for Uruguay’s president through a “double simultaneous vote.” In this process parties provide voters with ballots with a list of names of candidates running for president, representing different factions. The voter chooses a candidate, and that vote counts for both the candidate and the party that candidate represents. The candidate with the most votes from the party with the most votes becomes the president. This process has been controversial because you don’t need to be the candidate with the highest percentage of votes to win the presidency, just need to be the candidate with the most votes from the party with the most votes. Therefore the president’s ideals may not reflect the ideals of the majority of its own party nor country. After its return to

\(^{45}\) Caetano 1998, 25
democracy in 1985, Uruguay’s party system prior to the dictatorship seems picked up where it left off, with the exception of the leftist party Frente Amplio which has broken the Colorado’s long tradition of controlling Uruguayan politics with its two consecutive wins in the country’s presidential elections of 2004 and 2009.\textsuperscript{46}

**Populism**

The periods of populism in these countries differed in many ways. That of Chile’s came forty years after that of Uruguay’s, and where Chile’s populist leader had a history of carrying out undemocratic practices, such as two coup d’états, and being a cause behind a coup attempt, Uruguay’s populist leader found himself elected into office democratically. Uruguay’s populist leader also had a great deal of success in stabilizing the country’s warring parties, developing social welfare programs, and attempting to make the president less powerful though horizontal accountability. This section explains more in depth the differing phenomena of populism in both countries.

**Chile**

Chile’s history of populism is highlighted by the authoritarian populist leader General Carlos Ibáñez, a praetorian leader, which is a characteristic seen throughout Chile’s twentieth century with such leaders as Pinochet, Alessandri, and so on. In response to Chile’s party system’s polarization which led to its inability to react to economic problems Chile found itself going through a series of coup d’états led by the military starting in 1924 and ending in 1927.\textsuperscript{47} This period of coups ended with the military general, Carlos Ibáñez, as the country’s dictator,

\textsuperscript{46} Caetano 1998, 128
\textsuperscript{47} Collier and Sater 2004, 201
whose reign lasted from 1927 until 1931. After removing the previous president from office, unaffiliated with any traditional parties, Ibáñez carried out his executive duties in a manner to which the masses were unable to participate in Chile’s political decision making, a key part of the democratic process. Like other authoritarian populists, Ibáñez stocked his administration with military leaders, keeping the number of intellectuals and politicians to a minimum.\textsuperscript{48}

After taking office Ibáñez soon became looked upon by many as a paternalistic figure, who became loyal followers of his, for his appeal to the middle-class through promises of how he would fix the problem without giving specifics on how he and his administration would do so, like many other populist leaders.\textsuperscript{49} This support for Ibáñez soon became a broad following of supporters from different parties and classes, united with “no centrally accepted program or ideology, merely a ‘widespread emotional state,’” becoming known as Ibáñismo, which supporters believed “was a tendency and spirit superior to any program.”\textsuperscript{50} During his time as dictator he proved a large amount of discontent, among Chile’s electorate, for the country’s political system by gaining support for promises to change it. This support therefore demonstrated the lack of legitimacy given to it by those it represented.

At the start of Ibáñez’s rule as dictator he seemed to have the ability to make these promised changes. He expanded the job market by creating such ambitions works as LAN and the Carabineros.\textsuperscript{51} Between 1927 and 1930 Chile was experiencing an era of prosperity with the creation of nine-thousand jobs. With this social/economic improvement the majority of Chileans looked past the repressive measures of the dictator such as censorships, and persecutions, while

\textsuperscript{48} Dix 1985, 34  
\textsuperscript{49} Dix 1985, 41, 43  
\textsuperscript{50} Dix 1985, 39; Rector 2003, 148  
\textsuperscript{51} LAN (Linea Area Nacional de Chile) was created as a publicly owned airline started as a job creator, and a form of modernizing Chile’s postal system. LAN was privatized in 1989. The Carabineros are the national Chilean police force, which continue today.
creating a cult following for Ibáñez. But this era of Ibáñismo came to a crash with the great depression, which brought with it economic stress that Ibáñez and his administration was ill prepared to deal with, and eventually forced him out of office in 1931. This would not be the last of Ibáñez’s involvement in Chilean politics.

In 1938 a coup attempt, carried out by the Chilean party known as the National Socialists, or nacistas, to overthrow the president of the time and replace him with Ibáñez. This attempted coup was violently suppressed by the country’s military killing many of the nacistas who participated in the event. In 1952 Ibáñez again campaigned for Chile’s presidency, and won displaying the strength of sentiment for Ibáñismo still held by a large portion of Chileans. In this election Ibáñez once again ran on ambitious goals of fixing the country’s social and economic problems, which were similar to those he faced during his first period in office including “stabilizing the country’s economy, regulating the copper industry and fighting inflation.” He also continued to discredit Chile’s party system by promising to “liberate the country from party politics.” However this promise soon proved to fail when by the end of 1957 the Chilean party system had become more polarized than ever, which led to a loss in the popular support of Ibáñez.

Uruguay

Differing from that of Chile’s history with populism Uruguay experienced democratic populism, a more benign type of populism, which proved to be beneficial in the consolidation of the country’s democracy. Arguably the most unique aspect of Uruguay’s democracy has been

---

52 Rector 2003, 149
53 Dix 1985, 37
54 Rector 2003, 152
55 Rector 2003,152
56 Collier and Sater 2004, 259; Dix 1985, 44
Batllismo, which began with Jose Batlle y Ordoñez in his first full term in office from 1903 until 1907. As I will discuss in this section rather than get rid of the country’s traditional parties his administration focused more on stabilizing the existing party system to better function in a more democratic manner. Batlle also focused on state provided services such as education, healthcare and more. Such acts of implementation led to the development of a cult like following of Batllismo similar to that of other populist leaders in some ways, but differentiated Batlle’s populist behavior from that of Ibáñez’s by being more democratically friendly.

Jose Batlle y Ordoñez, a member of Uruguay’s long-lived Colorado party, stressed the stabilization of the country’s democracy through the organization of intraparty democracy as well as unified party ideologies, which as discussed in the previous section were few. This first term in office marked the start of seventy years of democratic peace with the exception of a short period of deviation in the early 1930s. The first obstacle that Batlle’s administration had to overcome was the pacification of the warring parties, the Blancos and Colorados, and his success in accomplishing this peace has been considered one of the reasons Uruguay’s party system and democracy has stood the test of time, by “crystallizing the workings of Uruguay’s democratic politics.”57 The truce between these two parties was carried out through a pact supported by democratic mean rather than violence to resolve the differences between the two parties.58 This pact has been attributed to the fact that Batlle was not interested in the destruction of the Colorado’s opposing Blanco party, but rather wanted to bargain with it.59 The truce between these two parties was reached when the Colorados bought off the Blancos by giving them political control over six of the country’s interior departments.60 This led to the solidification of

57 Panizza 1997, 667, 670
58 Nahum 1999, 79
59 Panizza 1997, 691; Fitzgibbon 1954, 135
60 Fitzgibbon 1954, 127
the county’s political organization with its centralization of political administrative decisions in Montevideo and the creation of a representative government based on the population size of each department.\textsuperscript{61}

Once the truce was made Batlle’s administration turned its attention towards the growing social problems caused by rapid urbanization, and immigration, that many countries were neglecting at this time. In this first term Batlle focused on children and women’s rights.\textsuperscript{62} This change in attitude toward political obligations to society was first seen in public benefits such as a change from the traditional fifteen to eighteen hour workdays to and eight hour maximum workday, the creation of a social security plan, the legalization of divorce, and the most striking benefit being that of education. During this first term the Batlle administration decided that for Uruguay to reach its full potential it needed to make education free and accessible to everyone at all levels. This included the creation of night schools for working adults, high schools in all of Uruguay’s eighteen departments, as well as a public university system.\textsuperscript{63}

After this first term ended Batlle took a long leave from the country to tour through Europe, specifically spending time in Switzerland, and returned to Uruguayan with ideas of how to better stabilize its political system.\textsuperscript{64} When Batlle returned to Uruguay, and was re-elected in 1911 his second administration focused on two major issues, ending the county’s economy and further stabilizing its democracy. In preventing future economic crisis, Batlle believed Uruguay needed to end its economic dependence on foreign owned industries and began to end this through the nationalization of Uruguayan industries so that the state would have more control.

\textsuperscript{61} Nahun 1999, 81  
\textsuperscript{62} Panizza 1997, 670  
\textsuperscript{63} Fitzgibbon 1954, 94, 127, 128; Nahum 1999, 77, 78  
\textsuperscript{64} “It is a common belief that Battle’s tour of Europe, for four years, between presidencies are responsible for the new ideas and maturity of an independent government, the society, the state, the economy and the culture of Uruguay” (Nahum 1999, 84).
over the country’s economy. These nationalized industries included the banking system with the Bank of the Republic, the insurance industry, with the State Insurance Bank, Montevideo’s transportation system, as well as the monopoly of the country’s oil and alcohol industries through the creation of ANCAP.

The second major theme of Batlle’s second term in office was the stabilization of Uruguay’s democracy. In order to prevent the personalistic leaders, often dictators, seen throughout Latin America Batlle implemented a form of horizontally accountability for the Uruguayan president. This was created with a nine-member council known as the National Council. Similar to the Swiss National Council of the time, this group, as a whole, had executive powers, but unlike that of the Swiss model, it was accompanied by a president with parallel authority. This council proved to not be as strong as Batlle desired, and was ineffective in the Terra dictatorship when it was suspended from power, and eventually eliminated from the Uruguayan political scene.

**Military-Civil Relations**

This section explains how the two countries’ military-civil relations differed. Chile’s military was more involved in the country’s political system, maintaining traditional elite groups, than in Uruguay’s case. Uruguay on the other hand saw little involvement of the military in its politics, and day-to-day life. Chile’s military stayed involved in the country’s politics throughout the twentieth century carrying out coups, and influencing political decisions. Chile’s military even developed the county’s current constitution during the Pinochet dictatorship. Uruguay’s

---

65 To prevent Uruguay’s “drainage of gold” to foreign counties Batlle began nationalizing industries with the help of loans from France to end their dependence on the sole country England (Nahum 1999, 86).

66 Fitzgibbon 1954, 131

67 Fitzgibbon 1954, 143
military however only played a roll in the country’s political system going into and coming out of the coup. Beside this Uruguay’s military has historically stayed out of the country’s political realm, and continues to do so.

Chile

Chile’s armed forces have long had a strong sense of military professionalism, which has been used as a legitimate form of combating political problems throughout the twentieth century. During this century this military professionalism was displayed in the various coup d’états as well in preventing attempted coups. This was seen on several occasions in the 1920s. In 1924 when a group of young military officers removed the president of the time, Arturo Alessandri, from office, instead of taking measure to prevent this the parties did little to interfere. Due to the social and economic crises of this time worsening the military was given the opportunity to intervene in the failing traditional political system with a coup d’état. Soon this junta was overthrown by a group of military officials ranked higher than the junta that over threw Alessandri, reinstating Alessandri, and later overthrowing Alessandri putting General Carlos Ibáñez in office, who would become known as the “Mussolini of Chile,” due to his repressive measures toward the leftist movement, especially communists.

Knowing how difficult it would be to eliminate the leftist parties from Chile’s political playing field, Ibáñez attempted to repress the labor movement by controlling it through state organized unions created by the state department (La Confederación Republicana de Acción Civica). The military also tried to solve the social unrest supported by the labor movement by improving Chile’s job market creating nine thousand jobs through public works with companies

---

68 Collier and Sater 2004, 207
69 Collier and Sater 2004, 215
70 Rector 2003, 144
such as LAN and the Carabineros. After Chile’s economic failure, due in large part to the Great Depression, the military lost a large enough portion of its support to remove it from politics, for a forty-year duration. In 1969 a portion of the military returned to the political arena with demands, protesting low military salaries, and poor equipment, when a military regiment took over downtown Santiago refusing to obey the President and minister of defense. Though this incident was quickly suppressed the military did not stay out of politics for long. By 1973 the military responded to the state of chaos in which Chile had found itself, and threats of removing military officials from politics, by first rolling tanks down one of Santiago’s busiest street, and eventually by a military led coup d’état on September 11, in 1973. Chile began its transition back to democracy with a semi-democratic regime under a constitution which was drafted in 1980 during the Pinochet authoritarian regime, retaining some military interests in politics during the country’s democratic transition. This constitution made Pinochet Chile’s Commander-and-Chief for life, as well as appointed nonelected senators, which was later amended.

Uruguay

Historically Uruguay has not been military minded, and the political system has for the most part kept the military on a short leash. After the end of the nineteenth century Uruguay did not have any need for supporting the growth, and power of its military, there were no real social problems within the country for the first half of the twentieth century, as seen in Chile. Uruguay did not take up a large role in either of the international wars of this century. So, it had

---

71 Rector 2003, 149
72 Rector 2003, 169
73 Rector 2003, 182
74 Collier and Sater 2003, 392; Rector 2003, 214
75 Fitzgibbons 1954, 158
no reason for support a strong military until the 1960s with the violent leftist movement lead by the Tupamaros.

Much like the MIR in Chile, the Tupamaros a militant leftist organization made up mostly of students, laborers, and members of the middle class, was formed in response to the country’s economic, and social crises of the time. Inspired by the leftist movements gaining popularity during this period, such as the Cuban Revolution, along with green movements in Europe, and the United States of America, the Tupamaros carried out attacks, sometimes violent, on the Uruguayan political system.76 “By the late 1960s the Tupamaros were staging increasingly bold and popular strikes on targets of the traditional political establishment, in turn provoking increased military repression…by the end of 1972 the Tupamaros were defeated by the military.” 77 During this time the parties were so divided both internally, due to high amount of fractionalization, and externally due to the polarization that they were unable to deal with the social, and economic struggles of the 1960s and 1970s. It was because of the traditional parties’ inability, or unwillingness to solve the economic crisis of the time that gave Uruguay’s military the opportunity and power to take control of the country’s political system in 1973, while its political leaders and citizens stood aside and watched it, forming little opposition to the developing military regime.78 After Uruguay’s return to democracy in 1985 the military moved back to the barracks, leaving the political realm, and the political system returned to its constitution drafted prior to the country’s coup of 1973, under a democratic regime.

76 Though the Tupamaro group was largely inspired by the Cuban Revolution, Che Guevara visited the country after the revolution, and in a speech to Public university he said, “Uruguay needs no violent revolution.”
77 Cason 2002, 87
78 Caetano 1998, 25
**Economy**

Chile and Uruguay share many similarities in responding to economic problems throughout the twentieth century, such as import substitution/protectionism policies which developed similar social crises within these countries leading up to their falls to dictatorship in 1973. However the distribution of resources among citizens varies greatly between both countries. As discussed in the previous literature review high levels of unsatisfactory unequal distribution of resources has been shown to have a strong correlation with such aspects of party polarization, and likelihood of violent coups. When looking at this brief comparison of the development of economies between Chile and Uruguay I hope to develop an understanding of how these countries have differed in the histories of their distribution or redistribution of resources. Though the explanation of Chile’s redistribution may be lacking I will further explain why in the next chapter. However this chapter shows that Uruguay put an early emphasis on resource redistribution which Chile did not experience in the early twentieth century.

**Chile**

Throughout the twentieth century Chile enacted a series protectionist acts to improve its economy. Prior to World War II its economy was dependent mainly on the exportation of nitrates. Due to this dependence on mined nitrates when technological advancements made synthetic nitrates cheaper to produce Chile’s loss of international income led it into an economic crisis. To combat this the government of the time enacted protectionist laws, raising tariffs on imported goods, as well as enacting an income tax based on occupation.\(^\text{79}\) Chile’s economy finally saw a period of improvement, in the sense that its economy did not seem to be worsening, in the late 1920s when Ibáñez attempted to fix the problem through expanding ambitious public

\(^{79}\) Collier and Sater 2004, 203-205
works which led to the beginning of a strong base of support for the country’s authoritative populist. However this all changed during the Great Depression, in which Ibáñez was able to fix through his attempts of cutting government spending, which eventually led to social unrest and Ibáñez fleeing the country. The succeeding administration following Ibáñez, attempted to fix these problems through tax breaks to new construction projects hoping to encourage economic development. It then raised tariffs, defaulted on foreign loans, then bought these loans back at a discounted price. The administration then tried to pump money into the economy which led to high levels of inflation, and in turn a decline in purchasing power.

After the Great Depression and throughout the Cold War Chile’s economy only seemed to worsen, as various administration attempted economic reform through such protectionists measures as freezing prices and wages, import substitution, raising tariffs on imports, matching the country’s currency to the dollar, and nationalization. These methods only led to the worsening of the country’s economy encouraging a loss of confidence among the people and government. During this period the Chile’s political parties only seemed to become more polarized preventing administration to react to these economic crises. By 1973 the economic/political situation seemed to be worsening after the implementation nationalization of the countries foreign owned industries, and social unrest which had become violent leading to the coup d’état in September of the same year.

Unlike in Uruguay Chile did not show much initiative in the redistribution of resources. Throughout the Chile continued a social system which resemble that of its patron-client system during colonialization, and which seemed to strengthen during the country’s industrialization.

---

80 Rector 2003, 149  
81 Rector 2003, 150  
82 Rector 2003, 149, 159  
83 Collier and Sater 2004, 253; Rector 2003, 152
Where the hacienda system, in which a single person or small group owned massive portions of land similar to that of Argentina, was unable to flourish in Uruguay as I will explain in the next section, it was able to develop strong roots in Chile’s countryside. This system, brought by Spanish settlers throughout Latin America, created societies in which small groups owned the majority resources while the majority of people had very few resources distributed amongst itself. In many societies that this system was implemented it proved create poor living conditions for the masses, and low levels of education.

However after since its transition to a democracy Chile has seen substantial economic growth through economic diversification, of such industries as wine, copper, tourism, produce. It was also during this period that Chile began seeing economic distribution among its citizens through such welfare programs as public health care, housing, and education decreasing the number of poverty stricken by half the turn of the twenty-first century.

Uruguay

After the party truce between the Blanco and Colorado parties in 1904 Uruguay experienced a period of economic growth, based mainly on its agriculture industry. This industry saw growth because with the ceasing of the country’s long civil war farmlands were no longer destroyed, in turn creating more confidence in the development of the countryside. Because of this late development of the countryside the oligarchies formed by small groups of large plantation owners, as seen in other parts of Latin America, including Chile, were few and spread out in Uruguay, making the workers of the countryside less controllable. This historic disorder in the countryside also gave Montevideo “early economic importance in centralizing the country”s

---

84 Collier and Sater 2003, 395
85 Collier and Sater 2003, 397
decision making process, both economically and politically.”

As a result of this socio-economic-political shift, between 1904 and 1911, Uruguay’s GDP saw an annual growth rate of “five percent, with the rural land value rising by eighty percent.” With this growing GDP producing more confidence in the economy Batlle decided to break its economic dependence on England, by taking out loans from France to begin financing diverse public works within Uruguay. This period of economic growth accompanied by the nation’s modernization, both industrial/economically as well as politically created the ideal environment for economic redistribution.

In response to the economic crisis brought on by the Great Depression, Uruguay experienced a period in which an authoritarian leader was in power, Gabriel Terra, who had made promises to end many of the economic policies implemented by Batlle, in an attempt to remove many of the social and economic responsibilities developed in Uruguay by these policies. However, due to the disastrous social and economic effects brought on by the Great Depression Terra found himself having to continue these policies.

Due to reliance a on import substitution to come out of the Great Depression, Uruguay eventually found itself in another economic crisis by the 1950s. “The country’s industries were almost completely dependent on imported supplies, and therefore relied on the performance of the export sector…The protectionist policies prohibited the import of articles which were or could be manufactured in the country, making costs high with low excess capacity, as well as low levels of competitive pressure. Manufacturers were content with their share of the domestic

---

86 Panizza 1997, 674
87 Panizza 1997, 673
88 Nahum 1999, 77
89 Nahum 1999, 114
market with little desire to expand into the international market.”

With an industrial production heavily dependent on export performance this proved to be a fatal challenge to Uruguay’s economy. “With the state resting on import substitution industrialization strategy that was quickly exhausted…growth began to stagnate in the 1950s and by the 1960s, increasing political conflict, reflected both an ailing economy and the general political ferment in Latin America after the Cuban revolution…This political and economic crisis was accompanied by a rise of the political left.” The import substitution policies “resulted in increased inflation, and fiscal crisis, leading to the bank crash of 1965 when the Republic’s checks ‘bounced' overseas,” leaving the country in a large amount of international debt. Facing this economic problem the public was left politically unprotected when the traditional parties became ideologically decentralized and unable to reach agreements within the parties themselves on nearly any subject amongst each other on how to fix the economic, and social problems caused by the high rates of inflation.

---

90 Finch 1971, 175
91 Cason 2000, 86
92 Gillespie 1986
93 Caetano 1998, 19
Chapter Four: Data and Analysis

Research Design

My dependent variable for this research is the countries’ levels of support for democracy since 1995. My definition of democracy is a system of government where masses choose officials who will carry out decisions on the behalf of the nation’s citizens. This is done through unbiased elections open to everyone of adequate voting age, where everyone’s vote carries the same weight. The Latinobarometro shows that support for democracy in Chile has not only been lower than that of Uruguay, but it has also been lower than Latin America’s average. If support for democracy is considered an important factor for its success, and if Chile’s is considered one of the democratic success stories of the third wave of democracy, then why does it have such low levels of support for democracy?

My key independent variables are party systems, populism, civil-military relations, and economic distribution. As discussed in my literature review these variables all have a correlation with democracy. I will look at the histories of Chile and Uruguay’s to compare the stability of both countries’ democracy from the early twentieth century until today. By demonstrating the stability of both countries’ democracies, I hope to show that one country has seen a more stable democracy than the other throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, making democracy in one country more favorable than in the other. Out of these two similar countries, in reference to their reasoning for going into a dictatorship, using a most similar case design, I have chosen to look at these differences, which I focused on in the history of the two countries in the

---

94 According to the Linz definition of democracy
95 Mainwaring 1998; Morlino 2009, 209-213; Birch 2001, 1
previous chapter, to explain one’s lower levels of support for democracy in comparison to the other. The explanations of these differences are expanded on in the independent variables of this chapter.

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable in this thesis is the support for democracy within these countries by their citizens. This variable has been illustrated through surveys carried out by the latinobarometro, a private organization that polls public opinions annually in various Latin American countries. The dependent variable in this thesis is the support for democracy within these countries by their citizens. This variable has been illustrated through surveys carried out by the latinobarometro, a private organization that polls public opinions annually in various Latin American countries. 

I have created chart a to demonstrate this variable. It shows the support for democracy from 1995 until 2010 in three places including Chile, Uruguay, and the average of Latin America as a whole. I have added the average of Latin America’s support for democracy to show how the support of democracy within Chile and Uruguay compares to the rest of the continent. Chart a shows the countries’ percentages of support for democracy year to year from 1995 until 2010. When looking at the Chart a we see that over the past fifteen years Chile has had a lower percentage of support for its democracy than not only Uruguay but also lower than the average rate for Latin America as a whole. On the other hand, Uruguay has had a much higher rate of support for democracy by its citizens than both Chile and the continent as a whole. In comparison to Chile, Uruguay has had a higher rate of democratic support by twenty to thirty percent.

---

96 [Latinobarometro.org](http://www.latinobarometro.org)  
97 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, México, Nicaragua, Panamá, Paraguay, Perú, República Dominicana, Uruguay, Venezuela
The only exception for this is in the most recent polling of the LatinoBarometro.org showing Uruguay being at a low of seventy-eight percent between 1995 and 2010 and Chile being at a high of just a little over sixty-five percent. In relation to the Latin American average, Chile stays about two to ten percent under the continent’s average. This, however, is with the two exceptions of 2005 when, at around sixty-two percent, Chile’s support for democracy is just about two percent higher than that of Latin America’s average rate, continuing to still be much lower than that of Uruguay. The second exception is in the poll’s most recent year where Chile’s rate of democratic support is almost identical to the whole of Latin America with them both being just above sixty-five percent. Another point demonstrated by this graph is that the gap of difference seems to be closing, as Chile’s percentage of support for democracy appears to be on a slow rise since 1995 while Uruguay’s has been on a decline. The second graph in this section shows us the average of all three areas surveyed with about a twenty-six percent difference between Chile at fifty-six percent and Uruguay, at 82 percent, as averaged over the years, and the Latin American average being between that of Chile and Uruguay at just above twenty-three percent.
Independent Variables

The independent variable for this study is the two countries’ party systems, their histories of populism, their civil-military relations, and their levels of economic inequality, on which I will discuss in this section.

Party systems

Using Scott Mainwaring’s criteria of a party system’s stability relying on its institutionalization, rootedness, legitimacy, and organization, I have shown that Uruguay’s party system has been more stable than has Chile’s throughout the last century. To support this, I have relied on comparing the two countries’ rates of electoral volatility, effective number of political parties, and methods other than democratic elections for leaders to rise to power.

Electoral Volatility

Electoral volatility is a snapshot or yardstick measuring support for political parties, showing to what extent voting patterns change from election to election. Levels of electoral volatility are an important indicator of whether or not a country’s party system is going through a transformation or is unstable, and is a “sufficiently important indicator to warrant” this judgment. Party systems with high electoral volatility rates between elections reflect a system of low party identity and therefore a more unstable party system than one with low electoral volatility. A system with low electoral volatility indicates a party system with established parties and stabilized voter-party relationships, making it difficult for new parties to enter these established
party systems. Crises within these established party systems are less likely than party systems without these characteristics.⁹⁸

When looking at chart b we see that the electoral volatility between Chile and Uruguay is quite different. In Chile’s case, electoral volatility starts out being very high at almost thirty-eight percent in 1932, and the electoral volatility of Uruguay is low being seven tenths of a percent in 1919 and not reaching ten percent until 1946. Chile’s volatility never goes below twenty percent prior to its 1970s dictatorship, and only goes below ten percent, at 0.0725, once between the elections of 1999 and 2004. Uruguay’s era of ‘high’ volatility is short lived, lasting only ten years, and is still much lower than Chile’s highest period of volatility. Chile saw not only a higher rate of electoral volatility, but also saw a very short period of low electoral volatility before it’s coup. The period of low electoral volatility before the coup for Chile was short, only about four years, where in Uruguay’s case it saw a much longer period of low electoral volatility prior to its 1970s dictatorship.

---

⁹⁸ Pedersen 1979, 8; Morlino 2009, 209
ENPP (Effective Number of Political Parties): Party Polarization

The ENPP (Effective Number of Political Parties) is a measurement of how many parties within a political system gain enough support through popular vote or distribution of seats to be competitive with other parties in the system, indicating the likelihood of whether or not coalition is necessary for parties within a system. This not only shows the number of parties that hold the majority of power within a political system, but also is an indicator of the level of party polarization within a country’s party system. The ENPP is calculated by first squaring the share of votes each party receives and then dividing one by this number squared. “If two roughly equal parties control a large majority and a third has fewer seats, then N would be equal to somewhere between 2.0 and 3.0.” I have displayed both countries’ rates of ENPP in chart c. When looking at the chart comparing Chile and Uruguay’s ENPP, it is easy to see that the two countries greatly differ in the number of effective parties that each country’s political system has contained for the past hundred years. In Chile’s ENPP, we see that between its first and second legislative elections on the chart its ENPP nearly doubled from 4.14 percent to 7.79 percent.

During this time of Chile’s political history, there were several important factors that could have affected its ENPP. First, within the country’s industrialization the working and middle classes were increasingly finding political representation in leftist parties such as Chile’s communist and socialist parties. Second, between 1924 and 1927, Chile’s government experienced three coups. One was by young lieutenants unhappy with the president of the time. The second was led by Colonel Carlos Ibañez, overthrowing the junta and reinstating the president, and then again in 1927 when the same Carlos Ibañez removed the president he helped

---

99 Mainwaring 1995, 28; Morlino 2009, 210
100 \( Ns = \frac{1}{\sum p_i^2} \)
101 Mainwaring 1995, 29
102 Walter 2005, 77
return to office, and ran as a candidate in the next election winning over ninety-five percent of the vote, making him Chile’s executive leader. Third, like all countries in 1929, Chile’s economy felt the economic blows of the great depression.

Though Chile’s ENPP goes down from 7.79 to 6.8 to and stays consistent for the next several election periods we see it again raise drastically in 1953 to 11.52 parties. During this period, Chile was experiencing an economic crisis after poor policy implementation. We then see from 1953 until 1965 a decline where it goes from 8.59 in 1957 to 6.44 in 1961 finally to 4.06 in 1965, and for the two elections after 1965, 1969 and 1971, we see the ENPP stay at about 5.5 until the 1973 coup. In comparison to Chile’s ENPP, Uruguay’s has been quite a constant ENPP.

For the majority of the twentieth century, Uruguay’s ENPP ranges between two and two and a half parties. Between 1966 and 1971, the last election before the coup, Uruguay’s ENPP rises up to having three effective parties. The third party added on to Uruguay’s two party system, historically dominated by the Blanco and Colorado parties, is the Frente Amplio, which was a coalition of the country’s smaller leftist parties and organizations, as well as leftist factions

---

103 Dix 1985, 41, 43
104 Sater 1981, 329
105 Rector 2003, 140, 152; Collier and Sater 2004, 253
of the Colorado party, one of Uruguay’s two catch all parties. Developing during a period fashionable for leftist parties in Latin America, the Frente Amplio has withstood the test of time, living through the dictatorship, and winning the two presidential elections back-to-back in both 2004, and 2009.106

The gaining of political power through non-democratic methods: Rate of Coup D’états

My third factor in explaining the dependent variable is that of non-democratic methods used to gain control of political office. The particular method of non-democratic acquisition of political power in terms of this paper is coup d’état. To demonstrate and compare the levels of coups within Chile and Uruguay I have used a point system giving years without a coup d’état a 0, giving years with an attempted coup d’état a 1, and giving years with successful coup d’états a 2. This is shown in chart d once again when comparing Chile and Uruguay we see that they have different histories. Chile saw several coups between 1925 and its 1973 coup. As stated before Chile saw three military coups between 1925 and 1927 and again saw an attempted coup in 1938, but this time instead of being carried out by military officials it was led by Chile’s National Socialist Movement through armed Chilean youths, which supported the reinstatement of Ibañez, and was violently repressed by the military. This event is known today as the Seguro Obrero Massacre.107 Uruguay on the other hand did not see any violent coups, or major movements that questioned its democracy prior to the dictatorship. Though it did have a group known as the Tupamaros which was made up of University students, and working middle class, this was a small unorganized group, unable of seriously, and directly threatening the country’s

---

106 Cason 2000, 87
107 Silva 2010, 134
political system. It was created, like many similar groups throughout Latin America it this time, in response to the Cuban Revolution.\textsuperscript{108}

Chart d: Rate of Coups

Chile's is the line which fluctuates
Uruguay is the line which does not change until 1973

Testing The Hypothesis

I have chosen the party systems, populism, civil-military relations, and economic distribution, because for both countries the road to dictatorship was similar in that they were both experiencing economic crises due to poor economic decisions made earlier (ISI), and were experiencing similar social crisis as a repercussion to these economic crises, accompanied by a liberal movement following the Cuban Revolution. The most profound differences I have discovered within these countries were these four categories, which have been developed over time, and anchored both Chile and Uruguay’s democracies. This helps to explain how one, democracy, Uruguay’s, has had a more stable democratic development than the other in turn making it more likely to be supportable than that of Chile’s, because when party systems have been stable the democracies they work in also tend to be stable.\textsuperscript{109} This democratic stability which had developed in Uruguay, throughout the twentieth century, even carried over into the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{108} Cason 2000, 87
\bibitem{109} Morlino 2009, 211
\end{thebibliography}
dictatorship of the seventies when the people voted not to change the constitution drafted under democratic rule, and unlike Chile did not allow leadership from the dictatorship to carryover into the new democratic regime in 1985. This indicates that Uruguay’s democracy itself has been stable, in comparison to Chile’s, since the dictatorship. With Chile’s unstable, yet institutionalized, party system and the lack of legitimacy accorded to it, the people of Chile have searched for different ways of channeling their desires, and goals that they believe the government should achieve. One of these current alternatives of channeling mass opinion is the same alternative that was seen several times within the country’s recent history, mass protest, and in some cases riots that have been violently suppressed, and at times accompanied by authoritarian regimes.

**Party Systems**

**Extent to Which the Party System is Institutionalized**

An institutionalized party system is the first criterion of stable party systems. Institutionalized party systems are more likely to produce patterns of competition that manifest regularly. This creates unspoken rules that actors tend follow expecting others to follow them as well.\(^{110}\) There are two main ways of demonstrating institutionalization within party systems. One is through a party system’s ENPP (Effective Number of Political Parties), and the other is through a party’s Electoral Volatility.\(^{111}\) The higher number of ENPP a country has the more polarized its party system tends to be, meaning the more necessary party coalitions are for party survival.\(^{112}\) When comparing the ENPP of Chile and Uruguay over the years we see that Chile’s party system has been quite a bit higher than that of Uruguay, never going below four parties.

\(^{110}\) Morlino 2009, 211  
\(^{111}\) Mainwaring 1998, 69  
\(^{112}\) Mainwaring 1995, 28; Morlino 2009, 210
Uruguay’s ENPP never becomes as high as four parties at one time. What is most interesting about this chart is that while Chile’s ENPP fluctuates, at times jumping from six effective parties in one election to over eleven in the next, Uruguay’s does not change very much until the sixties when it goes from two effective parties to three, with the rise of the Frente Amplio.

In terms of the countries’ rates of electoral volatility, one can see the difference of regularity in the two countries’ voting patterns. With the exception of two voting periods, Chile has a higher rate of electoral volatility than Uruguay ranging from about ten to fifty percent higher. Chile’s rates of electoral Volatility, being higher, indicates that its political outcomes are less predictable and therefore less stable, demonstrating the likelihood of powerful parties losing electoral support, and the possibility of new parties gaining high levels of support, making it more difficult for citizen to know where the different, old and new, parties stand.113 This data, given in the ENPP graph, shows that there is more regularity in Uruguay’s political competition than in that of Chile’s.

**Extent of Societal Party Rootedness**

Similar to how institutionalized a party system is, how deeply rooted parties are in their societies helps voters predict which stances different parties will take in elections, and therefore to what extent citizens will claim a party, and continuously vote for the party they claim. This too looks at the Electoral Volatility as a measurement. A system with low electoral volatility indicates that voters tend to vote for the same party in different elections, and to what extent voters identify with and based on a party label.114 Measuring the rootedness of a party also takes into account the electoral volatility of presidential elections. “Where parties shape political

---

113 Mainwaring 1998, 72
114 Mainwaring 1998, 69
preferences of most voters are deeply rooted, the difference between presidential and legislative voting should be less pronounced. “115 When comparing the electoral volatility of presidential elections in both Chile and Uruguay we see that the difference between the legislative and presidential voting is much more pronounced in Chile than it is in Uruguay indicating that Uruguay’s party system is more deeply rooted than that of Chile’s. One explanation of this is that the Uruguayan electoral system has taken an active role in institutionalizing deeply rooted party identity among its citizens with the Ley de Lemas which forces voters to first choose a party before being able to vote for candidates within that party. This is shown for Uruguay in chart e, and Chile in chart f.

Another indicator of whether or not a party system is deeply rooted is whether or not nonpartisan personalistic leaders gain mass support sufficient enough to win elections. “Where

115 Mainwaring 1998, 72
citizens are attached to a party, such candidates rarely win office.”¹¹⁶ This shows that party support is not the only legitimate form of winning office, making them at times an unnecessary channel for the masses to express their opinions. Though both Chile and Uruguay have had personalistic populist leaders, Chile’s were at times anti-party, Uruguay’s was supportive of an institutionalized party system developing electoral mechanisms to prevent future personalistic leaders from winning the Uruguayan presidency. For Chile this leader was Ibañez, for Uruguay it was Batlle. Ibañez, an authoritarian populist, carried out actions that undermined Chile’s political parties such as taking office by military force and using “active or retired military officers as aides and prominent members of his administration, much like Peron of Argentina.”¹¹⁷

Batlle, on the other hand, seemed to be more of a democratic populist, embracing Uruguay’s institutionalized parties by not only coming to power through election, but also overseeing the end of Uruguay’s long civil war through a treatise with his party’s historical opposing party the Blanco party, through a political agreement of how the two political parties would share power in future elections as to prevent any further violence.¹¹⁸ Batlle also institutionalized, or at least attempted to institutionalize, the electoral mechanism of a National Council, based off of the Swiss model he saw on a tour through Europe. This National Council would be given executive power equivalent to that of the country’s president. It was created in order to prevent future personalistic leaders from winning office and harming the country’s institutionalized political system.¹¹⁹ In comparing the two countries forms of personalistic leaders, Chile’s was an authoritarian populist, which tends to arise and promote authoritarian rule. Uruguay’s personalistic leader would be considered a democratic populist due to his arrival

¹¹⁶ Mainwaring 1998, 74
¹¹⁷ Dix 1985, 33
¹¹⁸ Nahum 1999, 78; Weinstein 1988, 23
¹¹⁹ Fitzgibbon 1954, 143
to power through a democratic process. His administration’s development of electoral mechanisms to prevent the type of personalistic leaders such as Ibañez, and seen throughout Chile, made Batlle’s form of populism congruent with democracy. This prevented a “vicious cycle” of the development of more personalistic leaders witnessed in the wake of authoritarian populists.\(^{120}\)

**Legitimacy**

In stable party systems, major political actors, such as politicians and voters, consider political parties to be a legitimate part of their country’s political process. Much like the two former criteria, of party institutionalization, and rootedness “legitimation is a dimension of institutionalization because the latter concept implies that actors base their behavior on the expectation that a practice will continue.”\(^{121}\) Political institutions become legitimate when the political actors “generally believe, in spite of short comings and failures, that their existing political institutions are better than possible alternatives.”\(^{122}\) The recent protests and at times violent demonstrations, such as those in the Austral region of Chile, demonstrate that the legitimacy of the country’s party system, and therefore its’ democratic process, is being questioned by its citizens. More consolidated democracies would use its party system to channel these concerns. But the mass questioning of Chile’s party system’s legitimacy is no new phenomenon. Traced in my research to 1924 with the coup d’état carried out by young lieutenants of the Chilean military, which was then succeeded by a double coup to first reinstate the once ousted president, and then again in 1927 to re-oust him. Chile saw another questioning of its party system’s legitimacy when in 1938 a party, supporting the once dictator of the

\(^{120}\) Dix 1985, 32; Mainwaring 1998, 75  
\(^{121}\) Mainwaring 1998, 69  
\(^{122}\) Morlino 2009, 211
country, Carlos Ibañez, attempted a coup and was brutally suppressed by the military, an incident known as the Seguro Obrero Massacre.

Though Uruguay did have a period in the sixties when the small domestic terrorist group known as the Tupamaros, made up mostly of students and middle/working class citizens, carried out attacks around the country, it was not nearly as extreme as the threats to democracy Chile experienced with such organized groups as the MIR. Groups like the Tupamaros were popping up all over Latin America at this time in response to the success of the Cuban Revolution, and not necessarily from Uruguay’s poor party performance. This legitimacy of the party system is important to consolidated democracies, “democracies tend to be more consolidated when actors accord legitimacy to parties, since they constitute the main means of competing for state power in virtually all democratic systems.” With this being the case, chart 5e of coups in both countries shows that throughout the twentieth century Uruguay’s party system has not only tended to be more legitimate among its citizens than that of Chile’s, but it also has tended to have a more consolidated democracy throughout the twentieth century. With the current mass protests in Chile, and higher levels of support for its democracy in recent years Uruguay has continued its tradition of being regarded as a legitimate and consolidated democracy by its citizens.

*Organizations Matter*

The fourth criteria of Mainwaring for a stable party system is that the organizations within it used to carry out political tasks, such as selecting leaders, are “clear and stable, and

123 Although this can be argued because at this point in time Uruguay’s parties were immobile and in effective at producing policies to combat the social, and economic problems of the time. However, when ‘Che’ Ernesto Guevara himself visited Uruguay after the Cuban revolution, he claimed that the country’s political system and society needed no revolutionary change, however if anything this made the party system less legitimate, and therefore less stable, while it legitimized the military’s ability to take care of the “situation,” and though the Tupamaros were “taken care of” before Uruguay’s 1973 coup the military and President Bordaberry continued to use them as a threat in order to legitimize their time in office.

124 Mainwaring 1998, 78
never subordinate to the leader." Once again, Uruguay and Chile differ in this area. With the Ley de Lemas, as mentioned earlier as a process for selecting presidents, the voter first votes for the party and then the leader. Uruguay’s institutionalized process of choosing a leader supports a more stabilized party system less likely to develop around a candidate. Chile’s, on the other hand, due to its party polarization and lack of such a mechanism, has had to rely on coalitions, making the elections more about the candidate than the parties themselves, which is not good when trying to prevent the rising of a personalistic leader, which Chile has failed at several times in recent history.

As seen in my charts representing the countries’ ENPPs, rates of electoral volatility and history of coups for the majority of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century, both countries have differed in all three areas. For the most part, Uruguay has displayed a much more stable party system than that of Chile. This has been no recent phenomenon, but rather something that has developed over time. My data collected to show the ENPP, as well as the electoral volatility, shows that until 1971 Uruguay had a much more constant and lower ENPP as well as a lower level of electoral volatility than that of Chile, and then went into its dictatorship, which lasted until 1985. On the other hand, Chile had seen a higher ENPP and rate of electoral volatility, and was just coming out of one of its highest periods of party system. Therefore it was less democratically stable, which had lasted about twenty years ENPP wise and twenty-five years electoral volatility wise, prior to the dictatorship lasting until 1990. This means that coming out of the dictatorship the age of the youngest people who would have remembered a stable democracy would have been about twenty-seven years of age, where the youngest Chileans that would have remembered anything about Chile’s period of stable democracy would have been

125 Mainwaring 1998, 78
about forty-two years old.\textsuperscript{126} This means that less percent of the population would have remembered anything about what Chile’s most stable period of democracy was like coming out of the dictatorship than that of Uruguay.

This does not take into account the differences of the processes of going into dictatorship, maintaining it, and coming out of it, that developed from the institutionalized party systems of these countries. In Chile’s case, where a less stable party system and therefore democracy had institutionalized other legitimate possibilities for obtaining power, seen in its former coups, saw a violent takeover where the military violently removed Allende from office. Also, the personalistic leader, discussed earlier in this thesis, that a weak unstable party system is known to develop, formed in Chile’s dictatorship with Pinochet who oversaw Chile’s transition to democracy. It prolonged the constitution made during the dictatorship, which contains such clauses as the senators-for-life clause, which continued to give the personalistic dictator power after the country’s transition to democracy. Uruguay’s dictatorship, however, saw a more peaceful transition to military rule with the government just letting it happen rather than the military forcing its way in with violence.\textsuperscript{127} Throughout the dictatorship, rather than have one leader such as Pinochet, Uruguay’s regime was lead by a military junta, and when the country transitioned back into democracy instead of using any constitution created during the dictatorship, after the Pacto Naval it continued to use the constitution used before the 1973 coup.

From my research the changing point for Uruguay is when it began institutionalizing a party system that would prove to be stable, and legitimate. This was after Batlle was elected into office. His administration first pacified the social unrest caused by the civil war between the Blancos and Colorados. He also began tinkering with the country’s political and electoral

\textsuperscript{126} I’ve put the youngest age of memory at 15 years old

\textsuperscript{127} Caetano 1998, 25
processes. Through organizations such as the National Council to prevent personalistic leaders form gaining power, and the development of electoral mechanisms such as the Ley de Lemas, the party system in Uruguay has developed to be one more stable than that of Chile’s.

**Populism**

Chile and Uruguay have differed in the types of populist leaders they have had, one having an authoritarian populist leader and the other having a democratic populist leader. The authoritarian populist leader tends to be harmful to democratic development, having a military background or use military force, and supporting wealthy elite-land-owning classes over the poorer classes by placing such elite in leadership positions and protecting their interests.\(^\text{128}\) The democratic populist on the other hand supports democratic development putting career politicians, professionals, and intellectuals into leadership roles as opposed to military officials, as well as promoting social welfare systems to benefit the lower classes.\(^\text{129}\)

Carlos Ibáñez, Chile’s major populist figure of the twentieth century had characteristics of an authoritarian populist leader when in power, which were harmful to the development of the country’s democracy. Those who Ibáñez appointed to leadership positions were mainly military officials, and members of the upper class elite.\(^\text{130}\) As discussed in my economic distribution section of this chapter as well as in the previous two chapters, this economic elite’s interest was not in giving equal rights to the lower classes in order to maintain the traditional oligarchic power among elite groups within Chilean society.\(^\text{131}\) Like other authoritarian populists, Carlos Ibáñez also put military officials in leadership positions. Appointing such leaders,

---

\(^{128}\) Dix 1985, 45  
\(^{129}\) Dix 1985, 33, 45, 47  
\(^{130}\) Dix 1985, 34  
\(^{131}\) Baland 2008, 1739
oligarchic/military, proved insufficient in dealing with the social and economic problems that Chile faced, which had led to the rise of Ibáñismo.\textsuperscript{132}

Jose Batlle y Ordoñez on the other hand carried more of the traits associated with a democratic populist. In relation to the leaders he appointed, Batlle tended to appoint politicians, intellectuals, and lawyers to leadership positions, which is a characteristic of a democratic populist.\textsuperscript{133} As is another characteristic of democratic populism, Batlle’s administration of such leaders focused on the redistribution of resources though such methods as the creation of free and accessible public education at all levels, and a social security program.\textsuperscript{134}

Another aspect of which puts Ibáñismo into the category of an authoritarian populist is that he gained support from groups/coalitions that were previously not a part of the institutionalized party system of Chile. As stated in my literature review authoritarian populists tend to work outside of the traditional party system rather than gaining support from previously existing parties/coalitions. Such coalitions that realize to support a populist tend to not outlast the populist’s time in power which proved to be the same case for Ibáñez with his supporting parties/coalitions disintegrating by 1958, the end of his term.\textsuperscript{135} This is harmful to the party system’s stabilization, demonstrating its shallow rootedness that can be harmful to democracy as mentioned earlier in this chapter.

A democratic populist however finds support through existing institutions, or parties.\textsuperscript{136} As a democratic populist, Batlle found his organized support through the preexisting Colorado party. Even though the party did not originally meet his expectations, as seen in his major organizational reforms made to it, Batlle’s utilization of this traditional party, as well as the other

\textsuperscript{132} Dix 1985, 34
\textsuperscript{133} Dix 1985, 33, 45, 47
\textsuperscript{134} Dix 1985, 34
\textsuperscript{135} Dix 1985, 43
\textsuperscript{136} Dix 1985, 44
parties of the party system at the time, demonstrates the legitimation of its ability to fix the social and economic issues at the turn of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{137}

Another factor in which the authoritarian populist differs from a democratic one is that of their ideology. An authoritarian runs on an ambiguous ideology attempting to draw support through emotional phrases and ambiguous goals.\textsuperscript{138} For Ibáñez such goals included “liberate the country from party politics, stabilizing the economy, regulating the copper industry and fighting inflation,” without really giving any specification of how such goals would be carried out.\textsuperscript{139} However, these promises made to improve Chile’s politics and economy proved unsuccessful leading to Ibáñez’s loss of support and no improvement in the country’s political and social problems.\textsuperscript{140} Though I’m unable to find information about the platform on which Batlle ran his campaign his successes as presidency, such as the National Council, the development of Uruguay’s welfare system, and implementation of democracy in politics, demonstrate that if not specific his policies were accomplishable. These differences I have discussed in this section show that the types of populist leaders of Chile and Uruguay differ from one another in that Uruguay’s Batlle was a democratic populist which is if not beneficial to democracy, was at least more so benign than that of Chile. Chile’s Ibáñez, an authoritarian populist, seemed to only continue the aspects which are incongruent with a democracy.

\textit{Civil-Military relations}

As explained in the literature review and earlier in this chapter, a military’s constant involvement in political tasks that should be carried out by an elected official is inconsistent with

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{137} Nahum 1999, 79
\item \textsuperscript{138} Dix 1985, 39
\item \textsuperscript{139} Rector 2003, 152
\item \textsuperscript{140} Collier and Sater 2003, 259; Dix 1985, 44
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
democracy, showing enough legitimacy to the military to gain political power through undemocratic means. When the party system has little legitimacy amongst its citizens it indicates such a party system unable to carryout desires of the citizenry leading them to find a more legitimate source of power elsewhere.\textsuperscript{141} This more legitimate source of power in Chile’s case has been the military. When comparing the civil-military relations of both Chile and Uruguay we see that one country, Chile, affords greater legitimacy to its military to carryout political tasks, especially when its elected official find themselves unable to do so. Throughout the twentieth century, when Chile’s party system found itself unable to effectively deal with the social and economic crises confronting it, its military often found itself stepping in to deal with such crises. However much like in the case of the political parties it often found itself ousted from office when such crises worsened while in power.

The development of Uruguay’s civil-military relationship has been different than that of Chile’s. Uruguay’s military was never very large, nor given nearly as much power after its democratization at the turn of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{142} Not playing any significant roles throughout the first half of the twentieth century, except as President Terra’s henchmen. This lack of military involvement in politics shows less legitimacy to carryout political tasks has been accorded to Uruguay’s military than that of Chile, allowing the country’s political decisions, such as choosing leaders and implementing policies, to be carried out through democratic processes. This in turn demonstrates that Uruguay has historically held a higher regard for its democracy than Chile’s, with the exception of the 1970s-80s dictatorship, and therefore that its current higher regard for its democracy is no new phenomenon. When looking at the differences in Chile and Uruguay’s civil-military relations one sees that more legitimacy has been given to

\textsuperscript{141} Mainwaring 1998, 78  
\textsuperscript{142} Fitzgibbons 1954, 158
Chile’s military to step in, whether democratically or not, and solve issues facing the nation when the political system is unable to do so. Uruguay, however, has kept its military realm and political realm separate, with the exception of the coup in 1973. This shows Uruguay’s political system has been given more legitimacy throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, by its citizens and military than that of Chile when faced with difficult challenges. Whether or not it is able to deal with such challenges is not the issue for this thesis but rather that in Uruguay the democratic process has been held to a higher regard than that of Chile’s for the past century, as demonstrated by Uruguay’s fewer military coups.

**Economic Distribution**

Due to lack of data I have not constructed a table to demonstrate the inequality of distribution of these two countries. However I have used their histories of redistribution of resources throughout the twentieth century to explain their differences in the development of their party/political systems. As I stressed earlier in the literature review distribution of resources matters as to how stable a country’s party/political system is going to be.\(^\text{143}\) Those party/political systems which have high levels of unequal distribution tend to be more unstable than those with lower levels of unequal economic distribution. By showing that Uruguay’s early implementation of redistribution in comparison to what little redistribution Chile has carried out since the turn of the twentieth century one is able to see how the patron-client institutions left by colonizers or in Uruguay’s case lack of, have developed in Chile a less stable, more polarized party system and in Uruguay the more stable party system of the two political systems.

Chile’s twentieth century was marked with a high rate of economic inequality, which was discussed in the previous chapter as developing from institutions left over from its period of

\(^{143}\) Przeworski 2008, 2
colonization causing high levels of social and political polarization.\textsuperscript{144} This period of Chile saw little redistribution among the lower classes accompanied by few rights in this period, which was a method used by elites to maintain power and traditional social organization which helps explain its high levels of polarization.\textsuperscript{145} Uruguay on the other hand had a different experience. Due to the country’s civil war destroying the countryside the hacienda system, which created great class gap between the rich and the poor in Chile, was practically non-existent. Uruguay witnessed early redistribution when Batlle implemented social benefit programs, such as state provided heath care, free education, early universal suffrage among other things.\textsuperscript{146}

This difference in distribution of resources between countries helps explain how Chile has developed a less stable, more polarized party/political system than that of Uruguay.\textsuperscript{147} Due to Uruguay’s distribution it built a larger middle class, than did Chile. Through social welfare programs such as free education at all levels, free health care systems, and other programs, Batlle and his administration was able to narrow the dividing class gap that led to the rise of extreme leftist parties polarizing Chile’s party system early on in the twentieth century, making it difficult for different classes to come to political agreements as to what would be better for Chile. The discussion in this section leads the reader to see the differences between Chile and Uruguay’s distribution of economic resources showing that Uruguay’s resources have been more evenly distributed among its society putting Chile’s democracy more at risk for polarization and even failure.\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{144} Welzel 2009, 79
\textsuperscript{145} Baland 2008, 1739
\textsuperscript{146} Cason 2000, 86
\textsuperscript{147} “In high levels of inequality both revolutions and coups are more attractive. Therefore these unequal societies are more likely to switch in and out of democratic regimes.” Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, 949
\textsuperscript{148} Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, 939
Chapter Five: Conclusion

So, why does support for democracy differ between these two countries? When using these independent variables, of party systems, populism, civil-military relations, and economic distribution to explain why Chile’s level of support for democracy is less than that of Uruguay’s on the latinobarometro, we see that Chile’s consolidation process of its democracy throughout the twentieth century was less stable than that of Uruguay, giving Chileans less of a reason to support their democracy. To highlight these independent variables, or rather institutions, I have given a short summary of the past three chapters and ended explaining how they lead to a concluding explanation of why support for democracy differs between these two countries.

Chile’s party system has been more inchoate in relation to that of Uruguay’s throughout the twentieth century, finding itself often unable to deal with the social, political, and economic issues it faced during this period. This inability to deal with such issues led to high levels of electoral volatility, the constant materialization of new parties from election to election, and several more undemocratic military interventions in Chile than in Uruguay. Uruguay’s party system however was quite stable with relatively low levels of electoral volatility, the inability for many new parties to materialize due to the political system’s monopolization by the Colorado and Blanco parties until the nineteen-sixties, and only one undemocratic military-led intervention, which shows its society held a higher respect for the democratic process over the past hundred years than did Chile’s.

Chile’s history of an authoritarian populist leader, and Uruguay’s history of a democratic populist leader shows that during the development of these two democracies, Chile supported a
type of leader that has proven harmful for the consolidation of democracy, whereas Uruguay produced a type of populist leader that seems to be more beneficial to the stabilization of a consolidated democracy. Ibáñez, Chile’s authoritarian populist leader, used members of the traditional elite class and military officers, two groups who had historically not supported the distribution of resources and rights to lower classes. Such distribution is important for democratic consolidation. The policies implemented, or rather attempted, by Ibáñez’s and his administration proved not to fulfill his vague promises of the improvement of Chile’s traditional political system. Batlle, Uruguay’s Democratic populist, made major improvements to the country’s political system, as stated above which helped to not only bring about peace between two warring sides but also consolidated Uruguay’s democracy.

As for economic distribution Chile’s twentieth century saw a period in which patron-client relations left over from colonization remained strong with little distribution of the country’s resources among its citizens. As stated in the literature review of this thesis this high level of economic distribution could have been one of the causes for the country’s polarization. Uruguay’s distribution early on, due to such reasons as its lack of traditional elite classes during its democratization, is one of the reasons this high level of polarization, and extreme leftists parties were not seen for some time after the county’s democratization and during its consolidating process.

Though not discussed much in the previous chapters, I believe length of democracy has also played a role in constructing the current views of democracy. When comparing both Chile and Uruguay’s lengths of democracy, one is able to see that Uruguay came out of its dictatorship five years earlier than did Chile. Not only did it come out of its dictatorship earlier, but prior to these dictatorships Chile had been experiencing an era of a rapidly rising effective number of
parties from 1953 until 1961, which as discussed earlier is an indicator of democratic instability. This period of political instability for Chile was then succeeded by its extreme leftist movement which lasted from the sixties until the 1973 coup. This shows that the youngest people would remember a “stable” period of democracy in Chile coming out of the coup would have been between their late forties mid-fifties. Uruguay did not experience such a lengthy period of political instability before its extreme leftist movement in the late 1960s. With Uruguay’s dictatorship ending in 1985 its youngest citizens that would remember a period in which Uruguay’s democracy was stable would have been in the age group of late twenties early thirties. This is a generation’s difference between the two countries as to who would remember what a stable democracy would look like after an era of democratic instability followed by dictatorship. This leads the reader to believe that a larger portion of Uruguayans remembered what a stable democracy looked like, therefore more able and willing to return to one after their dictatorship.

When looking at these independent variables in Chile and Uruguay throughout the twentieth century, it seems as though Chile has been a sort of basket case politically for this past one hundred years resembling the dysfunctional political systems often associated with Latin American politics. The reader of this thesis may interpret that these independent variables are not just phenomenon that happened over night, but have rather been institutionalized in both societies. These four institutions have developed differently in both countries creating what seems to been differing expectations of their democracies. Chileans as a whole, when faced with crises, seem to believe that there are more efficient ways than democracy of dealing with such problems. This has continued to be the case as students and middle class citizens have taken to the streets recently to protest the inadequate education system and job market. In some areas of the country these protests have become violent, resembling those of the nineteen-sixties and
seventies, as protestors have used homemade bombs to demonstrate their anger with what they view as the political system’s failures. Uruguay however never had many problems with not finding the democratic process unacceptable for voicing their opinions demonstrating that its democracy, or sense of democracy, has been institutionalized to be more accepted, by its citizens, as the preferred for of dealing with crises.\textsuperscript{149} My data leads me to conclude that this that Uruguay’s democratic experience has been more stable and more successful in confronting crises, over a longer period of time, than has Chile’s, making Uruguayans more willing to support democracy. This research has shown that these protests of Chileans, and low support for democracy is no new phenomenon but is rather one that has been occurring for the past one-hundred years and appears to be part of a cycle of its political process. Also when looking at the rates of support over the past fifteen years the reader sees that as Chile’s rate of support has tended to increase Uruguay’s has been on a steady decent leading one to believe that these rates may meet up in the future. This thesis has not been an attempt to discredit Chile and its political/democratic improvements over the past twenty-two years while showing how great Uruguay is. Instead it has been an attempt to explain Chile’s low rate of support for democracy, in relation to that of Uruguay, through its rocky development of democratic institutions over the past one hundred years.

\textbf{Weaknesses}

The first area of weakness involves incomplete data, including election results and Uruguay’s era of Terra. The data I got to calculate low house representatives, president, and national council is off by .1 to .2 of a percentage point in some years when adding up the percent of votes received by parties. This is because, due to publication purposes, the resource where I

\textsuperscript{149} With the exception of the 1970s-80s dictatorship.
got this data rounded to the tenth percent. If the reader will round the results, made by calculating these numbers such as the ENPP of the electoral volatility, to where there is no longer a decimal in the percentage, such as if they see 1.001 which in percentages would be 100.1 would round this to where it only had three digest, making it 100, the share of seats when added up will always equal to 100. The same goes for electoral volatility, but in the case of looking at the ENPP you would not move the decimal, but would still round to where it had three numbers past the decimal.

The second area were data is incomplete is in the presidential elections of Uruguay. From 1950 until 1966 Uruguay did not have a single president. It instead tried to more firmly institutionalize Batlle’s National Council of nine-elected official that carried out the country’s executive duties. When this proved to be inefficient, presidential elections for one executive leader were brought back, while the National Council was dissolved.\textsuperscript{150} To make up for this I have included both types of executive in my chart comparing the electoral volatility of presidential, and legislative elections, to continues show the electoral volatility of the executive elections even when there is no one single president.

Also it is not completely true that Uruguay’s democracy was perfect: during the great depression, Terra, the president of the time, carried out an authoritarian like regime, the difference was that he was elected through the established Colorado party when he gained power. During his time he dissolved the National Council so that he could make more rapid decisions in the face of the great depression. I did not add this period to the coup chart or take it into account when describing the stability of Uruguay’s party system, because during this period many politicians in many stable democracies were carrying out similar acts in response to the economic and social problems brought on to the world by the Great Depression. Even if he had

\textsuperscript{150} Nahum 1999, 123
gained power through a coup, it would have still been outweighed by Chile’s coup history. Also Terra gained power through democratic elections, and stepped down from power when he was voted from office.

The next weakness of my research is that of the definition of democracy. The definition of democracy differs between cultures. Some simply see it as a way of becoming rich, making their reasoning for supporting democracy superficial. I have not put an emphasis on the definition because in the research carried out by the latinobarometro, they take this into account when asking the question of whether or not democracy is supported within a country by not giving the reader the definition of democracy, and therefore letting them develop one on their own. Therefore definition of democracy could mean a completely different thing to a Chilean than it does to a Uruguayan. The definition/s of democracy developed by the citizens of these countries is a whole thesis worth of describing in itself. Therefore the definition of democracy to my research question is not important, but rather what is important is whether or not the citizens of these countries support their own definitions of democracy, in which case that support for personally/culturally-developed definitions is supported by a significantly higher percentage of people in Uruguay than in Chile. Another weakness is lack of information after the dictatorship. Pressed for time I had to put what I could back up with literature in the thesis. Due to lack of resources, it was hard to find enough evidence to back up several aspects Uruguay, for post dictatorship. However I put information to show how the institutions developed over the past one hundred years have continued since the countries’ transitions to democracy within the past twenty-five years.

\[151\] Inglehart 2009, 129
Future Research

Future research I would like to see carried out would be a more anthropological study of the two countries’ societies in explaining this phenomenon of support for democracy. Batlle often complained about the culture of indifference within Uruguay, and how it would lead to the fall of the country’s political system.¹⁵² This same indifference has been used to explain the country’s party system and democracy’s fall to military regime in 1973.¹⁵³ A research on this subject of indifference, I believe, would help provide a better understanding of Uruguay’s party system.

Another area I would like to see this research help develop would be a better understanding of the current similar youth/working-class protests recently carried out all over the world seen in the Arab Spring and in what were believed to be the stable, consolidated democracies of countries like Spain and even the United States with the recent “99 percent” protests. As 2011 proved to be a year filled with massive social movements questioning the legitimacy of the countries where these movements took place, it has shown that studies on developing and developed political systems, whether they be democratic, or authoritarian regimes, continue to be relevant, and in relation to the question of how my research can build on this field of study the possibilities are endless.

¹⁵² Fitzgibbon, 132
¹⁵³ Caetano, 25
Bibliography


iss.lib.olemiss.edu/stable/pdfplus/493413.pdf.


