WHY FAMILIES FLEE: A STUDY OF FAMILY MIGRATION PATTERNS FROM THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE OF CENTRAL AMERICA

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by

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ABSTRACT

CLAIRE MARIE WILLIAMS:

Why Families Flee: A Study of Family Migration Patterns from the Northern Triangle of Central American

(Under the direction of Dr. Oliver Dinius)

The past decade has witnessed an unprecedented increase in migrant families from the Northern Triangle, the region of Central America comprised of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The mass influx in family migration has important consequences for destination countries like the United States and Mexico as well as the countries which they leave behind. This study aims to answer the question of how family migration patterns in the Northern Triangle of Central America have changed in the past decade and why. I outline the migration decisions of families through a qualitative and quantitative lens. I use newspapers and NGO reports to outline the plethora of factors which inhibit economic, social, and political progress in the region. Understanding the complex dynamics in the Triangle inform the logistic regression which provides data on the relationships between intentions to migrate and crime victimization, gender, household economic status, and household location. I used the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey for the years 2012 and 2018 for all three countries to determine how patterns have changed and offer possible rationale for the shifts. The results indicate that crime victimization is less related to migration intentions relative to household income, gender, and rural status. This research may change the way we view migrant families from the Northern Triangle and inform policy solutions to what is now viewed as a humanitarian crisis.

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CHAPTER ONE: A SCENE FROM THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE

Migration from Northern Triangle of Central America has evolved over the past decade from a consistent stream of people into a full-fledged humanitarian crisis. The grave conditions on the ground in Central America have turned the triangular-shaped region comprised of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras into a place overwhelmed by the exodus of children and parents. These country's governments are faced with the challenge of averting these mass migrations and providing better conditions for their people. Emigration from the region, particularly migration caravans, has captured media attention around the world and provoked the perception that Northern Triangle governments are weak and powerless to amend the situation. Ultimately, the recent changes in family migration from the Northern Triangle transformed regional politics and requires new approaches across the board thus making it an area of crucial importance for academics and policy makers to further study. For many families, the risks involved with travelling to another country and establishing a new life abroad outweigh the risks of staying behind. Here are some of their stories:

At a migrant shelter in Mexico City, a Guatemalan family of four anxiously awaits the news which could changes their lives: whether they have been granted permission to enter the United States. The husband recounts how a gang in Guatemala was searching for him after he helped the police implicate some of its members in a kidnapping case. He used to own several properties in Guatemala but left hastily out of fear. He considered returning to sell those properties but if he dared to cross into Guatemala again, "they would kill [him]." He fled to Mexico ahead of his family but shortly after his departure the gangs began targeting his wife and two daughters, one is two years old while the other is just an infant. The gang members told his twenty-four-year old wife that "if [her] husband didn't return, they were going to kill the two

girls, or kidnap them."[1] They even threatened to pursue them into Mexico City. If the family's asylum petition gets denied, the young parents will be forced to continue their search for a country to raise their children in peace.

A twenty-three year old Honduran mother, six months pregnant with her second child, sits with her seven-year old daughter clinging to her arm. She describes her journey fleeing domestic violence after she separated from the father of her children. Shortly after the relationship ended, she began seeing another man. Both men threatened to harm her, so she left and headed north with her daughter and carrying her unborn child. After four months of travel, the family found a temporary shelter in Mexico. By this point, her daughter has been deprived of formal schooling for over a year. The trek through mountains and deserts brought with it many traumas of its own that cause the pair to cry spontaneously upon remembering them. She hopes to give birth to her second child in the United States "where [she] has family, and where [she] would feel supported and secure."[2] She still believes that the journey was worth it despite the emotional and physical toll placed upon her and her daughter. Staying put was simply not an option.

Óscar and Valeria Martinez left El Salvador so he could find a job and buy the pair a house of their own. Óscar's mother encouraged him before he left not "to pursue the 'American dream' because it is not easy to cross the southern border."[3] He ignored her advice and set out with high hopes for their future. After many days travelling through gang-filled territories in the scorching heat, all that stood between them and America was a swim through the river. When the strong current snatched Valeria from his grasp, Óscar desperately swam after her, but both

[1] Schifrin, Nick. *Running for Their Lives Was the Only Option for These Migrants*. PBS, 2018.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Sibrián, Walter, Mariana Arévalo, and Beatriz Calderon. "'Le Pedí Que No Siguiera El Sueño Americano': Madre de Migrante Salvadoreño Ahogado Junto a Hija." *La Prensa Gráfica*, June 25, 2019.

drowned in search of a better life. The Salvadoran father and toddler's bodies washed up on the shore of the Rio Grande river one mile from Brownsville, Texas. The photo of the limp bodies gripped headlines around the world in the summer of 2019. Their dream was never realized. The harrowing images of the father and daughter still intertwined on the riverbank represent the sacrifice and harsh truth of Central American migration.

Over the past decade, more and more stories of migrants like these from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador have surfaced revealing a new reality for the region at large. Families are pouring out of Central America in extraordinary numbers to escape gang violence, abuse, economic turmoil, and overall instability. The search of a better life for oneself and one's family in the Northern Triangle was and still is real. It is a humanitarian tragedy. Now more than ever, it is important to address the motivations and patterns that push these families to leave.

The Research Question

For this project, I hope to answer how family migration patterns in the Northern Triangle of Central America have changed in the past decade and why. This research is a response to the uproar about migrant caravans, the United States' recent family separation policy, and the political polarization over border security due to the sharp increase in migrants arriving at the US-Mexico border. I aspire to lay out the decision making process of Northern Triangle migrant families for to academics, policy makers, and the general public with hopes of contributing to a solution to this crisis.

I will employ a mixed methods approach to analyze pertinent migration variables through a newspaper analysis and document trends in family migration over time using quantitative data. The principal data source is the Latin American Public Opinion Project's (LAPOP) AmericasBarometer survey for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras for the years 2012 and 2018. Given the large change in family migration patterns between those two years, the time

frame will serve as a good case study for analysis. The combination of the qualitative and

quantitative sections will outline the migration decisions of families and help explain the shift in

migration patterns from Mexican single adults to family units from the Northern Triangle.

For the purposes of this study, family will be considered in a broad way. "Family" in the

Latin American context is more loosely defined than the traditional, biological American family.

Jan Kok's "The Family Factor in Migration Decisions," views family as "socially significant kin

with whom one shares basic activities."[4] While US Customs and Border Patrol employs a

nuclear definition of "family," Kok's definition more adequately captures the nature of families

in Latin America in which extended family members often take on the role of immediate kin.

The data selected to study family migration aims to follow Kok's guidelines for characterizing a

family.

The International Consequences

The consequences of family migration from the Northern Triangle transcend Central

America. The mass migration of families from the region has transformed into a crisis. The net

migration numbers, which are the net number of people who have either entered or exited a

country over a given five year period, are staggering. For El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras,

net migration as of 2018 is -34,000, -46,073, and -202,694 people respectively.[5] The countries

have become epicenters of exodus making any form of development extremely difficult.

The three countries already suffered from a lack of economic and social progress which is

compounded by the departure of a significant portion of the workforce. GDP per capita (in 2011

constant international dollars) in Costa Rica, one of Central America's most developed countries,

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[4] Kok, Jan. "The Family Factor in Migration Decisions." In *Migration History in World History: Multidisciplinary Approaches*. Brill, 2010. Pg. 215-50.
[5] World Development Indicators 2018, *The World Bank,* 2018. https://data.worldbank.org

is over $15,000. In El Salvador and Guatemala, that number drops to around $7,400 and $7,500. Honduras's GDP per capita sits at a remarkably low $4,560.[6] According to the Social Progress Index, a measurement of non-economic indicators such as basic well-being, access to basic human needs, and personal opportunities, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras fall into the fourth of six global tiers with rankings of 83, 96, and 99 of the 146 countries studied. They receive the lowest rankings of any Latin American countries included in the index (Venezuela was not studied).[7] Under these conditions, many families feel as though their home nation cannot adequately provide for them.

Organized crime and violence also disrupt the wellbeing of Northern Triangle residents. This region is considered to be the most dangerous outside of active war zones. In 2018, homicide rates per 100,000 people were 22 people in Guatemala, 40 in Honduras, and 51 in El Salvador. Mexico, a country with a reputation for widespread violence, had a homicide rate of 26 people per 100,000 in 2018 while Costa Rica, one of the safest countries in Central America, had a rate of 13 people per 100,000 for comparison.[8] Clearly, everyday violence poses a threat to the well-being and security of Northern Triangle residents.

The crisis is not only a humanitarian one, but also an inter-regional one. Changes in the scale and nature of Central American migration have disrupted regional politics and challenged countries to adapt to new realities. The family migration wave imposes a large burden on destination countries such as the United States and Mexico. Since 2012, the number of family units apprehended at the United States border has increased five-fold with most families coming from Central America as opposed to Mexico (see Department of Homeland Security graph

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[6] Ibid.
[7] "2018 Social Progress Index Executive Summary." Social Progress Imperative, n.d.
[8] Labrador, Rocio, and Danielle Renwick. "Central America's Violent Northern Triangle." Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations, June 26, 2018.

below).[9] The apprehensions of Mexican nationals at the US border have in fact reached near 40-year lows over the past decade.[10] It is estimated that between 80 and 90% of Central American migrants in recent years travel to the United States though some choose other countries in the region such as Panama and Costa Rica.[11]

Figure 2. Total Family Unit Apprehensions at the Southwest Border by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, FY2012-FY2018

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Border Patrol, "Stats and Summaries," https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/media-resources/stats.

With over 100,000 family units arriving at the United States southern border in recent years, the debate over how to handle the massive migrant flow emerges. Previously, single, male adults from Mexico dominated migration patterns but the influx of Northern Triangle families produces new challenges for destination countries. The responsibility for these migrant's well-being now predominantly falls on the governments of Mexico and the United States. These countries are forced to consider new asylum quotas and humane detainment strategies to accommodate the

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[9] "Recent Migration to the United States from Central America: Frequently Asked Questions." *Congressional Research Service*, January 29, 2019.
[10] Restrepo, Dan, Trevor Sutton, and Joel Martinez. "Getting Migration in the Americas Right." Center for American Progress, June 24, 2019.
[11] EFE. "Cuanto Paga Un Centroamericano Para Cumplir El Sueño Americano." *La Prensa Gráfica*, September 23, 2019.

immense influx of families while their already overloaded immigration systems struggle to process the sheer numbers cases to review.

The Region as Part of a Global Trend

Migration in the Northern Triangle is part of a worldwide pattern. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which includes predominantly European countries, Canada, the United States, Japan, South Korea, Mexico and Chile among a few other non-European nations, conducts research regarding family migration as a trend. In 2016, more than 1.8 million new migrants moved to the OECD countries for family reasons. The majority of these (approximately 1.6 million) emigrated with the intentions of family formation and family reunification.[12] A much smaller percentage fall into the "accompanying family member" category with around 270,000 people reported in 2016.[13]

Northern Triangle migration aligns with hemispheric migration patterns, particularly of asylum seekers. The widespread instability in Central and South America has increased the amount of asylum seekers in the region, fleeing because of persecution, war, or violence, to seek refugee status and receive protection and material assistance. According to the UN High Council on Refugees (UNHCR), there were between 500,000 and 550,000 refugees and asylum seekers in the Western Hemisphere from 2008-2013. That number jumped to 870,000 people in 2017 and exceeded one million by mid 2018.[14] See the graph below for the regional breakdown.

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[12] Migration Data Portal. "Family Migration," May 22, 2019.
[13] Ibid
[14] Restrepo, Dan, Trevor Sutton, and Joel Martinez. "Getting Migration in the Americas Right." Center for American Progress, June 24, 2019.

FIGURE 1
Western Hemisphere countries have seen a major increase in asylum-seeker and refugee populations
Total asylum-seekers and refugees from select countries, 2012 and mid-2018

Sources: U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, "Population Statistics: Persons of Concern, 2012," available at http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern (last accessed April 2019). The mid-2018 data from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees are unpublished and on file with authors.

CAP

The UNHCR indicates a notable increase in asylum seekers from the Northern Triangle countries. Asylum seeker populations grow 2128% in Honduras, 1275% in El Salvador, and 1115% in Guatemala from 2012 to 2018 (as seen in the graph above). This change implies that conditions in the Northern Triangle are encouraging migrant families to leave in greater numbers than they have before. Central American family migration, though especially pertinent to the United States, corresponds with broader migration trends globally and regionally.

Historical Background

The adverse conditions that encourage Northern Triangle residents to emigrate today stem from a complex history of interaction by military governments and foreign actors, specifically the United States throughout the 20th century. In El Salvador in 1932, a peasant uprising against the dictatorship in power provoked a military response that killed 30,000 civilians, most of whom were of indigenous descent.[15] The political violence between leftist guerillas and right-winged paramilitaries spiraled out of control in the following decades. In the

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[15] "El Salvador." San Francisco, CA: The Center for Justice and Accountability, n.d.

1980's, a 12 year civil-war broke out which ravished the country and claimed the lives of over 75,000 Salvadorans via massacres, executions, and bombings.[16] At the same time, the United States spearheaded the counter-insurgency in which they trained and funded death squads and facilitated the creation of a militarized society.[17] After the signing of the Chapultepec Peace Accords in 1992, the civil war finally ended and a United Nations Truth Commission was created to document the civil rights abuses from the war. Five days after the commission released its report in 1993, which implicated many military and paramilitary members, the government adopted an amnesty law which protected government officials and guerilla fighters from their war crimes and human rights violations. The law sent a message to the country that crimes can go unpunished in Salvadoran society. The war and lack of justice triggered mass migration from El Salvador to the United States where marginalized immigrant groups formed the gang that evolved into the modern Mara Salvatrucha, also known as MS-13. Over multiple US presidencies, members of the Mara were deported back to El Salvador where the gang further organized and evolved into a dominant criminal group within the region.[18] From the civil war to now, Salvadorans have been tormented by the violence of everyday life.

In Guatemala, the United States sponsored a coup in 1954 to overthrow the democratically elected and left-leaning Jacobo Árbenz and installed a military dictatorship with help from the Central Intelligence Agency. Under a series of authoritarian rulers and a 36-year-long civil war, death squads exterminated rural citizens, particularly Maya populations, and committed large scale human rights abuses. The post-Arbenz era ushered in decades of instability and strife which culminated in the deaths of over 200,000 indigenous people from

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[16] Allison, Mike. "El Salvador's Brutal Civil War: What We Still Don't Know." *Al Jazeera*, March 1, 2012.
[17] "U.S. Training Salvadoran Forces Linked with Death Squads." Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, April 9, 1984.
[18] "MS-13 Gang: The Story behind One of the World's Most Brutal Street Gangs." *BBC*, April 19, 2017.

1960-1996.[19] In 1982, General Ríos Montt took control of Guatemala. Though he allied himself with President Reagan and Christian conservatives in the US, his one-year presidency represents the bloodiest in the country's existence. He instituted a "scorched earth policy" against the Maya, sanctioned raids of over 600 indigenous villages, and facilitated the death or disappearance of over 70,000 indigenous Guatemalans.[20] Over half a million Mayans were displaced or fled the country as a result of what many consider a genocide. Guatemala still suffers from serious distrust between civilians and governments in addition to years of corrupt leaders, violence, and poverty. The president from 2016-2020, a former actor and comedian named Jimmy Morales, shut down the UN-supported International Committee against Impunity in Guatemala in 2018 thus furthering the government's ability to act arbitrarily. Over twenty years after the series of peace agreements signed in 1996 to end the conflict, Guatemala still feels the consequences of violence, intimidation, and a widespread culture of impunity for criminal and political actors.

During the majority of the 20th century, Honduras remained relatively immune to the violence that El Salvador and Guatemala experienced. Their luck shifted in the 70's and 80's when the United States staged a war against communism in Latin America by stationing troops in Honduras to combat the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. The US Central Intelligence Agency and FBI trained the notorious Battalion 316, the Honduran death squad well versed in interrogation and torture tactics, in the southwestern deserts of the US in order to assassinate political targets. The militarization of Honduras created a culture of repression with widespread poverty and human rights abuses that helped provoke mass migration to the United States beginning in the 1990's. To compound the political turmoil, Hurricane Mitch, a category five hurricane landed in

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[19] Borger, Julian. "Fleeing a Hell the US Helped Create: Why Central Americans Journey North." *The Guardian*, December 19, 2018.

[20] "Guatemala: 'Silent Holocaust.'" San Francisco, CA: The Center for Justice and Accountability, n.d.

Honduras in late October of 1998. The rain brought on by the hurricane triggered floods and mudslides which wiped out much of the country's crops and infrastructure. The instability continued in the wake of the hurricane's destruction when a coup d'état in 2009, backed by former Battalion 316 leaders and the United States, removed President Manuel Zelaya from power. The political unrest protected criminal actors from accountability, and the murder rate soared. By 2010, Honduras became the most violent country in the world not at war.[21] The historic and current volatility in Honduras resulted in many of the modern issues that persist in the country today.

Primary and Secondary Literature

Surprisingly, there is little academic literature that covers family migration as a process generally and in Central America. The majority of the coverage of this issue rather comes from primary sources such as news articles which form the bulk of the sources used in this thesis. I selected one major national news source from each country to use in the analysis. *La Prensa Gráfica* from El Salvador is one of the two largest newspapers in the country and is known for its credibility. *La Prensa Libre* from Guatemala is also one of the most widely circulated publications within the country and is known for its non-sensationalist approach to news. Lastly, *La Prensa* from Honduras is not as popular as the other publications but is one of the most centrist papers which makes it ideal for discussing the realities of a polarizing topic such as migration. Assorted other publications like *Al Jazeera*, *BBC, CNN, The Guardian,* and *PBS* are cited for specific areas of interest as well.

The majority of secondary source data comes from think tanks, the US Government, the United Nations (UN), and the World Bank. The research organizations selected include the

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[21] "Honduras: Battalion 316." San Francisco, CA: Center for Justice and Accountability, n.d.

Social Progress Imperative, The Center for Justice and Accountability, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Center for American Progress, and the Washington Office on Latin America. These sources offer well-verified statistics and documented histories of events in the region. United States government data comes from Customs and Border Patrol documents as well as the Congressional Research Service. The government data serves to document the changes in the phenomenon over time in a consistent and verifiable manner. Lastly, the UN and World Bank offer cross-country statistics which facilitated my international comparisons.

I cite the main academic contributors to the field of family migration though quantity of academic literature on the subject is sparse. Jan Kok, director of the Radboud Group for Historical Demography and Family History at Radboud University in the Netherlands, wrote a book on family migration in 2010 entitled *The Family Factor in Migration Decisions*. Her theories help shape the framework in which social scientists decipher whether migrants act out of self-interest or the interests of the other family members. There are multiple different ways to address the challenge of studying families and their intentions to migrate: analyzing the timing of the move as it relates to one's economic situation, comparing the life courses of movers and stayers, and using qualitative materials "in combination with quantitative materials to reconstruct the motives and intra-family deliberations behind migration."[22] The third strategy she proposes will be employed in this paper. Wendy A. Vogt, an associate professor of anthropology at IUPUI in Indianapolis, specializes in migration spaces and the transit process in Latin America. Her article, "Crossing Mexico: Structural Violence and the Commodification of Undocumented Central American Migrants," documents the harsh conditions on the journey from Central America to the US and the flourishing criminal economy created by illegally transporting

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[22] Kok, Jan. "The Family Factor in Migration Decisions." Pg. 233.

migrants.[23] The *International Migration Review*'s "Crime Victimization in Latin America and Intentions to Migrate to the United States" helped inspire my methodology.[24] The researchers in this study also used the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey to test how crime victimization influences people's intentions to migrate across Latin America using regression analysis. I adapted my study, based on the methods employed in this one, to fit the family criteria and increase the number of variables analyzed. These three academic sources aided me in defining family migration, describing the migration journey, and developing the quantitative framework for my analysis.

Limitations

This study provides fundamental insight into the migration intentions of families in the Northern Triangle. However, relying on newspaper data, surveys, and first-hand accounts brings with it some limitations. Newspaper data may contain bias. Reporters are often driven by readership as opposed to objectivity so the articles used in this study could disproportionately exaggerate or understate different issues. Social desirability bias, an inherent limitation of surveys, may pressure some respondents to answer a certain way to satisfy the researcher. In this case, respondents may be afraid of reporting being crime victims or ashamed of claiming their low income status which could alter the results. The nationally representative nature of the AmericasBarometer which allows LAPOP to create a diverse sample pool represents both an advantage and a disadvantage. The representativeness of the survey increases the sample size which increases the validity of the results. On the other hand, the broadness also inhibits the ability to understand how certain variables affect different subgroups in society. If this research

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[23] Vogt, Wendy. "Crossing Mexico: Structural Violence and the Commodification of Undocumented Central American Migrants." *American Ethnologist* 40, no. 4 (November 2013): 764–80.

[24] Wood, Charles H., Chris L. Gibson, Ludmila Ribeiro, and Paula Hamsho-Diaz. "Crime Victimization in Latin America and Intentions to Migrate to the United States." *International Migration Review* 44, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 3–24.

were to be repeated, I would suggest comparing the regressions of subgroups like women, indigenous groups, and rural residents with the results of the overall sample.

When working with survey data that is not one's own, a researcher is also limited by the questionnaire. Due to updated versions of the questionnaire each year, I was unable to limit the survey to respondents with children of all ages which would have broadened the sample size and increased the validity of the results. In an ideal world, I would have included an intermediary year (such as 2014) in the analysis to ensure that family migration trends follow a consistent pattern and are not isolated to specific years. However, the inconsistency of questions related to my study in the LAPOP surveys and the extra complexity that another year would have added encouraged me to pursue two-year project as opposed to a three-year one. Additionally, for all three countries, the number of respondents who affirmatively claim intentions to migrate is much smaller in 2012 than in 2018 which is consistent with the well-documented trends in migration patterns. Although the LAPOP surveys are representative of each country's populations, the smaller sample size in 2012 could negatively affect the legitimacy of the results. Lastly, , the questionnaire tracks migrants' "intentions" to migrate rather than migration behavior itself, so it is impossible to determine whether respondents act according to their responses. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

CHAPTER 2: THE MIGRATION PROCESS EACH STEP OF THE WAY

<u>Chapter Approach</u>

This chapter addresses Northern Triangle migration factors in the three key areas: the migrant's home country, the journey to a destination country, and the arrival in the destination country. Unlike for the case of war zones, there is no single overarching reason for mass family migration from the Northern Triangle. The exodus of families rather derives from an agglomeration of social, political, and economic factors. The themes covered in this chapter will include drivers of migration in the families' home countries (poverty, extortion, violence, gender discrimination, organized crime, and climate change), obstacles on the migration trail (dangerous routes, discrimination, organized crime, and coyotes), and finally family unification in the destination country.

The decision to migrate is a complex one. Families, either subconsciously or openly, weigh the benefits and costs of migration which is of particular importance when the livelihoods of their children are at stake. Migration must be feasible (permitted by law, facilitated by infrastructure) and desirable (information on destination is available, benefits are expected to outweigh the costs) in order for families to actually migrate.[25] In the case of Central American migrants, extensive illegal migration networks and the relative permeability of the United States border facilitate the migration process.

I will use a variety of different sources to conduct my analysis. A combination of scholarly articles, think-tank reports, and, most importantly, newspaper coverage provide well-rounded information on the subject. This chapter examines three major national newspapers in Central America—*La Prensa* in Honduras, *La Prensa Libre* in Guatemala, and *La Prensa*

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[25] Kok, Jan. "The Family Factor in Migration Decisions." Pg. 248.

Gráfica in El Salvador—to explicate the different variables in migration decisions. They reveal trends related to family migration as well as nuances unable to be captured within numerical analysis.

Drivers of Migration

The economic, social, and environmental state of the Northern Triangle encourages families to leave in search of a better life elsewhere. Specifically, poverty, extortion, violence, gender discrimination and climate change have encouraged migrant families to flee their home countries in the Northern Triangle in the past decade.

Poverty

The Northern Triangle suffers from high levels of poverty which encourages families to migrate in hopes of finding economic security abroad. In 2016, over half of Central America's population lived in poverty, a share that climbs to two-thirds in rural areas.[26] Rural communities across the region experience this to a severe degree with the three Northern Triangle countries suffering from the highest levels of rural poverty in all of Central America at 75% in Honduras, 54% in Guatemala, and 47% in El Salvador.[27] Unsurprisingly, many families seek economic opportunity elsewhere given the elevated poverty rates which especially debilitate rural communities. Since 2013, Honduras contained the largest percentage of poor households in the region where people live with incomes below $1.25 per day.[28] The high rates of crime and violence in El Salvador dissuade international investors from opening businesses or factories creating severe unemployment. El Salvador generates approximately 30,000 jobs per year yet 40,000 jobs would be required to match the number of workers entering the labor market.[29]

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[26] Marrone, Rhonda. "Poverty in Central America: Advancement and Needs." The Borgen Project, August 1, 2016.
[27] Ibid.
[28] "Pobreza e inseguridad causan migración de hondureños segun estudio." *La Prensa*. February 20, 2019.
[29] "The World Bank in El Salvador." The World Bank, October 10, 2019.

Twenty-three percent of Guatemalans believe that fleeing the country is the only way to improve their livelihoods and provide for their families, suggesting that one in four Guatemalans cannot envision economic improvement unless they emigrate. This statistic fails to capture the "reality in remote villages and communities where the only hope is migration," according to Lucía Muñoz, a researcher of rural areas in Guatemala.[30] The dire economic situation is manifested in high poverty rates and unemployment. These trends explain why many rural families choose to journey as a unit to countries with better economic opportunities.

Violence

The Northern Triangle is one of the most violent regions in the world from which families flee out of safety concerns. Many families hope to claim asylum abroad since they feel it is unsafe for them to remain in their home countries. The United Nations Agency for Refugees notes that the number of Central Americans applying for asylum around the world increased 58% from 2016 to 2017.[31] Many asylum petitioners are women and children, unaccompanied minors, or children separated from their parents who are fleeing violence. One migrant describes the violence as getting "stronger and harder" thus leaving them no other option.[32] On a daily basis in the region, people fear being victims of a crime or unintentionally witnessing a crime in the streets that turns into a "sentencia de muerte," a death sentence for them and their family.[33]

Even if a Northern Triangle family is victimized by criminal actors, the perpetrators often don't face justice. The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) conducted a series of interviews with crime victims in El Salvador and Honduras. They all emphasized the senseless and random violence against innocent people. Many crimes against citizens, women, and

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[30]Rodas, Sergio Morales. "La Única Opción de Superarse Es Migrar, Considera 1 de Cada 4 Encuestados." *Prensa Libre*. August 14, 2019.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] "Violencia alimenta la migración forzada desde Centroamérica." *La Prensa Gráfica*. May 23, 2018.

families go unpunished due to the lack of "internal accountability, oversight mechanisms, and processes to deal with police misconduct or criminal wrongdoing."[34] Criminal groups may bribe police to buy their impunity or law enforcement officers may be active members of the gangs. When police systems fail to control the violence, Northern Triangle countries have been known to deploy their militaries to confront crime. However, military forces are trained in combat rather than law enforcement, so their tendency to use force when dealing with crime has an adverse effect on decreasing violence. To varying degrees, "the criminal justice systems in these countries are fragile, underfunded, and unaccountable."[35] Police, organized crime groups, and petty offenses go unaddressed which deeper embeds the role of violence and crime in Northern Triangle society.

The region arguably can be labelled as the most dangerous region in the world for women. El Salvador in 2016 held the most dismal statistic in the world in which the murder rate per 100,000 women was 10.2. Honduras recorded 5.8 murders per 100,000 in 2016 whereas the rate in Guatemala was over two murders per 100,000 in 2017.[36] Feminicide, the killing of women for gender related reasons, is a severe problem in the Northern Triangle. These homicides tend to result from domestic violence, divorce, and verbal altercations. According to the secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), "femicide is the most extreme expression of violence against women. Neither the criminal classification of this offense nor the efforts to make it statistically visible have been enough to eradicate this scourge that alarms and horrifies us on a daily basis."[37]

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[34] Washington Office on Latin America. *In Their Own Words: Central Americans Face Violence, Corruption and Impunity*. Washington DC, 2018.
[35] Ibid.
[36] "At Least 2,795 Women Were Victims of Feminicide in 23 Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in 2017." United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, November 15, 2018.
[37] Ibid.

In addition to feminicide, women in the Northern Triangle commonly experience sexual assault and receive minimal legal support. According to the Observatory of Violence at the National Autonomous University of Honduras, at least one woman is murdered every 17 hours while many others experience threats, intimidation, and sexual violence.[38] Many women, in particular young girls, become pregnant after forced sexual encounters with men. In Chiquimula, the most populous city in Eastern Guatemala with over 100,000 residents, eighteen women were violently killed and over seventy girls ages 10 to 14 became pregnant in the year 2019 alone.[39] Women are often powerless against their aggressors and the legal system rarely supports their pleas for fairness under the law. Crimes against women go unpunished given the dynamics of a male-dominated society which is complicated by the normalcy of impunity in the Central American criminal justice systems. In a place where women can be killed for simply being a woman, many Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran women elect to leave to protect their dignity and safety.

Narcotrafficking

Drug traffickers, also known as "narcos," are some the most notorious criminal actors in the region. The residual violence and insecurity created by the crossfire of narcotrafficking activities makes families want to leave the region. The Northern Triangle geographically connects drug producing countries like Colombia and Peru to nations like the United States where demand for illegal drugs like cocaine and methamphetamine is high. Cartel-affiliated groups in the Northern Triangle act as "transportistas," the people who oversee the movement of these substances across the region.[40] To do so unscathed, narcos finance the campaigns of local

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[38]Garcia, David, and Roald Horving. "10 Things You Should Know About Violence in Central America." Norwegian Refugee Council, September 27, 2018.

[39] Stewart, Dony. "Mujeres Exigen Cese de La Violencia Mientras Se Registran 18 Asesinatos y 71 Embarazos En Niñas." *La Prensa Libre*, November 26, 2019.

[40] Dudley, Steven. "How Drug Trafficking Operates, Corrupts in Central America." Insight Crime, July 6, 2016.

officials and judges to avoid prosecution for their activities. They also kill rivals who sell drugs in their territories or infringe upon their transportation routes. Narcotraffickers operate at both the international and local levels. Gangs and cartels pay local people to act as contractors who sell drugs for them in different neighborhoods as a means of gaining control. It is estimated that trafficking in Honduras amounts to $700 million per year, which is 4% of the country's GDP.[41] The profits are used to buy safe houses, weapons, and the loyalty of politicians to continue their lucrative business. The success of the narcos encourages further militarization of society to combat the drug trade. However, the ability of the gangs to act with impunity and bribe officials "undermines the rule of law and the work to combat drugs in the region, despite the attempts to reform the judicial system and apply the law."[42]

Demands of Criminal Groups

Extortion, the practice criminal groups use to obtain money through force or threats, is intimately linked to poverty and insecurity in the Northern Triangle which encourages families to migrate. Paying fees charged by criminal groups, most notoriously the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18, ensures that the residents continue to operate their daily lives and businesses unharmed. Refusing to pay the fees means countless threats, potential destruction of property, or even death. Cartels and local criminal groups dominate local economies and territories in the Northern Triangle through this practice but "it is impossible to know the exact statistics of extortion" because "there are countless extortions that are hidden due to the panic of those affected to denounce it, which could lead to death."[43] The sums expected by criminal groups often exceed citizens ability to pay. Many members of organized crime enter the criminal market

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[41] Ibid.
[42] EFE. "El Narcotráfico Hunde a Centroamérica En La Violencia y La Corrupción." *La Prensa*, March 2, 2016.
[43] "Imperios de la extorsión están en Honduras y El Salvador." *La Prensa*, June 30, 2015.

out of desperation for higher wages, but their criminal activity furthers the cycle of economic depravity in the region.

Due to such high demands by cartels and local criminal groups, many Northern Triangle residents are forced to flee to less violent countries where payments to criminal groups are not required to conduct business or freely live one's life. The small business sector in El Salvador paid upwards of $30 million in rent each month and up to ten businesses were forced to close each week as a result of extortion. In over a two-year period in Honduras, at least 18,000 businesses had to close because they could no longer afford the "impuesto de guerra" or the "war tax" imposed on them by criminal actors. In 2015, it was calculated that gangs alone in Honduras received upwards of $54 million each year from this "tax." In Guatemala, it is estimated that citizens pay up to $61 million annually in extortion fees.[44] Extortion proves a threat not only to economic stability but also to physical security if a resident refuses to pay. The necessity to pay for one's own safety in the Northern Triangle incentivizes families to emigrate to countries where their freedom is not determined by criminal actors.

Climate Change

Climate change emerges as an increasingly important driver of migration in recent years. Prolonged droughts limit crop harvests and result in reduced wages and unemployment for families who depend on agriculture to survive. The Northern Triangle falls within the Central American Dry Corridor, a tropical dry forest in Western Central America that is one of the world's most vulnerable regions to climate change. Rising atmospheric temperatures in recent decades provoked a drought in the corridor which began in 2014. As of September 19, 2019, Honduras had not seen rain in ten months. Migration is not only influenced by the "heat and lack

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[44]Ibid.

of water which will affect agriculture," but also "increased sea levels could make some coastal areas uninhabitable."[45] Those dependent on the rain to sustain their livelihood are often forced to look for a new home or a new way of life to provide for themselves and their families.

While all agricultural productivity suffers at the hands of climate change, some crops are particularly affected. It is predicted that "the change and variability of climate will significantly affect the production of corn and beans in Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and to a lesser degree Guatemala" thus resulting in economic losses especially for rural farmers.[46] Coffee, an integral crop for farmers in the Northern Triangle, is very susceptible to changes in climate. In the past ten years, more than 60% of coffee farmers in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Mexico reported food insecurity during the harvest. One migrant en route to the United States who formerly worked on a coffee farm described how "each time there was less harvest and due to the drop in prices I was fired."[47] Even though climate change affects populations worldwide, the Northern Triangle farmers' dependence on the natural world for income and basic well-being has created a new phenomenon: climate refugees.

The Migration Journey

A family must consider whether their current economic and social situation justifies migration and whether they can endure the hardships of the journey. Migrants then must secure a way to their destination country, but the process is grueling. Northern Triangle families choose to subject themselves and their children to dangerous routes, discrimination, organized crime, and human smugglers. They travel by walking on foot, riding on the tops of gang-ridden trains, cramming into cars with customized compartments, or hiring a professional smuggler to lead

[45] BBC News Mundo. "Cambio Climático: La Razón Por La Que Se Prevé Migrarán Milliones de Centroamérica." *La Prensa Libre*, September 23, 2019.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.

them across borders. The journey is so gruesome that in 2016 alone, over 700 migrants were found dead on the journey heading north through Central America.[48] Even if a migrant family successfully arrives at an international border, the difficulty to achieve legal status abroad encourages many to cross into the destination country illegally. For example, the United States asylum process requires months or even years to receive a decision, and the backlog of recent migrant cases delays the process even more. These factors ought to dissuade migrant families from coming, yet the grim conditions in the region allow some families to justify the risk.

Dangerous Conditions

The physical conditions of the journey are extremely taxing. The trek through the desert and across the river has always been dangerous, but increased enforcement efforts by the Trump administration and Mexican government have forced migrants to take more remote, clandestine routes to avoid detection. The risks of migration activities has increased dramatically with families "following more dangerous routes to the United States and paying more money to human traffickers."[49] Migrants arrive "hurt and tired due to longer routes" and often "dehydrated and with viral infections."[50] One migrant claimed that the enforcement actions taken the both the President of the United States, Donald Trump, and the President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, have only "stirred the wasps nest causing more damage, more deaths."[51] Knowing the risks immigrants, particularly those travelling with children, face on the journey and the increased danger in recent years is fundamental to understanding the migration decisions of families.

Discrimination and Vulnerability

[48] EFE. "El Infierno En El Triángulo Norte de Centroamérica." *La Prensa Libre*, June 14, 2017.
[49]"Migrantes Hondureños Toman Más Riesgos En México En Su Ruta a EEUU." *La Prensa*, July 30, 2019.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.

Central American migrants face discrimination, threats, and exploitation when they travel to their destination. Families must decide whether the inequalities faced at home merit experiencing more animosity while on the journey. Fieldwork conducted in migrant shelters located in strategic spots on the journey to the United States speaks to the commodification of migrants. The migrant flow from the Triangle has become so steady that a term known as the "cachuco industry," cachuco roughly translating to "dirty pig," has emerged.[52] The "cachucos" are blamed for Mexico's social problems and viewed with the utmost skepticism. Migrants are targeted with slurs and rarely receive any sympathy. The violence they experience on the journey arguably mimics the violence of their everyday lives in the Northern Triangle. In Mexico, migrants "are equated with drugs, weapons, terrorists, and gangs thus becoming targets of state violence."[53] Throughout the entire trip, those passing through are constructed as "unwanted criminals and racialized and gendered others."[54]

The collective discrimination against Central American immigrants in Mexico includes cooperation between cartels and law enforcement. Different criminal groups "organize together with the police and they carry weapons, heavy artillery. The same police who denounce them are the ones who protect them."[55] Police are paid off by organized crime yet claim to enforce the rule of law. They either assist in criminal activities directly by acting as spies and helping move cartel cargo, or they indirectly allow their illegal activities to continue unscathed and with immunity. Vulnerable migrants serve as people to smuggle, bodies to sell for profit, and cheap labor to capitalize on. They are seen by criminal groups through the lens of profitability rather than humanity thus making the journey psychologically taxing and oftentimes violent. Migrants leave

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[52] Vogt, Wendy. "Crossing Mexico: Structural Violence and the Commodification…" 765.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.

one society in which they feel unsafe and unprotected yet enter another with a similar situation. This trade suggests that the promise of life elsewhere or simply the prospect of escaping the Northern Triangle overcomes the fears of discrimination and vulnerability while travelling.

Organized Crime

The vulnerability of migrants makes them an easy target for organized crime. The covert routes to transport migrants to the United States are also those often used by criminal actors in their smuggling activities thus increasing contact between the two groups. The train from Central America to Mexico, also called "La Bestia," or "The Beast," serves as a particularly defenseless space for travelers. Oftentimes mass kidnappings are "systematic operations coordinated by train conductors, heavily armed organized criminals, and Mexican authorities in remote areas. Local residents and even other migrants may be useful in such operations."[56] For many, the last step of the journey is navigating the Rio Grande river. One migrant claimed that cartels are "the owners of the river and nobody can cross them without paying a large portion to the narcotraffickers."[57] After paying the fee to cross the river, migrants still are at risk of drowning or discovery from border officials while the cartels watch from boats or from the shore. This is a coordinated effort amongst different facets of Mexican society in order to profit off of Central American migrants.

The presence of well-organized and powerful crime groups increases the risk for migrants and their families. Migration from the Northern Triangle is considered a "mina de oro" or "gold mine" for criminal actors.[58] In 2010, there were 11,000 incidents of kidnapping and 214 cases of mass kidnappings of migrants in Mexico.[59] Some migrants upon capture are even sold into sex and labor trafficking or fall victim to organ trafficking. In Tamaulipas, a state known for its

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[56] Rodas, Sergio Morales. "La Temible Frontera Sureste Entre EE. UU. y México Que Está En Manos Del Crimen Organizado." *La Prensa Libre*, July 11, 2019.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.

ample cartel activity, "a migrant cannot walk through the streets without being assaulted, harassed, kidnapped, or violated, all the time they have to stay in shelters."[60] The Zetas are particularly feared by migrants in Mexico given their history of kidnappings and executions. Perhaps the most shocking Zeta display of brutality and violence occurred in August of 2010 in which 72 migrants were murdered (58 men, 14 women).

Human Smugglers: "Coyotes"

Professional smugglers who are paid to transport migrants through cartel-controlled territories and across international borders are known in Mexico and Central America as "coyotes." Good coyotes with high success rates earn hefty profits and are sought after by government officials to help stem the migration flow. It is estimated that migrants pay smugglers between $3,500 and $7,000 per person whether they are affiliated with organized crime or not. This lucrative migration market brings in an estimated $6 billion per year according to the Mexican government.[61] Many of these payments are done in vain as coyotes oftentimes deceive, assault, or even kill the migrants they promised to deliver. One personal testimony says that migrants "do not care about the risks of being kidnapped, extorted, or deported because the nightmare of poverty pushes them to undertake the journey and risk everything.[62] The treatment of migrants by coyotes is perhaps one of the most heartless aspects of the migration journey. Coyotes view migrants as "commodities, the faster they can get rid of them, the better," so they utilize a variety of means like buses, vans, boats and safe houses to transport them quickly.[63]

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[60]Coronado, Eddy. "Niño Guatemalteco Secuestrado Por 'Los Zetas' En México Se Reencuentra Con Familiares." *La Prensa Libre*, August 19, 2019.
[61]"Tráfico de Migrantes Deja $6,000 Millones al Año." *La Prensa Gráfica*, June 15, 2019.
[62]"Coyotes Son Cada Vez Más Desalmados Para Llevar Migrantes a Estados Unidos." *La Prensa Libre*, June 30, 2018.
[63]Ibid.

Migrant children present an interesting case. Smugglers often charge less to transport children than they do with adults. Families can also be "arrested" by US Customs and Border Patrol, detained at the border, and released relatively quickly into the United States when compared to a single adult. By getting a family to the US border undetected by Mexican officials, the coyote avoids actually crossing the border and facing detection. According to American immigration laws, families ought to be released from detention and border processing centers after only 20 days (though the recent influx of migrant families has delayed this process). From there, migrant parents and their children can disappear into normal life in the United States to await their court hearing.[64] There are even reports of single migrants who purchase children who have been kidnapped from their parents by smugglers as a ticket for expedited release into the United States. Some families who cannot leave as a unit even offer up their children to extended family or friends to increase their odds of obtaining a better life in the US. Not all Northern Triangle families choose to take their chances with coyotes or the American immigration system, but it is certainly a consideration for many.

Family Reunification

Many migrant families flee to other countries to reunite with family members who left before them and established a life abroad. According to the International Organization on Migration, one of the top three reasons for migration in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras is family reunification.[65] The Inter-American Development Bank conducted a similar study in which over 40% of the Northern Triangle migrants surveyed reported reuniting with family as

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[64] Partlow, Joshua, and Nick Miroff. "For Central Americans, Children Open a Path to the U.S. — and Bring a Discount." *Washington Post*, November 23, 2018.
[65] "Salvadoreños se van a Otros Países Por Temas Económicos, Reunificación Familiar y Violencia, Dice La OIM." *La Prensa Gráfica*, May 8, 2018.

one of the main reasons for leaving central America.[66] It is difficult to estimate the number of migrants with family in the United States because many immigrants from the region have entered illegally and incoming families fear that reporting the location of a loved one could lead to their deportation. Nonetheless, the promise of family reunification draws many Central American families to leave their home countries. Northern Triangle migrants often leave family behind in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, but for some, saying goodbye to one set of family brings with it the opportunity to rejoin another.

Conclusions

After outlining the dangers in the Northern Triangle, this chapter helps validate many migrant families' claims for leaving. Years after civil wars and political conflicts, these countries continue to struggle. Economic opportunity is threatened from many different sides. The rural regions bear the brunt of high poverty rates where residents live on just a few dollars per day. Those who are employed or operate a business often fall victim to paying excessive dues or commissions to organized crime groups. The inability to pay those dues may force the business to close thus increasing unemployment in the region. Using intimidation and threats to establish control, criminal actors dominate local economies and produce some of the highest crime rates in the world. They bribe local officials to work for them, so oftentimes reporting a crime poses worse consequences than remaining silent. The lack of justice allows men to exploit women in Northern Triangle communities spurring them to fear for their safety in their own homes. On top of it all, climate change wreaks havoc on these agrarian countries putting many out of work.

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[66] Inter-American Development Bank. "IDB Study Offers Overview of the Central America's Migration to the U.S." United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, December 17, 2019.

The struggles only continue once a family packs their bags. On the migrant trail, many Central Americans face discrimination and abuse by those who they encounter along the way. Organized crime profits off of the vulnerability of those fleeing and created a lucrative business smuggling migrants and their family members across the border. These factors should deter migrant families from risking their lives to leave their home countries yet the increasing number of families pouring out of the Northern Triangle suggests otherwise.

In the next chapter, we will see large numbers of respondents who intend to migrate along with their different characteristics such as their age and education level among other variables. But those who answered the survey and intend to migrate are more than just a number. This chapter shows that they are soybean farmers who lost their jobs in a drought but have three daughters. They are pregnant women whose partner abused them. They are young parents who considered escaping the violence in their neighborhoods that doesn't allow their children to play outside. They are mothers and fathers. This chapter tells the detailed story of why a family may leave everything in search of something more.

CHAPTER THREE: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

This chapter focuses on how family migration has changed in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras between 2012 and 2018. The best place to track family migration patterns from the Northern Triangle is the US-Mexico border because the trends are well-documented and highly visible. The number of family units apprehended at the southern border was around 10,000 in 2012 (dominated by Mexican nationals) thus serving as a base year before the spike in Northern Triangle family migration had occurred. In 2014, the overall number of migrant families apprehended at the US-Mexico border increased to over five times the number in 2012 with the quantity of families coming from the Northern Triangle rising sharply and the amount coming from Mexico shrinking. The year 2018 offers a stark contrast to the patterns reported in 2012. Over 100,000 family units were apprehended at the border almost exclusively from the Northern Triangle countries. These six years saw a tenfold increase in the number of immigrant families coming to the United States' border and a complete shift in in family migration patterns from principally Mexican families in 2012 to nearly all Northern Triangle families in 2018.

Studying Family Units

To conduct my analysis, I will be using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey for the Northern Triangle countries to study how the aforementioned family migration patterns have changed from 2012 to 2018. Its consistency and renown as one of the most expansive surveys in the region encouraged me to select the LAPOP AmericasBarometer to address the question of family migration. The survey covers public opinion and behavior of voting-age adults in North America, South America, and the Caribbean. LAPOP surveys respondents on a wide array of subjects, employs a consistent questionnaire across countries, and uses samples that are representative of each population making it ideal for cross-country analysis.

I created a proxy for families within the available data because the survey is not designed to study family units specifically. I restricted the sample to only include cases where respondents answer one or more to question 12BN: "How many children under the age of 13 live in this house?" thus limiting the survey to parents or guardians of children. Implicit in narrowing the sample this way are two key considerations. First, men or women who have children consider their parental status or guardianship when making migration decisions. Migration of a mother, father, or entire family drastically affects the safety, social fabric, and economic stability of a family unit which a parent considers when contemplating migration. Second, limiting the sample to families with relatively young children (under the age of 13) helps capture the Latin American family dynamic. Children under 13 are typically dependent on their parental figures, are less self-sufficient than older minors, and are likely not capable of making their own migration decisions. I originally intended to maximize my sample size by limiting the study to respondents with children of all ages (those who answered "yes" to Question 12: "Do you have children?"), but the question was not included in the LAPOP questionnaires for both years of study.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for this study is a migrant's self-declared intention to migrate within the next couple years. Intentions to migrate are measured by question 14 in the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey: "Do you have intentions of leaving to live or work in another country in the next three years?".[67] The respondents answer either (1) Yes, (2) No, (888888) Don't know, and (98888) No answer. Respondents who claimed "Don't know" and "No answer" were excluded from the analysis.

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[67] The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org.

Question 14 represented the most applicable migration question in the survey by asking

respondents whether they "intend" to migrate within the next three years. Under this framework,

it is impossible to connect migration intentions with migration behavior thus inherently limiting

the scope of the analysis. Declaring intentions to migrate represents an important step in the

process but does not indicate that a respondent actually decides to migrate. Not all respondents

who answer affirmative to intentions of leaving may actually do so, and in the same way, not all

respondents who reject having intentions to migrate will maintain that opinion. The lack of an

equally comprehensive database that included data on migration behavior encouraged me to

pursue the research project using this question and this database.

Independent Variables

The independent variables for this study include both demographic variables as well as

migration specific variables such as crime victimization, social connections abroad, and

economic situation which are intimately connected with the study of migration specifically. As

we saw in Chapter 2, high crime rates, the prospect of reconnecting with family abroad, and

minimal economic opportunities are all widely cited reasons for migration from Central

America. This chapter will analyze them in greater detail along with demographic variables such

as age, gender, household location, and years of education. In total, the quantitative section

investigates eight independent variables which include 22 total values and their connection with

answering affirmative to intentions to migrate. The variables were selected based on their

relevance to the dependent variable: intentions to migrate. Each variable is outlined below:

> *Crime Victimization:* Crime Victimization is pertinent to the analysis because the
> Northern Triangle maintains high crime rates and widespread organized crime. The fear
> instilled by crime incentives families to migrate. Crime victimization is a binary variable
> with respondents answering (1) Yes or (2) No to question VIC1EXT: "Have you been a
> victim of crime in the past 12 months?".

Remittances: In addition to crime, if Northern Triangle residents answer affirmative to receiving foreign economic assistance, they may be encouraged to migrate and/or reunite with family members abroad. I use question 10A, "Do you or someone else in your household receive remittances?", to measure the existence of social connections abroad in which respondents answer either (1) Yes or (2) No.

Age: The different age groups of the parents migrating (which implies different age groups of children) may vary across years and pose different implications. I divided age, a numerical variable measured by question 2: "How old are you?", into four categories. Each category represents a ten year increment to capture a different stage of parenthood. The first value, (1) 18-27 of age, is intended to capture parents with young children. The second value, (2) 28-37 years of age, reflects moderately young parents with children from of all ages. The third value, (3) 38-47 years of age, represents parents likely to have older children while the fourth value, (4) 48+ years of age, is intended to capture the grandparent generation though unlikely that they may make the journey.

Gender: Gender is another important variable in the analysis because rampant gender inequality may have different effects on the migration decisions of males when compared to females. The survey defines gender as a binary variable, dividing the population into (1) male and (2) female, and is determined by the interviewer upon introduction (Question 1: Sex).

Education: With regards to years of schooling, different education levels may disproportionately affect migration patterns of families which is why it is included. I transformed education status, a numerical variable based on number of years of schooling completed. I divided education into three categorical values: (1) 0-5 years of education, to represent zero to some completion of primary school, (2) 6-11 years of schooling, to represent completion of primary school and zero to some completion of secondary school, and (3) 12+ years of schooling, to represent the completion of primary, secondary, and zero to some higher education.

Household Economic Status: Poverty in the region is widespread, so a migrant family's assessment of their household income may encourage them to leave or stay. I selected question 10D to address a household's income. The question asks respondents to choose the category which best describes their attitude towards their household's income according to the following criteria: (1) "it is good enough for you and you can save from it," (2) "it is just enough for you and you don't have major problems," (3) "it is not enough for you and you are stretched," and (4) "it is not enough for you and you are having a hard time."

Household Location: Additionally, the day to day life of rural households is radically different from that of urban households. The inequalities and vulnerabilities of rural families may encourage their migration decisions to differ from those of urban families. The type of household the respondent lives in is classified as a binary variable, " (1) rural" and " (2) urban," and determined by the interviewer upon arrival.

> *Employment Status:* Lastly, a migrant's employment status which is directly connected to their ability to provide for their families is considered when determining whether to migrate or not. I transformed the values for employment status of the respondent into five categories: (1) Employed, (2) Unemployed, (3) Student, (4) Taking care of the home, and (5) Retired, a pensioner, or permanently disabled to work.

Analysis Part One: Crosstabs

The crosstabs summarize the proportion of respondents who fall within each category listed above for the dependent variable intentions to migrate. I ran crosstabs in SPSS for each of my independent variables in order to observe how the composition of migrant families has changed from 2012 to 2018 for the three Northern Triangle countries. The percentage values in the tables below represent the proportion of respondents who answered affirmative to having intentions to migrate while also answering affirmative to or identifying as the indicated value in the leftmost column. While crosstabs cannot indicate any level of correlation or causality as it does not control for other factors, it is a valuable tool to track shifting dynamics of respondents who have children with declared intentions to migrate, my proxy for family units. See Table 1 in the Appendix for the full results.

Crosstabs Analysis:

The tables below show the percentage change for each independent variable's values for each country from 2012 to 2018. The number of respondents who report intentions to migrate increased dramatically between the two years (146 to 236 in El Salvador, 88 to 299 in Guatemala, and 69 to 439 in Honduras). This corresponds with documented migration numbers and is relevant when comparing the percentages across years. The difference was taken between the percentages of 2018 and 2012 to provide the clearest indication of patterns within the region for comparison. The results are outlined below:

Crime Victimization

	Honduras	Guatemala	El Salvador
Victim of Crime	-8.6%	-8%	+2.6%

Table 2.a: Using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, this table presents the change in percentages of crime victims between 2012 and 2018 for Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.

These results suggest that there are fewer migrants who are influenced by crime victimization in Honduras and Guatemala. The number of respondents who expressed intentions to migrate decreased by over 8% for those two countries. The positive percentage in El Salvador suggests either a worsening of the crime situation or crime victimization as a variable becoming more connected to migration decision given more crime victims want to leave. Crime is a prominent issue within the Northern Triangle, but these numbers suggest that the number of crime victims declaring intentions to migrate is either decreasing or growing slightly.

Remittances

	Honduras	Guatemala	El Salvador
Recipient of Remittances	+1%	-2.8%	+2.1%

Table 2.b: Using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, this table presents the change in percentages between remittance-receiving migrants from 2012 and 2018 for Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.

Remittance-receiving migrants with self-proclaimed intentions of migrating saw minimal changes across all three groups. Percentages increased slightly in Honduras and El Salvador but decreased slightly for Guatemala. These results suggest that remittance levels for respondents with intentions to migrate remained relatively constant given how close the percentages are to zero. These numbers indicate that there was either little change in the number of migrants who received remittances between the two years or those who receive remittances haven't changed their opinions on migrating.

Age

	Honduras	Guatemala	El Salvador
Age 18-27 years	+1.3%	+14.1%	+14.1%
Age 28-37 years	-6.5%	-9.8%	-17.6%

Age 38-47 years	+0.4%	-2.5%	-1.8%
Age 48+ years	+4.8%	-1.7%	+5.2%

Table 2.c: Using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, this table presents the change in percentages between age groups from 2012 and 2018 for Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.

There is somewhat of a polarization trend occurring in which both the youngest and oldest age brackets saw increases in intentions to migrate. The youngest age group with respondents age 18-27, designed to capture parents with young children, saw growth across all three countries implying an increase in younger parents with younger children migrating. The percentages climb to over 14% in both Guatemala and El Salvador suggesting that the migrants coming from those countries should be notably younger than in the past. There is a decrease in the second age group for all three countries and minimal change in the third group. For Honduras and El Salvador, there is an increase in the oldest age bracket of migrants suggesting that middle-aged parents may be migrating with older children.

Gender

	Honduras	Guatemala	El Salvador
Men	+12.4%	-5%	-1.6%
Women	-12.4%	+5%	+1.6%

Table 2.d: Using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, this table presents the change in percentages between genders from 2012 and 2018 for Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.

Gender differences proved very inconsistent with a large decrease in women declaring intentions to migrate in Honduras while smaller positive changes occurred for Guatemala and El Salvador. It is expected from these results that there would be disproportionately more Honduran fathers migrating from the region yet slightly more Guatemalan and Salvadoran mothers.

Education

	Honduras	Guatemala	El Salvador
0-5 years of education	-5.7%	+8.4%	-5.2%
6-11 years of education	-3.5%	+6.3%	+1.4%

12+ years of education	+9.1%	-2%	+3.7%

Table 2.e: Using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, this table presents the change in percentages in years of education from 2012 and 2018 for Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.

Education levels of those surveyed with intentions to migrate also proved inconsistent. Honduran respondents reported a larger increase in people pursuing higher education with intentions to migrate and a decrease in the more uneducated populations. Guatemalan responses indicate an increase in relatively uneducated migrants and those who completed primary and some secondary education. The percentages of people who completed primary and some secondary education along with those pursuing higher education also increased for El Salvadoran respondents.

Household Economic Status

	Honduras	Guatemala	El Salvador
Salary is Good Enough	-11.2%	+5.7%	+5.1%
Salary is Just Enough	-18.9%	+3%	+2.2%
Salary is Not Enough/Stretched	+6.6%	-12.6%	-4%
Salary is Not Enough/Having a Hard Time	+23.6%	+12.6%	-3.3%

Table 2.f: Using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, this table presents the change in percentages between migrants of different income brackets from 2012 and 2018 for Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.

These results present change in each area of the spectrum. In Honduras, members of the poorest income bracket (those whose salary is not enough, and they are having a hard time) who express migration intentions increase dramatically, the the largest change of any value. The second poorest group also expresses increased intentions to migrate, but the highest income brackets express decreased intentions to migrate by a large margin. Guatemala presents a peculiar situation in which all groups indicate increased intentions to migrate except the stretched salary respondents. Increased intentions to migrate for the fringe salary groups could be

indicative of increased indigenous migration (who are generally are of low socioeconomic status) and growing migration of upper classes (those with adequate resources to migrate). El Salvador's patterns are opposite of those in Honduras. Salvadoran respondents of the higher income brackets express and increased willingness to migrate whereas those of lower income reveal decreased intentions to migrate. There is an across the board increase in at least two income groups expressing intentions to migrate, but the groups vary from country to country.

Household Location

	Honduras	Guatemala	El Salvador
Urban	-6.9%	-3.8%	-4.2%
Rural	+6.9%	+3.8%	+4.2%

Table 2.g: Using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, this table presents the change in percentages between migrants urban and rural status from 2012 and 2018 for Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.

Urban residents with declared intentions to migration decreased and rural residents with intentions to migrate increased by the same amount for all three Northern Triangle countries. This is one of the only uniform results across all three countries and implies that there should be an observed increase in migrants from rural areas.

Employment Status

	Honduras	Guatemala	El Salvador
Employed	-9.6%	-22.4%	-11.2%
Unemployed	+12.9%	+12.6%	+11.3%
Student	-0.2%	+4.6%	+6.1%
Caring for the Home	-3.5%	+4.9%	-7.8%
Retired	+0.9%	+0.3%	+1.7%

Table 2.h: Using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, this table presents the change in percentages between migrants of different employment status from 2012 and 2018 for Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.

Lastly, all three countries witnessed a decline of employed respondents with intentions to migrate and an increase in unemployed migrates with intentions to migrate. Using the same logic as household location, this should imply an empirical increase in unemployed migrant families leaving the country as opposed to employed ones.

This section answers the first part of the research question regarding how family migration from the Northern Triangle has changed over time. The results indicate that migrants as members of families in 2018 tend to belong to the fringe age groups (Ages 18-27 or 48+), to be unemployed, and to reside rural areas in contrast with 2012. This has implications for both destination and home countries. The young migrant families arriving are likely desperately in need of work to provide for their children and may possess less work experience than migrants of the older age groups. Northern Triangle countries may see an emptying of the rural areas in recent years because migrants from those areas have expressed increased intentions to migrate. This analysis is also important in showing the variation between countries. Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador are often referenced as a collective unit under the title "Northern Triangle Countries" but in fact the composition of migrant families coming from the region are quite different with the exception of a few key variables according to this analysis.

Analysis Part 2: Logistic Regression

The regression analysis will allow us to test correlations between the independent variables and intentions to migrate. The logistic regression implemented in the second half of this chapter will speak to the relationship between the dependent variable and four independent variables of study: crime victimization, perceived economic situation, household location, and gender. The strength of the relationship between these key variables helps answer how migration patterns have changed in the past decade.

Hypotheses

1) _Crime victimization, household location and gender will be more related to intentions to migrate in 2018 than in 2012._

I hypothesize that crime victimization has become more important for migration decisions of families from 2012 to 2018 thus helping explain the massive influx of families emigrating from the Northern Triangle. Many factors disproportionately affect rural families as opposed to urban ones. I suggest this discrepancy could have encouraged the shift between 2012 and 2018. I also hypothesize that gender has become increasingly related to migration decisions given the shift in trends to family units as opposed to single adults.

2) *Household economic situation will be less related to intentions to migrate in 2018 than in 2012.*

I also hypothesize that household economic situation, a common predicter of migration trends, has become less connected to family migration decisions relative to crime victimization, household location, and gender since 2012. The increased number of asylum seekers in recent years, for which economic insecurity is not a qualification, leads me to place more weight on other variables to explain the shift in migration patterns.

Regression Analysis Methodology and Results

In order to determine the variables most closely connected to family migration for each year, I ran a binary logistic regression in SPSS for the three countries for using all eight independent variables as covariates and intentions to migrate as the dependent variable. The equation for the logistic regression is as follows: Logged odds (intention to emigrate) = beta_0 + beta_1*(crime victimization) + beta_2*(recipient of remittances) + beta_3*age + beta_4*female + beta_5*education + beta_6*salary + beta_7*urban + beta_8*employment. In order to calculate the percentage change in odds, which allows us to see how the probability of migration increases or decreases based on the relationship with the independent variable, I subtracted 1 from the logged odds and multiplied the result by 100 as follows: *(Exp(B) – 1) * 100 = percentage change in odds.*

The p-value measures whether we can say with certainly that a relationship exists or not between the dependent variable and the independent variables. The confidence with which we can confirm this relationship will be indicated by the number of asterisks. The lack of an asterisk means that the relationship between the two variables is not statistically significant. The percentage change in odds measures the magnitude and direction of that relationship (positive or negative) between the two. I compared the statistical significance across years to analyze changes in the relationship across time and used the odds ratio (Exp(B)) to see how much the odds of migration change as a result of each unit change in the four independent variables of focus. The results are outlined below:

Crime Victimization

	Regression Coefficient (B)	Standard Error (S.E.)	Logged Odds (exp(B))	Number of Cases	Cox-Snell R-Squared	Nagelkerke R-Squared
Honduras 2012	0.700**	0.301	2.014	700	0.078	0.157
Honduras 2018	0.269	0.169	1.308	1069	0.108	0.147
Guatemala 2012	0.636**	0.270	1.888	694	0.082	0.155
Guatemala 2018	0.592***	0.178	1.807	993	0.077	0.111
El Salvador 2012	0.443	0.250	1.558	597	0.978	0.117
El Salvador 2018	0.722***	0.198	2.059	773	0.090	0.129

*statistically significant at the 90% confidence interval
**statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval
*** statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval
Table 3.a: This table shows the p-value and logged odds results of the binary logistic regression analysis for crime victimization (P values labelled as 0.000 mean that the value was less than 0.001 and therefore was rounded down)

The crime victimization variable is a way to measure the effects of organized crime and everyday violence mentioned in chapter 2 on the migration intentions of families. According to the regression results, crime victimization becomes more strongly related to intentions to migrate in Guatemala and El Salvador but less related in Honduras between 2012 and 2018. Crime victimization was statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval in Honduras in 2012 but

was not significant in 2018 which suggests a weakening in the relationship between crime victimization and migration over time. The results show that crime victimization in El Salvador became increasingly related to migration decisions from 2012 to 2018. Crime victimization was statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval for 2018 whereas it was not statistically significant at all in 2012.

The direction of the relationship between crime victimization and is not what I anticipated. If a Salvadoran respondent answered "no" to having intentions to migrate, their logged odds of migrating in 2018 increased by over 100%. The logged odds of migrating in Guatemala decreases from 88% in 2012 to 80% in 2018 when shifting from category (1) being a victim of a crime to (2) not being a victim of a crime between the years. Overall, crime victimization is related to migration decisions but decreases the probability of migrating in Guatemala and El Salvador in 2018 which was unexpected. To explain this discrepancy, there must be a characteristic of crime victims, such as lower economic status or location in a rural community, which discourages families from intending to migrate.

Gender

	Regression Coefficient (B)	Standard Error (S.E.)	Logged Odds (exp(B))	Number of Cases	Cox-Snell R-Squared	Nagelkerke R-Squared
Honduras 2012	-0.178	0.332	0.837	700	0.078	0.157
Honduras 2018	0.430***	0.158	1.537	1069	0.108	0.147
Guatemala 2012	0.559**	0.278	1.749	694	0.082	0.155
Guatemala 2018	0.537***	0.167	1.710	993	0.077	0.111
El Salvador 2012	0.380	0.259	1.462	597	0.978	0.117
El Salvador 2018	0.337*	0.194	1.401	773	0.090	0.129

Table 3.b: This table shows the p-value and logged odds results of the binary logistic regression analysis for gender.

Gender's relationship with migration can be indicative of how women are treated within a society. If they express increased intentions to migrate, it could suggest that the social and

economic opportunities for woman are not satisfactory. Gender became more closely related to intentions to migrate in 2018 when compared with 2012. Gender was not statistically significant in Honduras and El Salvador in 2012 but became statistically significant in 2018 suggesting that the relationship between gender and intentions to migrate has increased over time. Gender is statistically significant in Guatemala for both 2012 and 2018 suggesting a relationship has existed between the two variables over time.

The results indicate with certainty that women were much more likely to intend to migrate than men in 2018. In 2018, being a woman increased the logged odds of migrating by 53% in Honduras. In El Salvador in 2018, being a female increased the logged odds of migrating by 40%. The logged odds of female migration over those six years in Guatemala slightly decreases from 74% to 71% but is still positive. Overall, females, who in this case are mothers or guardians of children given the sample parameters, express increased intentions to migrate in 2018 as opposed to 2012 and are more likely to migrate than men.

Household Economic Situation

	Regression Coefficient (B)	Standard Error (S.E.)	Logged Odds (exp(B))	Number of Cases	Cox-Snell R-Squared	Nagelkerke R-Squared
Honduras 2012	-0.090	0.172	0.914	700	0.078	0.157
Honduras 2018	-0.481***	0.085	0.618	1069	0.108	0.147
Guatemala 2012	-0.498***	0.177	0.608	694	0.082	0.155
Guatemala 2018	-0.261***	0.095	0.770	993	0.077	0.111
El Salvador 2012	-0.566***	0.138	0.568	597	0.978	0.117
El Salvador 2018	-0.245**	0.104	0.783	773	0.090	0.129

Table 3.c: This table shows the p-value and logged odds results of the binary logistic regression analysis for household's economic status.

The household economic status results represent the income distribution amongst those families with intentions to migrate. Contrary to the hypothesis which suggests a decreased

relationship with income and migration, household economic situation was related to intentions to migrate across both years for Guatemala and El Salvador. These results suggest that there has always been a significant relationship between a family's household income and their intentions to migrate in those two countries. In 2012, Honduras was the only country in which household economic situation was not explicitly related to intentions to migrate. In 2018, the relationship increased since household economic situation was statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval.

Overall, migrant parents of lower economic status tend to report less intentions to migrate across both years. As a household reports itself in a lower income bracket in Honduras, the probability of migrating for each lower bracket decreases by over 38%. The strength of the negative relationship between migration and lower economic status is strong for Guatemala and El Salvador as well. As income status decreases, the odds of not intending to migrate decrease from 39.2% to 23% in Guatemala and 43.2% to 39.2% in El Salvador. These results suggest that lower economic status is not as powerful of a predicter to dissuade families from migrating as it was in the past for these two countries. Nonetheless, lower income families still express less intentions to migrate than higher income ones.

Household Location

	Regression Coefficient (B)	Standard Error (S.E.)	Logged Odds (exp(B))	Number of Cases	Cox-Snell R-Squared	Nagelkerke R-Squared
Honduras 2012	0.232	0.295	1.261	700	0.078	0.157
Honduras 2018	0.271*	0.140	1.311	1069	0.108	0.147
Guatemala 2012	-0.247	0.266	0.781	694	0.082	0.155
Guatemala 2018	-0.317**	0.157	0.728	993	0.077	0.111
El Salvador 2012	0.372	0.096	1.451	597	0.978	0.117
El Salvador 2018	0.331*	0.187	1.393	773	0.090	0.129

Table 3.d: This table shows the p-value and logged odds results of the binary logistic regression analysis for household location.

A household's location is used to express two different ways of life. Cities tend to be less vulnerable to climate change than rural agrarian areas, likely offer better employment opportunities, and provide more resources for families. The relationship between household location and intentions to migrate increases over time. Rural or urban status was not statistically significant in 2012 for any of the three countries. In 2018, an important change occurred, and it became statistically significant for all three countries. In Honduras and El Salvador, household location was statistically significant at the 90% confidence interval but in Guatemala it was significant at the 95% confidence interval.

In Honduras and El Salvador in 2018, rural migrants became more likely than urban ones to express intentions to migrate. Parents or guardians of children who live in a rural area are 31.1% more likely in Honduras and 39.3% more likely in El Salvador to intend to migrate. For Guatemalan respondents, the relationship is negative. Respondents in a rural area are 27.2% less likely to migrate when compared to urban ones. This is a large change in both directions for the Northern Triangle countries. We should then expect to see a pattern of more urban families coming from Guatemala and more rural ones emigrating from Honduras and El Salvador in recent years.

Conclusions

Overall, the results partially satisfy the first hypothesis and render the second hypothesis incorrect. Crime victimization became more related to migration decisions in El Salvador which the hypothesis suggested, less related to migration decisions in Honduras, and remained relatively constant in Guatemala. The prevalence of organized crime and its grip on the lives of families is likely to be higher in El Salvador (since it has the highest murder rate in the region)

which could explain the results. Gender satisfied the hypothesis in which being a female increases the odds of migration by over 40% in each country in 2018. These results suggest that these countries have not prioritized the well-being of women. If anything, the situation for females has worsened. Household location also satisfies the hypothesis for all three countries. The predicted direction of the relationship is the same for Honduras and El Salvador in which rural status increases the logged odds of migration, but the opposite relationship occurs in Guatemala in which the logged odds of migration decrease with rural status. Perhaps the situation for rural migrants is more desperate in El Salvador and Honduras, or the rural migrant families in Guatemala cannot afford to undertake the journey.

The second hypothesis regarding a decreasing connection between household economic status and intentions to migrate proved to be false. Economic status became more closely connected to intentions to migrate in Honduras in 2018 but remained so in Guatemala and El Salvador suggesting a relatively constant relationship between the two variables. Interestingly, families of lower economic status are less likely to migrate when compared to those in a higher income bracket. The sharp increase in asylum seekers coming from the Northern Triangle in recent years suggest that violence is an increasingly important reason for intending to migrate. This research suggests otherwise. Economic insecurity has consistently been a prominent push factor in family migration intentions.

CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS

This thesis analyzes how migration patterns of families in the Northern Triangle of Central America changed over time. The qualitative research which included a combination of reports and newspaper analyses vividly outlines why a family may desire to migrate. Understanding the context for migration decisions in Central America and on the journey to another country is fundamental to understanding how and why families choose to leave. While the qualitative chapter explained the different variables in detail, the logistic regression analysis of the LAPOP data demonstrates which factors relate most to migration intentions of families and how that has changed between 2012 and 2018.

Implications of the Research

Crime Victimization

This research suggests that crime victimization is relatively less influential in intentions to migrate than the media and policy experts make it out to be. I initially anticipated that crime victimization and the intention to migrate would become more closely related over time which would help explain the recent increase families claiming asylum. For El Salvador alone, this proved true but not in the way I hypothesized. For a country with the one of the highest homicide rates in the world, I expected crime victimization to drastically increase the likelihood of migration. On the contrary, the results report that crime victimization actually decreases the odds of intending to migrate by over 100% in El Salvador for the year 2018. This suggests that either other characteristics weigh heavier in the migration decisions of Salvadorans or potentially that something about the population crime victims hinders them from migrating. For example, the exploitation of rural families by criminal groups may leave them financially unable to leave.

In Honduras, crime victimization and intentions to migrate become less connected over time which suggests that either other factors emerged to determine the migration decisions of

families or that the crime situation has actually improved in recent years. In Honduras in 2012, just three years after the coup d'état rocked the country, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime reports that the country had the world's highest murder rate: 90 homicides per 100,000.[68] That number has fallen by over half in 2018 which indicates improvement in the crime situation.[69] If this explains the results, it would poses important consequences for policy makers when considering the multitude of asylum claims coming from Honduras. For Guatemala, crime victimization proved related to migration intentions for both years, but the chances of a non-crime victim intending to migrate increases 8% between 2012 and 2018. Crime victimization for both years decreases the odds of having intentions of migrating by 80% or more. Despite the slight increase in non-crime victims intending to leave, crime predominantly decreases a family's likelihood to express migration intentions in Guatemala.

The crime victimization results suggest that crime has become less connected to migration intentions in Honduras and a potent factor in discouraging families from having intentions to migrate in the other countries. This could be due to the fact that criminal actors tend to target specific groups rather than the entire population. As mentioned in chapter 2, organized crime prays on the weakness and vulnerability of those who cannot defend themselves. In a survey that is representative of the entire population, the effects of crime victimization will likely be understated since the data includes those with political power and economic influence, the groups of society who are more immune to the violence of everyday life than disadvantaged populations.

Gender

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[68] "Which Countries Have the World's Highest Murder Rates? Honduras Tops the List." *CNN*. April 11, 2014.
[69] Labrador and Renwick. "Central America's Violent Northern Triangle."

The results of the gender regression are quite consistent with the proposed hypothesis and indicate that being a woman greatly increases the odds of intending to migrate. In 2018, gender was related to migration intentions for all three countries and woman were 40% more likely to declare intentions to migrate than men. These results imply that a strong connection exists between women and migration in recent years which could explain the shift in families leaving. It could be inferred that the odds of a mother leaving without her children is slim, especially in the case of divorce, domestic violence, or discrimination. The increase in female's intentions to migrate between 2012 and 2018 could indicate a worsening of the social situation for women in recent years. In a region where females fall victim to high levels of gender-based violence, these results highlight the need to address gender issues in order to stem family migration flows. This data could help explain the crime victimization discrepancy mentioned above. Crime rates are high in all three countries, and women represent a sub-group of the population disproportionately abused or killed.

Household Location

A household's location, either rural or urban, became more related to family migration over the period studied. Rural status increased the odds of migrating in El Salvador and Honduras but decreased the odds of migrating in Guatemala. This is initially surprising given Guatemala's extreme vulnerability to climate change and history of indigenous discrimination in the rural areas. When considering the context of rural poverty, the results make more sense. In 2016, 54% of Guatemala experienced rural poverty which could explain the lack of migration intentions by rural families.[70] Guatemala also possesses the most numerous indigenous

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[70] Marrone. "Poverty in Central America: Advancement and Needs." The Borgen Project.

population of the three countries. Language barriers and the high monetary costs of migration may limit this large subset of the population from leaving the country.

Honduras and El Salvador possess higher crime rates than Guatemala which could contribute to increased rural families intending to migrate. Though crime rates in the previous regressions appeared to discourage intentions to migrate, they could not be capturing the reality of the nuanced situation in rural areas in both countries. It can be inferred that there is less accountability in the rural areas because criminal actors and corrupt law enforcement have less oversight. Thus the desperation to escape violent crime could be higher in these two countries despite economic insecurities. The female murder rate is much higher in El Salvador (10.2 per every 100,000) and Honduras (5.8 per every 100,000) than in Guatemala (2 per every 100,000).[71] Females in rural areas fleeing violence could also explain why Guatemala is the outlier in this case.

Lastly, all three countries are extremely vulnerable to climate change, a process that disproportionately affects rural areas with an agrarian workforce. Though it seems another factor is hindering rural migrants from leaving in Guatemala, more prevalent droughts in the dry corridor could push migrant families in Honduras and El Salvador to intend to migrate. The agrarian sector's percentage of the workforce is declining faster between 2012 and 2018 in El Salvador and Honduras than in Guatemala. The percentage of agriculture employment during this period dropped from 37% to 30% in Honduras and nearly 21% to 16% in El Salvador. In Guatemala, the agrarian workforce remained constant over the two years (32.26% in 2012 and 31.5% in 2018).[72] Guatemala's rural families are less inclined to express intentions to migrate resulting in relatively consistent agriculture employment.

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[71] "At Least 2,795 Women Were Victims of Feminicide"… ECLAC.
[72] "The World Bank in El Salvador." The World Bank.

Household Economic Status

Lastly, I hypothesized that the relationship of self-reported economic status and intentions to migrate would decrease relative to other factors like crime victimization, gender, and rural vs. urban status. The results proved contrary to the hypothesis in which household situation was related to intentions to migrate for both years in Guatemala and El Salvador but actually became more related in Honduras in 2018. The results for all three countries conclude that Northern Triangle families with less income report less willingness to migrate. Though many migrants are labeled as desperate to escape the harsh realities of life in the Northern Triangle, this research suggests that the most desperate ones may never get the opportunity to leave.

Some migrant families who may desire to leave likely cannot afford to pay for transportation out of the country or for a guide to lead them across international borders. Families understand the realities of organized crime along the way and the potential of paying criminal actors upon entering their territory may be too daunting. Those with higher economic status may receive remittances from family members already in the destination country. Their social connections abroad and newfound ability to pay may encourage them to leave as opposed to poorer migrants with no international networks. Even if families have relatives abroad, the costs of starting over in a new country are extremely high especially coming from a region where families live on a couple dollars per day. Surely the financial, physical, and emotional burden of leaving is too much to bear for many migrant families.

Conclusions

The results show an increase in the relationship between Northern Triangle families' intentions to migrate and the four variables studied (respectively crime victimization, gender, household location, and household economic status). This shift correlates with large migration

wave of families in the region which occurred between 2012 and 2018. The increase in strength

between the relationships of crime victimization, gender, household economic situation, and

household location research has identified four variables intimately connected with intentions to

migrate at a statistically significant level and how those relationships have grown over time.

This research also suggests a correlation between higher economic status intentions to

migrate. Whereas US news media emphasizes the desperation of the Northern Triangle families

travelling to the border, these results express that some of the poorest families who seek better

life abroad may be forced to stay because they cannot afford to leave. Those with lower

economic status may not possess the necessary funds or connections to actually make the

journey. The testimonies of those who survived the migrant trail are harrowing, but the data

suggests that those who remain in the Triangle may have even more grueling stories to tell. This

is also an important insight for policy makers because it could suggest that increasing the

economic situation alone may not help stem the migrant flow to destination countries. The

problems for migrant families are deeper than the lack of money in their wallets. Increasing

income may actually encourage migrants to leave because they possess the newfound resources.

This research suggests that addressing non-economic variables like social inequality, corrupt law

enforcement, and rising global temperatures is fundamental to changing families' perspectives on

migration.

Gender discrimination is intimately connected with female migration in the region, and

the data suggests that it has either gotten worse or women have had enough of chronic

discrimination and violence. Being a female increases the logged odds of migration in all three

countries by over 40% in a way that it hasn't in the past. Confronting the systemic gender

inequality and violence proves essential to encourage women to stay. Providing more economic

opportunities for women, encouraging female education, and offering justice for gender related

crimes would improve the daily lives of Northern Triangle women and perhaps discourage them from intending to migrate. Finally, rural status is also an important indicator for migration in Honduras and El Salvador. Though the study does not analyze the different aspects that specifically affect rural living such as susceptibility to deep poverty, climate change, and indigenous discrimination, rural status increases probability of families intending to migrate. The results imply that one or multiple components of rural livelihoods are pushing migrants to leave in recent years in a new way. Uncovering which rural variable sparks this change is important to addressing migration patterns.

Addressing the Humanitarian Crisis

Documenting the factors which encourage families to leave and how they have changed over time is fundamental to understanding migration waves and patterns in the Western Hemisphere. This report will add to the sparse academic literature regarding both family and Northern Triangle migration while serving as tool for academics and policy makers alike to better understand the critical migration situation in the region. The influx of families has stressed the capacity of the Mexican and American governments to process immigrants and pressured the Northern Triangle governments to find an immediate solution. Research such as this offers a first step in trying to address this new international crisis.

In the wake of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), the vulnerable Northern Triangle migrant populations continue to suffer. Immediate border closures and lockdowns prohibit some families from leaving, stop those travelling in their tracks, and trap others in shelters and detention centers. Some shelters have even closed down leaving families without a place to sleep. Guidance by leaders all over the world is to stay at home, "but the migrants don't have

homes."[73] There is no safe place for these families. Their past home is unstable and their future one is uncertain. When this is all over, there will likely be another wave of migrant families coming from the Northern Triangle. In this case, we will begin where we left off: pondering how to solve the crisis in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Perhaps this research, among other works that seek to give justice and dignity to the migrant plight, will provide guidance on how to do just that.

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APPENDIX

Table 1: Crosstabs Results

	Honduras 2012	Honduras 2018	Guatemala 2012	Guatemala 2018	El Salvador 2012	El Salvador 2018
Victim of Crime	34.3%	25.7%	35.2%	27.2%	27.2%	29.8%
Recipient of Remittances	29.9%	30.9%	20.5%	17.7%	28.8%	30.9%
Age 18-27 years	39.7%	41%	28.4%	42.5%	32.9%	47%
Age 28-37 years	36.8%	30.3%	38.6%	28.8%	43.4%	25.8%
Age 38-47 years	17.6%	18%	21.6%	19.1%	15.4%	13.6%
Age 48+ years	5.9%	10.7%	11.4%	9.7%	8.4%	13.6%
Men	44.1%	56.5%	62.5%	57.5%	52.4%	50.8%
Women	55.9%	43.5%	37.5%	42.5%	47.6%	49.2%
0-5 years of education	26.5%	20.8%	19.3%	27.7%	20.4%	15.2%
6-11 years of education	54.4%	50.9%	53.4%	47.1%	52.4%	53.8%
12+ years of education	19.1%	28.2%	27.3%	25.3%	27.2%	30.9%
Salary is Good Enough	14.7%	3.5%	1.1%	6.8%	2.7%	7.8%
Salary is Just Enough	33.8%	14.9%	24.1%	27.1%	28.1%	30.3%
Salary is Not Enough/Stretched	35.3%	41.9%	67.8%	46.6%	40.4%	36.4%
Salary is Not Enough/Having a Hard Time	16.2%	39.8%	6.9%	19.5%	28.8%	25.5%
Urban	63.2%	56.3%	44.3%	40.5%	70.7%	66.5%
Rural	36.8%	43.7%	55.7%	59.5%	29.3%	33.5%
Employed	56.5%	46.9%	72.7%	50.3%	61.2%	50%

A

Unemployed	15.9%	28.4%	13.6%	26.2%	12.2%	23.5%
Student	4.3%	4.1%	1.1%	5.7%	2.0%	8.1%
Caring for the Home	23.2%	19.7%	12.5%	17.4%	24.5%	16.7%
Retired	0%	0.9%	0%	0.3%	0%	1.7%

Table 1: Using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, this table summarizes the crosstabs percentages for Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador for 2012 and 2018.

Table 2: Percentage Change in Crosstabs Results from 2012 to 2018

	Honduras	Guatemala	El Salvador
Victim of Crime	-8.6%	-8%	+2.6%
Recipient of Remittances	+1%	-2.8%	+2.1%
Age 18-27 years	+1.3%	+14.1%	+14.1%
Age 28-37 years	-6.5%	-9.8%	-17.6%
Age 38-47 years	+0.4%	-2.5%	-1.8%
Age 48+ years	+4.8%	-1.7%	+5.2%
Men	+12.4%	-5%	-1.6%
Women	-12.4%	+5%	+1.6%
0-5 years of education	-5.7%	+8.4%	-5.2%
6-11 years of education	-3.5%	+6.3%	+1.4%
12+ years of education	+9.1%	-2%	+3.7%
Salary is Good Enough	-11.2%	+5.7%	+5.1%
Salary is Just Enough	-18.9%	+3%	+2.2%
Salary is Not Enough/Stretched	+6.6%	-12.6%	-4%
Salary is Not Enough/Having a Hard Time	+23.6%	+12.6%	-3.3%
Urban	-6.9%	-3.8%	-4.2%
Rural	+6.9%	+3.8%	+4.2%
Employed	-9.6%	-22.4%	-11.2%
Unemployed	+12.9%	+12.6%	+11.3%
Student	-0.2%	+4.6%	+6.1%
Caring for the Home	-3.5%	+4.9%	-7.8%
Retired	+0.9%	+0.3%	+1.7%

Table 2: Using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, this table presents the change in percentages between 2012 and 2018 for Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.

Table 3: Regression Analysis Results

	Honduras 2012	Honduras 2018	Guatemala 2012	Guatemala 2018	El Salvador 2012	El Salvador 2018
Constant						
Regression Coefficient (B)	-4.044***	-1.654***	-0.697	-2.051***	-0.902	-3.074***
Standard Error (S.E.)	1.262	0.614	1.200	0.720	0.974	0.776

	0.018	0.191	0.498	0.129	0.406	0.046
Logged Odds (exp(B))	0.018	0.191	0.498	0.129	0.406	0.046
Crime Victimization						
B	0.700**	0.269	0.636**	0.592***	0.443	0.722***
S.E	0.301	0.169	0.270	0.178	0.250	0.198
(exp(b))	2.014	01.308	1.888	1.807	1.558	2.059
Gender						
B	-0.178	0.430***	0.559**	0.537***	0.380	0.337*
S.E.	0.332	0.158	0.278	0.167	0.259	0.194
(exp(B))	0.837	1.537	1.749	1.710	1.462	1.401
Household Economic Situation						
B	-0.090	-0.481***	-0.498***	-0.261***	-0.566***	-0.245**
S.E.	0.172	0.085	0.177	0.095	0.138	0.104
(exp(B))	0.914	0.618	0.608	0.770	0.568	0.783
Household Location						
B	0.232	0.271*	-0.247	-0.317**	0.372	0.331*
S.E.	0.295	0.140	0.266	0.157	0.096	0.187
(exp(B))	1.261	1.311	0.781	0.728	1.451	1.393
Number of Cases	700	1069	694	993	597	773
Cox-Snell R-Squared	0.078	0.108	0.082	0.077	0.978	0.090
Nagelkerke R-Squared	0.157	0.157	0.155	0.111	0.117	0.129

*statistically significant at the 90% confidence interval
**statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval
*** statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval
Table 3: This table shows the p-value and logged odds results of the binary logistic regression analysis for crime victimization, gender, household economic situation, and rural vs. urban status. (P values labelled as 0.000 mean that the value was less than 0.001 and therefore was rounded down). The constant values are consistent for each independent variable.

Crime Victimization

			¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		
			Sí	No	Total
Sí	Count		40	68	108

C

¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	27.2%	14.3%	17.3%
	No	Count	107	409	516
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	72.8%	85.7%	82.7%
Total		Count	147	477	624
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Remittances

			¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		
			Sí	No	Total
¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica d	Sí	Count	42	83	125
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	28.8%	17.4%	20.1%
	No	Count	104	394	498
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	71.2%	82.6%	79.9%
Total		Count	146	477	623
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Age

D

| | | | ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo | | |
			Sí	No	Total
Age in years	1.00	Count	47	114	161
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	32.9%	24.4%	26.4%
	2.00	Count	62	171	233
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	43.4%	36.6%	38.2%
	3.00	Count	22	123	145
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	15.4%	26.3%	23.8%
	4.00	Count	12	59	71
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	8.4%	12.6%	11.6%
Total		Count	143	467	610
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Gender

| | | | ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo | | |
			Sí	No	Total
Género	Hombre	Count	77	203	280
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	52.4%	42.4%	44.7%
	Mujer	Count	70	276	346
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	47.6%	57.6%	55.3%
Total		Count	147	479	626

E

			Sí	No	Total
% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Years of Schooling

			¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		
			Sí	No	Total
Years of Schooling	1.00	Count	30	165	195
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	20.4%	34.6%	31.3%
	2.00	Count	77	195	272
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	52.4%	40.9%	43.6%
	3.00	Count	40	117	157
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	27.2%	24.5%	25.2%
Total		Count	147	477	624
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Salary

			¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		
			Sí	No	Total
El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar:	Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar	Count	4	26	30
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	2.7%	5.5%	4.8%
		Count	41	154	195

F

			28.1%	32.6%	31.5%
Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades	% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		28.1%	32.6%	31.5%
No les alcanza y tienen dificultades	Count		59	189	248
	% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		40.4%	40.0%	40.1%
No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades	Count		42	104	146
	% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		28.8%	22.0%	23.6%
Total	Count		146	473	619
	% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Household Location

			¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		
			Sí	No	Total
Usar definición censal del país	Urbano	Count	104	283	387
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	70.7%	59.1%	61.8%
	Rural	Count	43	196	239
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	29.3%	40.9%	38.2%
Total		Count	147	479	626
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Employment Status

	¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	Total

G

			Sí	No	
Employment Status	1.00	Count	90	252	342
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	61.2%	52.7%	54.7%
	2.00	Count	18	33	51
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	12.2%	6.9%	8.2%
	3.00	Count	3	3	6
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	2.0%	0.6%	1.0%
	4.00	Count	36	183	219
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	24.5%	38.3%	35.0%
	5.00	Count	0	7	7
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	0.0%	1.5%	1.1%
Total		Count	147	478	625
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

SPSS El Salvador: Crosstabs 2018 Results

Crime Victimization

			Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		Total
			Sí	No	
Víctima de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses	Sí	Count	70	106	176
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	29.8%	16.7%	20.2%
	No	Count	165	530	695

H

			Sí	No	Total
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	70.2%	83.3%	79.8%
Total		Count	235	636	871
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Remittances

			Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		
			Sí	No	Total
Recibe remesas	Sí	Count	73	114	187
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	30.9%	18.0%	21.5%
	No	Count	163	520	683
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	69.1%	82.0%	78.5%
Total		Count	236	634	870
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Gender

			Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		
			Sí	No	Total
Sexo	Hombre	Count	120	281	401
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	50.8%	44.0%	45.9%
	Mujer	Count	116	357	473
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	49.2%	56.0%	54.1%
Total		Count	236	638	874
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Household Location

			Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		
			Sí	No	Total
Urbano/Rural	Urbano	Count	157	368	525
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	66.5%	57.7%	60.1%
	Rural	Count	79	270	349
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	33.5%	42.3%	39.9%
Total		Count	236	638	874
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Household Economic Situation

			Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		
			Sí	No	Total
La situación económica familiar	Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar	Count	18	33	51
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	7.8%	5.4%	6.1%
	Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades	Count	70	178	248
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	30.3%	29.2%	29.5%
	No les alcanza y tienen dificultades	Count	84	254	338
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	36.4%	41.7%	40.2%
	No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades	Count	59	144	203
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	25.5%	23.6%	24.2%
Total		Count	231	609	840
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

J

Age

			Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		
			Sí	No	Total
Age in years	1.00	Count	111	174	285
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	47.0%	27.3%	32.6%
	2.00	Count	61	159	220
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	25.8%	24.9%	25.2%
	3.00	Count	32	163	195
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	13.6%	25.5%	22.3%
	4.00	Count	32	142	174
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	13.6%	22.3%	19.9%
Total		Count	236	638	874
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Education

			Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		
			Sí	No	Total
Education in years	1.00	Count	34	145	179
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	15.2%	24.8%	22.2%
	2.00	Count	120	262	382
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	53.8%	44.8%	47.3%
	3.00	Count	69	178	247
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	30.9%	30.4%	30.6%
Total		Count	223	585	808
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Employment Status

			Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		
			Sí	No	Total
Employment Status	1.00	Count	117	314	431
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	50.0%	49.4%	49.6%
	2.00	Count	55	93	148
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	23.5%	14.6%	17.0%
	3.00	Count	19	29	48
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	8.1%	4.6%	5.5%
	4.00	Count	39	183	222
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	16.7%	28.8%	25.5%
	5.00	Count	4	16	20
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	1.7%	2.5%	2.3%
Total		Count	234	635	869
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Crime Victimization

			¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		
			Sí	No	Total
	Sí	Count	31	122	153

L

¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?. E					
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	35.2%	19.4%	21.4%
	No	Count	57	506	563
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	64.8%	80.6%	78.6%
Total		Count	88	628	716
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Remittances

			¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		
			Sí	No	Total
[RECOGER Tarjeta F] ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es deci	Sí	Count	18	37	55
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	20.5%	5.9%	7.7%
	No	Count	70	592	662
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	79.5%	94.1%	92.3%
Total		Count	88	629	717
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Age

M

| | | | ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo | | |
			Sí	No	Total
Age in years	1.00	Count	25	112	137
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	28.4%	17.8%	19.1%
	2.00	Count	34	211	245
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	38.6%	33.5%	34.1%
	3.00	Count	19	197	216
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	21.6%	31.3%	30.1%
	4.00	Count	10	110	120
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	11.4%	17.5%	16.7%
Total		Count	88	630	718
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Gender

| | | | ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo | | |
			Sí	No	Total
[Entrevistador: anotar, no preguntar:] Género:	Hombre	Count	55	295	350
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	62.5%	46.8%	48.7%

			Sí	No	Total
	Mujer	Count	33	335	368
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	37.5%	53.2%	51.3%
Total		Count	88	630	718
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Education

			¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		
			Sí	No	Total
Education in years	1.00	Count	17	287	304
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	19.3%	45.6%	42.3%
	2.00	Count	47	213	260
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	53.4%	33.8%	36.2%
	3.00	Count	24	130	154
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	27.3%	20.6%	21.4%
Total		Count	88	630	718
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Salary

	¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		
	Sí	No	Total
Count	1	30	31

O

El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: [Leer a	Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar	% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	1.1%	4.9%	4.5%
	Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades	Count	21	210	231
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	24.1%	34.6%	33.3%
	No les alcanza y tienen dificultades	Count	59	285	344
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	67.8%	47.0%	49.6%
	No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades	Count	6	82	88
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	6.9%	13.5%	12.7%
Total		Count	87	607	694
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Household Location

			¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		Total
				No	
Urbano	Count		39	263	302

P

			Sí		No	Total
Urbano / rural [Usar definición censal del país]		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	44.3%		41.7%	42.1%
	Rural {{Usar definición censal del país}}	Count	49		367	416
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	55.7%		58.3%	57.9%
Total		Count	88		630	718
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%

Employment Status

			¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		
			Sí	No	Total
Employment Status	1.00	Count	64	415	479
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	72.7%	66.1%	66.9%
	2.00	Count	12	25	37
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	13.6%	4.0%	5.2%
	3.00	Count	1	2	3
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	1.1%	0.3%	0.4%
	4.00	Count	11	173	184

			Sí	No	Total
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	12.5%	27.5%	25.7%
	5.00	Count	0	13	13
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	0.0%	2.1%	1.8%
Total		Count	88	628	716
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

SPSS Guatemala: Crosstabs 2018 Results

Crime Victimization

			Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		
			Sí	No	Total
Víctima de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses	Sí	Count	81	135	216
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	27.2%	17.7%	20.4%
	No	Count	217	626	843
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	72.8%	82.3%	79.6%
Total		Count	298	761	1059
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Remittances

			Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		
			Sí	No	Total
	Sí	Count	53	102	155

R

Recibe remesas			17.7%	13.4%	14.6%
	No	Count	246	658	904
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	82.3%	86.6%	85.4%
Total		Count	299	760	1059
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Gender

			Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		
			Sí	No	Total
Sexo	Hombre	Count	172	336	508
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	57.5%	44.0%	47.8%
	Mujer	Count	127	428	555
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	42.5%	56.0%	52.2%
Total		Count	299	764	1063
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Household Location

			Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		
			Sí	No	Total
Urbano/Rural	Urbano	Count	121	360	481
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	40.5%	47.1%	45.2%
	Rural	Count	178	404	582
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	59.5%	52.9%	54.8%
Total		Count	299	764	1063
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Household Economic Situation

| | | | Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país | | |
			Sí	No	Total
La situación económica familiar	Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar	Count	20	48	68
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	6.8%	6.5%	6.6%
	Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades	Count	79	259	338
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	27.1%	35.3%	33.0%
	No les alcanza y tienen dificultades	Count	136	312	448
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	46.6%	42.6%	43.7%
	No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades	Count	57	114	171
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	19.5%	15.6%	16.7%
Total		Count	292	733	1025
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Education

| | | | Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país | | |
			Sí	No	Total
Education in years	1.00	Count	80	207	287
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	27.7%	27.8%	27.8%
	2.00	Count	136	354	490
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	47.1%	47.5%	47.4%
	3.00	Count	73	184	257
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	25.3%	24.7%	24.9%
Total		Count	289	745	1034

T

			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país					

Age

			Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		
			Sí	No	Total
Age in years	1.00	Count	127	215	342
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	42.5%	28.1%	32.2%
	2.00	Count	86	200	286
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	28.8%	26.2%	26.9%
	3.00	Count	57	184	241
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	19.1%	24.1%	22.7%
	4.00	Count	29	165	194
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	9.7%	21.6%	18.3%
Total		Count	299	764	1063
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Employment Status

			Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		
			Sí	No	Total
Employment Status	1.00	Count	150	365	515
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	50.3%	48.2%	48.8%
	2.00	Count	78	125	203
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	26.2%	16.5%	19.2%
	3.00	Count	17	23	40
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	5.7%	3.0%	3.8%

U

			Sí	No	Total
4.00	Count		52	229	281
	% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		17.4%	30.3%	26.6%
5.00	Count		1	15	16
	% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		0.3%	2.0%	1.5%
Total	Count		298	757	1055
	% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

<mark>SPSS Honduras: Crosstabs 2012 Results</mark>

<u>Crime Victimization</u>

			¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		
			Sí	No	Total
¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?. E	Sí	Count	23	104	127
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	34.3%	18.8%	20.5%
	No	Count	44	448	492
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	65.7%	81.2%	79.5%
Total		Count	67	552	619
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

<u>Remittances</u>

			¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		
			Sí	No	Total
	Sí	Count	20	48	68

			Sí	No	Total
[RECOGER Tarjeta F] ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es deci		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	29.9%	8.7%	11.0%
	No	Count	47	506	553
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	70.1%	91.3%	89.0%
Total		Count	67	554	621
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Age

			¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		Total
			Sí	No	
age in years	1.00	Count	27	101	128
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	39.7%	18.1%	20.5%
	2.00	Count	25	201	226
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	36.8%	36.1%	36.2%
	3.00	Count	12	134	146
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	17.6%	24.1%	23.4%
	4.00	Count	4	121	125
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	5.9%	21.7%	20.0%
Total		Count	68	557	625
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Gender

W

			¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		
			Sí	No	Total
[Entrevistador: Anotar, no preguntar:] Género:	Hombre	Count	30	270	300
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	44.1%	48.6%	48.1%
	Mujer	Count	38	286	324
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	55.9%	51.4%	51.9%
Total		Count	68	556	624
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Education

			¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		
			Sí	No	Total
Education in years	1.00	Count	18	180	198
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	26.5%	32.3%	31.7%
	2.00	Count	37	259	296
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	54.4%	46.5%	47.4%
	3.00	Count	13	118	131
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	19.1%	21.2%	21.0%
Total		Count	68	557	625

X

			Sí	No	Total
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Household Economic Situation

			¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		
			Sí	No	Total
El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: [Leer a	Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar	Count	10	48	58
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	14.7%	8.7%	9.4%
	Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades	Count	23	216	239
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	33.8%	39.2%	38.6%
	No les alcanza y tienen dificultades	Count	24	208	232
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	35.3%	37.7%	37.5%
	No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades	Count	11	79	90
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	16.2%	14.3%	14.5%
Total		Count	68	551	619
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Y

Household Location

			¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		
			Sí	No	Total
[ESTRATE R] Urbano / rural [Usar definición censal del país]	Urbano	Count	43	312	355
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	63.2%	56.1%	56.9%
	Rural {{Usar definición censal del país}}	Count	25	244	269
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	36.8%	43.9%	43.1%
Total		Count	68	556	624
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Employment Status

			¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo		
			Sí	No	Total
Employment Status	1.00	Count	39	304	343
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	56.5%	54.8%	55.0%
	2.00	Count	11	69	80
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	15.9%	12.4%	12.8%
	3.00	Count	3	3	6

Z

		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	4.3%	0.5%	1.0%
	4.00	Count	16	166	182
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	23.2%	29.9%	29.2%
	5.00	Count	0	13	13
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	0.0%	2.3%	2.1%
Total		Count	69	555	624
		% within ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximo	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Crime Victimization

			Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		
			Sí	No	Total
Víctima de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses	Sí	Count	113	108	221
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	25.7%	15.7%	19.6%
	No	Count	326	578	904
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	74.3%	84.3%	80.4%
Total		Count	439	686	1125
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

AA

Remittances

| | | | Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país | | |
			Sí	No	Total
Recibe remesas	Sí	Count	73	114	187
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	30.9%	18.0%	21.5%
	No	Count	163	520	683
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	69.1%	82.0%	78.5%
Total		Count	236	634	870
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Household Economic Situation

| | | | Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país | | |
			Sí	No	Total
La situación económica familiar	Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar	Count	15	36	51
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	3.5%	5.4%	4.7%
	Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades	Count	64	144	208
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	14.9%	21.6%	19.0%
	No les alcanza y tienen dificultades	Count	180	268	448
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	41.9%	40.2%	40.9%
	No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades	Count	171	218	389
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	39.8%	32.7%	35.5%
Total		Count	430	666	1096
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Gender

			Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		
			Sí	No	Total
Sexo	Hombre	Count	248	297	545
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	56.5%	43.3%	48.4%
	Mujer	Count	191	389	580
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	43.5%	56.7%	51.6%
Total		Count	439	686	1125
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Household Location

			Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		
			Sí	No	Total
Urbano/ Rural	Urbano	Count	247	339	586
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	56.3%	49.4%	52.1%
	Rural	Count	192	347	539
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	43.7%	50.6%	47.9%
Total		Count	439	686	1125
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Age

			Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		
			Sí	No	Total
Age in years	1.00	Count	180	212	392
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	41.0%	30.9%	34.8%
	2.00	Count	133	159	292

			Sí	No	Total
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	30.3%	23.2%	26.0%
	3.00	Count	79	122	201
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	18.0%	17.8%	17.9%
	4.00	Count	47	193	240
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	10.7%	28.1%	21.3%
Total		Count	439	686	1125
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Education

			Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		
			Sí	No	Total
Education in years	1.00	Count	90	190	280
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	20.8%	28.4%	25.5%
	2.00	Count	220	330	550
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	50.9%	49.4%	50.0%
	3.00	Count	122	148	270
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	28.2%	22.2%	24.5%
Total		Count	432	668	1100
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Employment Status

			Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país		
			Sí	No	Total
Employment Status	1.00	Count	205	306	511
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	46.9%	44.9%	45.7%
	2.00	Count	124	77	201

			28.4%	11.3%	18.0%
	3.00	Count	18	29	47
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	4.1%	4.3%	4.2%
	4.00	Count	86	257	343
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	19.7%	37.7%	30.7%
	5.00	Count	4	12	16
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	0.9%	1.8%	1.4%
Total		Count	437	681	1118
		% within Intenciones de vivir o trabajar en otro país	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

SPSS El Salvador: Logistic Regression 2012 Results

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1ª	¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es	.443	.250	3.133	1	.077	1.558
	¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica d	.573	.247	5.375	1	.020	1.774
	Age in years	.387	.118	10.645	1	.001	1.472
	Género	.380	.259	2.145	1	.143	1.462
	Years of Schooling	-.166	.160	1.068	1	.301	.847
	El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar:	-.566	.138	16.917	1	.000	.568
	Usar definición censal del país	.372	.239	2.424	1	.119	1.451

EE

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
	Employment Status	.146	.096	2.294	1	.130	1.157
	Constant	-.902	.974	.856	1	.355	.406

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1ª	Víctima de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses	.722	.198	13.318	1	.000	2.059
	Recibe remesas	.622	.195	10.204	1	.001	1.863
	Age in years	.493	.086	32.941	1	.000	1.638
	Sexo	.337	.194	3.027	1	.082	1.401
	Education in years	.081	.132	.382	1	.536	1.085
	La situación económica familiar	-.245	.104	5.569	1	.018	.783
	Urbano/Rural	.331	.187	3.149	1	.076	1.393
	Employment Status	.060	.077	.611	1	.434	1.062
	Constant	-3.074	.776	15.677	1	.000	.046

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1ª	¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?. E	.636	.270	5.538	1	.019	1.888
	[RECOGER Tarjeta F] ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es deci	1.572	.340	21.350	1	.000	4.816
	Age in years	.293	.133	4.852	1	.028	1.340
	[Entrevistador: anotar, no preguntar:] Género:	.559	.278	4.050	1	.044	1.749
	Education in years	-.671	.184	13.358	1	.000	.511
	El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: [Leer a	-.498	.177	7.899	1	.005	.608

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
	Urbano / rural [Usar definición censal del país]	-.247	.266	.865	1	.352	.781
	Employment Status	.084	.120	.489	1	.484	1.088
	Constant	-.697	1.200	.338	1	.561	.498

SPSS Guatemala: Logistic Regression 2018 Results
Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1ª	Víctima de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses	.592	.178	11.060	1	.001	1.807
	Recibe remesas	.420	.203	4.292	1	.038	1.522
	Age in years	.438	.076	33.162	1	.000	1.550
	Sexo	.537	.167	10.377	1	.001	1.710
	Education in years	.211	.117	3.274	1	.070	1.235
	La situación económica familiar	-.261	.095	7.582	1	.006	.770
	Urbano/Rural	-.317	.157	4.090	1	.043	.728
	Employment Status	.097	.068	2.024	1	.155	1.102
	Constant	-2.051	.720	8.108	1	.004	.129

SPSS Honduras: Logistic Regression 2012 Results
Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1ª	¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?. E	.700	.301	5.398	1	.020	2.014
	[RECOGER Tarjeta F] ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es deci	1.630	.339	23.171	1	.000	5.104
	age in years	.638	.158	16.274	1	.000	1.893
	[Entrevistador: Anotar, no preguntar:] Género:	-.178	.332	.287	1	.592	.837
	Education in years	.207	.215	.931	1	.335	1.230
	El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: [Leer a	-.090	.172	.273	1	.601	.914

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
	[ESTRATER] Urbano / rural [Usar definición censal del país]	.232	.295	.619	1	.431	1.261
	Employment Status	.170	.129	1.730	1	.188	1.186
	Constant	-4.044	1.262	10.265	1	.001	.018

SPSS Honduras: Logistic Regression 2018 Results
Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1ª	Víctima de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses	.269	.169	2.512	1	.113	1.308
	Recibe remesas	.646	.162	15.939	1	.000	1.908
	Age in years	.401	.064	39.015	1	.000	1.494
	Sexo	.430	.158	7.440	1	.006	1.537
	Education in years	-.135	.105	1.674	1	.196	.873
	La situación económica familiar	-.481	.085	31.961	1	.000	.618
	Urbano/Rural	.271	.140	3.737	1	.053	1.311
	Employment Status	.131	.060	4.775	1	.029	1.140
	Constant	-1.654	.614	7.255	1	.007	.191

HH