RELIGION IN EDUCATION: THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES ON ANDALUSIAN YOUTH

by

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Religion, a major part of Spanish society, has seen a divide between those who affiliate themselves with Catholicism and those who do not, especially when it is involved in politics or the public sphere. Before the transition to democracy, the regime of Francisco Franco was tightly integrated with the Catholic Church. By illegalizing actions such as divorce, and allowing the Catholic Church to have control over education, Franco was able to gain the support of the Church to strengthen his regime. Under Franco, Catholicism was the only legally recognized religion in Spain. The official ideology of *el nacionalcatolicismo*, or National Catholicism, stated that, in order to be Spanish, one must also be Catholic. Religious courses were integrated into schools, and women who were not from elite families were discouraged from attending higher education. However, in the 1950s and 60s, a combination of international trade, U.S. involvement in Spain, which exposed Spaniards to Western culture, and the influence of the Opus Dei Technocrats within the regime, who were members of the Catholic Church that devised plans to stabilize Spain’s economy, forced Franco to ease up on the repression of individual rights in order to undergo socio-economic policy changes. By 1970, as a result of the Education Act, all Spanish citizens had equal education opportunities (Griera).

With the death of Franco in November of 1975, a transition to democracy occurred under the new king, Juan Carlos, and Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez. With the ratification of the 1978 Constitution, Suárez and his centrist government tried to undo the strict repression cast onto Spaniards by Franco by ensuring personal liberties, such as freedom of religion. Under the constitution, each religious group is equal before the law, and the State must maintain neutrality
in religious matters, thereby protecting the religious liberties of all citizens. Since the transition to democracy, Spain has experienced an increase of immigrants, altering the religious profile of the country. Although the existence of religious plurality is nothing new to Spain, as it was once a melting pot of religions from 711 until 1492, the visibility of religious minorities in the public sphere, however, is.

Even though Spain now enjoys religious freedom, the disagreements between left-wing and right-wing parties regarding religion in education have not been settled in part due to the 1979 Agreement Concerning Education and Cultural Affairs between the Spanish State and Holy See, which requires the teaching of the Catholic faith to be mandatory in all schools, but not obligatory for all students. It is left to the parents or the students themselves to enroll in these religious classes. Political tensions have risen in Spain over the place of religion in education due to the fact that conservatives want to maintain Catholic values among the Spanish youth, while liberals want to see a more laic style of education instill itself in Spanish society.

Research Question

This study aims to understand the question: Why do students choose to take a class on Catholicism? I hypothesize that students with parents who identify with conservative parties will take the class on Catholicism, while those who opt for an alternative class will have parents who identify as secular. In addition, I hypothesize that students from lower income households will identify as liberal, while students from wealthier households will identify as conservative. My hypotheses are based in my research of Spain’s history and the connection between pro-clerical policies and conservatism, and anti-clerical policies and secularism. It is also based on research
that states that those who are more educated, and therefore more wealthy, traditionally support right-wing parties (Inglehart, Norris 2017).

**Rationale**

My project matters because it contributes to the scholarly debate on how political partisanship effects religion. The effects of modernization, or the transformation by which a country undergoes industrialization and economic development, in addition to cultural, political, and social changes, have long been discussed in the field of social sciences (e.g. Inglehart). One component of modernity is secularism, or the separation of Church from State. Even though modernized countries have seen a shift in personal values towards those that form a more egalitarian society, people who live in secular societies still follow religious institutions, and scholars, have aimed to understand the role religion plays in society and the lives of individuals (Durkheim [1915]1947, Smith [1889]1972, Inglehart 2009). Especially in the last decade, as immigration and religious diversity has increased, cultural and political changes have stirred debates on religion’s place in secular societies. This phenomenon can be seen in Europe in places such as France, whose completely secular stance on all religions has created unrest among religious populations.

In addition, my project contributes to the studying of the southern Spanish region of Andalusia. With its recent economic development and increase in religious plurality, Andalusia is ideal for this study to understand the role of religious institutions in post-industrial societies.
Theoretical Framework

Sociologists have investigated the importance of religion from generation to generation, especially in communities that have deep cultural ties to a specific religion. Under the structural-functionalist theory, sociologists believe social institutions, such as religion and education, guide the lives of individuals to promote solidarity and stability in society (Durkheim [1893]1933). Many social institutions, like politics and religion, are interdependent and share common sets of principles that bring people together. An example of the interdependence of politics and religion can be seen in policies that support traditional church stances on issues such as homosexuality and abortion. In order to understand how social structures affect modern societies, it is necessary to study the roles which religion, education, and politics play in society.

From a functionalist perspective, religion endorses certain practices and beliefs that dictate specific behaviors and norms based on social needs and values, and contributes to social control and conformity. According to Émile Durkheim (1915), a major founder of the functionalist theory, people who unite under the same religion bond over their shared obligation to their faith and form a group identity. Under his theory, people who live in modernized societies still turn to religion because it acts as a moral force that binds people to the same social laws. Since each member strives to adhere to these laws, social solidarity and control are provided by the church and the religion, and both offer meaning and purpose to the lives of its followers. Similarly, another scholar, Max Weber ([1920]1963), believed that the practices and beliefs of Protestants influenced the development of capitalism. Weber points out that, since Protestants believed in predestination, they saw their careers as God’s calling and therefore personal economic success proved salvation. Similar to the Protestant lifestyle, the Opus Dei Technocrats in Spain valued economic prosperity and also wanted to uphold Christian values in
society. On the other hand, Karl Marx saw the creation of religion as a way to oppress certain social classes and maintain inequality.

Like religion, education is one of the most important social institutions in society. From the perspectives of Émile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons, education has two functions – manifest, or the desired impacts of formal education on individuals, and latent, the influence of school participation on students outside of its curriculum. Schools, which expose students to the rules and norms of society as a whole, replace the role of the family as the focal socializing-agency to integrate children into society. In addition, mass education has posed a degree of homogeneity on society by reinforcing the dominant economic, political, and cultural aspects of society. By doing so, schools aim to produce societal members who conform to the ideologies of the State.

Lastly, social scientists have studied how cultural changes influence the relationship between religion and political partisanship. According to Ronald Inglehart (2009), people who live in advanced, industrialized countries are more likely to deviate from traditional, social norms because they feel that they are economically and physically secure and therefore focus on personal liberation instead of conforming to tradition. He argues that, as personal security increases, the importance of religion decreases. Thus, the freedom to make one’s own political choices trumps religion. On the other hand, Michele F. Margolis (2018), states that individuals tend to move away from religion in early adulthood, since individuals are focused on obtaining degrees and finding work, and, as a result, political choices and identity emerge and shape their choice whether or not to participate in religious practices. Margolis believes individuals may reconnect with religion once they begin to think about a family and marriage, which depends on whether or not they believe it is an essential aspect of familial relations and their political stances. Hence, political affiliation can affect one’s religiosity.
Hypothesis

My preliminary hypothesis is that there is a divide between political party affiliation of the student’s parents and enrollment in religious education. I hypothesize that those who take the class will have parents who identify with conservative parties, while those who opt for the alternative will have parents who identify as left-wing. Although it may seem like common sense that parent’s ideologies dictate students’ choices to take a class on Catholicism, in a place like Andalusia, which has a history of political and religious repression, it may not be so. It is possible that parents may choose not to push their ideologies on their children, and instead external influences and personal limitations, such as social class, could affect a student’s choice on whether or not to take the class. Therefore, I want to discover if parental ideologies trump other influential factors.

Research Design

In order to understand the driving causes behind the choice to take a class on Catholicism in a secular state, I chose to focus my research on the southern region of Spain, Andalusia. Known for its rich history of religious plurality and relatively young population in comparison to the rest of Spain’s demographics, Andalusia has seen a recent advancement of its economy. Being a modernized, secular society, I expect to see the younger population of Andalusia emphasize egalitarian values. However, I anticipate that these values will not be a compelling reason in their decision to take a class on Catholicism, and instead the political ideologies of their parents will be the deciding factor. To test my hypothesis, I collected data on students’ opinions on religion in education through an anonymous survey. The results of this survey are used to analyze the connection between political ideologies and religious education.
Case Selection

Spain is a constitutional monarchy with 17 autonomous communities. Each autonomous community democratically elects their own officials, practices limited self-government, and has its own cultural and political values. Spain is a predominantly Catholic country, but has experienced a recent revival of Islamic culture as Moroccans move into Southern Spain. Due to its location in the Mediterranean Sea and its close proximity to Africa, Spain has been conquered many times by different civilizations, each bringing its religious values. Andalusia, which was often the point of first contact for new civilizations, has a deep history of religion, particularly Judaism, Islam, and Christianity. The impacts of these religions on Andalusian society can be seen to this day through architecture, religious communities, and public displays of traditions. Religious freedom has not always been evident in Spain since the 11th century, and, up until the transition to democracy, Catholicism had a stronghold on Spanish society. The history of religion since the 19th century, and its place in education, can be seen as a constant, predictable battle between conservative, pro-clerical parties, and liberal, pro-secular parties.

Data

In my study, I used the data collected from my survey to analyze the basic demographics of the individuals being studied, including gender, age, socio-economic status, and religiosity, to understand how certain demographics relate to political party affiliation. I also measured one’s association with their Autonomous Community and Spain, the level of importance religion holds in their life, and their participation in religious education. Lastly, I measured their political ideology and how they relate to that of their parents.
I gathered individual-level, primary data through an anonymous survey. I used the platform Qualtrics to stack survey questions in order to understand why students chose to take a class on Catholicism or the alternative. I utilized snowball sampling by first sending the survey out to my contacts in Granada, Spain, and asking them to share the link on their social media platforms. I received 16 responses, 13 females and 3 males, between the ages of 19 and 22, with varying economic and social statuses. The respondents were asked whether or not they took religious education during their time in Infant Education, Primary Education, Secondary Education, or Bachillerato, a two-year high school program. In addition to the questions mentioned previously, I asked students if they took the alternative social and civic values course, and why. The answers to these questions lead into more personalized questions in order to gauge their personal values. In addition, I asked three questions about the Catechism to gauge the knowledge of the Catholic faith among various religious groups. The responses to the questions in the survey are multiple choice and also on a 5-point scale. I hypothesize that fewer students will have taken classes on Catholicism as a result in the general decrease of the importance of religion in Spain. In addition, I hypothesize that the majority of students will want to eliminate religion in education as a result of the generational shift towards postmaterialistic values.

**Method**

After collecting the data from my survey, I measured the commonalities among the respondents using qualitative analysis. After comparing the basic demographics of the respondents, I used the data collected from the survey and my personal experiences in Andalusia to create four prototypical people. Within each composite, I analyzed the type of school attended, participation in religious education, political ideologies of the student and their parents’, and
one’s opinion on religion. I also compared their three three most important values to that of their political ideology. Each prototypical person was given a pseudonym.

Outline

Chapter 2 is centered around the analysis of social institutions in society, especially in modernized societies. This chapter provides a theoretical framework and explores the concepts of religion, education, and political affiliation discussed throughout the paper.

Chapter 3 explores the history of religious education in Spain since the First Spanish Republic and the political battle between liberal and conservatives over Catholicism in education. It also explores three unique components of Andalusia – its religious plurality, its relatively young population, and its economic position. In order to understand the current political state of the country, it is essential to analyze these aspects as they have greatly shaped the cultural development of Andalusia.

Chapter 4 analyzes the survey data I collected. To answer the research question of why students choose to take classes on Catholicism, this chapter focuses on analyzing the components of each respondents’ answers and finding commonalities to better understand how specific demographics correspond to religiosity.

Finally, Chapter 5 concludes with an argument surrounding the rise of postmaterialistic values in the Andalusian youth in relation to political ideologies and religious education. The chapter examines how parents’ political ideologies shape a student’s choice on religion, and compares the rate of enrollment in religious education to that of the alternative class and one’s opinion on religion in Spanish education.
Chapter 2

The Effects of Social Institutions on Individuals

How social institutions interact has long been debated by sociologists. Without a unanimous definition of what a “social institution” is, it has become difficult to measure the influence these structures have on society. The chapter begins by introducing Émile Durkheim’s theory of structural-functionalism to define social institution and its role in society. In addition, it breaks down three important social institutions – religion, education, and politics, and analyzes their social function. Finally, the chapter incorporates data from the World Values Survey to compare to Spain’s economic and political history and its current events to show how political and religious affiliations have evolved.

My theoretical framework is grounded in the sociological theories of religion, education, and politics. I start with Durkheim and the major ideas he established regarding structural functionalism because his theories laid the foundation for other social scientists to present their ideas. I compare the theories of Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Talcott Parsons to Durkheim to discuss the differences in sociological opinions and the addition of information to the structural functionalist theory. The concepts developed by these scholars still continue into modern-day, and are used as building blocks in the development of social theories, as seen in Ronald Inglehart’s research. By stitching together the concepts of Durkheim, Weber, Marx, and Inglehart, I am able to understand the theoretical framework behind my three main topics: Religion, education, and politics.

Émile Durkheim believed society is made of complex interrelated parts, or social institutions, that function to support social order by establishing pervasive commonalities, such
as shared values, languages, and symbols ([1893]1933). Each institution is a social structure that guides social behavior in order to uphold the status quo, which, consequently, maintains societal cohesion and stability; structural-functionalists believe that society desires to be at equilibrium. A central theme of functionalism is the interdependence of social institutions – as one changes, it initiates a transformation in another due to the fact that institutions share a common set of principles. Communities are continuously reminded of societal standards by institutions, therefore causing people to base their social and political values on their cultural system. As society undergoes modernization and experiences changes in cultural values, religion, education, and politics are modified.

**Religion**

Religion is a social institution found amid many cultures. Social scientists believe that “religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices… which unite into one single moral community” (Durkheim [1915] 1947, 47). The practices and beliefs endorsed by a religion promote specific behaviors and norms based on social needs and values, which vary across different cultures and faiths. Due to religion’s deep connection with society, one’s culture is often a product of religious beliefs, as seen in parts of the Middle East. From a functionalist perspective, religion is a major institution that serves many purposes, such as prompting social solidarity through social cohesion and control. On top of providing a place for social interaction, religion offers emotional support for people and answers any existential questions one may have.

In order to understand how religion came to be a key institution in society, it is important to analyze the findings of three major figures: Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Émile Durkheim. In “The Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism,” Max Weber analyzes how Puritan ethics, or the
beliefs and practices of Protestants, influenced the development of capitalism. Since Protestants, specifically Calvinists, believed in predestination, or the belief that God chose people in the beginning for salvation and damnation, they no longer turned to religious authority figures to find out how to be saved. Instead, Calvinists saw their professions as God’s calling and thus individual success became proof they were saved (Weber [1920]1963, xvi). Although it can be argued that religion no longer affects work ethic in modern-day, Weber’s theory on the rise of capitalism as a religious product shows how religion can create social change. On the other hand, Karl Marx believed religion was an extension of the social stratification and a way to oppress social classes to maintain inequality. By putting value into an unseen afterlife, one which comes with rewards and salvation, people accept the condition of their lives and do not strive for social change (Marx [1844]1964). However, although an oppressor, Marx believed religion still acted as a sanctuary for those to cope with everyday life. Lastly, Émile Durkheim saw religion as a unifying force that binds people together who adhere to it, “uniting them into a group leading a common life” under a common faith ([1915]1947, 60-61).

In order to understand Durkheim’s functionalist theory on religion, one must first look his theories surrounding its origin. According to Durkheim, religion originates from totemism, a belief system rooted in the human connection with another species, such as an animal or plant. The chosen species, known as the “clan’s totem,” became the object of worship for the group of individuals and ultimately reflected the clan’s conscience (Durkheim [1915]1947, 272-73). Durkheim explains how man looked to nature and “visualized the powers of nature as being like himself; and at the same time he set them apart from himself…[and] turned them into gods” (Durkheim [1887] 1975, 35). Thus, religion is the self worship of society. As groups began to be united under the same beliefs and practices, communal relations formed and produced a sense of
obligation to one another. Under religion, or the “unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things… one single moral community [forms] called a church” (Durkheim [1915]1947, 47). By associating oneself with the church, one connected to each person who also identified as a member of it, resulting in a group identity or “collective conscience.” Therefore, religion is the social actor that holds people together who have no blood ties (Durkheim [1915]1947).

Even as society has undergone rapid economic, social, and political changes, people still turn to religion. This event occurs because, as communal ties break and moral norms and rules of society change, people are able to use their religion as a moral force that holds them together as a group under the same social laws. As society evolves and people become more individualistic, finding themselves in a position of being either a winner or loser in a capitalist world, religion “teaches men that their lives and happiness are not the mere sport of blind forces of nature, but are watched over and cared for by a higher power” (Smith [1889]1972, 248). As the profane, or the routine aspects of our daily life, increasingly separated from the sacred, the things we perceive as extraordinary, religion became an institution that developed alongside society and merged with morality. When religious institutions created practices and beliefs to live by, it became the authoritative figure that built the laws of society. Compelled to follow the rules set out by the religious institution, each member bonded over the obligation to their faith (Durkheim [1915]1947). Moreover, religion, as a social actor, provides social cohesion to maintain social solidarity, which holds complex modern societies together, social control to enforce religious-based morals and norms, as a means of conforming and controlling society, and additionally offers meaning and purpose to the lives of its followers.

In relation to Spain, religion, and more specifically Catholicism, has continuously played a major institutional role in society. With Spain being one of the most predominantly Catholic
countries in the world, religion has taken a leading role in both politics and education. In regards to politics, conservative political parties promote the integration and maintenance of Catholic values in society. Throughout parts of the 19th and 20th century, conservative leaders and political parties allowed the Catholic Church to be the main educator of Spanish citizens. Under Durkheim’s theory, if people consider themselves to be a part of one religion, they will vote for the political party that best resembles the values that align with their religious beliefs and practices. Plus, allowing the Catholic Church to control education allows for all Spanish citizens to be united under the same morals and norms, creating solidarity within the nation. Through a different lens, Marxism would see the domination of the Catholic Church and its values under General Franco after the Spanish Civil War as a way to shut down socialists and maintain the power of the ruling class. In modern-day, traditional religious worship has decreased among Spaniards, with half of the Catholic population never attending worship, but two-thirds of the Spanish population identifies with Catholicism, making it the dominant faith (F028 WVS). Since the end of General Franco’s dictatorship, a decrease in religious worship has occurred as people separate from the Church and its control, and focus on identity formation outside of traditional norms, and also pursue economic opportunities.

**Education**

Education is one of the most important social institutions in society. Established as a fundamental human right, compulsory education has increased an individual’s access to personal development and social integration in modern societies. Since education is no longer a right given only to the elites, mass education has allowed for interactions among all social classes, genders, and ethnicities. Before the institutionalization of mass education, compulsory
instruction promoted the dominant culture, but, as society has become more inclusive and
diverse, it has become possible to learn a variety of cultural norms in school.

In order to understand the role of education in society, it is necessary to understand the
ideas of Talcott Parsons and Émile Durkheim. A promoter of solidarity and stability,
functionalist theorists believe that education has two purposes – manifest and latent. The
manifest, or primary function of education, evaluates the intended outcomes of formal
curriculum, whereas the latent, or secondary function of education, studies the hidden effects of
being in school, or, in other words, the influence schooling has on an individual independent of
formal education. Three major concepts of the manifest function of education are socialization,
social control, and social placement. According to Durkheim, schools teach children how to get
along with others and prepares them for the economic duties of adulthood, therefore replacing
the role of the family as the focal socializing-agency to integrate children into society (e.g.
Parsons). As schools transmit core values to students, schools practice social control by teaching
conformity to law and respect for authority under universalistic standards – thus, schools
represent society in miniature (e.g. Durkheim, Parsons). In regards to social placement,
Durkheim observed students studying career fields in college that were perceived as
advantageous on the social ladder in order to achieve financial freedom and security. Similarly,
under Parsons’ theories, education prepares students for roles in society by testing and evaluating
their talents, skills, and capacities; therefore, school is a major instrument that shapes role
allocation. On the other hand, the latent function of education influences students in various
aspects outside of formal education. For example, in the United States, schools promote
individualism, meaning the value of the individual is greater than the value of society as a whole,
while additionally teaching patriotism through reciting the pledge of allegiance. All in all,
education provides a foundation to impose certain rules and norms on students that society demands in order to create a cohesive social structure.

In conjunction with functionalist theories, scholars have continued to assess the effects of institutionalizing education. For one, institutions pose a degree of homogeneity in society. As the degree of institutionalization increases, the generational uniformity of cultural understandings increases, the necessity of social control to maintain universal standards lessens, and people resist cultural change (Zucker 1977). As a result of education, individuals are socialized and incorporated into society as members. Thus, mass education extends membership to all individuals in order to produce universality (Meyer, Ramirez, Soysal 1992), and “creates a whole series of social assumptions about the common culture of society” (Meyer 1977, 69). In addition, the curriculum of schools maintains dominant economic, political, and cultural arrangements that exist in society; thus, schools only legitimize specific values (Apple 1990). As student’s attitudes are shaped by the curriculum of their schools, they build personal qualities off of their educational experience. These qualities do not disappear as individuals transition into adults; instead, adults continue to gear their lives towards the expected roles instilled in them by their educators.


Spain and Bolivia are similar in that they both recently separated from the Catholic Church and became secular countries, and two-thirds of the countries identify as Catholic. In addition, education has been used as a tool to promote cultural homogeneity among students in Spain and Bolivia. The education system in Bolivia is a modern-day example of Durkheim and Parsons’ structural-functionalist theories on education. The effects of education on the creation
of a student’s identity are seen not only in Bolivia, as shown in the literary review, but additionally in Spain.

In “The Citizen Factory: Schooling and Cultural Production in Bolivia,” Aurolyn Luykx states that it is the duty of the school to “construct a bond between students and the nation, to embrace students within a network of meanings and practices that define them as “Bolivians” and make this relationship an enduring part of their ideological repertoire” (126). As shown in Bolivia, among countries all around the world, education plays a major role in socialization, or the process by which a child is integrated into society through cultural learning. From the language spoken, to the historical events taught, education reinforces the position of a student in society by comparing them to the dominant culture. Even when students find that they do not agree with the material presented, class debate hardly occurs, and instead students continue to take notes based off of what the teacher presents. The guideline for a professor’s curriculum is aimed towards unifying students under a common knowledge and practices that defines a good citizen. As students conform to the school’s principles, students disconnect with social identities that distract them from the nation’s prevailing ideologies. More specifically, “by legitimating certain language practices and stigmatizing others, the school creates/encourages certain cultural identities and represses others” (Luykx 1999, 304). Luykx believes that, ultimately, people who segregate themselves from the traditional ideologies of the state will alienate themselves from other ethnic groups, affecting the homogeneity of the state and moreover the integrity of the nation – schools are therefore the glue which holds together ethnic and class differences in order to produce one type of citizen.

Spain is no exception to the functionalist theory of education. Through each regime change in the 20th century came deep educational reforms. Education became the basis by which
authoritarian regimes, under leaders such as General Franco and General Primo de Rivera, could impose their ideology. From incorporating the Catholic faith into school curriculum, to demanding that the only language spoken in schools be Castilian, schools legitimized the culture of those who held power in society. Since the educational system “focuses on the socialization of individuals for membership in society,” it is not surprising that “movements in which educational reforms play a leading role” occur when political ideologies of leaders change drastically (Meyer, Ramirez, Soyal 1992,131). When the societal standards of citizenship change, schools must readjust their curriculum to establish authoritative guidelines for social behavior to reinforce peoples’ roles in society.

**Political Affiliation**

Various societal factors shape our political affiliation. Political scientists have tried to pinpoint which factors in society, such as the economy and immigration, facilitate cultural changes. Karl Marx stated that, as economies develop and civilizations undergo modernization, extensive cultural changes arise, causing a decline in religion and other traditional norms. However, another sociologist, Max Weber, believed certain cultural values, such as religiosity, endure throughout modernization. What makes one identify as conservative or liberal, and does this relate to how one reacts to cultural changes? How we view our self-image can often influence partisanship because we try to find a party with people who fall in line with our personal goals. The following section will analyze how modernity, along with economic and physical security, affects cultural change and political identity, and additionally examines the connection between religion and political affiliation.
Using modernization theories developed by scholars such as Karl Marx and Max Weber as a basis to his research, political scientist, Ronald Inglehart, has conducted studies on cultural change in post-industrial societies. In his research, Inglehart investigates how economic development and physical security affect basic values. According to Inglehart (2009), people who live in advanced industrialized societies tend to feel more economically and physically secure, which brings rise to a shift away from absolute norms towards the promotion of self expression and autonomy (Inglehart, Baker 2000). In societies that have experienced previous insecurity, Inglehart states that an intergenerational value change will occur and create two separate groups: materialists and postmaterialists. Those who have experienced a period of insecurity are considered materialists, and they emphasize the importance of in-group solidarity and traditional norms to initiate societal stability. However, those who feel relatively secure in society, or postmaterialists, focus their political energy on the promotion of egalitarian values (Inglehart 2009). As survival starts to be taken for granted, postmaterialists detach from traditional forms of religion and shift towards secular-rational values, such as divorce and abortion (WVS). However, although modernization gives way to cultural changes, the heritage of a society, often based on a specific religion, such as Catholicism in the case of Spain, “leaves an imprint on values that endures despite modernization” (Inglehart, Baker 2000, 19). Even as stability rises, people still hold onto their existential questions, and thus remain spiritual. Inglehart’s “data reveals two contrasting trends: the decline of attendance at religious services throughout advanced industrialized society… and the persistence of religious beliefs and the rise of spirituality” (Inglehart, Baker 2000, 46). However, during times of economic collapse, where job security and income decline, a temporary reverse to materialistic values will occur.
Traditionally, those who were the most educated and stable tended to support the conservative party. Nevertheless, in post-industrial societies, postmaterialists are gravitating towards the left and choosing to support parties who back political and cultural change (Inglehart, Norris 2017). Consequently, materialists, who focus on maintaining traditional norms, are more likely to identify with conservative parties. A major factor of materialism is religion and the strong importance it has in society. It can be argued that conservative political parties and religion have a deep entanglement, which is especially apparent in the last two centuries of Spain. When a conservative political party is associated with a specific religion, such as Catholicism, those who are devout Catholics will lean more towards that party because their beliefs and practices match each other. However, Michele Margolis (2018) argues that people whose religious status is evolving, such as teenagers and young adults that have taken a step back from the religious traditions they were raised in, are more likely to develop their political ideologies and then chose or chose not to participate in religion again. Hence, political party affiliation can affect one’s religiosity. As people experience college and focus on their career, they adhere to political ideologies that fit their personal values. Once one chooses a political affiliation, they become more secular or more invested in religion.

Evangelicals in America are an example of political affiliation affecting religion. According to the Pew Research Center, one in ten people choose to attend a new church because of their disagreement with their current church’s religious teachings and political stances. White evangelical Christians, who have openly supported and praised President Donald Trump, see his autocratic and anti-democratic conduct as a means to preserve evangelicalism. Since conservative evangelicals tend to fear racial and religious plurality, they have put their faith in Donald Trump, who they perceive to be a xenophobic figure and who has reacted to the rising
inequality of income and job security of Americans as an outcome of the increase in immigration and refugees (Inglehart, Norris 2017). Considering that white conservative evangelicals have consistently been pro-Trump, his supporters may feel drawn to evangelicalism because they know that the people in the pews around them will be like-minded. Evangelicals who disagree with President Trump, and do not want to be associated with the political stances of other evangelicals, may find a church that better fits their political ideology (Margolis 2018). Hence, churches are becoming more homogenous as political affiliation pushes individuals to join a church that fits their political beliefs.

Furthermore, political affiliation indicates the personal values of individuals. In Spain, more people are attending universities, marrying later in life, and having less children. During university, and also as individuals find and secure jobs, their political ideologies are shaped by their experiences. Those who experience the hardship of current economic instability, and are unable to obtain fulfilling jobs, may become more materialistic and fall back on traditional values and conservative parties. If this happens, an intergenerational shift in values from materialism to postmaterialism may not occur to a great extent in present-day Spain. History shows that, in Spain, conservative parties support the promotion of the Catholic Church in societal institutions, such as education, and liberal parties support the full secularization of Church and State. Although a deep Catholic heritage remains in Spain, one’s political party affiliation may determine the extent of one’s devotion to the Catholic faith.

Religion, education, and political affiliation are all intricately connected in Spain. Education has been a platform for political and religious reform since the end of the 19th century. Starting in the early 1900s, socialists have fought against the obligation of Catholic classes in the educational system (Flecha 2011). Under the dictatorships of General Primo de Rivera and
General Franco, educational instruction was seen as a way to mold individuals into future citizens. As Lyukx (1999) saw in her study of Bolivian education, both dictators used education to implement the use of one language, Castilian, and one religion, Catholicism, to unite Spaniards under the same cultural values. When schools transmit the core values of the dominant culture, students learn what the norms of society are. As they grow older, these values become vital aspects of their identity and shape their political affiliation. Since the end of Franco’s reign, and the ratification of the Spanish Constitution of 1978, political parties have continued to fight over religion’s place in society and whether or not it should be an educational subject.

As Spain undergoes economic development, political instability, and more intense cultural diversity, people’s religious association, opinions on education, and political identification reflect their stability in society. Looking at data from 1981 to 2014, the World Values Survey shows an increase in those who consider themselves to be moderate, with only a slight increase in those who believe they are politically left (E033 WVS). In addition, religious worship attendance has continued to drop, from 30% of the surveyors attending religious services once a week in the early 1980s to only 11% in 2014, and 53% of the population surveyed never attending worship (F028 WVS). However, 75.2% of Spaniards still classify themselves as Catholic. As Catholicism remains a major part of Spanish culture, it will continue to affect education and politics.
Chapter 3

A Battle Between Left and Right

Throughout Spanish history, conservatives and liberals have continuously clashed over religion’s place in society and schools. In order to understand the viewpoints on the opposing parties, and the role which religion has played in Spanish schools, I discuss the effects of regime changes on educational reforms since the start of the Restoration era to present day. In my analysis of educational reforms, I highlight the key differences between the ideologies of liberals and conservatives that have continued into Spanish society today. The second part of this chapter focuses on Andalusia and its unique components.

Before one can analyze the 20th century, it is necessary to discuss important events in the end of the 19th century and the Restoration era because the events stress how the conflict over religious education is an on-going issue that has roots beyond the 20th and 21st century. After the brief establishment of the First Republic in 1873, which aimed to separate the Church from the State in educational policies, the Spanish monarchy was restored under King Alfonso XII and sought to re-establish the Catholic Church’s control over education. The newly drafted Spanish Constitution of 1876 established Spain as a constitutional monarchy under the ideology of conservative liberalism. Article 11 of the Constitution stated that Catholicism was the official religion of the nation, but gave people the freedom to practice other religions as long as they did not display these publically. In Article 12, the Constitution established that educational instruction was applicable to everyone, as long as schools followed the laws set by the Constitution. Such laws stated that the State was in charge of issuing professional qualifications, in addition to establishing the conditions one must follow in order to obtain a certificate (Hernández Díaz 2010, 113). Plus, the State had control over the duties of the teachers. The
Constitution, although it promoted religious tolerance and the freedom of education, still supported doctrines such as the *Decreto Ovorio*, or Ovorio Decree, which forbade any teachings in universities that went against Catholic dogma (Shubert and Alvarez Junco 2017, 232). From disagreements between the teaching of religion and the power of the State to control universities, to the qualifications of faculty and rules governing what they could teach, liberals and conservatives clashed over their standpoints on educational policies (Hernández Díaz 2010). University professors who disagreed with the Ovorio Decree went on to found *La Institución Libre de Enseñanza*, or The Free Institution of Education, which promoted a secular, private education to support academic freedom. Although only a small minority of the population could attend the new institution, it became a symbol of cultural renovation in Spanish Society (Shubert and Alvarez Junco 2017, 232-233).

On the 13th of September 1923, General Miguel Primo de Rivera and the military overthrew the Spanish parliament and named himself the dictator under King Alfonso XIII. Under the motto “Country, Religion, Monarchy,” General Primo de Rivera sought to improve Spain’s economic, political, and social situation by enforcing centralization policies and banning leftist parties and workers’ unions. Under him, the Catholic Church strengthened their hold on the educational system, and integrated the Catholic faith into both private and state-run schools. For example, the student population was required to attend Mass at school and textbooks incorporated the Christian faith into classrooms. The presence of Catholicism in schools stirred debate among liberal, anti-clerical parties, and conservatives, which increased when the Catholic Church took control over secondary education (Quiroga 2014, 187-231). In addition, General Primo de Rivera sought to diminish any cultural deviations from the school system by creating an education plan centered around patriotic textbooks, which emphasized the “greatness of the
fatherland”’ (Quiroga 2014, 197). Liberal parties had been fighting Catholicism in education since the Ovorio Decree, which stated that “nothing contrary to Catholic dogma or morality would be taught” in Spanish universities, and they continued to fight against the enforcement of religious classes in schools until the Second Republic, when academic freedom and anti-clerical instruction were allowed.

With the fall of General Primo de Rivera, and the exile of King Alfonso XIII from Spain, the victorious Republican coalition formed a new government under modern intellectuals. From 1931 to 1936, the Second Spanish Republic pushed for liberal progression under Prime Minister Manuel Azaña and the support of socialist parties. No longer an authoritarian state under General Primo de Rivera, the new Republic created a constitution that embodied equality and freedom (Riviére and Fernández Enguita). The new constitution created by the Republic aimed to take out traditional Catholic values, and allow for actions such as divorce in hopes of developing a secular society. A component of the constitution was a major educational reform – religion would no longer be a part of mandatory curriculum, and instead a class on citizenship would be offered. In addition, bilingual schools would be allowed in Catalonia (Flecha García 2001, 22).

In Spain, public education was minimal, and the Second Republic planned to change the education system by enforcing a general education that was free of tuition and the Church’s control. Previously, the Catholic Church had been the main provider of education in Spain, in both public and private sectors, and it, along with the conservative parties, were not willing to give up tradition for academic freedom (Griera 2007). Many conservatives viewed Spain as the protector of the Catholic faith, and did not want the socialist parties to redevelop the educational system to resemble that of the United States and other parts of Europe, which allowed coeducation and religious neutrality (Pozo Andres and Braster 2006). Condemning the laic laws
of the Republic, Pope Pius XI and his ministry created an internal struggle in the Spanish Second Republic to maintain and promote its progressive ideology in regards to religion-free education (Griera 2007). The ideas promoted by the Second Republic became a leading factor in the start of the Civil Spanish War, and resulted in a change of power that enforced strict traditionalism.

Five months after el Frente Popular, or the Popular Front, a leftist coalition, won the general election in 1936, the Nationalist rebels, which represented the extreme right, tried to overthrow the government, resulting in a civil war from July 17, 1936 to April 1, 1939. During the Spanish Civil War, the educational system experienced a deep divide as Nationalist troops, led by General Francisco Franco, conquered Spanish territory and replaced the Republican government. From 1936 to 1939, areas controlled by the Republican army maintained public schooling and repressed Catholic schools. Oppositely, the Nationalist army strengthened Catholic schools and closed down state schools that were not controlled by the Church (Griera 2007). In turmoil, Spain felt a profound division between the “modern, secular, democratic ideology defended by the Republicans [and the] traditional religious worldview that predated the liberal revolution” (Laudio and Vilanou 2015, 436). Thereby, “two Spains” reemerged – one, “liberal [and] progressive” the other, “traditional [and] conservative” (Laudio and Torrano 2015, 436).

After the Spanish Civil War ended in 1939, General Francisco Franco took over as the leader of Spain. Franco desired to create an España Nacional, a Spain that upheld religious and military values, one that maintained a strict social order, and was rid of liberal ideas. Franco promoted the idea that the Second Republic did the work of Satan, and that he was Spain’s savior (Laudio and Vilanou 2015, 436-439). Similar to the ideologies of General Primo de Rivera, extreme nationalism and Catholicism became the foundation for education, and the Catholic
Church, once again, became the main educator of society. Under the first stages of the dictatorship, Franco sought to undo the educational reforms of the Second Republic. A deschooling policy was put into effect, forcing public secondary schools to close down and be given to the Church, and additionally compulsory education dropped from 8 years of schooling to 6 years (Fernández Enguita and Riviére). In addition, to promote Catholicism, every school, whether public or private, was required to teach the Catechism and promote it as a main text. Not only did the teaching of the Catholic faith take precedence over traditional classes, like math and science, but schools started with Mass and ended with Communion and confession. Since republicans and intellectuals had been exiled or assassinated, any literary or scientific ideologies that went against Franco’s principles diminished, creating a “fuga de cerebros,” or brain drain, in Spain. By instilling his fundamental principles in education, Franco could mold students into his idealized future citizens, that were willing “to serve (God above all others), [foster] brotherhood (in accordance with the Evangelical principle of love), and respect for hierarchy, that is, the Fatherland under the Caudillo” (Laudio and Vilanou 2015, 445). Like General Primo de Rivera, General Franco desired to unite Spain under one religion, Catholicism, and one language, Castilian, but he was determined to succeed, unlike his predecessors.

Starting in the 1950s, Spanish citizens started to more actively think about life outside of Spain, especially in relation to education. The Spanish educational system, which focused on the promotion and dedication to patriotic, traditional, and Catholic values, censored literary material that did not fall in line with Catholic dogma or Franco’s principles. The Concordat of 1953 with the Vatican officially restored the power of the Church and made religious instruction mandatory in all schools, public or private. In addition, the Catholic Church had the right to establish universities. Even la Escuela del Mar in Barcelona, a school whose instruction resembled that of
the Second Republic and became the model institution for modern teaching and coeducation, still
enforced religious education (Pozo Andres and Braster 2006). As international interactions
heightened in the 1960s, resulting in a period of economic development and international
cooperation, the influence of outside ideas on the Spanish education system could not stop the
enforcement of Catholicism in schools. However, industrialization, and the resulting economic
and demographic growth of Spain, paved way for one of the most significant educational reforms
since public instruction was established under the Moyano Law of 1857 – The General
Education Act. The General Education Act of 1970 established compulsory education for all of
the Spanish population between the ages of 6 and 14, a concern for quality education for all, and
support for private education, but Catholicism was still a required course (Fernández Enguita and
Rivière). The General Education Act became the basis for educational reform after the transition
to democracy, and paved the way for legislation to be passed that guaranteed the educational
opportunity for all.

With the death of Franco in 1975, and his appointed king, Juan Carlos, left in charge of
the Spanish government alongside Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez, Spain experienced a transition
to democracy. After years of repression under Franco’s dictatorship, Suárez and his centrist
government sought to bring individual freedom back into the hands of Spanish citizens. In order
to do so, a new constitution was created. A major reformation in the Spanish Constitution of
1978 was Article 27 and the right to education. Within Article 27, the Constitution states that
everyone has a right to an education, and, in addition, the right to receive “religious and moral
instruction that is in accordance with their own convictions.” Briefly after the Spanish
Constitution of 1978 was ratified, the 1979 Agreement Concerning Education and Cultural
Affairs between the Spanish State and Holy See required the teaching of the Catholic religion to
be mandatory in all schools, but not obligatory for all students. In order to reach this agreement, each party had to meet in the middle in hopes of modernizing the education system (Griera 2007). However, the 1979 Agreement has been controversial in politics since its ratification. With each political party change in the Spanish government, different ideologies and policies surrounding religion in education have come into play. For example, in 2003, the right wing *el Partido Popular*, or the Popular Party (PP), made the class on Catholicism a graded class, thus weighing it equally to core classes (Fuchs 2003). In 2018, however, *el Partido Socialista Obrero Español*, or Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE), replaced the previously conservative government under former Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy. Since Pedro Sánchez has come to power, he has been trying to not only undo the pro-clerical stance of Mariano Rajoy and the PP, but also the 1979 Agreements to halt state funding for religious instruction in state schools, and moreover the removal of religion from Spanish curriculum (Badcock 2018).

**Andalusia**

Andalusia is unique from the rest of Spain in three ways: it has a history of religious plurality, a relatively young population, and differs in its economic position since it has the highest rate of unemployment in Spain and one of the lowest GDP per capita. In order to fully understand the impact these traits have on the region, it is necessary to discuss them more in depth. In this section I first discuss the history of Andalusia’s religious diversity. Since some respondents of my survey identified as religious minorities who took classes on Catholicism, it is beneficial to discuss the historical context of religious diversity because it puts into focus the background of these minorities in present-day Andalusia. Also, I discuss Andalusia’s position against General Franco and his troops, and the recent Islamic revival. Next, I discuss the opinions of religion and religious education of the Andalusian youth. Lastly, I explore how the
increase in immigration and the high rate of unemployment in Andalusia has affected the political viewpoints of Andalusians.

A major characteristic of Andalusia is its long history of ethnic and religious plurality. Due to its close proximity to the Mediterranean Sea, Andalusia was often the first point of contact for various civilizations. With each civilization came new ethnicities, languages, and religions, the most important being Judaism, Islam, and Christianity. Andalusia had a diverse religious environment until the Catholic monarch conquered the last Moorish city in the southern region, Granada, and expelled the religious communities that did not convert to Christianity. Around this time, *gitanos*, or gypsies, arrived in southern Spain. In 1499, Cardinal Cisneros forced conversion to Catholicism to all Granadinas, or the citizens of the city, Granada, under the requirements of the Spanish Inquisition. Without any politico-religious alliances, *gitanos* were unable to escape persecution, and the people who stayed in Spain were subject to death if they did not abandon their culture. Similarly, under Franco, these religious and ethnic groups were targeted by laws forcing the assimilation of Castilian and Roman Catholicism. However, certain aspects of Andalusian culture, such as bullfighting and flamenco, which have *gitano* roots, were seen as part of Spain’s national identity, and therefore allowed to remain in Spanish society. Since Spain’s transition to democracy, and the resurgence of immigration, Muslims and Jews have increased their presence again in southern Spain. There has also been an increase in the amount of people who identify as Spanish Muslim since the 1960s (Pastor). Additionally, *gitanos* have gained more equality, but many steps still need to be taken to stop discrimination against these groups (Bartal 2014, “Roma/Gypsies”). As immigration continues, and brings ethnic and religious diversification, it is possible that Andalusia could be returning to the state of religious plurality seen before the Catholic Monarchs came to power.
Andalusia, with its wide rural sector and close proximity to Morocco, played a pivotal role in the advancement of the Nationalist rebel forces under General Franco. Mainly socialists and anarchists, the citizens of Andalusia widely supported the Spanish Second Republic, and later the efforts of the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War. Unlike other parts of Spain, such as Catalonia and the Basque region, Andalusia was crushed almost immediately by General Franco and his troops. At the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, General Franco first transported his troops from Morocco to Andalusia and seized the southern city of Seville. Made up of mostly small towns and villages, Franco’s troops were able to easily take Andalusian communities without much resistance. The Republican army, which was little prepared in comparison to the Nationalist forces, could not stop the capture of major cities such as Granada, Marbella, and Ronda. However, the Nationalist victory over the city of Málaga, a major supporter of the Republican government, proved to be the most disastrous loss for the Republican efforts in Andalusia. With the fall of Málaga to Nationalist forces, roughly 100,000 citizens fled to Almería, a city 135 miles away. On their trek, civilians continued to be persecuted by Franco’s army and their allied force; this event became known as the Málaga-Almería massacre. The fall of Málaga and the evacuation of Republican civilians was one of the lowest points in the Spanish Civil War in Andalusia. This event, along with the persecution and assassination of Andalusian intellectuals, such as poet Federico García Lorca, put Andalusian citizens at odds with Franco’s troops and, eventually, his dictatorship (Baker, 2017).

Recently in Spain, and more specifically in Andalusia, there has been an Islamic revival. The most obvious example of an Islamic presence is the growth of Arabic teashops in the Andalusian city, Granada. Located in a barrio, or neighborhood, previously known for prostitution, the establishment of these teashops has altered the culture and economics of
Granada and they have become a major attraction for tourists and natives alike (“Moorish Revival”). Additionally, in Granada in 2003, Spanish Muslims were able to build a mosque after 22 years of demanding a place to worship. It was the first time in 500 years that native Muslims were able to build a mosque in the historical capital of European Islam. However, the Islamic revival has not gone uncontested by the Spanish community. Uproars against mosques, prayer callings, and the misconstrued perception of the Muslim population in Spain has not allowed for complete coexistence among all religions (Wilkinson 2003). Not nearly as highly populated as before the Spanish Inquisition, an event that expelled Jews and Muslim people from Spain who did not convert to Christianity, Muslims now make up roughly 4% of the Spanish population, or about 2 million people, 300,000 of which live in Andalusia. Judaism, along with other religions, have increased in Spain since the transition to democracy, and are predicted to continue to rise in the future.

As religious plurality continues to grow in Southern Spain, more and more Andalusian youth are wanting courses on religion to be inclusive. As a result of an increase in the presence of Muslims, Jews, Protestants, and other religious groups in Spain, and especially in Andalusia, schools have started to implement the pluralization of religious classes in communities with higher populations of these religious minorities. Even so, only 0.68% of students attending Spanish schools receive a minority religious education (Veinguer 2001, 6). According to the article, “Under the Shadow of Al-Andalus? Spanish Teenagers’ Attitudes and Experiences with Religious Diversity at School,” interviews conducted among students in Andalusia show that the majority agreed with the maintenance of religious education in schools in order to know more about their religion. However, minority religious groups, such as Muslim respondents, felt that it was necessary to know other religions outside of Catholicism. A major intergenerational shift in
ideologies is shown through the idea that Islam should also have a class of its own in order to not discriminate against Muslims. Only a minority of the students interviewed felt that religion has no place in schools, but almost all agreed that they want to understand others, live in peace, and learn the history of their country. Regarding their opinion on religion in education, many Spanish youth take a more conservative stance and wish to maintain confessional religious education in schools. However, the acceptance of other religions, and the desire to coexist, shows a generational change in Spain.

Andalusia, the most populous region in Spain, has a comparatively young population, which suffers from the country’s highest unemployment rate. A main entry point for migrants, many come to Andalusia in search of work. Sectors such as construction, agriculture, and tourism have seen an increase of the presence of immigrant workers’ presence (“Employment and Working”). Most cross over from Morocco but come from Sub-Saharan African countries. In 2018, more than 35,000 immigrants entered Spain, an increase from its 2017 statistics, but, as a result, refugee centers in Andalusia have become overcrowded (Benavides 2018). Accounting for 7.51% of the Andalusian population of 8,409,657, over 75% of the foreign population is of working age, or between the ages of 16 and 64. In comparison, just about half of the Spanish population in Andalusia is of working age, but 25.41% of people 16 and over are unemployed. The increase in immigrants has therefore created more competition among those looking for jobs, and additionally diversified the Andalusian culture as they integrate into society. Not only do Andalusians suffer from a high unemployment rate, but Andalusia has one of the lowest GDP per capita (“EURES”). Even though agricultural production of wine and olive oil has increased, Andalusia still struggles to boost its economy. However, as a result of an increase in tourism, the
service and manufacturing sectors have grown and provided more employment opportunities for the young Andalusian population.

With an increase in immigration, a high unemployment rate, and poor economy, the election of the extreme-right party, Vox, into the Andalusian parliament can be seen as no surprise. After 36-years of a PSOE stronghold, Andalusia is seeing a potential conservative shift in the majority party in parliament. For the first time since the end of the Franco dictatorship, Vox, a political party that supports xenophobic and anti-abortion laws, is receiving support from Andalusian citizens (Villaverde 2018). The people who are supportive of Vox are those who are 65 and older and who hold jobs or are retired, but receives very little support from students and people who are unemployed (Llaneras 2018). Those who are in the age group of 18 to 29 do not heavily back center and right parties, and instead over half want the liberal party, PSOE, to remain in power in the Andalusian parliament. Thus, even though those who are voting for Vox do so because of the increase in immigration, the younger generation that is suffering from unemployment still focuses on egalitarian values over xenophobia. The political differences between older and younger Andalusian citizens is an example of Ronald Inglehart’s generational gap previously discussed, and additionally shows how the Andalusian youth still widely agrees with postmaterialistic values in the face of economic hardship and cultural diversity. Therefore, if postmaterialistic values continue to remain strong among the Andalusian youth, religion and traditional norms should decrease in importance and result in more individuals wanting to eliminate religious education from Spanish curriculum.
Chapter 4

Data and Analysis

Chapter 4 focuses on my hypothesis and compares the relationship between political ideology and one’s choice to take religion in school. In addition, it analyzes my hypothesis on how parents’ political ideology decides whether or not a student chooses to take a class on Catholicism, or the alternate social and civic values course. The first part of this chapter focuses on the demographics of the respondents, while the second part analyzes the data collected from my survey. Also, using both the data from my survey and my experiences with Andalusian youth, I create small vignettes that each represent a different type of young person in Andalusian society. To conduct my survey, I used Qualtrics, an online survey tool, that gathered data from Andalusians in regards to basic demographics, opinion based questions on religion and religion in education, and their political ideology. The survey ended with three optional questions about the Catechism. The survey was used to better understand how political views and religiosity shape one’s personal values and choice to take a class on Catholicism.

To evaluate how political ideology affects one’s choice to take a class on religion, or the alternative class on social and civic values, I sent out a survey to various Andalusian citizens to gain insight on their opinion surrounding religion in education, how they compared to their parents’ politically, the importance of faith in their life, and their worship attendance. The survey was sent out online through Qualtrics and recorded anonymously. Data was collected between January 7, 2019 and March 1, 2019. Respondents were recruited through sending the survey to contacts I made during my time abroad in Andalusia who forwarded the link to students at the University of Granada. The survey began with demographic questions and continued to opinion-based questions, such as “How important is religion to you,” where the response is recorded on a
scale of no importance, 1, to very important, 5. The entirety of the survey is translated into English in Appendix A, and all quotes from respondents have been additionally been translated from Spanish. Each name of the respondent is not that of their own, but instead a pseudonym.

Before evaluating the data of the respondents, I analyzed their demographics. Out of the 16 respondents, 18.75% were male and 81.25% were female. In relation to the student community in attendance at the University of Granada, where 58.25% are female and 41.71% are male, the survey demographic shows a much larger presence of females. Out of the 16 respondents, the mean age was 20.31. In regards to socio-economic class, 1 respondent identified as lower class and 15 identified as middle class. In addition, 15 respondents identified with the Autonomous Community of Andalusia, while 1 identified with the Community of Madrid. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of religion for male and female respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Atheism</th>
<th>Agnosticism</th>
<th>Catholicism</th>
<th>Islam</th>
<th>Buddhism</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>No religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data, although only composed of 16 respondents, resembles the religious plurality one would expect to see on a larger scale in Andalusia. In the data collected, 43.75% of the respondents identified as Catholic, 12.5% identified as Atheist, 25% identified as Agnostic or with no religion, and 18.75% identified with a religion other than Catholicism. In comparison, in Spain, 68.5% of the population classifies themselves as Catholic, 26.4% as non-believers or Atheists, and 2.6% of people identify with other religions, according to the official Spanish Center for Sociological Research. The distribution of religiosity is only one aspect of this study.
The views on religious importance, religion in education, and political ideology make up the majority of the data collected from the survey.

First, I analyze one’s religiosity in relation to their strength of identification with their Autonomous Community and Spain. Table 4.2 shows the respondents strength of affiliation to their Autonomous Community based on their religion. All respondents associate themselves with Andalusia, besides the male participant who identified as “other.” Table 4.3 shows the respondents strength of affiliation to Spain based on their religion. Both questions were answered on a scale from no affiliation, 1, to very strong affiliation, 5.

Table 4.2 Respondents Affiliation to their Autonomous Community by Religiosity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>No Affiliation</th>
<th>Some Affiliation</th>
<th>Moderate Affiliation</th>
<th>Strong Affiliation</th>
<th>Very Strong Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atheism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agnosticism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholicism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.3 Respondents Affiliation to Spain by Religiosity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>No Affiliation</th>
<th>Some Affiliation</th>
<th>Moderate Affiliation</th>
<th>Strong Affiliation</th>
<th>Very Strong Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atheism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agnosticism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholicism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From both tables, it can be concluded that those who practice Catholicism, a religion that was once promoted as the official religion of the State, do not identify any stronger with Spain than those who do not practice Catholicism. Furthermore, it seems that religious affiliation does not predict one’s personal identification with Spain or their Autonomous Community.

I also analyze the frequency of worship attendance in comparison to religious affiliation; this is shown in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4 Respondents Frequency of Worship Attendance by Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>Weekly</th>
<th>Monthly</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Almost Never</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atheism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agnosticism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholicism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of the 14 responses, 71.42% of respondents attend religious services sometimes, almost never, or never. This data closely resembles that found by the World Values Survey and
other databases that show a decline in attendance in Spain. According to the Pew Research Center, 77% of Spaniards attend religious services a few times a year, seldom, or never.

Next, I analyze the importance of faith to each respondent by religion, shown in Table 4.5. I have combined the respondents who identify with no religion or are Agnostic into the same category named “No Religion.” I have also combined the respondents who identify as Buddhist, Muslim, or a different religion in the category named “Other.” The respondents ranked the importance of faith to them personally on a scale from 1, no importance, to 5, very strong importance.

Table 4.5 The Importance of Faith to Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Importance</th>
<th>Some Importance</th>
<th>Moderate Importance</th>
<th>Strong Importance</th>
<th>Very Strong Importance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atheism</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholicism</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of the 14 respondents, 85.7% of them felt that religion was at least moderately important to them and no respondent answered that religion had no importance to them.

Comparing Table 4.4 and 4.5, we see that, although the majority of respondents believe religion is at least moderately important in their life, most only attend worship sometimes or less. As discussed in Chapter 2, Inglehart found that, even as religious attendance decreases, spirituality remains high (Inglehart, Baker 2000, 46).

Next, Table 4.6 shows the political ideologies of the respondents by religion.
Table 4.6 Politically Ideology in Comparison to Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Left</th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Right</th>
<th>Very Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atheism</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholicism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As seen in the table, Catholics are the only religious group to identify as politically right. More respondents identified as politically left or very left than right, and additionally more identified as moderate than any other category. In addition, those who ranked themselves between a 3 and a 5 on the scale of political ideology, 3 meaning moderate, 4 meaning right, and 5 meaning very right, took a class on religion at one point during their education, regardless of current religious affiliation. Likewise, those who felt that their families were more right than them also took a class on religion at one point in their educational career. The only exception to this case was the Muslim respondent, who is politically left but still took classes on religion during Secondary Education.

According to the data collected from the survey, Secondary Education, which consists of ages 12 to 16, had the highest rate of enrollment of respondents in religious education, with 13 out of the 16 respondents (81.25%) enrolled. The education level with the second highest rate of enrollment was Primary Education (75%), ages 6 to 12, then Infant Education (56.25%), ages 3 to 6, and the level with the least enrollment was Bachillerato, ages 16 to 18, with 7 out of the 16 respondents enrolled (43.75%). Thus, there is a 37.5% decrease in the amount of people taking religious education from Secondary Education to Bachillerato. 10 out of the 16 respondents took the alternate social and civic class (62.5%), while 6 of the respondents did not (37.5%). In the survey, the respondents were asked why they chose to take, or did not choose to take, the
alternate class. The following are quotes from the respondents in regards to their opinions on religious education and the social and civic values class: One student did not take the alternative class because “[he] believes that civic values, and those that are considered as good, are equally taught in the subject of religion.” Another student decided to take the alternative class because “it appeared essential for the life of a person.”

When given the option to choose which statement one agrees with most:

- Religion should be eliminated from the Spanish curriculum
- Religion should not be eliminated from the Spanish curriculum
- Neither opinion

the majority of respondents who associate with the political left, or very left, agree that religion should be eliminated. On the other hand, those whose political ideology resembles that of the right believe that religion should remain in education. Almost all who identify as politically moderate did not agree with either opinion, with the exception of the respondent who identified as Buddhist and felt that religion should be eliminated from schools. Lastly, the three values that the majority of the respondents agreed with were, in order from most votes: Education, equality, and family.

Next, I use the data collected from my survey and also my experience in Andalusia to create composites. Each composite represents a different type of young person in Andalusian society. In order to create these vignettes, I clustered the respondents from my survey into groups based off their political ideologies. Once I formed my groups, I analyzed the characteristics of those who identified as politically left, right, and moderate, and combined my data with my experiences in Andalusia to create prototypical youth who can be found in Spanish society. I did not conduct formal interviews with the respondents, but I have met people similar to them during
my time studying abroad, and was able to relate the qualities of the respondents of the survey to people I met in Spain.

**María**

María is a young female attending the University of Granada. Although she identifies with both Spain and her Autonomous Community, Andalusia, she more strongly identifies with her region. María comes from a middle class family, and her parents are politically right. However, she identifies as politically left. Although María’s parents identify as Catholic, they do not participate in worship services. María, on the other hand, does not identify with any specific religion, but still partook in religious education. Since she attended a religious charter school, she had to take classes on religion during parts of her education. However, when given the chance to take the alternative class on social and civic values, she did so because it aligned more with her personal and political identity. María comes from a respected family and lives in a good neighborhood, and, even though her parents are not religiously devout, they enrolled her in a charter school because of the higher quality of education. Even though María has taken religious classes throughout her studies, she believes that religion should be eliminated from the Spanish curriculum. She most values her personal liberty, education, family, and equality, especially for women in Spain. María identifies with the political left because of their liberal policies and feminist views, and less because of her religious preferences. María represents someone whose environment and family influences her choice to take religious education, but feels that religion does not have a place in her life and only creates inequality among male and females when used as a basis of legal policies. I noticed that Maria highly valued personal freedom and expression,
and therefore chose to study Fine Arts in university. Like María, roughly one-fifth of the Spanish population does not identify with any religion (Govan).

**Elvira**

Elvira is also a young female who is attending the University of Granada. Elvira identifies strongly with both her Autonomous Community, Andalusia, and Spain. Like María, Elvira come from a middle class family, and her parents are also politically right. However, opposite of María, Elvira’s political ideologies match that of her parents. Both her and her family identify as Catholic, and attend worship services at least monthly. Roughly two-thirds of the Spanish population identifies as Catholic, but only one-third of them actually attend religious services. Roughly 14% of the Catholic population attends religious services on a regular basis, like Elvira. She chose to take religious education and also the alternative social and civic values class throughout her studies. She attended a secular public school, which offered religious education to all students, but was not mandatory. Although her peers may have chosen to take the alternative class, Elvira chose to take religious education because Catholicism is very important to her life personally and to her family’s. Elvira advocates for religion in Spanish education, and identifies with *el Partido Popular*, or Popular Party, which also pushes to keep religion a part of Spanish society. Elvira most values her family, education, faith, and also personal freedom. Elvira represents someone whose upbringings in a very Catholic and politically right household influenced her identity formation, and therefore she chose to take religious education because it fell in line with what she had grown up with. Unlike María, Elvira chose a more traditional degree to study in university: Law. She chose to study law because she felt pressured to follow in her mother’s footsteps, and, since she highly values her family and their ideals, did not choose a different route.
**Pablo**

Pablo is a young man who studies at the University of Granada. Like Elvira, Pablo strongly relates both the Autonomous Community he lives in, Andalusia, and Spain. Pablo comes from a middle class family, and his parents are politically moderate. Pablo’s political affiliation matches that of his parents. Pablo identifies as Catholic, and his faith is relatively important to him, but he almost never attends religious worship. Pablo attended a secular public school, and took minimal classes on religion during his studies. Pablo chose to take the alternative civic and social values class over religious education because he felt like it was beneficial to his personal growth. Pablo values education, equality, modernity, and also personal liberty, and connects to center political parties, such as *PSOE*, or the Spanish Socialist Workers Party. Pablo is indifferent on religion’s position in education, meaning he does not feel that it must be, or must not be, eliminated from the Spanish curriculum. He may have partaken in religious classes because he felt it was the right thing to do as a Catholic, but, since he does not practice his faith very often, transitioned to taking an alternative class that focused more on citizenship over religion. I noticed that Pablo, like many Andalusian and Spanish youth, is unable to find a part-time job, and is worried about being economically secure once he graduates from university. Pablo is not only an example of a Spaniard who identifies as Catholic, but is not actively involved in the church, but also is an example of the Spanish youth who hold degrees but are unable to make a liveable wage. Studies show that over half of those who identify as Catholic almost never attend religious worship. Additionally, only two out of every ten people under 24 hold some form of a job (Laborde).
Isabella

Lastly, Isabella, a student at the University of Granada, is a young woman who comes from a lower class family. Similar to Elvira and Pablo, Isabella has a strong connection with both Andalusia and Spain. Isabella considers herself to be very left politically, which aligns with her parents’ ideologies. Isabella identifies as Muslim, and her religious affiliation extremely affects her political affiliation. For Isabella, religion is extremely important to her personally, and she attends worship daily. This differs from the other politically left student, María, who does not identify with any religion and does not find it important. However, both her and María attended a religious charter school, and both took classes on religion. The reasons behind each student taking a class on religion differs – María took classes on religion because she comes from a conservative, Catholic family that believes it is necessary to know about, and take part in, the Catholic faith. Isabella, whose family is not conservative, took classes on the Catholic religion as a mechanism to fit in at school. Since she is a religious minority, Isabella felt that the only way to be recognized equally as a Spaniard was to learn about Catholicism and take religious classes. Surprisingly, Isabella does not believe that religious education should be eliminated from Spanish curriculum. She most values modernity, tradition, and faith. Isabella represents the Islamic youth population that is trying to find a place in Spanish society and in Spanish schools, where only the Catholic religion has the option to be taught. When it comes to her religion, she values tradition, but when it comes to the life around her, she desires to see modern political and cultural stances. Islam makes up the largest minority religious group in Spain, and is continuing to grow as immigrants flow in from Africa. 4% of Spain’s population practices Islam, and most of them practice their religion more actively than that of many Catholics.
Overall, the four students show how religion and political affiliation play into one’s choice to take a class on Catholicism. María is an example of Inglehart’s theory on the intergenerational shift in values because she, unlike her parents, gears her focus away from the traditional viewpoints of religion and towards egalitarian, postmaterialistic norms, such as equality and personal expression. Oppositely, Elvira, who aligns with her parents’ conservative views, is very Catholic and chose to take religious education because it resonated with her personally. Although she does believe in personal liberation, a postmaterialistic value under Inglehart’s theory, Elvira’s deep connection to her religion shows how certain cultural values remain in modernized societies, as discussed by Weber. The Catholic faith and conservative parties have been deeply intertwined in Spanish history and society, and Elvira demonstrates how this connection continues in modern-day. The two students are an example of how the political ideologies and religiosity of one’s parents can influence a child’s political and religious formation, but also how they do not always. Pablo, whose parents’ and himself identify as politically moderate, is Catholic, but is not deeply invested in his faith. Since him nor his parents are devoutly religious, and they additionally do not align with the pro-Catholic views of right-wing parties, he did not feel the need to take many classes on Catholicism. He does, however, hold onto his spirituality to an extent that María does not because he feels physically insecure as a result of economic instability. Inglehart found that, although there is a decline in religious worship attendance, the rate of spirituality and religiosity remains relatively high. It is possible that those who are physically insecure fall back on religion and materialistic values, and hope to find social support through the church and its norms. Isabella, who is Muslim and not Catholic, felt the opposite of Pablo – although she actively practices her religion, she felt the need to take classes on Catholicism in order to fit in. Isabella comes from a politically left family, but her
participation and opinion on religious education resembles more of that of the right. Religion, for Isabella, provides her with social laws and morals to follow. As seen in Durkheim’s theories, religion brings people together under common beliefs, and, for someone like Isabella, who practices her religion with strong devotion, her belief system affects her choice in political partisanship. Isabella is an example of how religion can affect political affiliation, but outside influences from Spanish society push her to enroll in Catholic classes. She also shows how Muslim youth incorporate themselves in a predominantly Catholic country.

In sum, those who take courses on religion, and agree that religion should remain a subject in Spanish education, are more likely to be politically right, or have parents that associate with the political right. As Spain, and more specifically Andalusia, experience an influx of immigrants and a high rate of unemployment, the survey suggests that postmaterialistic values, such as education and equality, still remain more important to the respondents than materialistic values, like security and tradition. However, being a small sample size, the data is not fully representative. It does, however, capture the growing religious plurality in Andalusia, and contributes to the on-going debate in Spain regarding religion in education.
Chapter 5

Conclusion

Overall, there has been a generational shift in Spain as the younger generation focuses their attention more on egalitarian values, and less on materialistic values, due to the change in social values through modernization. As postmaterialistic values rise among the younger generation, and the importance of religion and attendance of worship decrease, one would predict to see a smaller amount of participation in religious education. However, 9 out of the 16 respondents (56.25%) took a class on religion in at least three different education levels: Infant Education, Primary Education, Secondary Education, and Bachillerato. In comparison, the amount of students who chose to take the alternative social and civic values course was only slightly higher, with 10 out of the 16 respondents (62.5%) choosing to take it. According to the survey data, parents’ political ideology was the most consistent predictor of whether a student decided to take courses on religion, but it did not predict whether or not they additionally took the alternative class. This comes with no surprise as Spain has a long history of opposing political parties battling over educational reform in regards to the presence of religion in education. However, my hypothesis that the majority of students will want religion from educated eliminated from Spanish curriculum did not hold in my study. Only 21.43% of the respondents wanted religious education to be eliminated, 28.57% of respondents did not want it removed, and 50% of the respondents had no opinion. The data suggests that, although religious minorities and non-believers are increasing their presence in Spain, and attendance at religious services has decreased, people are still compelled to incorporate the Catholic faith into their lives through religious education.
The writing process for this study has presented some challenges. Primarily, having people fill out the survey, and getting them to share the survey with those who met the criteria, was difficult. Since the amount of data received was small, it is not representative of the Andalusian population. With more results, a larger sample size would prove to be more conclusive and would result in more information regarding the opinions of religion in education.

While this study focuses on Andalusia, it can be applied to other similar societies who have a history of a deeply rooted religion to understand the impact modernization and intergenerational changes have on the importance of religion. It can also be used to further research in the region in regards to opinions on religious education by expanding the survey questions and also obtaining a larger sample size. By furthering research in Andalusia, and understanding the trend of political ideology and religion in schools, one will be able to analyze if the region is on the road to reverting back to a place of religious acceptance and coexistence.
Bibliography


Spanish Constitution. art. 16.

Spanish Constitution. art. 27.


Appendix A – Translated Survey

Survey in Andalusia

1. Are you 18 or older?
   a. Yes
   b. No

2. Do you live in Andalusia, Spain?
   a. Yes
   b. No
      i. Have you ever lived in Andalusia?
         1. Yes
         2. No

3. What Autonomous Community do you identify with?

4. On a scale from 1 to 5, how strongly do you identify with your autonomous community? (1: no association, 5: very strong association)

5. On a scale from 1 to 5, how strongly do you identify with Spain? (1: no association, 5: very strong association)

6. What is your age?

7. What is your gender?
   a. Male
   b. Female

8. What is the income level of your family?
   a. Low
   b. Middle
   c. High

9. Do you identify with a specific religion?
   a. Yes
      i. With what religion do you identify?
         1. Catholicism
         2. Islam
         3. Judaism
         4. Protestant
         5. Hinduism
         6. Buddhism
         7. Other
   b. No
      i. Are you Atheist or Agnostic?
         1. Atheist
         2. Agnostic
         3. Neither

10. On a scale from 1-5, how important is religion to you? (1: no importance, 5: very strong importance)

11. Did you ever take a class on Catholicism in school?
   a. Yes
      i. During what years did you take a class on religion?
1. Infant Education
2. Primary Education
3. Secondary Education
4. Bachillerato

b. No

12. Did you ever choose to take the social and civic values class in school?
   a. Yes
      i. Why?
   b. No
      i. Why?

13. Did you attend a religious or laic school?
   a. Religious
   b. Laic

14. Did you attend a public, private, or charter school?
   a. Public
   b. Private
   c. Charter

15. Choose three issues that you value the most from the list below.
   a. Security
   b. Family
   c. Personal liberty
   d. Modernity
   e. Tradition
   f. Equality
   g. Education
   h. Employment
   i. Faith
   j. Environment

16. Place yourself on the scale according to your political ideology. (1: very left, 2: left, 3: moderate, 4: right, 5: very right)

17. Do you identify with a specific political party?
   a. Yes
   b. No

18. How do you compare to your parents’ political ideology? Place yourself on the scale. (1: very left in comparison, 2: more left, 3: the same, 4: more right, 5: very right)

19. Does your religion affect your political partisanship?
   a. No
   b. Somewhat
   c. Yes
   d. Extremely

20. How often do you attend religious worship?
   a. Daily
   b. Weekly
   c. Monthly
   d. Occasionally
   e. Hardly never
f. Never

21. Choose the option that best resembles how you feel about religion in education.
   a. Religion should be eliminated from the Spanish curriculum.
   b. Religion should not be eliminated from the Spanish curriculum.
   c. Neither opinion.

22. In Our Father, the line “deliver us from evil” refers to the general idea of evil in the world?
   a. True
   b. False

23. What is considered the “feast of feasts?”
   a. Christmas
   b. Good Friday
   c. Easter
   d. Pentecost

24. The “source” and summit” of Christian life is:
   a. Baptism
   b. Union with God
   c. Eucharist
   d. Holy Orders