Turkey and the European Union:
Why Europe Doesn’t Want a Taste of Turkey

© 2009
By: Ann Kirkpatrick Jacobs

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies
Croft Institute for International Studies
(Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College)
The University of Mississippi

University, Mississippi
Spring 2009

Approved:

________________________________
Advisor: Dr. Ahmet Yukleyen

________________________________
Reader: Dr. William Schenck

________________________________
Reader: Dr. David Rossbach
Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to thank the Croft Institute for International Studies and the Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College for all of the opportunities that each institution made available to me during the past four years that have helped me get to this point. I would like to thank Dr. Gispen for his good advice and instruction during my years at Ole Miss. Also, thanks to Dr. Schenck, and Dr. Rossbach for all of their help and support. Many, many thanks to Dr. Yukleyen for all of his patience and instruction, without his help this thesis would never have been possible and I am truly grateful. I would also like to thank Rob Pettit for his expertise in graphs and statistics. Many thanks to Alex Bucaciuc, my friend and “twin,” for her friendship, without it I would have never made it through the past four years. Lastly, merci mille fois à Kline Gilbert, who will never know the depth of my gratitude for his friendship and support, I could not have finished without it.
This thesis examines the debate surrounding Turkey’s accession into the European Union, namely the allegation by some scholars that there has been a shift in the type of opposition against Turkey during recent years. Its goal is to examine the reasons why this shift occurred and it focuses on France as a specific country in which a shift in opposition has occurred. In the first chapter, it analyzes editorials published in the two most important French newspapers, *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*, alongside the context of the simultaneously occurring external and political events, in order to prove that the shift occurred. In order to find out why the shift occurred, it looks at the European identity: what factors throughout history have gone into its creation, and how it has been challenged by the possibility of Turkey becoming a member of the European Union. Lastly, it examines how the growing presence of Islam within Europe as a result of Muslim immigration has caused conservative Europeans to become even more close-minded towards the idea of a multicultural Europe and how this has affected their perceptions of Turkey. It concludes that a shift did occur, and that the reasons explored were very significant in causing it, and makes some overall conclusions regarding the future of Turkey’s EU accession and what changes need to take place within Europe in order for it to occur.
Table of Contents

I. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 5
II. Media and Politics .............................................................................................. 18
III. European Identity .............................................................................................. 39
IV. Muslim Immigrants in Europe ......................................................................... 61
V. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 77
VI. Appendix ............................................................................................................ 81
VII. Bibliography ..................................................................................................... 82
INTRODUCTION:

During my semester abroad in Nantes, France last spring, I was privileged to have an amazing class on politics in the Middle East, which was taught by one of the most enthusiastic professors I have ever been instructed by. She had spent a large amount of time in the Middle East, spoke Arabic, and had a very deep understanding of the politics of the region, and her enthusiasm was contagious. For nearly four hours every Thursday, we were her audience as she enlightened us on the politics, culture, and history of the Middle East. One topic of conversation that came up not only in this class, but in others as well was the subject of Turkey’s EU aspirations. I knew very little on the subject initially, but the more I heard about it in class, as well as from my very conservative host family, the more engaging the subject became. The harsh opinions of most of these French citizens towards Turkey’s cause really caught my attention and made me want to learn more, and thus my decision to explore the topic in my senior thesis.

Turkey has been trying to become a part of Europe for well over half a century. Its membership in the European Community (EC) was initially turned down in 1987 for socio-economic and political reasons, such as human rights issues and the lack of a true democracy. However, after much work and despite numerous setbacks, Turkey reached the early 21st century with impressive, monumental reforms of its economy, judicial system, and government that almost completely complied with the European Union (EU) criteria as laid out in the

---

Copenhagen Criteria in 1993. Turkey’s good progress was rewarded by being granted candidacy in 2004, with negotiations for membership set to begin in 2005.²

However, four years later, nearly no progress has been achieved in the membership negotiations between Turkey and the EU. It seems that the tides have changed within the EU, where former leaders such as Jacques Chirac of France were once very supportive, but with the election of new leaders such as Nicolas Sarkozy, who publicly opposed Turkey’s EU membership in his presidential campaign, has come more opposition from within. Despite the considerable progress Turkey has made in meeting the socio-economic requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria, many conservative Europeans, such as the French who sympathize with the extremely conservative Front Nationale and those Germans who sympathize with the far-right Republikaner Party, are starting to cite differences in culture, religion, history, and geography as reasons why Turkey should not be allowed to join the EU.³ These reasons can all be grouped under the category of cultural differences. It seems that there has been a shift in conservative Europeans’ opposition of Turkey’s EU accession from socio-economic and political reasons to reasons involving cultural differences.⁴

This shift has been acknowledged by scholars such as Nilufer Gole and Elizabeth Shakman Hurd. Gole, in her article “Europe – an identity or a project?” has identified the shift as having taken place in 2002, and cites discussions involving geography, religion, and cultural differences as new arguments against Turkey that began to develop at that time. She also refers to the Turkey issue as being the “catalyst” for the crisis of European identity. She wrote that it

Jacobs 7

had an important part in that identity because it served as the ‘other’ from which the European identity has traditionally been made distinct.⁵

In her academic publication “Negotiating Europe: the politics of religion and the prospects for Turkish accession,” Hurd also discusses how the European identity, which, according to her, many conservative Europeans believe to be based on Christian heritage, has been jeopardized by the possibility of Turkey’s becoming a member of the EU. She attributes the shift to being based upon issues that can all be tied together because of religion.⁶

It is this shift in the type of opposition that has caused the debate surrounding Turkey’s potential accession into the EU to become so heated and controversial. This thesis aims examine the reasons for this shift to understand these reasons and the resulting implications on the likelihood of Turkey’s EU accession.

Turkey’s journey towards gaining admission into the EU has been a long and arduous one that officially began in 1959 when Turkey first submitted its application to become a member of the European Economic Community, however it could be argued that the process began long before. The territory that is today known as Turkey has been a part of many great civilizations, existing back into the ancient times. It was a part of the Roman Empire, then the Byzantine Empire, and finally the Ottoman Empire starting in the 14th century. For centuries, Muslim culture had a powerful and important presence in what is today known as the Middle East as well as in Europe. It was a center of culture and knowledge in the arts and sciences while Europe was going through the period known as the Dark Ages, and its culture and knowledge was inherited

⁵ Gole, 2
⁶ Hurd, 402-406
by the Ottoman Empire. However, as Europe began to emerge into the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, the Ottoman Empire began to decline. By the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Ottoman Empire had begun to unravel. During the First World War, the Ottoman Empire chose to align itself with Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, causing it to end up on the losing side at the end of the war. From 1919-1923, the Turks waged the War of Liberation, during which they became independent of the Ally-occupied former Ottoman Empire. During this period, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk rose to power, helping to create the Republic of Turkey, and eventually becoming its founder and first president. Although difficult at first, these reforms began to become ingrained in Turkish society.

Once these reforms began to take hold in Turkish society, it began to look towards Europe as a way to solidify these reforms in its society. Ataturk, as he came to be called, made numerous reforms within Turkish society so it could become more Western. He used the French laïcité as a model for complete separation of religion and the state. He also abolished the sultanate that had been in power for over 600 years, and he established a representative democracy that was based on the Western model. He made considerable societal reforms, such as the abolishment of headscarves and hats, which traditionally separated people by class and religion. He also introduced a more Western style of clothing into Turkish society. He made reforms in education, which were a continuation of the educational reforms started during the 19th century by the Ottomans, by introducing the Western alphabet and by opening schools at which all Turkish people could learn.

---

7 Kosebalaban, 98-99
Ataturk’s “Westernization Project” was aimed at Turkey’s eventually becoming an official part of “Europe.” After World War II, the Western European countries created the European Economic Community (EEC) in order to prevent another war between the European nation-states. In 1959, Turkey applied for membership, but was not immediately accepted. After a few years, the EEC presented a customs agreement, which was signed in 1963 and called the Ankara Agreement. From 1963 to 1987, Turkey continued to try to strengthen its democracy and maintain the separation of religion and the State. It encountered many problems, with the military being forced to intervene on several occasions (1960, 1971, and 1980) in order to maintain this separation of religion and state. There was also the controversy surrounding the island of Cyprus, which was invaded by Turkey in order to protect the Turkish citizens who lived there, but which was viewed by many Europeans as encroachment on the Greek part of the island. The situation is a very controversial one, but one that nevertheless plays a role in the debate surrounding Turkey’s EU accession from the European point of view. In 1987, Turkey applied for membership in the European Community (EC), but was turned down because there were too many objections to its economy and government. When the Soviet Union fell in 1989, all thoughts about the potential of Turkey’s membership were pushed aside, as the EU began to focus on the former Soviet-bloc nations, whose history and geography made them ‘European,’ even if their recent political situations were as anti-‘European’ as possible. At the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the EC became the European Union, and in 1993, it met at a summit in Copenhagen and agreed on three criteria for membership that any potential candidate should

12 Fatos and Adams, 55.
meet. These criteria became known as the Copenhagen Criteria and stated that any nation hoping to become a member of the EU must:

1. Be democratic, with respect for human rights and the rule of law.
2. Have a functioning free market economy and the capacity to cope with the competitive pressures of capitalism.
3. Be able to take on the obligations of the *acquis communitaire*, which is the body of laws and regulations already adopted by the EU.¹³

During the 1990’s, Turkey made considerable reforms in order to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria. With the election of Recep Tayyip Erdogan as Prime Minister in 2003, many sweeping reforms took place within Turkey. The death penalty was abolished in 2002, and rights for women and minorities were further extended. He also made efforts to contain the military and to improve Turkey’s economy.¹⁴ Starting in 1999 after the Helsinki Summit, the European Commission published yearly reports on Turkey’s progress, and by 2004, it determined that Turkey had, for the most part, met the Copenhagen Criteria. The European Commission Progress Report of 2005 concluded that the Turkish government had made many reforms on its political system, specifically on its legislative system, which had been recommended in the 2004 Report. Changes were made in the civil-military relations that were more in line with the democratic principles of the EU. The judicial system of Turkey was strengthened by the creation and implementation of structural reforms. Anti-corruption measures had been taken, although the report added that these measures could use some work in order to

¹³ McCormick, 92-93.
become stronger. All of these measures were investigated and reported by European Commission officials, who then presented the report to the Commission, from which Turkey was granted status as candidate.\textsuperscript{15} Negotiations for membership began in 2005, with Turkey not projected to join until 2014-15.\textsuperscript{16} During the years after the creation of the Copenhagen Criteria, many European nations began to change their stances on Turkey’s EU accession. The most notable change of opinion occurred in France, whose leaders and citizens were mostly supportive of Turkey during the early to mid-1990’s, but who gradually became more opposed as the years wore on.

The reasons for opposition towards Turkey’s EU accession vary among different groups of Europeans, but as a whole, they go much deeper than just whether or not it meets the Copenhagen Criteria. When the European Community initially refused Turkey in 1987, it was on the grounds of its economy, weak democracy, and human rights issues.\textsuperscript{17} These socio-economic reasons for opposition were made legitimate by the publication of the Copenhagen Criteria, and Turkey accepted the challenge to meet the criteria in order to become an official member of the EU. However, over the course of the 1990’s, Turkey made drastic reforms that resulted in growing closer to achieving the Copenhagen Criteria. It is also important to note that Turkey’s economy has consistently surpassed the economies of Bulgaria and Romania, two Eastern European nations that were admitted into the EU in 2007, since 1991, which can be seen

\textsuperscript{16} Kosebalaban, 103.
\textsuperscript{17} Carkoglu and Rubin, 149-150
As far as Human Rights are concerned, the 2005 Commission report states that Turkey has made considerable progress with reforms in all areas, some more successful than others. The death penalty was abolished in 2002, and there has been much progress in guaranteeing freedom of the press. Also, the treatment of minority groups such as the Kurds has improved, with Kurdish TV stations being allowed as well as with the Kurdish language being taught in schools.\footnote{European Commission Report, 18-39}

However, it seems that as Turkey grew closer to meeting the Copenhagen Criteria, European oppositions seemed to become more closely tied to the European identity itself and how Turkey’s membership would affect it than to any economic shortcomings or inability to maintain a democratic government. In the late 1990’s public discourse and newspaper editorials

---

Figure 1 Source: World Development Indicators 2007
began to cite religious and cultural issues against Turkey’s EU membership rather than the traditional oppositions that were based on failures to meet the Copenhagen Criteria. This mention of more cultural issues in opposition of Turkey’s EU accession began to become more prominent in both the media and in popular discourse within Europe, and is especially true in the French media, which will be explored in depth in the first chapter in order to pinpoint the change in type of opposition and its effect on public opinion. Also, France seemed to be in favor of Turkey’s EU accession when it did not seem likely to occur, i.e. from 1963-1990’s. Former French President Jacques Chirac was known for being in favor of Turkey until it seemed that the growing problems with Muslim immigrants, world events, and the growing likelihood of Turkey’s success in meeting the Copenhagen Criteria were changing the way in which the French public viewed Turkey’s EU accession. The conservative Nicolas Sarkozy was elected President of France in 2007 on a much more conservative platform that included an anti-immigration stance and opposition to Turkey’s EU accession. The election of such a conservative President is an important indicator in the change in sentiments towards Turkey that was taking place within France during this time. This change in opinion that took place throughout Europe and most notably in France, called a ‘shift’ by scholars such as Nilufer Gole and Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, is what creates Turkey’s newest obstacle towards membership in the EU.

The question that arises is what are the reasons that caused this ‘shift’ to occur? The goal of this thesis is to answer this question. It will be answered by looking at what factors determine the European identity and how this affects Turkey’s status as the ‘other’ from which much of the

19 Duzgit, Senem Aydin. “Seeking Kant in the EU’s Relations with Turkey.” TESEV Publications. Istanbul, Turkey. December 2006. 4
European identity is based. The understanding of the beliefs in what factors make up the European identity can then be applied to the impact of the growing anxiety towards Muslim immigration within both France and the rest of Europe. This is significant because of the fears of the growing reality of a multicultural Europe and the resulting crisis of identity among Europeans affects the attitudes and opinions of Europeans towards Turkey. The thesis will proceed in the following way, and will conclude by showing how all of these factors have combined to both cause and then strengthen this shift in type of opposition.

The first chapter will examine the media and politics in France during the time period in which the shift occurred. It will begin by giving an overview of the political situation in France starting with the election of Jacques Chirac as President in 1995 all the way through to the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as President in 2007 as well as all of the significant events that took place during this time. It will also examine surveys that were taken within France during this time that specifically focus on the public’s opinions concerning Turkey. The chapter will then examine editorials published in the two most important French newspapers, the liberal *Le Monde* and the conservative *Le Figaro*, in order to gauge the shift within France during this time. This analysis will be presented alongside major events that took place either in France or in the rest of the world that were key in shaping the content of the editorials that were published during the same time period. Once all of this is done, it will be easy to see that a shift in opinion indeed occurred.

Once the existence of the shift in opinion has been established by way of the media and politics in France, it will be important to explore what caused this shift to occur. Conservative Europeans, such as former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing have opposed Turkey on
the basis that it is simply “not European.” The question that then arises is “What does it mean to be ‘European’?” The second chapter will attempt to answer this question. The necessity of the presence of a distinct ‘other’ from which one group can be derived in order for an identity to be formed, and how this relates to the European identity will be explored initially. Because Turkey has traditionally served as this ‘other,’ the possibility of Turkey becoming European, and therefore taking on the identity of Europe, presents a challenge to what Europeans have traditionally thought of as their identity and has resulted in an identity crisis within Europe. This identity crisis has been further extended because of the growing reality of Europe’s becoming a multicultural society as a result of immigration. Also, the EU’s attempts at forging an official European identity in efforts to create a stronger union that is based on common identification with the European Union as a whole rather than just economic ties between separate nations will be factored into this analysis of the implications of Europeans’ crisis of identity in the face of Turkey’s potential EU accession.

The third chapter will contribute to answering the research question by addressing the impact of growing anxieties about Muslim immigration within European societies and how this has caused them to associate Turkey with the Muslim immigrants, as well as how this affects their perceptions of the European identity. It will look specifically at France, who has experienced much animosity among its citizens regarding immigration. A special case of the Turkish expatriate community in Germany will also be examined to see if the overall sentiments applied towards Muslim immigrants can be applied to Turkish immigrants as well.

It is apparent that much is at stake concerning the Turkey/EU debate. The debate on Turkey’s EU accession has brought many weaknesses within the European Union as well as

21 “Ex-French President Snubs Turks on Union Bid.” The New York Times. 9 November 2002
within the European identity to the surface. It is a debate of whether to ‘widen’ the EU by allowing Turkey and other countries in, which would strengthen its economy and ‘soft power’ status in the long run. However, those who wish to ‘deepen’ the EU want it to remain an exclusive federation of European nations who are united through their identity, and through their allegiance to a singular supranational government. It is through the debate between these two schools of thought that the issue of Turkey has become so controversial. Through the thorough examination of all aspects that construct the opposition to Turkey’s EU accession it will become possible to understand the greater significance of Turkey’s potential membership in the European Union.

MEDIA AND POLITICS CHAPTER

“Newspapers are the second hand of history.”
Arthur Schopenhauer

Newspapers are an important part of the everyday lives of the citizens who read them. They show what is going on in a certain nation, and give opinions on those events. It is because of this that the use of newspapers in gauging the shift in type of opposition towards Turkey’s EU accession is important. France is a country in which a shift in type of opposition appears to have taken place. Therefore, this chapter will use French newspapers alongside the politics that were occurring simultaneously to gauge the shift in opposition within France.

The situation in France regarding Turkey can be applied to the situation within Europe as a whole because such a shift has taken place directly within France during the last fifteen years. One way in which the shift within France can be seen is through editorials written in France’s two leading newspapers, *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*. These two newspapers are published daily and read by people all over France. *Le Monde* is traditionally more liberal, while *Le Figaro* is
traditionally more conservative. In order for the shift in opinion to be seen, it is necessary to
look at editorials published in each newspaper concerning Turkey and the EU from 1995 to
2008. It is also important to note that access to editorials before 1997 in *Le Figaro* was not
possible. The reason for the use of these time periods is because Jacques Chirac’s presidency
began in 1995, and so they span the length of his presidency as well as the rise to power and
eventual election of Nicolas Sarkozy as President of France. Also, they span the time from the
years just after the Copenhagen Criteria were agreed upon and released all the way to the
decision to give Turkey the status as an official EU candidate country in 2004. While the context
surrounding the time in which these editorials were written is an important part of the analysis,
what was written within the articles is significant as well.

The careful analysis of these editorials is a necessary component in understanding how
the media was both affected by and significant in the shift in type of opposition towards Turkey’s
EU accession. The content of each editorial, as well as the context surrounding the publication
of each editorial as well as the newspaper in which it was published will all be important factors
in the analysis.

POLITICAL CONTEXT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS:

The political scenery in France during the span of the years covered by the editorials is
also a good way in which the attitudes towards Turkey can be gauged. According to an
academic study by Robert Andersen and Jocelyn Evans, there was a distinct shift to the right in
French politics during the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. French President Jacques Chirac was an
advocate of Turkey’s the entire time he was in office, and during his last few years, the French
public and even members of his own party began to become vocal in their opposition towards
Another publication about the political discourse of Turkey within France by Bezya Cagaty Tekin stated that the rise of the Right during Chirac’s administration was a result of the “destruction of traditional community life, the transformation of industrial society, and the rise of immigration.” This political shift to the Right within France is a key component in the Turkey-EU debate because it is two-fold. On one side the possibility of Turkey’s becoming a member of the EU and the resulting influx of Turkish immigrants made many French people become more conservative in their views towards Turkey and towards immigration in general. However, politicians also recognized this potential shift to the right and fully exploited and encouraged it in order to gain votes. It is a mixture of these two factors that took the shift to the public stage and made it an important factor in the Turkey-EU debate within France.

In 2002, the shift to the right in French politics was consummated during the French presidential elections. Jean Marie Le Pen, the candidate of the extreme right Front Nationale (FN) reached the final run-off in the presidential election between himself and Jacques Chirac, thus causing the election take place between candidates of the moderate and extreme Right. The fact that such a staunch conservative could be so successful in the Presidential election proved that a shift to the right had indeed occurred. Although Chirac did win the election, the extreme right has remained prominent on the French political scene, forcing the moderate Right parties, such as the l’Union pour une Democratie Francaise (UDF) and l’Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP), to embrace much more conservative policies than before. This is apparent in how public officials such as Alain Juppé, the then president of the UMP and Nicolas Sarkozy,

---

24 Anderson and Evans, 286-88
the then Interior Minister of France as well as member of the UMP, became vocal in opposing Chirac’s support of Turkey.²⁵ It was also during this time that the UMP and the public began to distance themselves from Chirac because of his supportive stance towards Turkey. The issue of a referendum over the EU Constitution Treaty in 2005 was also significant in the issue of Turkey, because the two were negatively associated by the moderate and extreme Right in order to exploit the anti-immigrant feelings that were stirring within conservative French circles, thus enabling them to gain votes.²⁶

It is no coincidence that Nicolas Sarkozy rose in power during the years in which Jacques Chirac’s popularity and support were dwindling. Sarkozy’s negative stance towards Turkey put him in favor of the popular conservative sentiment that was found in France during the early 2000’s. An interesting statistic found by an IFOP Poll conducted for Valeurs Actuelles in 2008 found that 68% of French people opposed to Turkey becoming a member of the EU voted for Nicolas Sarkozy in the 2007 Presidential elections and that 81% voted for Jean Marie Le Pen.²⁷ This further reinforces the point that a political shift to the right in French politics could be largely attributed to the presence of a more conservative stance regarding immigration and Turkey’s EU candidacy among the French. According to an academic study by Gilles Ivaldi, the negative association of the EU Constitution to Turkey’s EU accession played a large role in the negative views towards Turkey that were found among the French people. It is also no coincidence that those negative views usually encompassed opposition based on cultural terms. The study also claims that Sarkozy used his very public disdain for the EU Constitution and

²⁵ Drake, 306-308
²⁶ Anderson and Evans, 287
Turkey’s EU accession to further his own political career. Sarkozy stepped into the limelight in 2005 when he successfully passed a call for a referendum on the EU Constitution Treaty at a UMP convention. He then became Prime Minister, and was finally elected President in 2007.

The shift in type of opposition within France is also apparent in surveys taken throughout the time period of the debate concerning Turkey’s EU accession. Although there were no surveys conducted before 2004 within France that specifically addressed the Turkey issue, all surveys conducted within France from 2004-on showed cultural differences as reasons why the French opposed Turkey’s EU accession.

In 2004, a survey conducted by IFOP for Le Figaro showed that 67% of French people were against Turkey’s EU accession, while only 32% were in favor. The top three reasons given for opposition towards Turkey were human rights, cultural/religious differences, and women’s rights. In 2005, a Eurobarometer survey was published which revealed that immigration and cultural differences were the most important reasons for opposition aside from Turkey’s economy and human rights. The graph featured below shows the responses of members of each EU nation when asked if Turkey should not be allowed to join the EU because of reasons of cultural differences.

---

It is also important to note that there was an entire section of the survey devoted specifically to the Turkey issue, and that this was the first time that the Turkey-EU debate became a specific focus within a Eurobarometer survey. This survey was also conducted during the months after Turkey was granted official candidate country status because of its successes at complying with the Copenhagen Criteria. The presence of opposition based on cultural differences in these polls at this time further proves that a shift in the type of opposition indeed occurred in France.

The knowledge and understanding of the political context in France during the time in which the shift took place is very important in being able to understand the analysis of the editorials published during that time. It is through the context of external events that it is
possible to understand the motives and attitudes behind each editorial, and it is for this reason that such a large portion of this chapter was devoted to the political context.

METHODOLOGY:

The attitudes and overall themes as well as the patterns found in each of the editorials will be very important in gauging the shift in opinion. Whether the editorial argues for or against Turkey’s accession will be very important in two ways. Firstly, it will be important to note the newspaper in which these editorials were written because it will show the opinion towards Turkey on both the conservative and liberal sides. The second importance of the overall attitude of each editorial is the context surrounding each article and how that context influenced what was written. The number and pattern of each of these editorials arguing for or against Turkey in both newspapers is also significant because this pattern could be a direct way in which the shift can be gauged.

The overall theme of each editorial in relation to what is going on politically at the same time is very significant because what was written in these editorials reflects what was going on externally. The first part of the analysis will be set up chronologically with editorials that will be presented alongside major events that occurred in the same year. The major years and events that will be focused upon are: 1995, when Jacques Chirac was elected President of France; 1999, when the Helsinki Summit occurred; 2001, the year of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center; 2002, the year of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s infamous statement about the EU being a “Christian Club,” as well as the French Presidential elections that took place between Jean Marie Le Pen and Jacques Chirac; 2004/2005, the year in which Turkey was granted official EU
candidate status and also the year of the EU Constitution Referendum; and 2006/2007, when Nicolas Sarkozy was elected President of France. It is these external events that inspired editorials which either pleaded Turkey’s case before the French public or further negated the idea of Turkey’s EU accession.

The major theme that will be explored is that of culture, for it is the term around which the new type of opposition is based. The term culture, for the purposes of this chapter, denotes any mention of religion, European identity, or geography in relation to Turkey. Any mention whatsoever of these themes in relation to Turkey is significant, whether they are used to argue in favor of or against it. Once the existence of these culturally based themes is found in these articles, it will be necessary to note the years in which they began to be mentioned. It will also be important to note how much of a role the culture issues played in both opposing and advocating Turkey’s EU accession.

Newspapers are a great source to use when measuring the public opinion because it is the public who reads the articles and editorials that are printed in newspapers and it is that same public who writes letters to the editor in response to these articles and editorials. Not only do these newspapers give an idea of what was going on in the world at the time of Turkey’s attempts at EU accession, but they also give a good idea of the opinions and ideas towards Turkey that were circulating in France during this time. It is for this reason that they will be used in this chapter.

ANALYSIS:

The analysis will begin with a brief overview of the overall attitudes and themes of each newspaper. The results of the analysis of the editorials will then be presented alongside the
external events which occurred during the same time period. It will then conclude with analysis of the presence and use of the culture argument to argue for and against Turkey.

**LE FIGARO:**

In the *Le Figaro* editorials, the overall pattern was negative towards Turkey. In 1997, editorials were written against Turkey that cited religion, culture, and geography as reasons why it did not belong in Europe.\(^{30}\) Such types of arguments continued throughout the span of editorials, and they became more frequent as the years went by. However, after 2004, when Turkey had been granted official candidate status, the presence of opposition towards Turkey that was based on cultural reasons remained, but began to fade into the background. In 2006, editorials began to be focused on how attitudes had changed towards Turkey and how politicians were beginning to exploit this shift towards more conservative sentiments towards Turkey and towards immigration in general in order to win votes.\(^{31}\) The eruption of a pattern like this in the conservative *Le Figaro* shows the formation of the base of the conservative movement within France as well as its potential implications on the French political system.

**LE MONDE:**

In *Le Monde*, starting in 1995, the editorials began with more indifferent attitudes towards Turkey. From 1995 to 1999, any editorials that mentioned Turkey were positive towards its EU aspirations. One editorial in 1999 even went so far as to state that Turkey was completely European and that it respected democracy and human rights.\(^{32}\) From 1999-2002,

---

however, Turkey was not mentioned very often in the editorial section. 2002 was the first year in the surveyed time period in which editorials were written that were against Turkey’s EU accession. The next editorials written that concerned Turkey were published in 2004, and from then on all were in favor of Turkey becoming a member of the EU. No more editorials were written concerning Turkey until 2008, when one was written by conservatives that argued against Turkey because of geography and its economy, with a response by the socialists that completely discounted the argument made by the conservatives. However, the very presence of such a conservative editorial in *Le Monde* proves that the conservative movement had taken hold and even though the editorial was almost immediately refuted by the Socialists, the fact that it even made it into *Le Monde* shows that the conservative stance had gained strong footing within France. Overall, the views in *Le Monde* towards Turkey were mostly positive, with a few negative ones that were scattered throughout. The issue was also not covered as extensively in *Le Monde* as in *Le Figaro*.

CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS:

1995:

The year 1995 is a significant one in which to begin the analysis because it was the year in which Jacques Chirac was elected President of France. In *Le Monde*, the editorials that were published in 1995 were either in favor of or indifferent towards Turkey’s EU accession, but were not against it. However, none of them saw Turkey’s EU accession as something that was likely to happen any time soon. It is also important to note that one editorial was written in which it explicitly stated that Europe supported Turkey because it was not a Christian organization.33

---

These findings are important for the analysis because they show that at one time, there was widespread support for Turkey’s cause. This is evident in that there were no editorials published that refuted these claims. However, it is also important to note that this may have been the case because the event of Turkey’s EU accession was seen as very far off and unlikely to occur any time soon.

1999:

1999 was the next year in which a major event took place that involved Turkey. The Helsinki Summit, at which it was decided that yearly reports were to be published before the European Commission on Turkey’s progress in achieving and implementing the Copenhagen Criteria. This was the first year in the time periods featured in the analysis in which both newspapers had an explosion of editorials concerning Turkey’s plight.

In *Le Figaro*, the editorials published in 1999 were oozing with references to culture, used to argue both for and against Turkey. This is key, because the publication of these editorials in the conservative French newspaper shows that these cultural issues were stirring amongst those on the conservative side as early as 1999. In *Le Monde*, it is important to note that from 1995 to 1999, any editorials that mentioned Turkey were positive towards its EU aspirations. One editorial written by David Tarschys in 1999 even went so far as to state that Turkey was completely European and that it respected democracy and human rights. It is also important to note that up until this time, there was no mention of culture, neither in support nor in opposition, in any editorial published in *Le Monde*. This is significant because it shows that the use of culture in reference to Turkey began on the Conservative side.

2001:

---

The next major external event that took place was the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Incidentally, there were no editorials written specifically about Turkey during the remaining four months of 2001, but those published from 2002-on in both newspapers had a distinct change in tone from all those published prior to September 11.

2002:

There were two major events that took place in 2002 that were instrumental in shaping the attitudes and opinions of the editorialists who wrote articles in 2002. The first was the statement made by the former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing that the EU was a “Christian Club,” and that if Turkey was allowed to join then it would mean the “end of Europe.” The second was the French Presidential election that ended up taking place between the candidates of the moderate and extreme Right, which proved that a shift to the right in French politics had taken place.

Opposition towards Turkey’s EU accession began to be published in the pages of *Le Monde* in 2002, and it was almost solely based on culture issues. Cultural issues were mentioned both in support of and in opposition to Turkey’s EU accession for the first time. There were also concerns about what would happen after Turkey is admitted into the EU, such as whether Russia or the North African countries will be allowed to join on the same precedent. There were also a few letters from Turkish people that were published in order to give Turkey a human face and let Europeans see the Turkish people as European like themselves. One editorial even explicitly mentioned the effect of Giscard’s statement and how it had caused the numbers of

---

those who opposed Turkey to soar.\textsuperscript{39} These distinct changes in the tone of these editorials published after 9/11 and during a year in which two important events took place within France shows the impact that they had on public opinion and on what was written in editorials at that time.

In \textit{Le Figaro}, however, three editorials were published that argued in favor of Turkey. Cultural issues were mentioned as reasons why some people opposed Turkey, but they were also dismissed. Cultural issues were even referenced as reasons why Turkey’s accession into the EU is important.\textsuperscript{40} The absence of editorials written in opposition towards Turkey or in support of Giscard’s statement indicates that there was no need to fire up conservatives against Turkey’s cause, because it has already happened. In fact, the presence of editorials in such a renowned conservative newspaper that argue in Turkey’s favor by using cultural references indicates that there was an effort to change the opinion of the conservatives who read \textit{Le Figaro}.

\textbf{2004/2005:}

2004 was the year in which Turkey was granted status as an official candidate to the EU. Yearly reports and been filed with the European Commission since the Helsinki Summit in 1999, which chronicled Turkey’s successes in implementing the Copenhagen Criteria. By 2004, it had become apparent that Turkey had nearly succeeded, and so Turkey’s application for admission into the EU came up before the Commission. It was decided that negotiations for accession would begin in 2005. During these two years, the editorial section of \textit{Le Figaro} was full of editorials that both supported and opposed Turkey’s EU accession. It is perhaps most interesting


to note that a shift in type of opposition was indeed recognized in an editorial during this time.41

The presence of such a large number of editorials concerning Turkey’s plight in Le Figaro is significant because it shows that the issue of Turkey was a hot one on the Conservative side.

In Le Monde, two editorials calling for the disappearance of any oppositions towards Turkey that were based on cultural issues were published.42 This shows that a shift in the type of opposition had taken place at least on the conservative side and that the liberals were making strong efforts to sway the undecided public not to completely side with the conservatives in the Turkey-EU debate. Also, the absence of editorials about the issue of Turkey’s EU accession after 2004 in Le Monde is an indicator that there was no audience for editorials that argued in Turkey’s favor, and perhaps the absence of editorials that opposed Turkey suggests that there had been success in bringing a large majority of the French public to oppose Turkey’s cause.

2006-2007:

2007 was the year in which Nicolas Sarkozy was elected President of France. He first became prominent as a result of his opposition towards Turkey, and eventually became Prime Minister under Jacques Chirac, even though he did not agree with his policy concerning Turkey. In both 2006 and 2007, editorials were published in Le Figaro that referenced a shift in type of opposition towards Turkey within France. The editorial published in 2006 even went so far as to state that politicians were now exploiting this change in order to win votes.43 This can be directly applied to Nicolas Sarkozy because it was the year during which he was building up his presidential campaign. It is interesting that editorials citing a shift in opposition were published

in *Le Figaro*, perhaps this was done in order to further strengthen the conservative base that would then elect politicians such as Sarkozy to power.

**CULTURE ARGUMENTS IN *LE FIGARO***:

Culture was a major theme mentioned throughout *Le Figaro* editorials. It began to be referenced as early as 1997, in opposition to Turkey. In February 1997, Jean-Claude Casanova wrote that Europe distinguishes itself from Turkey because of religion and history and that Europe celebrates the defeat of the Turks at Vienna. This was published just before the Turkish ambassador wrote a letter accusing the EU of taking a discriminatory stance towards Turkey. An editorial written by Jean-Claude Casanova in 1999 argued against Turkey because it was not historically in Europe, and he mentioned the geographical and religious factors as well. In 2000, Dominique Venner wrote an editorial that argued against Turkey’s EU membership, using history and religion. He also exerted a negative stance towards Islam by referring to the fall of Constantinople (now Istanbul) to the Ottomans in 1453 and how one of the most beautiful cities in the world had passed over into the hands of Islam at that time. Such arguments extended through 2005, although the cultural opposition was mentioned in other ways during this time as well. These uses of culture as reason to oppose Turkey’s EU accession that were published in the conservative *Le Figaro* show that it was becoming more and more acceptable to oppose Turkey on the basis of cultural differences among French conservatives.

---

However, culture was also used to argue in favor of Turkey. While there were numerous editorials that opposed Turkey on the basis of cultural differences, there were also editorials arguing that Turkey and Europe shared common histories and that Turkey’s culture would enrich the EU.\textsuperscript{48} It seems that editorialists who were in favor of Turkey were targeting the readers of the more conservative \textit{Le Figaro}, who because of their status as conservatives tended to be more opposed to Turkey because of cultural reasons rather than whether it met the Copenhagen Criteria.

Some editorials that argued in favor of Turkey mentioned the cultural opposition as a type of opposition that existed, and even went so far as to discount that type of opposition as illegitimate. In 2002, Semih Vaner mentioned the fact that religion was an issue in the argument against Turkey, but does so while arguing in favor of Turkey.\textsuperscript{49} In 2004, the former French Prime Minister Michel Rocard and the Former Austrian Foreign Relations Minister wrote an editorial arguing in favor of Turkey’s EU accession, and completely dismissed all cultural issues by stating that the Commission had shown how the cultural/geographical problems could be surpassed in its report on Turkey’s good progress.\textsuperscript{50} The change in the mere mention of culture and religion as a reason to oppose Turkey to it becoming the sole argument behind Turkey’s opposition proves that to some degree, there was a shift in opposition to Turkey’s EU accession, at least among conservatives.

**CULTURE ARGUMENTS IN \textit{LE MONDE}:**

The first time culture was mentioned in \textit{Le Monde} was in 2002. Up until that time, editorials were either indifferent towards Turkey’s EU accession or they were in favor of it. In

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{49} Vaner, Semih. “TURQUIE des elections legislatives de dimanche au sommet européen de décembre; Le baton et la carotte.” \textit{Le Figaro}. 1 November 2002.
\end{itemize}
2002, however, European identity was mentioned, as well as culture, religion, race, and
geography as reasons why Turkey should not be allowed to become a part of the EU. On that
same note, however, cultural arguments were used to argue in favor of Turkey. One editorial,
written by Abdullah Gul, the current President of Turkey but who was the Turkish Prime
Minister at the time the article was written stated that Turkey and Europe shared common
histories. This use of culture to argue both for Turkey and against it is an interesting twist in
the newspaper editorial debates of Turkey’s EU accession. This shows that the liberal French
were realizing that these culture-based oppositions were becoming more prominent and their use
of culture to argue for Turkey’s EU accession makes this fact more concrete. However, after
2002, the only mention of culture was in reference to its being mentioned in opposition. Several
editorials then called for all such oppositions to disappear.

In *Le Monde* from 1995 to 1999, no mention was made of culture, and no strong
arguments were made against Turkey. No editorials were written in 2000 or 2001, but in 2002,
editorials that argued against Turkey on the basis of culture and religion, as well as those that
questioned Turkey’s place in the European identity were published. By 2004, however, any
mention of cultural oppositions only stated that they must disappear and are not legitimate.
This pattern of a sudden change in the presence of culture issues shows that conservative
ideology was beginning to break through, however, the liberal editorialists of *Le Monde* refused
to allow such ungrounded opposition towards Turkey to exist in their editorials. The fact that the
editorials after 2004 called for the cultural opposition to disappear indicates its existence and also
indicates that it was significant enough to garner attention from the liberal side.

---

52 Zecchini, Laurent. “La Turquie européenne?” *Le Monde.* 14 October 2002. Also, see Barthes, Dominique. “La
CONCLUSION:

The shift in type of opposition within France is the result of many factors, namely the shift to the right in French politics that was the result of the fear of the growing presence of Islam within France. However, the existence of this shift can be most strongly proven via the presence of it in editorials written in France’s main liberal and conservative newspapers. The editorials of the conservative *Le Figaro* continuously used culture as a reason to oppose Turkey’s EU accession, and it went from being merely mentioned to arguments being centered on cultural opposition. Because those editorials were continuously present within French society, they began to be embraced by the sudden conservative trend that hit in 2002. This explains the appearance of culture arguments in *Le Monde* in that same year. If all of the events of 2001 and 2002 (9/11, rise of Muslim immigrants, Giscard’s statement) as well as Turkey’s gaining status as a candidate country are taken into consideration, it shows why people began to become more conservative and thus the reason for the growth in numbers of French people opposed to Turkey’s EU accession based on cultural differences rather than its failure to completely comply with the Copenhagen Criteria.

The shift in the type of opposition towards Turkey reflects the shift to the right in French politics that also occurred during this time period. The culmination of external events, such as 9/11, the rising numbers of the Muslim immigrant population, and the public statement by Valery Giscard d’Estaing were all major contributing factors to the political shift to the right. In the 2002 presidential elections, the election run-offs were between the extreme and moderate

---

54 Tekin, pp. 731-733
Right candidates rather than the traditional Left and Right Candidates, thus showing that the focus at that time was on the conservative sentiment.  

Because the overwhelming sentiment within France at this time was conservative, it makes sense that Nicolas Sarkozy and other members of the UMP fully embraced the negative stance towards Turkey and used it to further their political aspirations. All of this is fully reflected in the editorials that were written during Chirac’s years in power and during Sarkozy’s rise to power and first few years in office.

The existence of the shift in type of opposition within France is the result of many changes that have been taking place within France over the past fifteen to twenty years. Politically, the French people began to embrace conservative views because of the fear of their loss of identity as a result of the growing presence of Islam via immigration within their nation. This fear was magnified because of the possibility of Turkey becoming a member of the EU and because Turkey has almost entirely complied with the Copenhagen Criteria. Thus, Europeans have changed their type of opposition and have begun to base it almost solely on cultural oppositions. This shift is apparent in newspaper editorials, in which culture was used as both a reason for opposition as well as a reason to support Turkey. The many patterns found in these editorials prove the existence of this shift.

Now that the existence of the shift has been established, it is necessary to look at the reasons why the shift occurred. Many of these editorials stated that Turkey should not be allowed to join the EU because it was “not European.” So what is it to be “European?” The next chapter will explore this question as well as the implications Turkey’s attempts at becoming a member of the EU on what was traditionally thought to make up the European identity.

---

55 Andersen and Evans, p. 286.
European Identity Chapter

*Take up the White Man's burden--
And reap his old reward:
The blame of those ye better,
The hate of those ye guard--
The cry of hosts ye humour
(Ah, slowly!) toward the light:--
"Why brought he us from bondage,
Our loved Egyptian night?"

-Rudyard Kipling, 'The White Man’s Burden’

What makes a person European? Is it a state of mind, an attitude? Is it a common religious Judaeo-Christian heritage? Is it a geographical location on a map? Is it a shared history, the mutual experience of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment? Or is it simply a matter of modernity and progress? One thing that most would agree upon is that there is no one singular way in which the European identity can be defined, thus when faced with Turkey’s potential EU accession, the fact that there is no concrete definition of European identity comes to the surface. It is this lack of a concrete definition of identity that causes the debate of whether Turkey is considered European enough to become a part of the European Union to take form.

The debate of Turkey’s EU accession has brought forth many uncertainties. What is it to be European? What makes Bulgaria or Greece, Turkey’s geographical neighbors, European, while Turkey is not? Are there common attributes that are possessed by all ‘Europeans,’ and that separate them from peoples and nations from other parts of the world? Identities are continuously shifting and changing, and the only way for them to remain somewhat constant is to
be relational. Therefore one’s identity is based on the differences that separate it from another. Throughout history, Europeans traditionally derived their identity from what they were not, which was consistently the Muslims of the East. However, during the Twentieth century, with the advent of globalization and continuously shifting ideas of what it was to be European throughout the rise and fall of Imperialism, the changing borders and nationalities that resulted from two World Wars, and the ideological battle between Communism and Capitalism, the piece of the European identity that remained constant was its differentiation from Islam. As long as Europeans could base their identities on things such as common religious backgrounds and common memories of history, both of which were factors that separated them from Islam and the nations and peoples who practiced it, the European identity could remain to some degree concrete. However, Turkey’s request to become officially a part of the EU, and the growing likelihood of this occurrence, has challenged Europeans’ identities and has caused a crisis of identity to develop within Europe.

WHAT IS IDENTITY?

In order to understand the complexities that have gone into the formation of the European identity, it is first important to understand the concept of the use of the “Other” in identity formation. The concept of the use of the “Other” is mentioned throughout literature concerning the European identity, because the “Other” has played such a large role in the creation of it. The use of the other is mentioned in Gerard Delanty’s *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, as a pivotal part of identity formation. Delanty wrote that identity could be based on the state,
gender, church, and color, giving racism as an example.\textsuperscript{56} Several important thinkers have cited the use of the ‘other’ in identity formation, which is the unifying aspect of all of their thoughts on identity.

Another theory of identity that relates to the concept of the “Other,” is that of Etienne Balibar in \textit{We, the People of Europe?}. Balibar believes in the presence of the “ethos” and “demos” in identity formation. The “ethos” is an “imagined community of members,” while the “demos” is the “people,” as the body that makes decisions and has certain rights. According to Balibar, the construction of the idea of the border and national belonging is a result of this dynamic between the “ethos” and “demos.” It leads to exclusion, thus dividing the majorities and minorities, natives and foreigners, and leading to the derivation of identity from a distinct “other.”\textsuperscript{57}

Iver B. Neumann also wrote a book on the use of the ‘other’ in European identity formation in which he referenced many scholars and philosophers who assert this claim in their works. According to Neumann, G.W.F. Hegel is one of the main theorists who specifically referenced the use of the “other” in forming one’s own identity in his work \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} by stating that

\begin{quote}
Each is for the other the middle term through which each meditates itself; and each is for himself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own accord, which at the same time is such only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.\textsuperscript{58}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{56} Delanty, Gerard. \textit{Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality}. 2-3
\textsuperscript{57} Balibar, Etienne. \textit{We, the People of Europe?: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship.}
Hegel has had considerable influence on the thoughts of people concerning the formation of identity, which have evolved through the years into many different ways in which identity can be defined. Neumann specifically addresses the use of the “Eastern Other” in the formation of the European identity by referencing the works of Georg Simmel, Carl Schmitt, and Friedrich Nietzsche.

Simmel also refers to the use of the ‘other’ by referring to the concept of the ‘stranger’ in identity formation. The presence of the stranger, writes Simmel, causes the question of the self to rise to the surface. Neumann then cites Schmitt, who wrote about the influence and importance in the concept of the ‘public enemy’ in identity formation. Also according to Neumann, Nietzsche believed that the self creates its own image of the world through its perceptions of “others.” It is easy to see the influence of Hegel’s belief in the use of a distinct ‘Other’ in identity formation found in these later works that were presented by Neumann regarding the existence and importance of the Eastern ‘Other.’

The philosophies of identity of these important thinkers all center on the necessity of the existence of a distinct ‘other’ so that a group can define its identity from what it is not. This is an important component of understanding the opposition towards Turkey that is based on its affect on the European identity. It is now necessary to apply this theory throughout the history of the relations between Europe and Turkey in order to see how Europe’s vision of Turkey as its ‘other’ began and evolved throughout history to become what it is today.

EUROPEAN HISTORY AND THE EASTERN ‘OTHER’:

For centuries, the formation of the European identity has been affirmed by the distinct awareness of the presence of the Eastern ‘Other.’ Much of the territory that is today known as Europe was once a part of the great Roman Empire. The Roman Empire was the supreme world power for centuries, before growing too large and having to be split into the Western Roman Empire, and the eastern Byzantine Empire in 284 AD. The Roman Empire went on to fall in 476 AD, and the territory that was once united under one name began to split off into separate nations. The Byzantine Empire, however, managed to survive for nearly 700 more years, and after being invaded by the Ottomans in 1453, became known as the Ottoman Empire.\(^6\) It was through the Crusades that were begun in 1091 that the peoples of Europe began to unite together under the name of Christianity against the peoples of the East who had taken over the territories that they felt were tied to the origins of their religion. It was this common theme of religion that was one of the first unifying factors of the peoples who inhabited the territory that would eventually come to be known as Europe. It was also through the opposition to Islam that these Christians began come together in unity.\(^3\)

Roger Ballard also asserted this use of Christianity as the common bond uniting the Crusaders against their Eastern foes, although he notes that the religious factor was the only unifying one, as there was no mention of ‘Europe,’ or of ‘Europeans,’ at this point in time. He also wrote that the Crusaders made no attempts at understanding their Islamic opponents, they simply formed opinions and took actions that were based upon their own conceptions and prejudices, thus enabling them to justify their actions. According to Ballard, the Christians of

\(^{6}\) Wilson, Kevin and Jan van der Dussen. *The History of the Idea of Europe*. 18-31

\(^{3}\) Wilson and van der Dussen, 34-35
this time believed that anything that veered from their own form of Christianity was heretical and evil, and must be destroyed, hence, the commencement of the deeply entrenched opposition of the Christian West towards the Muslim East. The Crusaders used these beliefs of their own ‘righteousness’ and ‘purity’ to create distorted images of their Muslim foes, which became engrained in the minds of Europeans for centuries, and formed a portion of the base of the opposition towards Turkey that is found amongst conservative Europeans today.\textsuperscript{64}

The animosity towards the Muslim world as a result of the Crusades extended on throughout history to the campaigns against the Muslims in Spain from 718 to 1492 AD.\textsuperscript{65} Much of the culture of southern Spain has its roots from when the Muslims occupied it during those years. However, the fact that there was a Muslim presence within Europe for nearly 700 years is something that is nearly forgotten amongst Europeans.\textsuperscript{66} The East, which came to be associated with the almighty Ottoman Empire, continued to be a place with which fear was associated because of the constantly looming threat of invasion.\textsuperscript{67} One such invasion that has not been forgotten by Austrians to this day occurred in the year 1529, when the Ottoman Turks laid siege at the gates of Vienna. It was not until the year 1683 that the Habsburgs, with the help of Pope Innocent XI, drove out the Ottomans. Once this occurred, the threat of a European invasion by the Ottoman Empire began to diminish as the birth of capitalism and creation of new technologies allowed the different European Empires to begin to explore new lands and opportunities during the age of Imperialism and Colonialism.\textsuperscript{68}

\textsuperscript{64} Ballard, Roger. “Islam and the Construction of Europe.” INST 312 course packet.
\textsuperscript{65} Mikkeli, Heikki. \textit{Europe as an Idea and an Identity}. 141. Ballard, 27-28
\textsuperscript{66} Ballard, 28
\textsuperscript{67} Neumann, 40
\textsuperscript{68} Delanty, Gerard, \textit{Inventing Europe}. 51-52. Mikkeli, 22
The age of Imperialism and Colonialism was another time in which the West and East came into contact with one another. The Europeans of the West saw themselves as vastly superior in intellect and in technology to the East. They thus used this superiority/inferiority complex to both create and invade the “Orient”. According to Edward Said in *Orientalism*, the use of the word “oriental” was “canononical, having been employed by Chaucer, Mandeville, Shakespeare, Dryden, Pope, and Byron. It designated Asia or the East, geographically, morally, culturally.”

Gerard Delanty further extended this use of the East as the ‘Other’ by writing that the Orient has been used as a sort of “mirror” through which the Europeans could see themselves in a chapter of his book *Inventing Europe*, titled “Europe in the Mirror of the Orient.” He wrote that Europe saw other civilizations and tried to impart their qualities which they saw to be most important to those civilizations, and the East is no exception. Thus, the Orient, through the age of imperialism and colonialism, became a “distorted mirror” through which the West, i.e. Europe, saw itself. However the fact that the Orient was the “East” and also the “Other” was never forgotten.

It was also during this time that the East began to take on a more romantic view because it began to become less of a threat to the West. Thus, once the empires of Europe began their campaigns of colonization around the globe, more and more Europeans began to enter into the Orient. It became fashionable to have knowledge about the Orient, and it became a place where Europeans could take part in things that they could never have imagined in Europe, thus the concept of the Orient becoming a place of pleasure, while the West was characterized by social

---

70 Delanty, 84-85.
stability and responsibility.\textsuperscript{71} Thus, wrote Delanty, the “invention” of the Orient enabled Europe to develop its own identity, simply put “the West was what the Orient was not.” Thus, in this way, the Western identity was formed out of negation.\textsuperscript{72} Delanty also wrote that by the eighteenth century the Orient was seen as “innocent and childlike,” while the West was seen as a representation of “progress and modernity.” However, the goal was not for the Orient to “catch-up” with the West, but rather to imitate it to a lesser degree, which kept it separate from the West but also further enabled the distorted “mirror” image to exist.\textsuperscript{73} Their more negative, subservient views towards the colonial peoples led to a phenomenon that would become so engrained in the peoples of Europe that it has almost become second nature, racism.

Racism began to take hold in Europe during the eighteenth century. The Orient also began to be regarded as “weak,” in part because of the weakening Ottoman Empire. This was also when the myths of both the ‘noble savage’ and the ‘decadent orient’ began to appear in Europe, further romanticizing the Orient. However, it is important to note that the savage was only thought of as “noble” because of its complete “submission” to the West.\textsuperscript{74} It was also during this time that the concept of “civilization” began to form in the West. There is a significant difference between ‘civilization’ and ‘culture,’ for ‘civilization’ was European, while ‘culture’ referred to anything other than European.\textsuperscript{75}

The myth of the ‘White Man’s Burden,’ made popular through the poem written by Rudyard Kipling, characterized the way in which Europeans conducted themselves towards the Orient as well as towards the other continents upon which they were colonizing and building...

\textsuperscript{71} Delanty, 85
\textsuperscript{72} Delanty, 88-89.
\textsuperscript{73} Delanty, 90-91
\textsuperscript{74} Delanty, 91-92
\textsuperscript{75} Delanty, 93-94
empires during the nineteenth century. It began to become widely believed amongst Europeans that it was their responsibility to restore culture and knowledge to the Orient, which were things that it had ‘lost’ over the course of European imperialism and colonialism.\textsuperscript{76} It was also during this time that Europeans began to strengthen their association of the Christian faith with their identity as Europeans. Because the Orient was not Christian, this fortified the lines of separation and the view of it as the ‘Other.’ Thus, Europeans set out in attempts of ‘converting’ the peoples of the Orient to Christianity through imperialism.\textsuperscript{77}

Throughout the events of history (the Crusades, Imperialism/Colonialism), Europeans continuously looked towards the peoples of the Orient as different, as the departing point from which they could define their own identity. As long as they could assert that their identity was completely separate from that of the Orientals that they came in contact with throughout history, their identity could remain concrete. Delanty concluded that racism “lay at the core of the European identity.”\textsuperscript{78} This is definitely the case as far as colonialism and imperialism is concerned. Through violence and conquest, Europeans reached the twentieth century with assurance that the peoples of the Orient that they had encountered were not only beneath them, but also completely separated from them. Thus, the modern idea of the European identity was formed based on the distinct line of demarcation that Europeans saw between East and West, which gave them a sense of racial “superiority” and separated them from their “inferior” Oriental counterparts.

OTHER DEFINITIONS OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY:

\textsuperscript{76} Delanty, 94-95  
\textsuperscript{77} Delanty, 96-97  
\textsuperscript{78} Delanty, 98
Although the use of the “Other” to determine one’s identity has played a significant role in the formation of European Identity, other factors have played roles as well. Much has been written concerning the creation of the European identity, as many scholars, philosophers, and politicians have desired to create a definition of what makes one European. A few influential thinkers who have written and studied about the concept of what it is to be European have had a large impact on how many people view the European identity. Thus it is important to be familiar with their beliefs on the subject.

**DERRIDA:**

Jacques Derrida’s publication *The Other Heading* is cited throughout literature concerning the European identity. In *The Other Heading*, Derrida referenced Edmund Husserl’s idea that Europe’s culture was a direct descendent of that of ancient Greece. However, he takes the concept a bit further by writing that although the European culture and society has taken much from the Greek culture, its identity is also derived from many different sources, such as Jewish, Arabic, Christian, Roman, Germanic, etc. Derrida also claimed that by European culture and identity being inspired by ancient Greece, it also took on the ancient Greek characteristic of distinguishing itself from the Egyptian “other.” Derrida was also one of the first to believe in the concept of a multicultural Europe, for he wrote “I am not, nor do I feel, European in every part, that is, European through and through… My cultural identity – that in the name of which I speak – is not only European, it is not identical to itself… I feel European

---

79 Gasche, Rudolphe. “This Little Thing That Is Europe.” ProjectMuse. 3.
among other things. It is up to others, and up to me among them, to decide.”

It is this belief in a multicultural Europe that differentiates Derrida from other thinkers and writers who have written on the subject, and has thus been influential in the overall construction of the European identity.

**VALERY:**

Paul Valéry was a French writer, poet, and philosopher who spent much time pondering the aspects that made up the European identity, and his works are often cited in studies and publications that are written about the concept of the European identity. According to Heikki Mikkeli, in *Europe as an Idea and an Identity*, the essential values of the European identity, as defined by Paul Valéry in his publication entitled *Variété I*, are the presence of Roman law and order, the Christian faith, and the critical spirit of Greece. Other works cite Valéry’s beliefs in a certain European ‘spirit,’ as well as in a common culture, both of which have had a unifying effect on the European continent. His Eurocentric views were opposed by Jacques Derrida, who wrote in *The Other Heading* that Europeans could not be men of universality, for it was not their universal right. Valéry’s influence on the concept of the European identity can be seen throughout works written on the subject.

**HEIDEGGER:**

Another philosopher and thinker whose works have had an impact on the thought process concerning the European identity was Martin Heidegger. Heidegger was a student of Edmund Husserl until he lost his rights when the Nazis came to power during the 1930’s. He was also

---


83 Mikkeli, 195

84 Delanty, 2, 81

inspired by German philosopher Max Scheler. However, his beliefs that the European identity can be derived from the ancient times have had an influence on the overall concept of what it is to be European. Heidegger, like Husserl, believed that the cultural origins of Europe were to be found in Antiquity, however, he believed that the European culture was more inspired by Rome, who was Greek-inspired. An entire work entitled “Heidegger’s Parmenides: Greek Modernity and the Classical Legacy,” was written about how Heidegger believe the origins of Europe to be not Greek, but Roman, hence the imperialistic nature and tendencies of the European continent.

Although the belief that Europe’s culture and identity was derived from Antiquity is one that has been circulating since the Enlightenment, Heidegger’s study of the subject has had considerable influence on how many people perceive the origins of Europe, and thus the European identity.

GENERAL CHARACTERSITICS:

When one combines the factors of European identity, as stated by Derrida, Valéry, and Heidegger, a sort of general picture of what it is to be European, in the minds of Europeans, begins to take form. The influence of these characteristics of what it is to be European can be found in the works of Gerhard Delanty. He even took it a step further by going into specifics by citing the state, economy, culture, and society of Europe as forces that have greatly impacted the European identity through scientific/technological advances, presence of the bourgeoisie, and present day attempts at forming an official culture. He also defined it according to the common experiences of Christianity, civilization, the West, imperialism, racism, fascism, and modernity. Some general ways in which European identity can be defined is through

86 Wilson and Van der Dussen, 115.
87 Spanos, William V. “Heidegger’s Parmenides: Greek Modernity and the Classical Legacy.” 91-105.
88 Delanty, 12-16
Christianity, common history and experience, democracy, a uniting ‘spirit,’ and a belief in modernity.

Many scholars and philosophers have attempted to define Europe by certain characteristics that they believe to be an essential component of the European identity. Christianity, many believe, has played a large role in the formation of the European consciousness. Both Gerard Delanty and T.S. Eliot believed that Christianity had the largest impact on the European culture as it is known today, however Eliot pointed out that it was not the religion itself, but its influence on the development of European art and laws.\footnote{Delanty, 9. Mikkeli, 196} The tragedies of two world wars and the Holocaust, which both occurred on European soil during the past 100 years, further attest to Eliot’s belief in Christianity playing a role in the construction of the European identity in a strictly cultural and historical sense.

Another area that many believe to be a base component of the European identity is the fact that those who like to define themselves as Europeans believe that they share a common history and experience. Many believe that the common experience of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment have created a sense of identity amongst Europeans that only those who have been brought up in a place where post-Enlightenment ideas have shaped society can possess.\footnote{Mikkeli, 195} However, European history can attest to the fact that throughout the centuries, Europe has suffered from multiple divisions between nation-states and between East and West Europe.\footnote{Delanty, 84} Geography has also been cited as playing a role in the formation of the European identity, however, since no official map of Europe exists, geography seems to be a weaker aspect of the
European identity. Delanty also associates geography with the confrontation with Islam.\textsuperscript{92} It is obvious that history and geography have had some influence on the formation of the European identity; however, there are enough contradictions to prevent either from becoming a prominent source of definition of European identity.

Many believe that the common existence of liberal democracy and Roman law within the European laws created throughout the centuries within Europe plays a role in what creates the European identity. It has been cited as a unifying factor as well as a part of the identity.\textsuperscript{93} There is also the concept of a ‘spirit,’ or ‘attitude,’ of Europe as a part of what makes a person European. Europe’s spiritual identity has its roots in Greek philosophy, which has had a great influence on European laws and thoughts.\textsuperscript{94} Valéry advocated this belief in a common uniting European spirit.\textsuperscript{95} Another aspect that some believe to be part of the European identity is the presence of modernity within Europe. Starting with the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, Europeans began to take pride in their belief that they were the most advanced peoples on earth. It was because of these advances in science, medicine, and farming that they began to be able to go out into the world and conquer those who they believed to be “savages.”\textsuperscript{96} This belief in their own modernity has lasted for centuries, and plays a large role in the idea of the European identity.

From all of the intellectual thoughts and publications concerning the European identity, it can be concluded that there is no one way that it can be defined. Many factors have gone into what Europeans believe to be a part of their identity as Europeans, from historical events and
memories, to religion, to the belief in democracy. However, one can also negatively attribute racism, and chauvinism through imperialism and colonialism of the worlds that they believed to be inferior to them. Because none of these factors of the European identity have remained constant throughout history, Europeans relied heavily on their differences from the East (Turkey) in order to maintain some degree of a concrete identity. However, Turkey’s attempts at becoming a part of Europe have thrown even this traditionally stable part of what Europeans based their identities upon off balance, causing a crisis of identity. It is the fear of the traditional ideas of what makes up the European identity being changed once again and the fear of Europe becoming multicultural that has caused many Europeans to turn inward and take more conservative stances towards Turkey. The EU has taken this identity crisis and tried to make it into an issue of identity politics by attempting to define the European identity in order to create a more solid base from which their own political agenda can move forward.

IDENTITY POLITICS AND THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY:

As far as the European Union is concerned, the question of the European identity has become an issue of identity politics. The EU has been trying to create an official European identity so as to become more than just an economic union. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was founded after WWII in order to promote peace and stability on the war-ravaged European continent. It was made up of Western European nations who, for centuries, had been cultivating their own distinct cultures, as well as rivalries and oppositions against each other. The ECSC was initially an economic union, formed on the belief that the creation of economic ties could foster peace on the continent. As the years passed, the ECSC became the
European Economic Community (EEC), and then it became the European Community (EC), and with that change also became more politically minded. It began to become apparent that in order for it to truly become a powerful force in the world, it would need the undying support of its citizens. Thus, in 1973, the EC formed a committee whose sole purpose was to define a common European identity.

In 1973, the EC released a “Declaration on European Identity” enabling them to “achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs.”97 According to this declaration, the European identity was based on the common European heritage, which included consistent attitudes towards life, principles of a representative democracy, the rule of law, social justice, and human rights standards. In 1977, the Commission of the EC developed a ‘cultural policy’ whose goal was to “boost” people’s awareness of the existence of a common European cultural identity.98 Then, in 1984, the Commission formed the “Committee for a People’s Europe,” whose purpose was to promote the EC’s identity and its image in order to create unity among its citizens and to strengthen its stance before the rest of the world.99 Several other actions were taken by the EC throughout the rest of the 1980’s, including the Single European Act in 1987, which aimed at creating more unity within the EC by eliminating nearly all remaining barriers within the EC, and the Schengen Agreement in 1985, which allowed EC citizens to cross any EC border freely.100

Once the EC became the EU, it began to become apparent that the EU was experiencing a “democratic deficit” because its institutions were not transparent, and because most EU citizens

97 Copenhagen Summit Declaration, December 14, 1973. www.ena.lu
99 Shore, 788
did not have a good understanding of how the EU worked. So, in 2001 at the European Council Meeting at Laeken, it was decided that in order to decrease the “deficit,” an EU constitution was in order. The constitution was meant to strengthen democracy, which many hoped would encourage EU citizens to identify more with the EU than with their nation, thus fostering a sense of European identity throughout the EU. The debates surrounding the EU constitution were very heated, resulting in each nation having its own referendum. The possibility of including reference to a common religion sparked heated debates throughout the EU, involving the Pope. This move would be controversial because it would discriminate against Muslim Turkey, thus it was decided after much debate that religion would be left out of the preamble to the EU constitution. As a result of this debate as well as debates on other aspects of the proposed constitution, the EU has been left with no official constitution, and no real sense of an official overall European identity that transcends the national identity. This has become increasingly problematic in the debates surrounding Turkey’s pending EU accession.

THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND TURKEY:

The issue of Turkey’s potential accession into the EU has brought to the surface the fact that there is no distinct definition of European identity. According to Luisa Passerini, people tend to cling to and foster identities when they feel uprooted or endangered. She believes that the emergence of the debate surrounding the European identity is a sign of both “discomfort” and
“uncertainty,” but at the same time it is a “regressive operation to protect old values.” As a result, Europeans have felt the need to define their identity in order to protect themselves from this newfound challenge. Talal Asad further extends this thought by writing that the “discourse of identity indicates not the rediscovery of ethnic loyalties so much as the undermining of old certainties… The discourse of European identity is a symptom of anxieties about non-Europeans.” Thus, the growing consciousness of the European identity, or lack thereof, has only emerged as a major issue facing Europe because of Turkey’s potential accession.

Since the 19th century, Turkey has been making reforms in the image of Europe. These reforms began in response to the declining power of the Ottomans, but continued through the 1923 Revolution because of pressures from Europe itself. Or, as Neumann wrote, in order to “play at the Concert of Europe, ‘the Turk’ had to learn new tunes.” However, no matter how many reforms were made within Turkey, it was still not regarded as equivalent to the other European nations during the early part of the twentieth century. Even as Turkey became its own nation during this time, past prejudices from Europeans remained in place. Thus, the complicated framework that formed the base of the debates concerning Turkey’s EU accession evolved from history into the heated issue that it is today.

The question of European identity and how Turkey fits within it is a very controversial one. Conservative Europeans are not persuaded that Turkey is European. Moreover, those who are sympathetic to Turkey’s cause are still skeptical because they believe that it is not Western enough. Many conservative Europeans see Turkey’s situation as an identity crisis of its

---

105 Passerini, Luisa. “From the Ironies of Identity.” In The Idea of Europe, by Anthony Pagden. 193-4
106 Asad, Talal. “Muslims and European Identity.” In The Idea of Europe, by Anthonly Pagden, 211
107 Neumann, 57-58
108 Neumann, 59-60
109 Ivaldi, Gilles, 54
own, a crisis of a country that is stuck somewhere between Europe and Asia, making it a sort of “hybrid,” according to Kevin Robbins. However, the existence of the debate surrounding Turkey’s EU accession has caused enough of a commotion to catch the attention of all EU citizens, causing them to question their own identities. It is from this exploration of identity amongst both Europeans and Turks that the solution to the issue at hand can be found.

CONCLUSION:

The debate surrounding Turkey’s EU accession has brought to the forefront the fact that there is no distinct definition of European identity. However, the opposition to Turkey that is based on whether it is European remains prominent amongst Europeans. Gerard Delanty has written that the European identity is “rapidly becoming a white bourgeois populism defined in opposition to the Muslim World and the Third World.” This seems to be the case among many Europeans, especially conservatives. Many factors and events have gone into the traditional definitions of what it is to be European. However, as history has shown time and again, the religious, historical, and democratic ideals that so many Europeans feel is a base of their identity have failed to bring complete unity to the European continent. The fact that Europeans are unable to create a distinct definition of what it is to be European has consequences that come to the surface because of the growing multicultural society within Europe as a result of immigration. Muslim immigrants have changed parts of European culture and society in ways that Europeans never dreamed possible, and this has laid the foundation for the identity crisis that Europeans have begun to deal with as a result of Turkey’s potential EU accession.

---

110 Robbins, Kevin. “Interrupting Identities: Turkey/Europe.” In Questions of Cultural Identity, ed. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay. 64-65
111 Delanty, 155
MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS CHAPTER

The phrase “a few bad apples can destroy the whole bunch,” is particularly applicable to the current situation of Muslim immigrants in Europe. Their growing presence has brought to the forefront the negative results of discrimination and the inability of the European nations to successfully integrate them into their societies. Not all Muslim immigrants in Europe fall under the stigma of being uneducated, fanatically religious, and anti-Western. In fact the opposite is true; a large number of Muslim immigrants are not only very successful in school but are also successfully integrated into their communities. In his article “Bridging the European Union and Turkey: The Turkish Diaspora in Europe,” Talip Kucukcan wrote that the second and third generations of the Turkish immigrants were well integrated into the societies of their host countries and had even been able to develop and establish civil society associations. These organizations have been instrumental in creating a Turkish social capital in countries like Holland.\(^{112}\) However, it is the Muslim immigrants who, as a result of their abject poverty and inability to integrate into the local culture, take part in terrorist organizations and become extreme in their Islamic faith. This type of immigrant seems to be the one on whom the European stereotype toward Muslims as a whole is created. It seems that this stereotype is behind much of the European opposition to the accession of Turkey, a country with a secular democratic government but a predominantly Muslim society, into the European Union.

BACKGROUND/CONTEXT:

There are several potential reasons for this shift: changes in political leaders, changes in public opinion, world events involving the Middle East and the West, and identity politics.\textsuperscript{113} The public opinion of Europeans has been very important throughout the process of Turkey’s attempts at EU accession, and has been influenced by several factors, namely the growing presence of Islam within Europe as a result of the influx of immigration during the second half of the twentieth century from Muslim nations, including Turkey. A combination of negative repercussions of this influx of immigrants has caused Europeans, especially conservatives, to unfairly associate them with Turkey’s EU accession. The violence and poverty of many immigrant communities that has come to be negatively associated with Turkey, as has the fear of the economic repercussions of Turkey’s accession on the European economies, as well as the rising fear of terrorism from fundamentalist Muslim groups. The shift in opposition to Turkey’s EU accession seems to have been influenced by the negative European perceptions towards Muslim immigrants.

Since Europe has been experiencing a rise in Muslim immigration since the time in which Turkey first applied for membership in the European Economic Community, their perceptions towards Muslims as a whole, and therefore towards Turkey, are shaped by their day-to-day encounters with the Muslim immigrants present in their countries. In 2003, there were more than 23 million Muslim immigrants residing in Europe, which was nearly 5 percent of the population. This figure has grown in twenty years time, for in 1982 there were 15.6 million Muslims in Europe, making up 3.2 percent of the population. When Turkey is included in the EU, the figures for Muslims in Europe will grow to 90 million, making up fifteen percent of the

\textsuperscript{113} Hurd, 407, Gole, 3
European population.\textsuperscript{114} According to a report of the Independent Commission on Turkey in 2004, opposition to Turkey’s EU accession seems to be the strongest in the countries where there is a significant Turkish immigrant minority, such as Germany, France, Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium.\textsuperscript{115} It is this growth of Muslim presence within Europe that has made so many Europeans fearful and therefore opposed to Turkey’s EU accession.

HISTORY OF MUSLIM IMMIGRATION IN EUROPE:

A Muslim presence in Europe started to reach high levels during the twentieth century, with the arrival of Muslim immigrants from Europe’s colonies. Three main waves can be attributed to the growing influx of Muslim immigrants into Europe, the first coming just after World War II, when there was a widespread shortage of workers within Europe. Muslim men were invited as “guest workers” to come live and work in Europe under the conditions that they would eventually return to their home countries. Also, the decolonization of the French and British Empires during the postwar years contributed to the rise of immigration, as subjects of those colonies were offered citizenship in both Britain and France. The second wave occurred during the 1970’s and 1980’s, with the repatriation of the families of these “guest workers” in Europe. The third wave involved asylum seekers from civil wars and persecution in their home countries. The ending result of these three waves was a very large, dynamic group of Muslims


within Europe who wished to keep their culture, religion, and traditions, while their European counterparts encouraged their assimilation into European culture.  

Initially, these immigrants consisted of mostly men, who went virtually unnoticed in European society. But when their families began to join them in Europe, their presence began to become more apparent as their numbers grew. They also began to become more visible in their communities because of their religious and cultural practices and appearances. These immigrants often ended up living in communities that were separate from the other Europeans, often in the *banlieus* (suburbs) of France or in specific, secluded neighborhoods of other major European cities. Because they were not in the centers of the cities, and they were often unskilled workers, these immigrants were put at a major disadvantage when compared to their European counterparts in the job market and were therefore forced to take low-paying jobs. The cycle of low paying jobs, little or no education, and the inability to get out of their communities is commonly associated with Muslim immigrants in Europe, even those who are of the second and third generations of immigrant families. However, this observation is stereotypical and cannot be applied to all Muslim immigrants and their descendants. But at the same time, it is precisely those who fall into this cycle that are the ones who are attracting the animosity that exudes from Europeans. This cycle has caused poverty and has led to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as some of these Muslims have begun to embrace radical Islam in rebellion against a hostile environment. According to a report by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), “immigrants, and particularly foreigners, are presented as the persons


responsible for the deterioration of security conditions, terrorism, unemployment and increased public expenditure. This process of stigmatization and criminalization provides a breeding ground for racial discrimination towards this part of Europe’s population. Poverty, the rise of political Islamism, as well as the fear of the economic effect of an influx of poor, unskilled immigrants have all been factors in the negative opinions of Europeans towards Muslim immigrants. The Turkish immigrant community in Germany has been no exception to this treatment of Muslim immigrants in Europe.

TURKISH IMMIGRANTS IN GERMANY:

The negative actions of certain Muslim immigrants have had a large impact on the opinion of Europeans towards Turkey’s EU accession. However, more often that not, these negative actions of Muslim immigrants are a direct response of the ways in which they are regarded and treated by their European counterparts. The Turkish immigrants in Germany are a good example of this. Germany contains one of the largest Turkish expatriate communities in Europe. However, Germany is also a prominent opponent of Turkey’s EU accession, since the election of Angela Merkel in 2005.

German citizenship is based on blood, or *jus sanguinis*. Thus, any person can easily become German, even if they were born in a different country, as long as they have German ancestry. This makes it rather difficult for Turkish immigrants in Germany to gain citizenship, although it is possible once they have reached certain challenging measures. Also, as in most

---

119 ECRI report, 32
120 Haddad, Yvonne Yazbek and Jane I. Smith. *Muslim Minorities in the West*. Altamira Press, Walnut Creek, CA, 2002. 177-78
European countries, native Germans and Turks live separately with much animosity existing between the two.\textsuperscript{121} Former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl also stated at one point that Turkish immigrants are “German citizens of Turkish heritage,” in response to Neo-nazi attacks on Turkish immigrant residences in the early 1990’s.\textsuperscript{122} Another separating factor is that Islam is not given the same legal distinction as Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism within the German government. Christian and Jewish schools and churches are subsidized by the state, while mosques are not.\textsuperscript{123} Because of the anxiety and animosity that these Turkish immigrants receive before they even set foot in Germany, many begin to turn towards measures that they would normally veer away from in Turkey.

Turkish immigrants in Germany are met with the same prejudices and hostilities that Muslim immigrants are met with across Europe. The German media has focused largely on this fact, and uses it as a separation mechanism, citing Huntington’s thesis on the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ as a reason to not help these immigrants to integrate into society. Germans throughout history have created a part of their identity based on the opposition towards an “Other.” Traditionally, it was the Jews who were separated from Germans as the “Other” from which they could derive their identity, with disastrous results. However, since World War II and the influx of immigrants into Germany, the category of “Other” has been shifted from Jews to Muslims. It is partially because of the inherent prejudice of the German people towards outsiders that the Turkish immigrants in Germany have remained a separate entity (Haddad and Smith, p. 183-185). As a result, many have resorted to religion in order to find an identity and a sense of belonging. Mosques have taken on the form of community centers, markets, etc. in

\textsuperscript{121} Lebor, Adam. \textit{A Heart Turned West: Among the Muslims of Europe and America}. St. Martin’s Press, New York. 1997. 188
\textsuperscript{122} Lebor, 197
\textsuperscript{123} Haddad and Smith, 183-185
Germany rather than simply houses of prayer like they are in Turkey, thus forcing these immigrants to become even more inward, and increasing the German animosity towards them (Haddad and Smith, p. 186-187). As a result, the Turkish immigrant community in Germany has “redefined” the idea of being Turkish from it being a nationality to a religious distinction. Thus it is the “Muslim Turks” who give Germans their perception of Turkey in a religious sense rather than in a political one, causing them to oppose Turkey’s EU accession.

EUROPEANS’ INTERNAL ISSUES:

Although the ways in which many European Muslims live and behave in Europe has caused them to be discriminated against, much of this opposition to their presence comes from within Europeans themselves. Europeans had been largely “emigrant” during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with citizens migrating to North America and other areas of the world, leaving their mother countries mostly homogenous. However, after WWII, with the first big wave of immigration, Europe had to begin to deal with migration into Europe. Thus, Europeans were never really open and receptive to the idea of immigration into their homelands and therefore never took the initiative to aide these immigrants in integrating into European culture.\textsuperscript{124} The large influx of immigrants is further negated by the fact that more and more Europeans are becoming xenophobic, or fearful of foreigners. Many xenophobes are fearful of the potential outcomes of change within their cultures as a result of the influx of immigrants, and therefore perceive them in negative ways.\textsuperscript{125} Racism has traditionally been present in Europe,

stemming back to the anti-Semitism that existed for centuries. The growing number of Muslims within Europe has given racist Europeans a new group to target. Also, the rise of terrorism from Jihadi Salifis has given Europeans a reason to become fearful and cause many to stereotype Muslims as a whole as pro-violence or as terrorists.

The influx of Muslim immigrants into Europe has also caused many Europeans to question their identity as Europeans, questioning where Islam fits within that identity. This has been particularly the case in France, where there have been problems with integrating immigrants into the French society. There are also two schools of thought concerning integration. Many Europeans believe that integration only truly occurs in the second or third generation and is also indicated by mastery of the colloquial language, improvement in performance at school, rising in position on the social ladder, marriages between immigrants and locals, a decline in birth rate, and a decrease in religious practice. However, according to Hasan Kosebalaban, integration is a “structural and institutional term without cultural connotations” and is a “recognition and appreciation of multiculturalism.” Integration is different from assimilation in that it shifts identities towards each other, making the necessary changes along the way, but does not try to dissipate the existing identities that do not fit. In theory, integration/multiculturalism makes the most sense, but many Europeans are not fond of the idea of having to make changes in their culture in order to live in harmony with immigrants who do not, in their minds, belong there in the first place. This feeling is exemplified in a statement by German Chancellor Angela Merkel that “the idea of a multicultural society cannot succeed. It is prone to failure from the start. Multiculturalism is not integration.”

---

127 Kosebalaban, 107-8
All of these factors have contributed to a shift of established European political parties to the right in terms of immigration. According to an article by Dan Bilefsky and Ian Fisher published in the *New York Times* in 2006, anti-immigration stances were traditionally taken by more conservative European parties. These issues also seem to have pushed some moderates, both ordinary people and politicians, to question the limits of tolerance and multiculturalism.128

As a reflection of these opinions towards immigration becoming more negative amongst Europeans, leaders such as French President Nicolas Sarkozy have been elected with campaign platforms that are specifically anti-immigration as well as anti-Turkish EU accession. Within his first few months in office in 2007, Sarkozy put together a bill that would make it more difficult for immigrant families to come into France because they would have to learn basic French as well as its history and customs before being allowed into the country. They would also be required to sign a contract stating that they would make every effort to integrate their families into France. All of this is in effort to protect the French identity, another important aspect of Sarkozy’s immigration policy.129 Europeans have many reservations and prejudices as far as Muslim immigrants are concerned, and this is shaping their attitudes towards Turkey and its EU aspirations as a result.

HOW TURKEY IS AFFECTED:

---

Under the Schengen Agreement, the free movement of EU citizens throughout any EU country is guaranteed. If Turkey were to become a member of the EU, this freedom would apply to Turkish citizens as well. Since there are already such large numbers of immigrants from Muslim countries from North Africa and the Middle East, the free movement of Turkish citizens strikes a major chord among Europeans. They envision the influx of Turks into Europe in the same way that they envision a large influx of Muslim immigrants, and not in the ways that they envision the movement of people from other EU states. Many Europeans worry about the economic effects of the large immigration of unskilled migrants from poor areas of Turkey if it is admitted into the EU. They also worry that they will take over jobs that Europeans feel rightfully belong to them and that unwanted crime and violence will accompany them. They are also concerned with the idea of their governments having to pay for these unskilled and uneducated immigrants and their families who tend to live in abject poverty. This is one of the main reasons for European opposition to Turkey’s EU accession and has been heavily influenced by the large numbers of immigrants already present within Europe.

The opinion of the public vis-à-vis Turkey’s EU accession is very important in the success of its accession into the EU. As mentioned earlier, the number of xenophobes in Europe is on the rise, and it is this fear of foreigners that is related to their opinion towards Turkey, seen

---

130 McCormick, 275  
132 Muftuler-Bac, 20-21  
133 Muftuler-Bac, 20-21  
134 Muftuler-Bac, 20-21
through the “prism” of Muslim immigrants in Europe.\textsuperscript{135} A study done by Sara De Master and Michael K. Le Roy in their academic work “Xenophobia and the European Union,” empirically investigates the relationship between the support for European integration and xenophobia. In the study, they used data from the \textit{Eurobarometer 41.1} from 1994, which included questions about support for European integration as well as regarding the perceptions of foreigners. The respondents were asked seven questions concerning foreigners in order to properly gauge their opinions towards foreigners and in order make sure that their xenophobic tendencies were accurately displayed. The questions touched on the respondents’ thoughts towards the amount of immigrants in their countries, whether they thought immigration was a problem in their countries, and specific questions that included issues such as their feelings on immigrants’ exploitation of social welfare, increased unemployment, delinquency and violence, problems as neighbors, and unsuccessful mixed marriages. The findings of the survey indicated that respondents who seemed to be more xenophobic were less supportive of European integration. It also found that those who seemed to be more supportive of European integration were less xenophobic, thus concluding that xenophobia directly correlates with the support of Europeans towards the integration of Europe.\textsuperscript{136} Although xenophobia can also be applied to immigrants from Eastern European countries regarding the full integration of the former Soviet-bloc nations, it is especially applicable to Turkey’s case. Alongside xenophobia as an important part of the reason for many Europeans’ opposition to Turkey’s EU accession, world events have significantly influenced Europeans’ perceptions towards the presence of Muslims in the EU.


\textsuperscript{136} De Master and Le Roy, 426-430
The rise of the fear of terrorism from fundamentalist Muslim groups within Europe such as al-Qaeda and the Hizb ut-Tahrir since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 has contributed to Europeans’ fears of the repercussions of dispondent Muslim immigrants within their nations. These terrorist groups target dispirited Muslim immigrant youth who feel as if they are on the outside because of the discrimination and separation they have experienced, giving them a purpose and a sense of belonging. It is the violence that these groups teach and force these youths to take part in that the international world is familiar with and that creates stereotypes against Muslim immigrants that actually only apply to a small faction. The rising awareness of the dangers of such groups in Europe is apparent in British home secretary John Reid’s public statement to Muslim parents in 2006 that they must guard their children from becoming brainwashed by such groups. Muslims have also noticed a difference in European attitudes towards them since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the gravity of the situation became a reality. One Belgian woman was even quoted in the New York Times, stating that she now hesitates to tell people that she is married to a Muslim immigrant, whereas before she was very eager to tell people. She is fearful of the negative responses she might receive. Because many Europeans negatively view Muslims as potential terrorists, their perceptions towards Turkey and the implications of having a large, predominantly Muslim country as a part of the EU remain distorted.

CONCLUSIONS:

138 Bilefsky and Fisher, 3
139 Bilefsky and Fisher, 3
There are many different ways in which Europe can deal with this new influx of Muslim immigrants that could result in better relations between Europeans and Muslims, and therefore with Turkey, that have been brought to the forefront and discussed throughout Europe. One opinion regarding Muslim immigration involves European governments aiding these immigrants in assimilating into the culture of the European country that they have chosen to be their new home. The problem with assimilation is that it “places the burden on the politically dominated and culturally inferior group,” and shows a “dualistic philosophy” in which there are two distinct and separated groups, with the “inferior” group being the one to change in order to fit within the “superior” group. It is this European prejudice towards these immigrants and insistence that they are “different” and “culturally inferior” that cause them to be referred to as “Muslims in Europe” instead of “European Muslims.”

Another opinion regarding how to ameliorate the situation between Europeans and Muslim immigrants is to integrate them into European society, not by forcing them to forget their culture and traditions and comply with European culture, but by both sides coming together and making compromises that will result in better relations between Muslim immigrants and their European counterparts. Although Europeans like to think that they are a liberal, accepting, multicultural society, those beliefs cannot be truly legitimate if Europeans refuse to make some concessions regarding their acceptance of Islam into their society, resulting in the EU’s acceptance of Turkey as a member state.

The debate over Turkey’s EU accession is a long and complicated one that goes much deeper than the socio-economic/political disparities between Turkey and the EU as traditionally cited by the EU as reasons why Turkey cannot become a member. They involve deeper issues

---

140 Kosebalaban, 108
141 Kosebalaban, 108
that are not so easily voiced by the EU but that exist just the same. The common thread running
through all of these cultural reasons for opposition is the religious factor. The fact that the
numbers of Muslims present in Europe have tripled and quadrupled in the past few decades, as
well as the rise of crime rates and poverty amongst those numbers has not helped the image of
Islam amongst Europeans. It seems only natural that Europeans would think of the more
negative aspects of the Muslim immigrants that they come into contact with on a daily basis
when they think of the prospect of Turkey becoming a member of the EU, and thus, in a sense,
becoming “European.” However, the reality is that if Europe wants to truly set an example for
tolerance for the rest of the world and truly become multicultural, it must make concessions and
do the best it can not only to integrate the Muslim immigrants, but to also accept Turkey for what
it is: a secular democracy with the main difference from Europe being the existence of Islam as
the dominant religion amongst its citizens.
CONCLUSION:

It is apparent that the European identity crisis and growing presence of Islam in Europe via Muslim immigrants have had a significant effect on European attitudes towards Turkey’s EU accession. This is especially true in France, where these attitudes have been reflected in the media and where the shift in type of opposition has occurred almost simultaneously as the shift to the Right in French politics. In the media, the editorials published in the conservative *Le Figaro* opposed Turkey on the grounds of cultural differences began in 1997 and strengthened during the following years. This trend reflected the growing conservative movement and showed that a shift in type of opposition was taking place. The editorials of the more liberal *Le Monde* reflected conservative sentiments around key events, and in later years discounted them while arguing in favor of Turkey. Thus, the fact that a change in type of opposition had taken place was acknowledged.

Through the debates surrounding Turkey’s EU accession, the ambiguity of Turkey’s identity as ‘European’ or the ‘other’ has brought to the surface the fact that there is no EU-wide accepted definition of what it is to be ‘European.’ This has caused a sort of identity crisis to occur within Europe. The chapter on European identity offered many ways in which the European identity has traditionally been defined: Christianity, common history, geography, liberal democracy, human rights, etc. It is to these definitive factors that conservative Europeans cling when attempting to distinguish themselves from Turkey. However, as the last several hundred years of history can attest (the Crusades, World Wars I and II, Capitalism vs. Communism, the Holocaust), the factors that conservative Europeans believe fundamentally separate them from Turkey are unable to withstand the tests of time. It is this realization, and the
uncertainty of what lies in the future of the European identity, that lies at the heart of the debate surrounding Turkey’s EU accession.

The fact of the matter is that conservative Europeans greatly fear the growing reality that is a multicultural Europe and its implications on what they believe to be the European identity. Xenophobia, as some would call it, has caused conservative Europeans to barricade themselves from a society that is rapidly transforming around them. This has caused them to become more racist and close-minded. It is these types of attitudes that have prevented Muslim immigrants from being able to successfully integrate into the European societies that they now call home, and have even pushed them into radical Islam in order to feel a sense of belonging. The resulting violence and terrorism has caused conservative Europeans to become even more introverted and racist. These attitudes towards the Muslim immigrants that Europeans come into contact with on a daily basis have been directed towards Turkey because its citizens are predominantly Muslim and conservative Europeans fear the repercussions of an influx of Turkish Muslim immigrants into Europe.

From all of this, it can be suggested that although on the surface it appears that a shift in type of opposition has taken place, the oppositions towards Turkey that fall under the category of culture, and that have only in recent years begun to take hold, have always been present. Because Turkey’s dossier as an EU candidate is continuously shrinking as it meets more and more of the Copenhagen Criteria, Europeans are beginning to have to grapple around for other reasons that could prevent Turkey from becoming a part of Europe. It is this growing lack of failures to meet the Copenhagen Criteria that has caused conservative Europeans to cling to the remaining oppositions, even if some fall under the category of discriminatory and all are unfit for print in the official literature of the European Union.
The growing reality of the probability of Turkey eventually joining the European Union and the crisis of identity that this has caused has only helped to strengthen the cultural factors that have long been in the background of the opposition towards Turkey becoming an official member. The same is true of the growing anxieties among Europeans as a result of the presence of Islam within their societies. The violence and poverty that has unfortunately come to be associated with Muslim immigrants in Europe in recent years has caused Europeans to become more conservative and equate Islam with evil. These opinions have, as a result, been applied to Turkey because its citizens are predominantly Muslim. The violent actions of these socially suffocated Muslim immigrants have only made Europeans become more conservative and have therefore caused larger numbers to stand behind oppositions towards Turkey that some could label as ‘discriminatory,’ which makes them legitimate in the eyes of conservative Europeans. The media in France has further strengthened the conservative force behind these cultural oppositions by way of editorials that were written throughout the time period of Turkey’s attempts at complying with the Copenhagen Criteria and gaining status as official EU candidate. The conservative movement within France was strengthened by the content of these editorials, and reflected the rise of conservative opposition towards Turkey in the form of objections based on cultural differences.

What can be taken from this is that Europeans need to come to terms with the reality that identities are constantly changing and shifting, and that theirs is becoming one that includes a Muslim faction, whether or not Turkey is admitted into the EU. One aspect of their identity in which Europeans have always taken pride is the belief that their society is one with open-minded, liberal values. However, the refusal to welcome Turkey into the European Union goes against this belief because most of the opposition is based on factors that are very conservative.
and close-minded. Europe has also always taken pride in their belief that they are a leader of advancement in science, philosophy. If Europeans put aside their prejudices and allow Turkey to become a member of the EU, they can again be the example for the rest of the world of tolerance and acceptance of those with different beliefs and customs. If this can be accomplished, then it can be a start towards ameliorating the relations between the East and West, and Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis can be disproved once and for all.
Appendix A.

The cultural differences between Turkey and the EU Member States are too significant to allow for this accession.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU 25</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Cyprus</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia - LV</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania - LT</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area not controlled by the gov't of the Republic of Cyprus</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BIBLIOGRAPHY:


“Chirac’s ruling party opposes Turkey’s bid for talks to join the EU.” *AFX European Focus*. 7 April 2004. LexisNexis. J.D. Williams Library, University of Mississippi. 30 September 2008.

Copenhagen Summit Declaration, December 14, 1973. [www.ena.lu](http://www.ena.lu)


Jacobs 78


World Development Indicators 2007
