Confucianism and the Modern East Asian

by
Paul Jennings Treutel

A thesis submitted to the faculty of The University of Mississippi in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College and the Croft Institute for International Studies.

Approved by

_____
Dr. Gang Guo

_____
Dr. Minjoo Oh

_____
Dr. Kees Gispen

Paul Jennings Treutel

Table of Contents

This thesis was formatted using Chicago Style.

List of Tables

The Relevance of Confucianism Today

Introduction

As many Western businessmen, government officials, and tourists can attest, the Eastern Asian nations of today are a far cry from the descriptions in Coleridge's *Kubla Khan*, Polo's *The Travels of Marco Polo*, or any number of published and private accounts of daily life written by the Westerners in the 18th,19th, and even early 20th centuries. The relaxing of tradition, changes in governance, and success of globalized[1] culture have fundamentally altered East Asian culture to the point that, at first glance, there seems little to differentiate citizens of Taipei from citizens of Los Angeles. The countries of East Asia experience steady economic growth, have high-tech industrial sectors, and burgeoning or established middle classes with aspirations and desires very similar to the world's other middle classes. It appears that proponents of globalization were right—cultural identities are becoming blurred, economies are interdependent, and the world's peoples are merging into a uniform, global community.

Tempting though such a view may be, especially with globalization as the focus of much current economic and sociological research, accepting it out of hand would be a mistake. Not much more than a century ago, when the seeds of globalization were just beginning to take root, Western scholars were infatuated with the so-called "Orient," examining elements of East Asian culture either through rose-tinted glasses, or through Christian or Enlightment-tinged prejudice and condescension. Examples of the rosy outlook are seen in the numerous works of fiction

1 Some would argue "Americanized" (Mendis, 2005, 5-6).

published in the West depicting a romanticized, otherworldly East Asia (Buruma 1999), while the latter approach is evident even in serious sociological work such as Max Weber's "The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism". Though such biased views have been recognized today as, at best, a hindrance, and at worst, destructive to intercultural relations and understanding, the researchers, travellers, and novelists of the Orientalist era were not irrational people. They sensed something fundamentally, tangibly different in the cultures of East Asia. Researchers today purport to view issues with maximum objectivity; however, the sheer volume of literature on Confucian values in East Asia and the still-greater volume published on its watered-down conceptual cousin, "Asian values," by researchers on both sides of the Pacific show that the East-West culture divide is impossible to ignore[2]. (Huang 2007) But when and from where does this difference originate?

Prior to the twentieth century, China had for several millennia been the cultural hegemon of the East Asian region, and the ideas espoused by its rulers and people were emulated by nearby kingdoms after being filtered through and mixed with their own respective cultures. Thus, for much of recorded history, the general trends of Chinese thought and evolution of Chinese government dictated the pace of change and development for the nations within China's sphere of influence. This cultural dominance began with the prosperity of the Han Dynasty, formed in 206BC. Viewing the Legalist school of thought as a direct contributor to the fall of the Qin Dynasty, Han Dynasty officials instead adopted the teachings of Confucius as a foundation on which to build the government structure, legal code, and morality of the new empire. The Han Dynasty lasted until 220AD, when it collapsed under the combined stresses of factionalism, administrative

2 Often grouping East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Subcontinent into the word "Asia."

incompetence, and corruption, plunging China into several centuries of weak government, constant warfare, and incursions from a new, alien religion: Buddhism. Confucian tradition seemed to have all but faded, but the Tang, Song, and Ming Dynasties, and even the non-Chinese Qing Dynasty, each revived Confucianism as their guiding principles and saw great stability and prosperity. There was something about Confucianism that worked, and with each successive revival it became more and more ingrained in Chinese life, and by extension, the lives of Koreans, Japanese, and even Southeast Asian peoples.

With such successes, one would expect to see people so steeped in generations upon generations of Confucian history to be visibly Confucian in their lifestyles. But where is Confucianism to be seen among a crowd of stylish, tipsy young adults leaving a noisy, smoky *noraebang* in Busan? Where is it evident in the jeans-clad crowds window-shopping in the Taipei's flashy Ximengding shopping district? Where are the manifestations of Confucianism in the businessmen hurrying impersonally past one another through the wide, sterile avenues of Shanghai's Pudong business district? One is far more likely to stumble across a Buddhist temple in China or a Christian wedding at a church in South Korea than to see a Confucian institute of learning or a Confucian ritual in progress. So does Confucianism still exist in East Asia, or is it a relic of the past, discarded along with emperors and imperial examinations?

This paper aims to answer this question in four steps. First, a thorough review of relevant literature and similar studies will provide an academic context for this research. Second, a clear definition of what exactly is meant by the term "Confucianism" will be laid out. Third, a well-researched history of Confucianism's development in each country will be provided in order to understand the proclivities and biases unique to each Confucian nation. Fourth, a quantitative

analysis of select questions from AsiaBarometer's 2006 survey data on the daily lives, attitudes, and social relationships will be complemented by a qualitative analysis of the results (AsiaBarometer 2006, Profile).

Theoretical Framework

There are many theories as to how Confucian values fit into the ever-changing social landscape of East Asia, but the there are two that stand above the rest. The first is that Confucianism is a relic of the past, destined to be swept away by the increasingly powerful tides of globalization. The second is that Confucianism, having been vilified as the cause of East Asia's relative backwardness and frailty during nineteenth century skirmishes with the West, smacks of feudalism and obsolence to most East Asians. However, it remains a highly influential belief system that lies dormant among East Asian peoples, and could be a key to greater economic prosperity and political harmony within the region.

An example of the former is the theory articulated by Princeton professor of sociology and notable researcher of Confucianism Gilbert Rozman. Rozman portrays Confucian values as struggling to survive in the conflict between particularist elements (namely, nationalism, low levels of trust in society, nepotism, and protectionist economic policy) and universalist elements (esteeming merit above nationality or personal connections, and less government intervention in the economy to promote competition). According to Rozman, East Asia gradually became completely “Confucianized” in the centuries leading up to the twentieth century. Confucianism's greatest strength, its social and administrative stability, became the region's greatest weakness as particularism had stifled competition and rigid adherence to tradition had all but stamped out innovation. East Asia was neither ready nor able to adapt to a challenge from outside their

Confucian bubble, as demonstrated by the decay of Qing authority through the nineteenth century and the dominance of post-Meiji, modernized Japan over the region's backward, Confucian kingdoms. One by one, layers of Confucianism were stripped away from society. “Imperial Confucianism,” the amalgamation of Qin-era Legalism tempered with Han dynasty Confucianism practiced by the emperors and kings of China, Korea, and Japan, was the first casualty, destroyed by the Meiji Restoration, the annexation of Korea by Imperial Japan, and the prolonged death of the Qing Dynasty. "Elite Confucianism,” which emphasized self-cultivation, art, and learning and was practiced by the Confucian nobility, died along with the abolition of the imperial exam system in China and Korea and the samurai class in Japan. All that remains today is “mass Confucianism,” the form of Confucius' teachings practiced by the common people that emphasized family and lineage relationships (Rozman 1991, 162-163).

Roughly a century after the emperors were deposed and the elites replaced by a burgeoning middle class, mass Confucianism remained the most visible fragment of particularism left by the once all-encompassing, particularist Confucian value system. Subtle and overt sexism, nepotism, and corporate patriarchy are seen as the residual effects of previous, greater social evils such as foot binding, hereditary nobility, and total patriarchal dominance. Mass Confucianism is the last surviving form of Confucianism, and it is currently gradually being dismantled as East Asians citizens seek a way to enjoy the economic development and increased living standards of the West by adopting universalism (Rozman, 2002, 25-26). With the last and perhaps most fundamental form of Confucianism under constant erosion from successively globalized, universalist generations, the future of Confucianism appears bleak (Rozman 2002).

The second major theory, that of Confucianism remaining suppressed but ingrained in all

aspects of East Asian life, is best articulated in the book "Confucianism for the Modern World." Confucianism as a worldview is still dominant in the region, manifest in Korean citizens' demands for the qualities of "uprightness" (in essence, *ren*) and "knowing one's station" (in essence, *li*) in their elected officials, and the frequent use of Confucian aphorisms in political discourse as examples of such a worldview. Obvious though these manifestations may seem, the conventional wisdom that Confucianism, particularly *li,* is merely a tool for authoritarian leaders to promote blind loyalty to their regime makes Confucianism a dirty word in politics (Hahm, 2003, 47-48). In another example, this time from the 1990s, a Korean schoolteacher was asked about the importance of "moral education" and responded as follows:

> *In the primary and secondary school curriculum moral education is always mentioned before all other subjects, because the right way of living is more important than anything else.* ***Learning to live as a member of society, as a civilized citizen, is the most important thing. In order to lead a civilized life, we need models, ideas and guidelines, and we need discipline.*** *Our instruction aims at getting the children to think about these subjects, and* ***the final goal is to lead them in the right direction, to lead them to behave as they were taught.*** *That is why moral education is always mentioned first, even before the Korean language.* (Helgelsen, 1998, 169) (emphasis added)

Translated into Confucian parlance, this teacher is saying that the marriage of "learning" and "virtue" is paramount in one's education (Helgesen, 2003, 161). The bolded portion of the above quote is nearly a direct paraphrase of Confucius' own words: "Deep study of knowledge and restraining oneself in accordance with *li* allow one to not stray from the right path" (Analects VI, 27). With careful avoidance or perhaps with ignorance of Confucian vocabulary, the Confucian context in which the Korean teacher saw the integration of morality into students' education is evident. A third example lies in the contrast between Western and East Asian approaches to law. In the West, the primary method of resolving legal conflicts is litigation, a competitive process that

often worsens disputes. In China, where Confucianism has long promoted conflict resolution through consenus, the favored method for resolving legal battles is mediation (Chen, 2003, 276). Mediation, though no longer directly based on passages from the Confucian canon, follows roughly the same format as it did under Confucian imperial rule. Its main aim is to promote a voluntary resolution of conflict consistent with the state's laws. In practice, those who enter into mediation do not always do so voluntarily, invalidating any so-called "consensus" that is reached; however, the prominence of mediation in Chinese courts and attempts by judges to mediate even after litigation has commenced highlight an important difference in legal practice from the West, a difference rooted in Confucian values of social harmony and the importance of relationships (Chen, 2003, 284-287).

There are myriad examples such as the ones provided above; suffice to say, in contrast to Rozman's globalization theory, there is just as strong an argument that Confucianism is alive and well in East Asia.

Review of Literature

The Changing Confucian Family: Two Studies

Confucianism has been studied by Western scholars since Max Weber's “The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism” began the dialogue nearly 150 years ago. This review of the most recent literature similar in focus to this paper or relevant to the Confucian character of Taiwan, Korea, and China will provide a context in which to integrate my thesis.

In their study of Confucianism in the modern Korean family, Park and Cho define Confucianism as the popular belief system of China, Japan, and Korea as influenced by Taoism, Legalism, Mohism, and Buddhism. As discussed in the history section, Confucian values have pervaded Korean society for a millennium and have had their greatest impact over the last two centuries; direct evidence of this can be found in Korea's strictly hierarchical social structure and the emphasis on family as the fundamental unit of society. Today, Confucianism has become a social ethic so pervasive, influential, and second-nature that for most Koreans it is virtually invisible—only about one percent of Koreans claim to actively practice Confucianism as a religion (Park and Cho, 1995, 117-118).

Park and Cho give a demographic profile of the Korean family that reflects a decline in traditional values. Around the middle of the twentieth century Korea was no different from the majority of the world in that nuclear families were the most common family unit. However, “stem families," a cultural phenomenon with origins unique to the Confucian world, also formed a large

minority of Korean households. A sort of middle ground between the nuclear family and the Chinese three-generational home, stem families consisted of two parents and a married son living together. Such a system allowed most children to enjoy greater freedom and mobility after marriage, while still leaving one child to fulfill the traditional Confucian duty of filial piety. Industrialization seems to have weakened this tradition, however, and stem families declined from roughly one third of Korean households to around one tenth over the course of a century (Park and Cho, 1995, 121-122). An illustration of this from a different vantage point is the decline in household size over the same period; in 1966, the average Korean household had 5.5 occupants, while in 1990 the number had shrunk to 3.8 (Park and Cho, 1995, 122). This seems suggests that increasing numbers of children valued personal goals over the traditional Confucian virtue of filial piety; however, there were other factors at work during this same period that may also explain the change. The increasing freedom and equality enjoyed by women during this period saw users of contraception balloon from less than one tenth to over three quarters of all women. Predictably, the birth rate was affected as well, falling steeply from an average of six children in 1960 to an average of less than two in 1990 (Park and Cho, 1995, 123-124). In 1980, 60% of Koreans couples said that they would not adopt a child or take on a concubine if they were unable to have children. In 1990, 42% of couples opined that they either did not need an heir or would accept a daughter to continue the family lineage, and only 18% believed that children should always obey their parents (Park and Cho, 1995, 125). These numbers show an obvious relaxing of pre-industrial Confucian patriarchal values. Despite such shifts, Korea is still far from an egalitarian nation. More girls go to school now than ever before and female representation in post-middle school education has roughly quadrupled, but there are still two boys for every girl in post-middle school institutions.

The sexual division of labor still has men as the unchallenged breadwinners; in 1980, 42% of the female labor force were unpaid family laborers, mostly in rural areas (Park and Cho, 1995, 127). Industrialization appears not to have destroyed Korean Confucianism, but merely softened its harshest tenets.

Lee and Sun's study on Taiwanese family and demographics asserts that in Taiwan, as in most other Confucian societies, family is the most important basic family unit, and that “although changes in family following the industrialization, urbanization, and contact with Western ideals are in progress, the deep-seated ideas and behavioral patterns associated with Chinese family life have not been overturned” (Lee and Sun, 1995, 101). According to Lee and Sun, the majority of people in Taiwan believe in a “mixture of Confucianism and animism permeated with Taoist elements and often placed in a Buddhist framework" (Lee and Sun, 1995, 101). East Asian religions borrow from each other rather freely, and it is not uncommon for people to adhere to multiple religious traditions. Ancestor worship is a crucial part of familial duty, pointing to the Confucian aspect of the Taiwanese mixed religion. The only major exception from the aforementioned generalizations is the Taiwanese Christian community. Protestants are forbidden from idol worship and thus eschew the rituals of ancestor worship or practice a stripped-down version. The nature and core teachings of Christianity, namely that relationships ought to be based on love and respect, undermine Confucian patrilineal structure to a degree that interpersonal relations in Taiwanese Christian families are likely very different from their non-Christian neighbors (Lee and Sun, 1995, 102, 113). The study also mentions that “there are very few studies which investigate the variations in the religious aspect of the family in Taiwan, ... [since] there are only a small proportion of citizens in religious groups other than animist, ... and the strong family-oriented

tradition pervades and overwhelms religious belief in various aspects of people's life in this society" (Lee and Sun, 1995, 106).

"Stem families," discussed above, and "joint stem families," namely families that have two or more married children taking care of the parents, are gradually declining in number while nuclear families are slowly becoming more numerous. The impact of this decrease in stem families ought not be overestimated, however; in 1985, about 75% of elderly Taiwanese lived with a son to care for them and at least another 15% lived in close proximity to such a son (Lee and Sun, 1995, 103).

Marriage is a highly important part of Taiwanese life. The percentage of women married or previously married hovers around 99% for the 1960-1990 period. Son preference also remains strong. In 1990, women in their 20s averaged 1.35 sons and 1.08 daughters, while women in their 30s reported a still stronger son preference with an average of 1.47 sons and 1.17 daughters (Lee and Sun, 1995, 105). Contraceptive use also supports this, with sonless couples reporting slightly lower rates in birth control usage. Among "animists," that is, believers of Taoism, Buddhism, and indigenous religions, son preference and submission of the wife to the husband have remained constant, while in the agnostic and Christian minorities adherence to these traditions has slightly fallen (Lee and Sun, 1995, 104).

As in Korea, women's lives have changed drastically since industrialization. The statistics are similar to those discussed in Park and Cho's study; however, change in Taiwan seems to have been more conservative, as fertility rates only dropped from 5.8 in 1965 to 3.2 in 1985. The latter figure is twice Korea's rate in roughly the same period, in spite of the fact that Taiwan had industrialized slightly earlier. Contraception has shown trends similar to those described in Park

and Cho's study. In 1965, use among the female population was at 24%, and by 1990 it had risen to 80%. In 1990, a slight majority of women were not part of the workforce before marriage, though this majority is on the decline. After marriage and childbirth, an large majority of women remained at home, with only 20% of those previously employed returning to work (Lee and Sun, 1995, 108).

Summary and Relevance

These two studies of the changes in family life in two major Confucian societies lend credence to Rozman's theory that mass Confucian particularism is being supplanted by universalism. The decrease in the number of stem families, importance of heirs (and by extension, lineage), and number of children per family in both societies is evidence that family ties and, possibly, social connections are becoming less important. Of equal interest is the improved status of women, which shows a slight decrease in the particularist Confucian idea that women are inferior solely because of their sex. Finally, both studies emphasize that Confucianism is not widely practiced as a religion. This lends support to the idea that Confucianism is first and foremost a social order and has few visible rituals or manifestations today.

The Quality of Life in Confucian States: Three Studies

A series of three parallel quantitative studies published in 2008 in *Social Indicators Research,* namely “The Quality of Life in Taiwan,” by Yao, Cheng, and Cheng, "The Quality of Life in Korea," by Chong-Min Park, and "The Quality of Life in China," by Shu and Zhu, the quality of life in Taiwan, Korea, and China is quantified. The data analyzed was from the AsiaBarometer Survey

2006, which covered a host of East Asian countries. The basic methodology used in each study was the grouping of 25 “life domains” such as access to health care, home ownership, and trust of others into five different spheres. These categories were material, nonmaterial, personal, interpersonal, and public. The material sphere consisted of material desires such as income and standards of living; the nonmaterial sphere of desires such as leisure and spiritual pursuits; the personal sphere of health, education, and employment; the interpersonal sphere of relationships with others; and the public sphere of desires such as public safety and politics. A few similarities cropped up during each study's appraisal of its respective society. First was the trend of greatest happiness in the interpersonal sphere and least satisfaction with the public sphere. This signifies general harmony between family, friends, and acquaintances and a low opinion of the various governments' efforts to curb crime and pollution and to open the government up to the democratic process. All countries reported low satisfaction with the material sphere, and placed very little importance on the nonmaterial sphere. Park and Cho provided an analysis of the reasons for this in Korea that is generalizable to all three nations: “The prioritization of their values reveals that they care much more about the need for having than about the need for being. This finding suggests that the Korean people have not yet fully acquired a sense of existential security.”

The differences in the findings between countries were not particularly surprising. Taiwan and Korea were very similar. Both societies reported the material life domain as the greatest factor in overall happiness. Health was the most important material life domain. Although 41% of the population professed Taoism, 31% professed Buddhism, and 3% professed Christianity, 49% of believers claimed they never prayed or meditated and only 11% claimed to do so frequently. Of those 11%, 41% were Christian. Korea had very similar statistics but with a slightly lower

percentage of believers, a higher proportion of Christians, and a higher proportion of both prayerful and non-praying individuals. This suggests that belief in Taoism and Buddhism only entails participation in lunar calendar-based rituals. In Taiwan, of the top twelve most important values in a ranking of twenty-five, four were personal, three were material, three were interpersonal, two were public, and none were nonmaterial. In Korea, of the top ten values, half of them were material. Though the emphasis on material needs can in part be explained by Maslow's hierarchy of needs, the near-complete neglect of the nonmaterial sphere suggests that the Taiwanese and Koreans mostly seek fulfillment and security in higher incomes and health care rather than in spirituality, artistic pursuits, or leisure.

China's situation is similar to Korea and Taiwan, but with a few notable differences. First, the material and interpersonal spheres were nearly equal in terms of their influence on overall happiness. This suggest that while satisfaction with the interpersonal sphere is high in all three nations, it is valued more in China. Another difference is that income level does not have a significant effect on overall happiness. Finally, and perhaps most notably, Chinese residents report a higher level of overall satisfaction than residents of both Taiwan and Korea. Shu and Zhu explain this last effect as a result of a unique Chinese outlook on life called “historical comparison.” Chinese tend to compare their standard of living not with their neighbors, but instead with the standard of living they had when they were children. Such an outlook focuses more on the country's rapid growth and less on the nation's glaring income inequality.

Summary and Relevance

The results of these three studies look at Confucianism from a different angle than the

research discussed in the previous section of the literature review. Using the same AsiaBarometer survey data that will be used in the quantative portion of this paper, these three "quality of life" studies demonstrate that Confucian tradition and ritual have lost ground in the second half of the twentieth century due to the demands of an industrialized society, but Confucian hierarchy and morality remain the foundation of the East Asian mind. The high satisfaction across the interpersonal sphere show that the main elements of Rozman's "mass Confucianism," namely family ties are still highly regarded. This reveals a discrepancy between practice and belief. As discussed above, Park and Cho 1995 and Lee and Sun 1995 illustrated that family size and number of stem families, both important measures of filial piety and the importance of lineage, are on the decline. Since the three "quality of life" surveys use self-reported AsiaBarometer survey data, use of this data in for the quantitative portion of this paper can only be trusted to reflect the values of East Asian people and not their actual practices.

The Question of How to Measure Confucianism: A study

Cheung 2006 endeavors to answer the question, "to what extent and in what respects is Confucianism still relevant for understanding Chinese society?" (Cheung, 2006, 158). In order to accomplish this, Cheung proposes four things. First, that the unit of analysis be adherent of Confucianism rather that Confucianism as a whole. Second, that the "*junzi*," or "gentleman," be considered the ideal type of a Confucian adherent. Third, that this ideal type is precisely that—a type, a model, a tool to aid the researcher in measurement, not a necessarily a representation of an attainable Confucian perfection. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Cheung recognizes the differences between "formal" and "substantive" virtues. Formal Confucian virtues are those that

transcend history, while substantive virtues are the manifestations of the formal virtues according to the historical and social context of the Confucian adherent (Cheung, 2006, 161-163). For example, the Confucian virtue of "*li*," or "propriety," once was expressed in the form of sumptuary laws dictating the number of horses and three-legged ceramic vessels one had to own according to social class, but today manifests rather more frequently as respect for superiors or obedience to authority.

Cheung then proceeds to enumerate the foremost formal Confucian virtues. First, "the intrinsic motivation for moral attainment" encourages one to do good and cultivate virtue for one's own sake, not for recognition or spiritual salvation. Second, there is "the belief in moral perfectibility for all human beings." Third, there is reflection on and constant evaluations of one's actions to determine whether one has remained on the path to virtue or erred in some way. Fourth, there is the valuing of moral considerations over material concerns and desires. Finally, there is a sense of social responsibility, a calling to not only better oneself but also to better the lives of others around one (Cheung, 2006, 163-164).

Next, Cheung divised four questions for each of these five virtues for a total of twenty questions, and then conducted surveys in the vicinities of Hong Kong, Guangzhou, and Taipei. Each respondent's answers were scored on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the most Confucian. The results were similar across the three locations; among the five formal virtues identified, all but one had an average in the 3.0 to 3.5. The outlier was the valuing of moral considerations over material concerns, a full point lower than all the other average scores at around 2.5.

In the conclusion, Cheung argues that while the study's results fell in line with established knowledge, the approach of separating formal values from substantive values provided three

things. First, a novel method of measuring Confucianism by creating an ideal type against which to measure individual Confucian adherents. Second, proof that Confucian values are still relevant today by distilling formal Confucian values from substantive ones. Third, that discovering an adherent's degree of Confucian-ness is in fact more useful in understanding modern Confucianism than the traditional *junzi/xiaoren,* or gentleman/small man, dichotomy.

Summary and Relevance

Cheung's study is excellent in its insistence on separating culturally-bound ritual and custom from Confucianism's abstract, eternal truths. Cheung's research is indeed groundbreaking in its novel method for the measurement of Confucianism, but it falls short in several areas. First, there is the problem of self-reporting. As discussed above in the review of the three "quality of life" studies, there is a considerable difference between self-reported beliefs and practice of these beliefs. As such, directly asking members of a traditionally Confucian society questions with one Confucian and one non-Confucian answer will likely produce an exaggeratedly Confucian portrait of said society, as people's ideals tend to be loftier than those evident from their actual behavior.[3] A less obvious approach would be to pose questions that collect data on general social and moral values and then identify which answer could be considered "Confucian" after the fact through careful reason and argument. This would give a relatively unbiased picture of a society's Confucian character. Second, Cheung's assertion that Confucian virtues contain "the belief in moral perfectibility for all human beings" is incorrect. As discussed in the chapter "What Exactly is Confucianism," Confucius and his followers believed men and women to be fundamentally

3 See "Introduction to the AsiaBarometer 2006 Survey" below.

different in their capacities for virtue, to say nothing of the differing capacities between "lazy" men and "men of virtue." It is clear that Confucian virtues were open only to men, and men of education at that. With these two criticisms in mind, this paper will attempt to emulate Cheung's approach to measuring Confucianism. Although the AsiaBarometer 2006 survey data is self-reported, the pitfalls of an exaggeratedly Confucian response will be avoided, as described above. Also, the superiority of men over women having been explicitly stated by Confucius himself, and with no abstract formal virtues to extrapolate from such statements, this value will be included as a measure of Confucianism in a society.

What exactly is Confucianism?

Though Confucianism is practiced differently depending on the social role and status of the individual, the moral essence of all Confucian teachings can be traced back to Confucius's earliest disciples' transcriptions of conversations and aphorisms uttered by the sage himself and by those with whom he conversed. Confucius and his disciples used the Five Classics as the basis for their studies. These five volumes were Zhou Dynasty texts covering history, divination, poetry, famous speeches, and rites. The ideas and interpretations they gleaned from these texts were recorded, organized into what became known as the Four Books, and over a millennium later organized by the father of Neo-Confucianism, Zhu Xi, into was has become known as the "Confucian canon." Below, are translated quotes from the original *Analects* that explain the main virtues and goals of Confucianism.

The Cardinal Virtues

> *Master You said, "...filial piety and brotherly love, are these not the foundation of humanity?"* (Analects I, 2)

First, there is *ren*, or "humanity," the cardinal Confucian virtue. *Ren* is a somewhat characterless virtue by virtue of the fact that it includes all the others. Its major subdivis*i*ons are filial piety (*xiao*), respect for elders (*di*), righteousness or justice (*yi*), and social etiquette (*li*).

Filial Piety and Respect for Elders

> *The Master said, "A young man ought to respect his parents at home, respect his non-kin elders outside his home, be cautious in his words, have love for all, and befriend the upright; if after doing these thing he still has spare energy, he should use it to study* (Analects I, 6).

The character for 'filial piety' occurs 18 times in *The Analects*, while the character for 'respect for non-kin elders' appears in only 4 passages. It is not immediately clear from *The Analects* why Confucius places more emphasis on respect for parents as opposed to respect for all elders, but the logical assumption is that Confucius believed that those trained to respect their elders at home would naturally show the same obeisance outside the home. Though there are several passages in which observance of the proper rites for, provision of material support for, and subservience toward parents are stressed (Analects I, 9; Analects II, 5; Analects IV, 18-19), Confucius makes it clear that the behavior of a son who does these things without respect is no different than the natural instincts of horses and dogs (Analects II, 7), implying that without filial respect, there is a lack of the cardinal virtue, humanity.

Justice

> *The Master said: "The mind of a gentleman is governed by justice; the mind of a small man is governed by profit."* (Analects IV, 16)

Governing all interactions, there is the principle of *yi*, or righteousness, sometimes translated as 'justice' or the 'disposition to do good.' The Confucian concept of righteousness is very similar to the Western Christian concept; humility, sincerity, and constant reflection are key elements in both, not to mention the elevation of social welfare over individual gain. Consequently, similar to pre-modern Western societies, those who sought "profit" were considered to be lacking in virtue. Merchants, traders, and shopkeepers all fell into this category and were considered "small men."

Propriety/The Rites

> *"The gentleman centers himself on righteousness. He carries it out according to the rites, humbly and sincerely. This is a true gentleman!"* (Analects XV, 17)

Finally, there is *li*, or "rites." Though "rites" is the corresponding Chinese character's most common translation, the term encompasses a great deal more than Confucian rituals and ceremonies, as illustrated below:

> *Lord Jing of the country of Qi asked Confucius about government. Confucius said to him, "When the lords are lords, ministers are ministers, fathers are fathers, and sons are sons, there is government." The lord said, "Good! Were the lords not lords, ministers not ministers, fathers not fathers, and sons not sons, though I had my millet, how could I eat?"* (Analects XII, 11)

The preceding passage shows that the importance of the five relationships: father-son, elder brother-younger brother, husband-wife, senior-junior, and ruler-subject, in order of importance. Important to note is the fact that these five relationships are not one-sided; while the senior in each expects obedience from the junior, the junior also expects benevolence and just treatment from the senior, as evidenced by the following passage:

> *Master Ji Kang asked, "How can I make the people respect power?" The Master said, "If you face them with solemnity, they will show respect. If you are kind and fatherly, they will show loyalty. If you promote the common good and educate the ignorant, they will learn virtue."* (Analects II, 20)

These relationships form a clear hierarchy of roles that preserve social stability through interdependence and prescribe duties. "Rites" also implies a sense of moderation and appropriate use:

> *Master Yu said: "In the practice of the rites, poise is prized. In the way of the sage kings, poise is praised. In small and large matters, there is no instance where we do not follow them. However, knowing the importance of poise but manifesting with disregard for the rites ought not be done."* (Analects I, 12)

> *The Master said, "Wealth and status are what men desire; if they cannot be obtained by following one's duties, they ought not be kept. Poverty and baseness are what men hate; if they cannot be dispelled by following one's duties, they ought to be retained. If a gentleman abandons virtue, how can he be called a gentleman? The gentleman does not for even one meal offend virtue, not in moments of panic or in times of hardship."* (Analects IV, 5)

The first passage encourages people to be confident and measured in action and warns against abusing such confidence, while the second passage places duty over personal well-being, implying adherence to the rites (which produces social stability) is more important than one's personal lot in life.

> *The Master said, "One who reviews the old and learns the new is capable of teaching others."* (Analects II, 11.)

Also important to note is the emphasis Confucius placed on education. Reviewing old knowledge, learning new knowledge, contemplation (Analects XVII, 9), and introspection (Analects XIX, 7) are all mentioned frequently in his quotations.

These main virtues of Confucianism are by and large in accord with the formal virtues identified in Cheung 2006 and discussed above in the review of literature. In addition to these, I plan to add two more measures, sexism and aspirituality.

Sexism was not actively promoted by either Mencius or Confucius, but they certainly did not oppose it. Confucius said, "Only in women and small men is it difficult to cultivate [virtue]" (Analects XVII, 25). Its institutionalization by the Han Confucian Dong Zhongshu less than two centuries after Mencius' death (Li, 2000, 4) combined with the uninterrupted, systematic sexism practiced in some Confucian nations since then up until modern times have made it a hallmark of Confucian practice.

Confucius plainly discouraged inquiry into the spiritual world and afterlife:

> *Ji Lu inquired about serving the spirits. The Master replied, "We are unable to serve humanity. How can we serve the spirits?" [Ji Lu said,] "Dare I ask about death? The Master replied, "We do not yet understand life, how can we understand death?"*
> (Analects XI, 11)

Confucius makes it plain that there is no point in worrying about the afterlife when people cannot even understand how to organize human society. In another passage (Analects XX, 5) he says that birth, death, wealth, and status are all predestined, implying the futility of prayer and fighting one's social duty.

A Brief History of Confucianism

Though many articles and dissertations on Confucian thought and late twentieth century economic development already exist, most focus on portraying Confucian morality (sometimes even lumped into the nebulous, inchoate "Asian values") exclusively in either a positive or negative light. Furthermore, such qualitative, normative studies are often based on a few carefully selected cases, leaving them vulnerable to contradiction. The goal of this research is not to produce a statistical analysis of Confucianism that merely categorizes its characteristics as “positive” or “negative,” but instead examines which elements of traditional Confucian practice still exist today. China, Taiwan, and South Korea were chosen for this study for two reasons. First, each country has its own unique brand of Confucianism, as detailed below. Second, each of the three countries is currently dominated by different belief systems; comparing the three will aid in separating Confucian values from present-day religious values.

The history of each country's relationship with Confucianism is important in understanding the context through which people in a given society view Confucianism. For example, in a hypothetical nation where Confucianism has created opportunities for corruption and destroyed government efficiency, it might be viewed as an oppressive, feudal belief system, thus making it less likely that the people of said hypothetical nation will be willing to harbor Confucian beliefs. As this is not a history paper, only the most important milestones in the developments of each country's Confucian tradition will be examined.

China

The Founders: Confucius and Mencius

As the birthplace of Confucius himself, China is an obvious choice for this study. Confucius is thought to have been born in 551 BC (Berthrong, 1998, 15). He was a child of aristocratic refugees from the State of Song[4] who emigrated to the State of Lu[5] after a series of natural disasters (Armstrong, 2006, 238-289). At that time, the state of Lu was in a state of decline. The Duke of Zhou, then also ruler of Lu, was exhausting his power and fortune in an effort to perpetuate the *li*, of the (then all but defunct) Zhou dynasty. As the *li* were a cohesive social force that provided strict roles, restrictions, and civic duties to all strata of society, they were essential in preventing tyranny and oppression. As the Duke exhausted his wealth, his reputation was simultaneously being undermined by three noble families intent on exploit the impending power vacuum. Their feuding and treachery finally exhausted the Duke's resources completely, and the three families attempted to usurp the throne. They committed grave offenses against *li*, performing rituals exclusive to kings and flouting consumption laws. *Li* appeared to have failed the people as a system for keeping the rapacious nobility at bay.

It was during this time of political chaos that Confucius grew up. He was an ardent supporter of the Duke, whom he viewed as the last bastion of civility and benevolence in an increasingly brutal, chaotic world(Armstrong, 2006, 240). At first intent on propagating his ideas by becoming a royal adviser, he never attained more than a menial post in government due to his stubbornness and blunt manner of speaking. Discouraged by his lack of political influence in Lu, he wandered from state to state in search of employment. After several years of searching bore no

4 Located roughly in modern day eastern Henan province.
5 Located, along with Qi, on the peninsula that comprises modern day Shandong province.

fruit, Confucius returned to Lu, deciding that if he could not become a government official, he would at least teach Zhou-era morality in the hopes that his students would one day influence politics for the better (Armstrong, 2006, 241).

Unlike many founders of philosophical or religious movements, Confucius never claimed to be divinely inspired, nor did he claim to have originated what he taught. However, his interpretations of old tradition did contain some innovation. In a time where *li* were considered relics of a failed dynasty, Confucius rightly recognized their value in structuring society and simultaneously recognized the short-sightedness of the Lu nobility's infighting while neighboring states built up militaries and conquered nearby kingdoms. Confucius believed that gentlemen, or *junzi*, were not warriors, but scholars, and that all that was required to become one was to "curb your ego an surrender to *li*" (Analects XII, 1). In another break from tradition, Confucius switched life's focus from heaven-worship to mundane interpersonal relationships, promoting humaneness, or *ren*, and justice, or *yi*. As for the spiritual world, Confucius famously dealt with one student's insistence on hearing his opinion about the immaterial world by quipping "Till you know about the living, how are you to know about the dead"? (Analects XI, 10) Confucius was never recognized during his life for his foresight and wisdom (Armstrong, 2006, 242-245). He died in obscurity in approximately 479 BC (Berthrong, 1998, 15).

The next great thinker in Confucian philosophy was Mencius, often called the "Second Sage," who was born around 371 BC (Berthrong, 1998, 23), roughly a century after the death of Confucius. Mencius' primary contribution to Confucianism was his clarification of and elaboration on the words of Confucius, as well as the systematizing of Confucian precepts (Bell, 2003, 220). The setting of Mencius's youth and adulthood was very similar to that of Confucius's, with one

exception—the political and social situation was much worse. Mencius lived through the Warring States period, a time of near-constant warfare as many small states vyed for supremacy and military technology underwent revolutionary changes. The Warring States period was also a philosophical battleground. The “Hundred Schools of Thought” lived up to its name and it was a golden age of rational thinking; as a result, Mencius was very different from Confucius in his style of argument. While Confucius strove to be rational and amiable in his exchanges with students, Mencius was a militant orator, hardened in a crucible of intense debate. His essays show a concise, logical, sharp-tongued man, sometimes brutal when it came rebutting or dissecting opponents' arguments. Mencius's interpretation of Confucian doctrine heavily emphasized the necessity of cultivating one's heart and mind. Human nature is given by heaven, but is easily corrupted if not monitored; thus men were urged to take their mental and moral formation very seriously lest they fall prey to the vices of pettiness, cruelty and perversion. Even then, people unfortunate enough to be born into a bad environment might be unable to become *junzi* even with the sincerest of effort (Berthrong, 1998, 25). Another aspect of Confucius's teaching that Mencius highlighted was the "Mandate of Heaven," namely, that heaven's will and the people's will were one, and that kings only ruled with the consent of the governed, and by extension, heaven (Berthrong, 1998, 27). Mencius was critical of the Mohist, or Legalist school of thought, the beginning of a long-lasting conflict between the two schools described in greater detail below. Mencius died in 289 BC (Berthrong, 1998, 23).

The next great Confucian scholar, Xunzi, was born around 310 BC, right before the death of Mencius (Berthrong, 1998, 27). He is a controversial character primarily because he was the first notable Confucian scholar to openly disagree with Confucius's teachings. Xunzi wrote an

(in)famous essay outlining why he believed human beings were fundamentally evil, directly contradicting Confucius's implications (and Mencius's outright assertions) that human beings were, by nature, good. There has been debate over whether Xunzi really believed strongly that human beings were essentially depraved; the essay in question echoes Mencius's sentiment about the importance of cultivating one's heart and mind, so it could have just been rhetoric designed to underline the point. Less ambiguous and controversial changes include reinterpreting Confucius's "heaven" as nature itself rather than a sky god and supplanting mythological kings and the semi-mythical sage-kings Yao and Shun with the yin and yang forces of eternal nature (Berthrong, 1998, 30). Xunzi's biggest political and philosophical opponent at the time was Hanfeizi, a brilliant philosopher and the man who polished Legalism into a usable political philosophy. Hanfeizi and the Legalists believed that *ren* and *yi* were not what motivated people to do good, but rather it was the law; thus, he and his followers favored the use of harsh, clear laws that dictated reward or punishment for nearly everything. In a way, the philosophy was quite Machiavellian, as Hanfeizi did not care for finding "ultimate truth" as long as government ruled efficiently and effectively. During the last few years of Xunzi's life, the Qin dynasty united China adopted Legalism as its official political philosophy. No major advances were made in Confucian thought until the rise of the Han nearly twenty years later, in 206 BC (Berthrong, 1998, 29), when both principles of Confucianism and Daoism were woven into Chinese culture to create a unique cosmology that assigned *yin, yang,* and the five elements to both material and spiritual phenomena (Fairbank and Goldman, 1998, 64). The orthodox tenets of Confucian belief, however, had solidified.

Neo-Confucianism

Confucianism, which had derived much of its popularity from being a gateway to civil service and the basis of imperial law, fell out of favor during the period of political division after the fall of the Han Dynasty in 220 AD. This vacuum left room for the individualistic philosophy of Daoism to flourish, which facilitated Buddhism's rise to prominence (Roberts, 2004, 70-72). It was not until the rise of another centralized imperial power in 589 AD, the Sui Dynasty, that interest in Confucianism was rekindled. The Sui was a brutal, authoritarian, militaristic dynasty, in many ways similar to the Qin Dynasty. Both dynasties survived on military conquest and oppression, and both lasted only briefly before giving way to a more moderate state; in the Sui Dynasty's case, it was the Tang Dynasty. Tang Dynasty scholars compiled authoritative versions of Confucian texts for imperial examination purposes. Han Yu, a preeminent Tang scholar, attacked Buddhism and criticized the abandonment of Confucian principles; later Confucian scholars would point to him as the first Neo-Confucian for his attempts at redefining and re-integrating Confucianism into Tang Dynasty China (Roberts, 2004, 120). The Tang dynasty eventually fell into decline, war-torn and sapped of resources trying to quell the prolonged An Lushan rebellion, giving rise to a brief period of disunity, followed by the rise of the Song Dynasty in 960 AD (Roberts, 2004, 130).

The Song Dynasty suffered internal strife and fractured into several rival dynasties, the most prominent among them being the Jurchen-ruled Jin Dynasty in the north and the Southern Song Dynasty. Southern Song Confucian scholars looked to the work of Han Yu to promote Confucianism, specifically in opposition to Buddhism. Zhu Xi, a Confucian scholar, gathered the writings of several prominent Confucian scholars of the day and combined them into one doctrine. This doctrine included a cosmology even more extensive that the one developed under by Han

Dynasty Confucians, with the concept of the “Great Ultimate,” from which *yin, yang*, and the five elements derive, the idea that man's consciousness was derived from a combination of the highest forms of these elements, and the idea of “qi” as the fundamental matter and energy of which all things in the universe were comprised. This last tenet was specifically designed to combat Buddhism and to assert that reality was indeed as perceived, and not an illusion (Roberts, 2004, 149-150). Zhu Xi also gave a specific order to and wrote extensive commentaries on the four Confucian classics. Zhu Xi's efforts provided the foundation of Neo-Confucianism, the revival of Confucianism after the lapse of the Han Confucian system and the runaway success of Buddhism. The expansion of the Confucian cosmology, especially in regard to the use of elements, allowed greater room for a dynasty to prove its legitimacy. For example, the succession of the elements was associated with the succession of dynasties, with the Song Dynasty choosing fire as its representative element and the Jin Dynasty choosing earth[6] as the successors to the Song (Fairbank and Goldman, 104). Zhu Xi's writings and commentaries would become the basis of Confucian learning and study for the entire second millennium AD, not only in China, but also in Korea, Japan, and Southeast Asia.

From the perspective of this paper, Zhu Xi and the Neo-Confucian movement's contribution to Confucianism is a mixed blessing. One one hand, it revived Confucianism from near-extinction under the success of Buddhism and Daoism. On the other hand, it transformed what once was a straightforward, practical philosophy for administrating a state and cultivating social harmony into a quasi-religion replete with assertions about the metaphysical and theories and practices appropriated, ironically, from Daoism and Buddhism. This presents a challenge to research on

6 Earth (ash) is the successor to fire in the succession of the five elements.

"Confucianism" and is the primary reason why only the recorded words of Confucius and Mencius will be used in this paper when referencing "Confucianism."

Neo-Confucianism remained the official state ideology even under changes in dynasty and the ethnicity of the ruling class, and was even exported to Joseon Korea (discussed below) and Japan. Up until the fall of the Qing, Zhu Xi's translations of the four Confucian classics were widely studied. And it was precisely due to the fall of the Qing and the unrest that followed that the institution of Confucianism began to be dismantled in Chinese society.

Revolutionary Reactions Against Confucianism

During the early years of the Chinese Republic that rose from the ashes of the Qing, criticism of China's traditions were widely published and read. The most prominent among these was Lu Xun's famous "Diary of a Madman," in which Confucian morals were likened to social cannibalism and criticized as China's main problem. The prevailing philosophy among the students in the 1919 May 4th movement was the so-called "New Thought," which aimed to rebuild Chinese culture and society from the ground up (Roberts, 2004, 359-361). Marxism gained ground simultaneously, leading to a clash of ideologies (and militaries) between the army of the fledgling Chinese Communist Party and the conservative Nationalists under Jiang Jieshi[7]. The military conflict ended in 1949, when Jiang and his government fled to Taiwan, but the battle of ideologies continued on opposite sides of the Taiwan Strait, where the mainland Chinese destruction of Confucianism and the Taiwanese promotion of Confucianism yielded very different results[8].

After the 1949 Revolution in China, in the spirit of the New Thought and in line with

7 The pinyin romanization of Chiang Kai-Shek.

8 See chapter below on Taiwanese Confucianism.

Communist ideology, Confucian practices were suppressed and Confucius was vilified as a symbol of backwardness and feudalism. The Cultural Revolution that raged from the mid-1960s until Mao's death in 1976 (Fairbank and Goldman, 1998, 397) was the most severe period of persecution. Roving bands of students, called “Red Guards,” sought to carry out Mao's command to destroy the “four olds,” namely old ideas, old customs, old culture, and old habits (Roberts, 2004, 451; Fairbank and Goldman, 1998, 393), and were very successful. The heart of Chinese Confucianism appeared to have been torn out, and Confucian principles and studies remained neglected for decades, chilled by an inhospitable political climate.

South Korea

South Korea today is unparalleled in its preservation of a Confucian social hierarchy and in Confucian ritual; Confucianism is present there today in a way that has not been seen in China since the early Qing Dynasty. Since the adoption of writing in Korea, the Confucian classics were studied with great zeal if only for their advice on governance; little attention was paid to the Confucian cosmological order and other philosophical tenets. During Korea's Three Kingdoms period, the nation of Silla, by virtue of its distance from the Sino-Korean border, remained the least influenced by Neo-Confucianism; however, Silla still produced one of the most respected of the early Korean Neo-Confucian thinkers, Seol Chong, who was the first to translate the four Confucian classics into the Korean language. The Silla court instituted an exam system and an academy, and paid particular attention to Confucian *li*, or social order and rights (Yang and Henderson, 1958, 83-84). During this early period, though, Neo-Confucian thought and views still remained relegated to the court and nobility. It was not until the thirteenth century that Confucianism began to affect Korea. During the tenth through thirteenth centuries, the first four centuries of the Goryeo

dynasty, Buddhism’s influence peaked in Korea while interest in Neo-Confucianism declined sharply. The Neo-Confucian academy in the capital closed down for want of students and the exam system ceased functioning. Zhu Xi's interpretation of Confucius's philosophy was down but not out; although during this period Neo-Confucian thought retained its influence in the royal court, Korea produced no original philosophy to speak of, even as Song Chinese scholars were developing Neo-Confucian thought (Yang and Henderson, 1958, 85). After the Song and Goryeo dynasties' subjugation under the Mongols in the early thirteenth century, another shift occurred. A student named An Hyang traveled to Beijing for study and returned to Korea with Zhu Xi's Commentary, the basis for Neo-Confucianism, still the dominant form of Confucian thought in Korea today. Meanwhile, as the Goryeo Dynasty moved closer to collapse in the late fourteenth century, discontent with Buddhism festered. Those disgusted with the political ambitions and dissolute lifestyles of the monks questioned the legitimacy of the religion as Korea's guiding philosophy. Furthermore, Buddhism gained an association with the Mongol invaders, further destroying its credibility (Yang and Henderson, 1958, 86). Neo-Confucianism filled the intellectual vacuum among the elite at this time, if not only because it provided for a strong centralized bureaucracy, or in another words, an ideology under which the nobility could wrest political control from the Buddhist monks. Zhu Xi's writings gained further influence in Korea at this time, and combined with the relative ease of exchanging ideas with China under the Mongol suzerain, the fourteenth century became the first period of Confucian ideological dominance in Korea. But though Neo-Confucianism had been swiftly and suddenly become the dominant government ideology, government officials were more pragmatists than philosophers. They instituted universities, adopted Confucian administrative practices, and followed the prescribed ritual and

ceremony appropriate for their offices, but understood little of the philosophy behind these prescriptions. Great change occurred again around the beginning of the fifteenth century. The Goryeo dynasty, weakened and discredited by a century of Mongol rule, was overthrown by Yi Seong Gye, a war hero instrumental in expelling the Mongols from the Korean peninsula. He then founded the Yi Dynasty, which lasted until the Japanese invasion of the twentieth century. Under the Yi, Korea entered a golden age of Confucian thought. The new government worked with old Goryeo officials to establish Neo-Confucianism as a legitimate moral and political authority, at the same time actively undermining Buddhism (not in small part due to Zhu Xi's incorporation of Buddhist tenets into Confucianism) (Yang and Henderson, 1958, 90). The *coup de grace* came in 1421, when by royal edict, Neo-Confucianism was declared the official basis of national policy, requiring even the Crown Prince to worship at the Confucian shrine and honor Confucian sages. For Korea, this proclamation was “a striking symbol... for Korea almost as momentous as when the Divine Right of kings yielded to the concept of the rule of law in Europe.” (Yang and Henderson, 1958, 91).

During the later Joseon Dynasty, the importance of Confucianism among the ruling elite had increased to the point where it was arguably their defining characteristic. Buddhism, and to an even greater degree, shamanism, were associated with ignorance and the common people and thus shunned by scholars and aristocrats. The complete embrace of Confucian values trickled down to lower classes eager to prove that they were cultured, further increasing Confucianism's dominance in Korea. Only the lowest classes of society or those with dangerous occupations continued to rely on shaman rituals (Walraven, 2008, 195-196). One of the major results of these trends was the near-complete Confucianization of Korean men; this is still evident today in the fact

that far more women than men participate in religious ceremonies of any type. Another major result of the Confucianization of nearly all social strata was that by accepting Confucian rituals and values, the common people implicitly accepted the rule of the Confucian government (Walraven, 2008, 197). In this way, Confucianism became the most important social force on all levels of Korean society, an effect which last to this very day.

Taiwan

Though Taiwan has been sovereign for a much shorter period than Korea and mainland China, it still has a complex and unique relationship with Confucianism. Confucianism was introduced to the island after the overthrow of the Ming dynasty. In an effort to avoid the authoritarian and heavy-handed grasp of the newly-formed Qing dynasty, many Confucian intellectuals fled south to the remnants of the Ming, the fledgling Southern Ming state. Though Confucian customs and ideals had already migrated to the island, a Confucian intellectual class arose only with the arrival of these scholar refugees. Following the Qing Dynasty's wresting control of Formosa from the rule of Zheng Chenggong and his descendants, Han migration to the island increased. These mainlanders, mostly Fujianese, brought with them an additional layer of Confucian social influence; Confucian preparation for imperial examinations. As the Qing entered its terminal decline, it ceded Taiwan to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, mostly in an effort to appease the expansionist Japanese. This change of leadership gave new significance to Han Confucian culture in the eyes of the Taiwanese; instead of a cultural imposition from a faraway ruler, it became the primary method of clinging to Chinese identity under Japanese cultural and imperial rule. After the destruction of the Japanese empire and subsequent retreat of the Guomindang to Taiwan, the Jiang Jieshi government adopted Confucianism as the official state

ideology (Chen, 2009, 11).

Early Taiwanese Confucian scholarship under the crumbling Ming focused on the original Confucian texts; as a result, it was dominated by inquiries into statesmanship and government systems, a response to the then turbulent and decadent state of politics. In Beijing, Zheng Chenggong and his protege Chen Yonghua both publicly protested the Manchu invasion and "barbarian" Qing usurpation (Chen, 2009, 14). Fleeing south as the Manchus consolidated their power, both men ended up in Fujian, and later traveled to Taiwan, where Zheng Chenggong ruled over a Ming-loyalist Taiwanese state, and Chen Yonghua instituted a Confucian education system throughout southern Taiwan. Both men aided tremendously in the expansion of Confucian lifestyle from mere interpersonal custom and social ritual to government and all levels of academia. Ming resistance lasted only a few decades, however, and in the 1680s the Qing quelled the last of the Ming loyalists, ushering in a new age of Confucianism for Taiwan.

Whereas Confucian studies under the Ming had centered largely on the practical topics of government and social justice, the political calm after the Qing dynasty's consolidation of power allowed room for the return of debate on abstract topics such as human nature and the difference between heart and mind. The Kangxi Emperor's efforts and opinions furthered this trend; as an ardent follower of Zhu Xi, the father of Neo-Confucianism, he actively promoted Zhu Xi's interpretations of and additions to Confucian canon, resulting in Neo-Confucianism becoming the *de facto* meaning of "Confucianism" during this period. The Kangxi Emperor's promotion of Zhu Xi was not without ulterior motives, however, as demonstrated by the contents of an inscribed tablet from a Confucian school quoted below:

> *The students must establish determination, should study in order to become loyal and upright officials, and must study examples of loyal and upright officials*

> *recorded in history. . . . Students will not be allowed to discuss every positive and negative aspect of soldiers and civilians in their writings to higher officials. If they write something that they are not permitted to, they will be punished according to their violation of the system and will be removed from their posts. Students are not allowed to gather together in large numbers or to assemble societies. They are not to control the officials or bully those in rural areas. They are not to publish or inscribe writing on their own accord. Those who disobey the local education administrators are to be punished* (Liu, 1977, 1).

It is clear from the restrictions on challenging the government and forming societies that the Kangxi Emperor and Qing officials had learned their lesson dealing with the Ming-era Confucians and supported Confucian debate as long as it remained far removed from the candid and incisive questioning and criticism of government to which both Confucius and Mencius had devoted most of their lives (Chen, 2009, 20). Thus Qing-supported Neo-Confucian studies served two purposes; first and foremost, as a diversion for pacifying the potentially dangerous scholar class, and secondarily as common area of study that homogenized the diverse population under Qing rule. In the context of Taiwan, Qing rule completed the work that Zheng Chenggong and Chen Yonghua began, creating a society equally as steeped in Confucian custom and tradition as mainland Chinese society.

Education remained synonymous with Confucian learning up until the cession of Taiwan to Japan in 1895. Confucian scholars led armed resistance against the Japanese, but the island quickly fell. In contrast to grudging respect shown to the Qing dynasty, there was not even superficial respect shown to the Japanese, who were regarded as culturally inferior and invaders (Takeshi, 2006, 143). The Japanese promoted their own culture, opening Japanese-language schools and encouraging Japanese-style clothing and housing in an effort to assimilate the Taiwanese into the Japanese Empire and decrease resistance. The

Taiwanese vigorously resisted these attempts to replace their culture, and small village classrooms sprung up all over the countryside to provide a culturally Han and Confucian education; in this way, the Taiwanese effectively nullified the assimilating effect of the new Japanese school system, despite the fact that by 1940 over 70% of Taiwanese were able to communicate in Japanese (Fong, 2006, 174). Public readings of the Confucian classics as a veiled assertion of Chinese pride were a common method of antagonizing the Japanese occupation forces (Chen, 2009, 25). During this period of cultural and ideological oppression, Confucianism, Chinese identity, and patriotism became inextricably linked in the Taiwanese mind as a defensive mechanism against Japanese assertions of cultural and racial superiority (Fong, 2006, 173).

The end of World War II saw the end of the Japanese occupation of Taiwan and, several years later, the arrival of the Jiang administration. While deriving his initial support from the "New Thought" movement that sought to recreate Chinese culture from the ground up, Jiang Jieshi, after consolodating his rule over Taiwan, began to promote Confucian values of discipline and respect for authority in addition to the revolutionary New Thought principles. Study of the four Confucian Classics resumed, and Confucius's birthday was made a national holiday (Roberts, 2004, 381). Confucianism was adopted as a state ideology and a means of legitimizing Jiang's power; as a result, it underwent considerable distortion (Huang, 2009, 49). The dissemination of speeches and editorials expressing unwavering support for the ruling regime became the primary function of the government-controlled Confucian institutions, and the long-standing Confucian tradition of questioning and examining the conduct of the government was neglected. This sort of "state Confucianism" waned

following the lifting of martial law in 1987, and it remains to be seen what role Confucianism will play in Taiwanese society (Huang, 2009, 65).

Quantitative Analysis of AsiaBarometer 2006 Survey Data

Introduction

As there has been relatively little quantitative research done on Confucianism compared to other belief systems—not in small part to the nebulous nature and differing interpretations of the philosophy—this paper aims to produce preliminary quantitative research on the subject. This chapter details the steps leading up to linear regression performed on survey data from subjects in Taiwan, China, and South Korea. It includes an introduction to the survey data, the rationale behind the selection of the survey questions used to create the dependent variable, and speculation rooted in history and logic as to which sectors of the three countries' populaces would likely be more Confucian. Finally, it includes regression data and an interpretation of the regression results.

The AsiaBarometer 2006 Survey

Surveys, like all research methods, have both advantages and disadvantages. The most obvious advantage is the ability to collect exactly the type of data desired based on the nature and quantity of the survey questions. Face-to-face surveys, or interviews, are even more useful in that they provide opportunities to ask additional questions relevant to the research. There are two major disadvantages of such interviews. First, there is “interviewer bias,” a verbal or non-verbal signaling of “correct” or “incorrect” answers by the interviewer that in turn influences the responses of the interviewee. Second, there is the desire of some interviewees to provide socially acceptable rather than factual answers, often in response to questions considered embarrassing or

probing (Mitchell, 2009, 267-268). Though it is unclear what steps AsiaBarometer took to compensate for the shortcomings inherent to this method, it is important to remember throughout this process that face-to face surveys are an imperfect tool that will never produce completely reliable data.

The AsiaBarometer 2006 survey was conducted in seven East Asian countries, among them the focuses of this study, namely China, Korea, and Taiwan. Korea and Taiwan each had a sample size of 1,000, while China had a sample size of 2,000 to compensate for its vastly larger population. For each country, survey sites were randomly chosen and interviews were set up for between 5 and 20 of the residents at each location, along with a few randomly-chosen impromptu interviews of nearby shoppers, pedestrians, and residents. Care was taken not to include residents of other areas or foreign nationals. Those surveyed also conformed to a strict age quota, divided into five ten-year segments from 20 to 69 years of age, and a strict sex quota, with a near-equal sample of men and women. The surveys were conducted between July 3, 2006 and August 11, 2006. (AsiaBarometer 2006, Fieldwork Reports).

AsiaBarometer's intended goal with these surveys is fourfold, the first of these being to "portray daily lives of ordinary people on physical, psychological, and sociological dimensions" (AsiaBarometer 2006, Profile). This paper's primary aim is thus consistent with one of the main reasons AsiaBarometer carried out its 2006 survey, making the survey's data appropriate for use in attempting to measure how Confucian people in China, Korea, and Taiwan live their daily lives. Furthermore, there are few, if any, surveys available to the English-speaking world that cover East Asian values with breadth and depth matching that of AsiaBarometer. This survey is a valuable and unique asset to research, and likely the most appropriate for the topic of this paper.

Devising and Using a "Yardstick" for Confucianism

Cheung 2006 was not far off in describing conceiving of a yardstick for Confucianism as "an impossible venture." As discussed above, Confucianism has been infused with other religions' tenets, reinterpreted, twisted by governments, and viciously repressed. For this reason, the variables selected as representative would be very different depending on whether late Qing Neo-Confucian practice, Ming Dynasty Confucianism, or Early Han Dynasty Confucianism was used as a baseline. To avoid favoring one historical interpretation or practice over another, two precautions were taken. First, fresh translations of the Analects were made in order to more fully grasp the range meaning and the context in which Confucius's words were spoken[9]. Second, Cheung 2006's model of separating formal and substantive virtues was utilized in interpreting these new translations. This paper aims to quantify the remaining "mass Confucian" character of the modern East Asian citizen. The dependent variable for this study will be a "Confucianism Index" compiled from selected questions in AsiaBarometer's 2006 survey. The independent variables will be demographic variables in the same survey.

The Dependent Variable: The Confucianism Indexes

The dependent variables were composed from survey questions relevant to measuring Confucianism. In the course of the research, four different models (henceforth referred to as

9 Some would argue that interpreting the Five Classics, the Zhou dynasty texts that Confucius urged his disciples to master in order to master his teachings, would produce a still-purer form of Confucianism. This criticism would be correct if subsequent Confucians had heeded Confucius's advice to study the Five Classics; however, even before Zhu Xi's time, Confucian scholars referred primarily to the Analects, the Mencius, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Great Learning as the sources of Confucian doctrine (Berthrong, 1998, 31).

Model I, II, III, and IV) were constructed in sequence to find which was the best representation of Confucianism. These models were increasingly narrow in focus, with each successive model using a unique "Confucianism Index" for measurement constructed only from the survey questions that were deemed the strongest measures of Confucianism from the previous model. Thus, Model I was the first created and included all twelve of the selected survey questions, while Model IV was the last created and contained only the strongest five survey questions. For the sake of explanation, these twelve variables have been grouped into categories, with the first four of these categories paraphrased from Cheung 2006. They are:

- Intrinsic Motivation for Moral Attainment
- Importance of Moral Vigilance
- Pre-Eminence of the Moral over the Material
- Sense of Social Responsibility
- Perception of Men as Of Greater Value than Women
- Focus on the Human Realm over the Spiritual Realm

Intrinsic motivation for moral attainment

Q10a	How would you like to see your son(s) grow up?
Ans.:	Become a loving and charitable person.
Q28	In your opinion, what are benefits of education?
Ans.:	Develops your humanity.

The first of the responses, Q10a, shows an esteem for charity over all other aspirations. Confucius, when asked how to compress his teachings into a single word that could be used to guide one throughout one's whole life, replied, "Look to "empathy!" What you yourself do not desire, do not inflict upon other people." (Analects XV, 23). This demonstrates that a parent or future parent's desire for their children is to attain this empathy, in other words, for the child to be motivated to cultivate this virtue in themselves, motivated solely by love for other people. The second of the responses, Q28, is worded in Confucian language, "humanity" being the cardinal Confucian virtue. Confucius himself implies that study is the path to "humanity," saying "By becoming well-versed in knowledge and conducting oneself according to propriety, one can refrain from straying from the proper." (Analects XII, 15). This passage asserts that learning is a key component in cultivating one's "humanity," and makes learning a means for the development of virtue rather than a means for attaining worldly rewards. Further illustrating this point, Confucius also described the "six obfuscations" that result from a lack of learning: "Love of humanity without love of study leads to foolishness; love of knowledge without love of study leads to dissolution of the intellect; love of being earnest without love of study leads to evil and deceit; love of candor without love of study leads to tactlessness; love of courage without love of study leads to disorder; and love of firmness without love of study leads to madness." (Analects VXII, 8). Learning is clearly

crucial in developing humanity.

Importance of Moral Vigilance

Q12	Do you think that people generally try to be helpful or do you think that they mostly look out for themselves?
Ans.:	People generally try to be helpful.
Q50	Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties.
Ans.:	Never justifiable.

The first response, Q12, enquires about the general goodness of people. Confucius said, "Men are similar in nature, but very different in pratice." (Analects XVII, 2). Mencius further clarifies this, saying, "In plentiful years, the children of the people are mostly good; in years of hardship, the children of the people are prone to violence. It is not in their heaven-bestowed ability that they differ, but in that they fall into drowning their hearts and minds" (Mencius, Gaozi I, 7). These two quotes demonstrate that men are, at birth, alike in nature. Since men only become good or evil through conditioning, it behooves a Confucian to exercise vigilance in interpersonal relations and to examine the morality of learned habits in order to attain goodness.

The second response, Q50, touches on the necessity of honesty and integrity, even at the expense of personal gain. Confucius said, "Eating scant food, drinking water, and using my bent arm for a pillow, happiness is still within me. Wealth and staus gained through injustice are to me as fleeting as the clouds" (Analects VII, 16). While Confucius's love for propriety may have helped him cultivate honesty, not all people have such lofty moral standards. Indeed, one of the major

faults of Confucianism is its suppostion that laws are unnecessary when people conform to social ritual and the rules of propriety. Similar to communism in its overly optimistic portrayal of human nature, Confucianism's moral "honor system" has historically proven to be fertile ground for corruption. As such, corruption falls into a moral gray area; is it justifiable to take a bribe if one needed money to feed one's father? Because of this conflict, this variable was not used in most of the models.

Pre-Eminence of the Moral over the Material

Q10a	How would you like to see your son(s) grow up?
Ans.:	Become a great scholar.
Q43_2	Which of the following describe your family structure?
Ans.:	(1) Single-person household (2) Married couple only (3) A parent(s) and child(ren) who are not married (two generation household) (4) A parent(s) and child(ren) who is/are married (two generation household) (5) Grandparent(s), parent(s) and child(ren) (three-generation household)

The first response, Q10a, shows a concern for education and its moral benefits (discussed above in the explanation of Q28) over a concern over other concerns. Other answers for this question included "become very wealthy" and "become a person respected by the masses." Wealth and fame are two extremely attractive goals in modern society, and the fact that the

pursuit of knowledge is elevated above both is significant. The second response, Q43_2, is a scale of the number of people living in a household. Multiple generations living together places a financial and social burden on the generation that is of working age. Those willing to sacrifice time and money for their parents are closer to the Confucian virtue of *xiao,* or filial piety, which demands that children do their utmost to serve and respect their parents.

Sense of Social Responsibility

Q10a	How would you like to see your son(s) grow up?
Ans.:	Become a person who cares about family.
Q15	Suppose that you are the president of a company. In the company's employment examination, a relative of yours got the second highest grade, scoring only marginally less than the candidate with the highest grade. In such a case, which person would you employ?
Ans.:	The person with the highest grade.
Q28	In your opinion, what are benefits of education? Please choose the three most important benefits from the following.
Ans.:	Enables you to contribute to your society.

The first response, Q10a, is primary directed at measuring the value a subject puts on filial piety. Attention to family and being filial had far-reaching implications outside of the home, however. Master You said, "Few are those who are filial and brotherly but love to offend. There are none who do not love causing offense, but love creating disorder. The gentleman does his

utmost to find the root; after establishing it, the way is evident. Filial piety and brotherly love, are they not the root of perfect virtue?" (Analects I, 2). In this passage, Confucius makes evident the importance of filial piety as the most basic virtue; its absence is incompatible with higher virtue. As the cultivation of virtue starts in the home, society's fundamental building block, one's elders are naturally the main source of guidance. "A man named Zi Lu asked, "Is it okay to do as one hears [from others]? Confucius said, "The guidance of your father and elder brothers is available. Why would one do as one hears [from others]?" As for the spreading of virtue to the rest of society, leading by example is also important. Confucius said, "If one's character is correct, people will obey without being ordered. If one's character is incorrect, people will not obey despite being ordered." Thus, cultivating the earliest, most primitive of virtues in one's children is at the core of transforming society for the better.

The second response, Q15, sheds light upon the subject's opinion of nepotism. The Analects may appear to exhort readers to favor their own family members above others, but this is not entirely true. One passage in particular makes clear Confucius and his disciples' thoughts on the matter. After asking Confucius's son Bo Yu whether he'd learned any special knowledge from his father, Confucian disciple Chen Kang remarked, "I asked one thing I got three; I heard about the Odes, I heard about the Rites, and I learned that the gentleman is reserved toward his son" (Analects XVI, 13). Another example is seen in this passage: "Yan Yuan died, and Yan Lu begged for Confucius's carriage in order to buy an outer coffin. The Master said, "Talented or not, everyone calls their sons "sons." [Bo Yu] also died; he had a coffin but not an outer coffin. I would not walk on foot in order for him to have an outer coffin. Because I have followed great officers, I cannot walk on foot" (Analects XI, 8). Confucius himself, the champion of filial piety, treated his own son

like any other students as far as his public, teaching duties were concerned, and he refused to dishonor his station and violate the rites (in this case, sumptuary laws) by walking around on foot just to provide a better funeral for his son. These passages assert that rites and propriety come before family ties. On the other hand, Confucius says that "The father covers up for his son, and the son covers up for his father. Righteousness is found in this." (Analects XIII, 18) This passage suggests that blood relations are primary. Further complicating the case, this passage discussing government supports particularism: "Zhong Gong, head of the Ji clan, asked about government. The Master said, "First employ those you have, pardon small mistakes, and promote the virtuous and talented. [Zhong Gong] replied: "How can I know the virtuous and talented to promote them?" [The Master] replied: Promote those you know. As for those you do not know, will they be abandoned?" Confucius appears not to favor his own son, but at the same time to support choosing people based on personal knowledge of their character. Ultimately, Confucius's direct, general statements about behavior should be taken as what constitutes "Confucian values" rather than his indirectly observed or anecdotal behavior. After all, examining a man's behavior against his professed morals is useful for appraising said man's character, but does nothing to prove whether or not his professed values are reasonable. This is admittedly a shaky and self-contradictory theoretical ground; as such, this variable was not included in most models.

The third response, Q28, is rather straightforward. Respondents who see community improvement as one of education's primary purposes are obviously using their learning to give back to the community. The virtue insinuated in this answer relies on transforming the community not from the its core, but from its edges—by leading by example from a position of authority.

Though it is obvious from the amount of time Confucius devotes to their discussion that familial duties are the seeds of virtue, “Zi Xia said, “If an official has satisfied his obligations, he should study. If a student has completed his studies, he ought to become an official” (Analects XIX, 13). This illustrates that the purpose of knowledge is not only to cultivate inner virtue, but also to use that inner virtue and knowledge to improve the nation's government.

Perception of Men as Of Greater Value than Women

Q10b Ans.:	How would you like to see your daughter(s) grow up? Find a good marriage partner.
Q22 Ans.:	Do you think that on the whole men and women are treated equally in your country? Please indicate which of the following is closest to your opinion. (1) Men are treated much more favorably than women. (2) Men are treated somewhat more favorably than women. (3) Men and women are treated equally. (4) Women are treated somewhat more favorably than men. (5) Women are treated much more favorably than men.

Sexism has a history in Confucianism, as discussed in the chapter “What is Confucianism?” The first response, Q10b, reveals a parent's primary concern for a daughter is marriage, chosen above all other considerations, implying that marriage is a daughter's primary. Also, in both Chinese[10] and Korean[11], the question did not specify what was meant by a “good marriage partner,” leaving the question to be interpreted multiple ways. Though to the Western read a “good marriage partner” most likely means a caring husband who is able to provide, in the context of a Confucian society, where social capital is highly valued, a “good marriage partner” might be one that brings benefits to the entire family by broadening the family's network of connections. In the latter case, a woman's primary value would be as a bridge between two social networks; one assumes that there are few families who would just as likely use a son as a bargaining chip.

The second response, Q22, reveals a subject's perception of the treatment of women his or her country. In a culture steeped in Confucian tradition, the claim that women are treated better than men is likely voiced by a subject who sees things from a traditional point of view, and is a negative reaction against the increasing empowerment of women in modern society. However, this perception could be influenced by many things, such as prior relationship history, educational background, and the rural-urban cultural divide. Perception does not always reflect reality; as such, this question was not included in most models.

Focus on the Human Realm over the Spiritual Realm

10 “找到一个好的婚姻伴□.” (AsiaBarometer 2006, 2006 年中国居民社会 □□□卷) The Taiwanese questionnaire was unavailable.

11 “□□ □□□□ □□□” (AsiaBarometer 2006, Asia Barometer □□)

Q49 Do you believe in an unseen spiritual world that can influence events in the world we see around us?
(1) Definitely I believe
(2) Somewhat I believe
(3) I do not really believe
(4) I do not believe at all

The final category, focus on the material world over the spiritual, was the most difficult to measure. As discussed in the chapter, "What is Confucianism?", Confucius believed that little was to be gained in serving about spirits and gods when there was so much room for improvement in serving one's fellow man. Thus, response Q49 provides an indirect measure for this; those who do not believe in a spiritual world or are unsure or lukewarm in their belief probably put worldly concerns first. Thus, those who chose option (3) or option (4) were deemed more likely to be Confucian.

Independent Variables and Hypotheses

The independent variables used in this paper were chosen based on the characteristics of Confucianism and the historical factors discussed in the history chapter. Both of these provided evidence that Confucian values will be stronger among different sectors of the populace, namely:

- Men
- Older people
- More Educated People

- Married people
- Professionals and students
- Wealthier people
- People who self-identify as Confucian
- People living areas with greater population density
- Koreans and Taiwanese

Men: As Confucianism is widely regarded as a patriarchal social system and has long put the rights and desires of men above those of women, it stands to reason that men, having the most to gain from Confucianism, would have stronger Confucian leanings.

Older People: Those who were born early enough to experience the old Confucian order in East Asia or its residuals are more likely to equate Confucianism with an East Asian, national, or cultural identity, and thus more likely to embrace Confucian beliefs.

More Educated People: Since its adoption by the Han Dynasty over two thousand years ago, Confucianism has been the official ideology of the governing elite. The imperial examination system has strongly linked education and political power. To be in government, one had to first become educated; to be educated, one had to study Confucius. Furthermore, Confucius's own ideas on learning dictate that men of letters are more able to understand and enact Confucian principles in their lives. Thus, education and Confucian beliefs appear to go hand in hand.

Married People: Confucianism regards mastery of filial piety as the starting point of virtue. One of a son's most important duties, if not *the* most important duty, was to provide male offspring to honor his parents and ancestors by continuing the family bloodline. Also important was ritual or propriety, the virtue of behaving according to Confucian social norms. Married couples presumably have practiced both of these virtues; firstly, by getting married before producing children, in accordance with propriety, and second, by intending to produce male heirs. Accordingly, married people are expected to be more Confucian than single people, and certainly more so than divorced or separated couples.

Professionals and Students: Educated professionals, a category including doctors, lawyers, engineers, and other professionals in specialized fields, are expected to be more Confucian by virtue of belonging to the intelligentsia, a social stratum long associated with Confucian learning and values. Students, defined in Confucian terms as people aspiring to become part of the intelligentsia, naturally will also have Confucian leanings. Merchants and the unemployed are expected to be the least Confucian. Merchants fall into the category of those "concerned with profit" (Analects IV, 16); many pre-modern societies had strong biases against the merchant class. Confucius' appraisal of idlers can be seen in the following passage: "Zai Yu was lying down during the day. The Master said, "Rotten wood cannot be carved. A wall of dung cannot be whitewashed. What, then, is the use in reprimanding Yu?"" According to Confucian thought, the unemployed are chronically lazy and thus correspond with the Confucian "small man" archetype; as such, they are likely less Confucian.

Wealthier People: Like education, wealth has traditionally propelled people into the ranks of

the elite, where Confucianism has historically held sway. Also, unlike Daoism or Buddhism, Confucianism did not place a stigma on wealth or associate virtue with poverty. For these two reasons, it is expected that wealthier people will prove to be more Confucian.

People Who Self-Identify as Confucian: While it has been asserted many times in the above history, analysis, and theoretical framework that Confucianism is largely an invisible influence in the lives of East Asian people, it is fairly obvious that people who are Confucian enough to be aware of their philosophical leanings would be more Confucian than the rest of the populace.

People Living in Areas with Greater Population Density: Confucianism is a hierarchical philosophy based on social relationships and the correct way to handle them. Therefore, people who live in areas where they are in constant contact with other people of differing backgrounds (i.e. urban areas) should have more need for such values than farmers in rural villages who rarely interact with anyone outside their own peasant social class. Thus, people who have contact with multiple social classes and live in a society with a complicated social and political hierarchy ought to be more Confucian.

Koreans and Taiwanese: Eastern and Central China are the traditional domain of Han Chinese (and by extension, Confucian) culture. Northwestern China holds large minorities of Muslim Uighur and Chinese, while the central west and southwest are the traditional domain of the Tibetans, strict adherents of Buddhism who are culturally and ethnically distinct from the Han Chinese. Thus, Eastern and Central China are expected to be more Confucian than Western China. Confucianism holds a different place in Korean and Taiwanese history when

compared with China, as explained in the history section. China experienced great political upheaval during the second half of the nineteenth century with the imperial system sliding into irrelevance as Europeans and Japanese seized real power. The 1949 Communist victory followed by the mid-60s Cultural Revolution both further attacked and weakened Confucian social institutions. In contrast, Korea clung to a Confucian world order until the Japanese annexation in 1910 and experienced social and political turmoil in the latter half of the nineteenth century when compared with its neighbors. In Taiwan, Confucianism became a tool to preserve a Chinese identity under Japanese oppression, and later was used as a propaganda tool by the Jiang regime to foster nationalism. Thus, Korea and Taiwan are expected to show the highest levels of Confucianism, and Western China is expected to show the lowest levels.

Linear Regression and Detailed Methodology

Before carrying out the statistical analysis of the survey data, exploratory research was performed in order to ascertain which survey questions would be best for this study. A factor analysis extracted promising factors that strongly coincided with the hypothesized "Confucianism Index" dependent variable.

The Confucianism Index was composed of the twelve survey questions discussed above. Each question's data was checked to ensure consistency. If nominal, the relevant responses were transformed into dummy variables. If ordinal, the responses were numerically ordered from least to most Confucian. Next, the z-scores of each of the twelve survey response variables was

calculated. The relevant z-scores were averaged to create each model's "Confucianism index," a unified measure of the Confucian values expressed in the survey responses.

Four linear regression were run to produce four models, each using one of the four Confucianism indexes as the dependent variable. As discussed above, each successive model was more focused than the last. The survey questions used to compose the Confucianism index in each model are listed in abbreviated form in Table 1.S

Table 1

Survey Questions Used in Constructing the Confucianism Index for Each Model

Survey Question:		**Model I**	**Model II**	**Model III**	**Model IV**
Q10a	Son: Loving and charitable person	✔	✔	✔	
Q28	Education: Develops your humanity	✔	✔	✔	✔
Q12	Are most people altruistic or selfish?	✔	✔	✔	✔
Q50	How justifiable is bribery?	✔			
Q10a	Son: Become a scholar	✔	✔	✔	✔
Q43_2	Which describes your family structure?	✔	✔		
Q10a	Son: Cares about family	✔	✔	✔	✔
Q15	Employ the qualified or a relative?	✔			
Q28	Education: Allows contribution to society	✔	✔	✔	✔
Q10b	Daughter: Find a good marriage partner	✔	✔		
Q22	Are men and women treated equally?	✔			
Q49	Do you believe in an unseen spiritual world?	✔	✔	✔	

Number of questions in the index	*12*	*9*	*7*	*5*

As the above table reveals, each model had a distinct character. Model I was very general; it included every question in the survey that appeared to measure Confucianism. Model II was more conservative, using only survey questions that measured aspects described by relevant literature as measuring Confucian values. Model III whittled Confucian values down to filial piety, sense of social responsibility, motivation for moral attainment, and aspirituality. Model IV focused only on the most direct measures of filial piety, sense of social responsibility, and motivation for moral attainment.

Since each model had a slightly different focus, each regression naturally produced a different output. The regression output, as well as the independent variables that were found to be significant in each regression are detailed in Table 2 below. This table shows the unstandardized betas for each independent variable across the four models. The statistical significance of each unstandardized beta is indicated with stars, and each beta's standard error is listed below it in parentheses.

Table 2

Results of Linear Regression on Confucian Values[a]

Independent Variable	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV
Male	.022** (.009)	.055** (.010)	.079** (.109)	.091** (.014)
Age[b]	.001 (.001)	.000 (.001)	.001 (.001)	.002** (.001)
Education Level[c]	-.008	-.010*	.008	.013

	(.005)	(.006)	(.011)	(.008)
Married or Widowed	.060	-.044	-.002	.081
	(.080)	(.085)	(.007)	(.116)
Single	.018	-.077	-.007	.086
	(.080)	(.086)	(.097)	(.117)
Divorced	.053	-.051	-.066	-.030
	(.086)	(.092)	(.097)	(.126)
"Merchant" Class[d]	.003	-.015	-.015	-.055*
	(.021)	(.023)	(.104)	(.031)
"Educated Professional" Class[e]	-.013	-.024	-.016	-.048
	(.023)	(.024)	(.026)	(.033)
"Producer" Class[f]	-.014	-.029	-.035	-.070**
	(.020)	(.022)	(.028)	(.030)
"Student" Class	.020	-.001	-.017	-.062
	(.031)	(.033)	(.025)	(.046)
Retired	.028	-.009	.000	.000
	(.028)	(.030)	(.038)	(.040)
Unemployed	-.009	-.013	-.012	-.062
	(.026)	(.028)	(.034)	(.039)
Level of income[g]	.003**	.001	-.006**	-.004
	(.001)	(.002)	(.032)	(.002)
Christian	-.010	-.067*	-.087**	-.039
	(.036)	(.039)	(.002)	(.053)
Buddhist	.044	.013	-.010	-.007
	(.035)	(.037)	(.044)	(.051)
Confucian	.099	.076	.086	.131
	(.092)	(.099)	(.042)	(.135)
Taoist	.048	.028	-.002	-.018
	(.038)	(.041)	(.112)	(.056)
Non-religious	.055	.033	.036	-.016
	(.033)	(.036)	(.046)	(.049)
Population Size of Area of Residence[h]	.016**	.028**	.028**	.029**
	(.006)	(.007)	(.041)	(.009)
Korea	-.008	.010	.043**	.067**

	(.013)	(.014)	(.008)	(.020)
Taiwan	-.048**	-.031*	-.020	-.008
	(.017)	(.018)	(.016)	(.024)
Western China	-.053**	-.065**	-.071**	-.037
	(.016)	(.017)	(.020)	(.024)

[a] Standard errors are listed below the unstandardized beta in parentheses.
[b] Range: 20 – 69 years.
[c] Range: Elementary/no education – postgraduate education.
[d] Includes manager, sales, vendor, and any business owner categories.
[e] Includes self-empoyed and employed professional categories.
[f] Includes self-employed agricultural worker, manual worker, and homemaker categories.
[g] A relative scale of twenty income brackets created by combining the specific scales of each country.
[h] A relative scale of three brackets: rural, small city, and large city.
*: $p < 0.1$; **: $p < 0.05$

The unstandardized beta explains the relationship between the dependent and an independent variable. For every unit of change in the independent variable, the unstandardized beta shows the corresponding change in the dependent variable. The range of the dependent variables (the four Confucianism indexes) is on average 2.245[12], and the mean value is on average -0.0514.

Independent variables found to be significant in at least two of the models are worthy of discussion. The above comparison of the four models shows that in at least two models, level of income, living in Korea, living in Taiwan, and professing Christianity have a statistically significant relationship with adherence to Confucian values. In three of the models, living in Western China

12 See Appendix I for each index's descriptive statistics.

had a statistically significant relationship with adherence to Confucian values. In all four models, both being male and differences in population size of area of residence had a statistically significant relationship with adherence to Confucian values.

Independent Variables and Hypotheses Revisited

Men: As expected, being male correlates with Confucian values Regression analysis showed being male to be statistically significant in all four models at the .05 level. However, the standardized betas ranged only from .022 to .091. Thus, being male is very likely a weak predictor of greater emphasis on Confucian values.

Older People: Age was only statistically significant in Model IV and at the .05 level. The unstandardized beta was a very low .002. As age was statistically insignificant in three of the four models, there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. In short, there is no evidence that age is a predictor of Confucian values.

More Educated People: Education was only statistically significant in Model II and at the 0.1 level. The unstandardized beta was a very low -.010. As education was statistically insignificant in three of the four models, there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. In short, there is no evidence that education is a predictor of Confucian values.

Married People: Marital status, whether, single, married, or divorced, was statistically insignificant

in all four models. Therefore, there is no evidence that marital status is a predictor of Confucian values.

Professionals and Students: In Model IV, the merchant class returned an unstandardized beta of -.55, which was significant at the 0.1 level, and the producer class return an unstandardized beta of -.070 that was statistically significant at the .05 level. However, in Models I, II, and III, both the merchant class and the produceer class were statistically insignificant. The educated professional class, student class, retired class, and unemployed class were statistically insignificant in all four models. Therefore, there is no evidence that occupation is a predictor of Confucian values.

Wealthier People: Income level was statistically significant in Models I and III at the .05 level. In Model I, income level had a very low unstandardized beta of .003, and in Model III, income level had a very low unstandardized beta of -.006. Since the relationship between income level and Confucian values is conflicting and extremely weak in Models I and III and statistically insignificant in Models II and IV, income level is likely a very poor predictor of Confucian values.

People Who Self-Identify as Confucian: Self-reporting as Confucian was statistically insignificant in all four models, as were self-reporting as Buddhist, Taoist, or Non-Religious. In Model II, self-reporting as Christian returned an unstandardized beta of -.067 which was statistically significant at the 0.1 level. In Model III, self-reporting as Christian returned an unstandardized beta of -.087 which was statistically significant at the .05 level. Since self-

reporting as Confucian, Buddhist, Taoist, or Non-Religious was statistically insignificant in all models, there is no evidence that they are predictors of Confucian values. Self-reporting as Christian was statistically significant in Models II and III and had a weak negative relationship with the Confucianism index. Thus, Christianity may possibly be a weak predictor of less emphasis on Confucian values.

People Living in Areas with Greater Population Density: Population size of area of residence was consistently significant in all four models at the .05 level. The unstandardized betas for the four models ranged from .016 to .029, with Models II, III, and IV extremely close to one another. This consistency reveals that population size of area of residence shares a weak positive relationship with Confucian values is thus very likely a weak predictor of Confucian values.

Koreans and Taiwanese: In Models III and IV, living in Korea was statistically significant at the .05 level with unstandardized betas of .043 and .067, respectively. Thus, living in Korea may possibly have a weak positive relationship with Confucian values, and thus may be a weak predictor of more emphasis on Confucian values. In Model I, living in Taiwan was statistically significant at the .05 level with an unstandardized beta of .048, while in Model II, living in Taiwan was statistically significant at the 0.1 level with an unstandardized beta of .031. Thus, living in Taiwan may possibly have a weak negative relationship with Confucian values, and thus may be a weak predictor of less emphasis on Confucian values. In Models I, II, and III, living in Western China was statistically significant at the .05 level with unstandardized betas of -.053, -.065, and -.071, repectively. Thus, living in Western China probably has a weak

negative relationship with Confucian values, and thus is probably a weak predictor of less emphasis on Confucian values.

Conclusions

Overview

Looking solely at the results of this research in the context of its theoretical framework, it appears that the most realistic of the two opposing theories is Rozman's portrait of an antiquated, fading Confucianism beleaguered by the forces of modernization and globalization. While Confucianism may have been a powerful force in the past, there appears to be little relationship between the lifestyle choices and demographic characteristics of the modern East Asian citizen and his or her adherence to Confucian values and social norms. Confucianism appears to have slipped into irrelevance.

Irrelevance, that is, in the rather narrow context of this study. Before delving into the specific conclusions presented by the quantitative portion of this paper, a disclaimer is necessary. As a preliminary attempt at measuring an inchoate belief system with myriad interpretations and variations, the results of this research must be taken not with a grain, but with a *pillar* of salt. Hopefully, these results will pique interest and spur more precise, specialized research that will tackle Confucianism from a different angle and with a different interpretation and provide a greater body of knowledge from which to draw conclusions about the Confucian character of East

Asians in the twenty-first century.

Specific Conclusions

The quantitative portion of this research yielded both expected and unexpected results. First, the expected results. A patriarchal system will naturally be preferred by those who benefit most from it, namely men. However, the small influence gender had on Confucian values suggests that modern East Asian men may be more egalitarian in their thinking than the conventional wisdom holds. That Christianity seems to cause a decrease in Confucian values is unsurprising, considering conflict between Christian churches and Confucian rulers dates back at least to the onset of the Chinese Rites Controversy in the mid-seventeenth century, which forbade Chinese Catholics from participating in ancestor worship, a crucial component of Confucian filial piety (Roberts, 2003, 216). Similarly unsurprising were Buddhism and Taoism's lack of relationship with Confucianism, since Neo-Confucianism interwove elements of both religions into the Confucian canon. Because of this, all of these three belief systems have considerable overlap in practices and it is difficult to completely separate the practices of one from another using only the narrow questions in the AsiaBarometer survey. Regional variables mostly fell in line with expectations, with Korea showing a probable higher level of Confucianism when compared to Eastern and Central China, while Western China, with its minority groups and tradition of being outside the boundary of traditional Chinese culture, had a very probable lower level of Confucian values.

The unexpected results were more numerous. Notably, age had almost no correlation with Confucian values at all. Using the same logic used to justify male preference for Confucian values, the elderly should also favor Confucianism as they stand only to gain respect and material support

from their juniors. Why this is not so is unclear, but it may simply be that Confucianism as a world order has been defunct long enough that even the oldest subjects (between age 60 and 69) no longer use it as their primary moral philosophy. Since the oldest subjects were 69 in 2006, the earliest possible year of birth would have been 1937. With age 13 as a generous estimate of the age of maturity, the oldest subjects would have been "mature" around 1950. This is after World War II, at the beginning of the American occupation in Korea, at the beginning of the appropriation of Confucianism in Taiwan for political propaganda, and in the first few years of Communist rule in China. Thus, Confucianism was no longer the official social philosophy of any of the three countries, and two of them were dominated by alien philosophies (Communism in China and American values in occupied Korea). It appears that these past few decades have seen the disappearance of the last few generations of cradle Confucians.

Education and income level also showed no links to Confucian values. It appears that Confucianism is no longer the value system of the educated, wealthy elite. Nor is it the preferred value system of those living traditional lifestyles in rural areas. What, then, does education, a focal point of Confucius's teachings and part of the path to Confucian virtue, mean for East Asians today? Is it merely a means to a career, like it is for so many in the West? This could possibly be explained by the fundamental difference between what made one successful under the Confucian world order and what makes one successful in a competitive global economy. Particularism and seclusion afforded the Confucian world the luxury of drawing up its own standards for success, which were virtue, an understanding of the classics, and moral administration; wealth and productive capacity, though important, were secondary concerns. In a world of many competing cultures, these groups have been reversed—competition and capital became the new world

order's common denominator. In a striking example of this reversal, Deng Xiaoping, ruler of Confucius's own ancestral homeland and of the people whose ancestors once propagated and practiced Confucius's philosophy, had as the unofficial slogan for his economic reforms, "To get rich is glorious."

Marital status also had no effect on Confucian values. This seems to suggest that while displays of Confucian familial respect and authority within the family, so often cited as evidence for Confucianism's continued existence, are merely the visible artifacts of a belief system which has long been replaced as the core of family values—in other words, the ritual are still carried out but the moral and philosophical convictions are no longer present. As different families are as varied as they are complex, the analysis based on marital status presented in this paper is insufficient grounds to conjecture the reasons that Confucianism is not at the heart of family relations, or even to assume that Confucianism does not influence family relations.

The lack of relationship between Confucian values and the "educated professional" class, "student" class, and "merchant" class may reflect a decrease in Confucian values, but more than likely simply represent the fundamental changes in class structure from the pre-modern period to present day. A middle class did not exist in Confucius's time, nor did near-universal access to education. Also, as noted previously, the globalization-induced shift from particularist metrics of success to universalist metrics has severely reduced the relevance of Confucian values, as they are no longer a steeping stone to wealth and social privilege.

Probably the most surprising result of all was a probable lower level of Confucian values in Taiwan when compared to mainland China. As discussed above, Chinese Confucianism suffered under Communist rule, while Taiwanese Confucianism became an important part of the national

identity for nearly a century. The most obvious explanation for this seeming contradiction stems from the ideological and cultural rift that formed after the Chinese civil war, as both countries took different development tracks. Taiwan has had large dosesof both modernization and Westernization; the former under the occupation of the Japanese, and the latter under the patronage of the United States. Across the strait, China is just beginning both processes. It appears that modernization and Westernization were able to accomplish what a century of rhetoric, purges, and violence could not.

So How Confucian are Modern East Asians?

Using the original teachings of Confucius as a baseline for Confucian values and the results of the four regression models as evidence, there seems to be little proof that Confucianism influences, in any meaningful sense, the modern values of the average Chinese, Korean, or Taiwanese. As discussed above, this research reveals many surprising inconsistencies between the conventional perception of "Confucianism" or "Asian values" as the leading moral system in East Asia and reality. Jjudging from these results, a more fruitful question might be, "What has replaced Confucianism in East Asia?"

Bibliography

AsiaBarometer 2006. "AsiaBarometer: Profile." Accessed April 10, 2011.

https://www.asiabarometer.org/en/profile.

AsiaBarometer 2006. "Fieldwork Report." Accessed April 10, 2011.

https://www.asiabarometer.org/files/AB2006_FieldworkReport_Taiwan.xls.

AsiaBarometer 2006. "Fieldwork Report." Accessed April 10, 2011.

https://www.asiabarometer.org/files/AB2006_FieldworkReport_China.xls.

AsiaBarometer 2006. "Fieldwork Report." Accessed April 10, 2011.

https://www.asiabarometer.org/files/AB2006_FieldworkReport_Korea.xls.

AsiaBarometer 2006. "2006 年中国居民社会 □□□卷." Accessed April 13, 2011.

https://www.asiabarometer.org/files/China_0.pdf

AsiaBarometer 2006. "Asia Barometer □□." Accessed April 13, 2011.

https://www.asiabarometer.org/files/Korea_0.pdf

Armstrong, Karen. “The Great Transformation.”

Anchor Books: New York City, NY. 2006.

Bell, Daniel A., and Hahm Chaibong, eds. *Confucianism for the Modern World*. New York, NY:

Cambridge University Press, 2003. Print. 4.

Bell, Daniel A. “Confucian Constraints on Property Rights." In *Confucianism for the Modern World,* edited by Daniel A. Bell and Hahm Chaibong (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 220.

Berthrong, John H. “Transformations of the Confucian Way.” Westview Press: Boulder, CO. 1998.

Buruma, Ian. January 04, 1999. TWO CHEERS FOR ORIENTALISM The Chan's Great Continent: China in Western Minds. The New republic, (accessed April 09, 2011).

Chen, Albert H. Y. "Mediation, Litigation, and Justice." In *Confucianism for the Modern World,* edited by Daniel A. Bell and Hahm Chaibong (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 276, 284-287.

Chen, Chao-Ying. “Development of Confucianism in Taiwan.” *Contemporary Chinese Thought,* vol. 41, no. 1, Fall 2009, pp. 10–27.

Cheung, Tak Sing, Hoi Man Chan, Kin Man Chan, Ambrose King, Chi Yue Chiu, and Chung Fang Yang. 2006. How Confucian are Contemporary Chinese? Construction of an Ideal Type and its Application to Three Chinese Communities. *European Journal of East Asian Studies*. 5 (2):157-180.

Chong-Min Park, “The Quality of Life in South Korea.” *Social Indicators Research* 92 (2009): 263-294.

Fong, Shiaw-Chian. "Hegemony and Identity in the Colonial Experience of Taiwan, 1895-1945." In *Taiwan Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895-1945,* edited by Liao Ping-Hui and David Der-Wei Wang (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2006), 173-174.

Grace Yao, Yen-Pi Cheng, and Chiao-Pi Cheng, “The Quality of Life in Taiwan.” *Social Indicators Research* 92 (2009): 377-404.

Hahm, Chaihark. "Constitutionalism, Virtue, and Propriety." In *Confucianism for the Modern World,* edited by Daniel A. Bell and Hahm Chaibong (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 47-48.

Helgesen, Geir. *Democracy and Authority in Korea: The Cultural Dimension in Korean Politics* (Richmond, VA: Curzon Press, 1998), 169.

Helgesen, Geir. "The Case for Moral Education." In *Confucianism for the Modern World,* edited by Daniel A. Bell and Hahm Chaibong (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 161.

Huang, Chun-Chieh. "The Conservative Trend of Confucianism in Taiwan After World War II." *Contemporary Chinese Thought,* vol. 41, no. 1, Fall 2009, pp. 49–69.

Huang, Xiaoming. 2007. "Do Asian Values Matter—for an East Asian Community?." *Politics & Policy* 35, no. 1: 154-161. *Political Science Complete*, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 9, 2011).

Li, Chenyang. The sage and the second sex: Confucianism, ethics, and gender. Open Court: Chicago, IL. 2000.

Liu, Liangbi, 重修台湾府志 (南投: 台湾省文献会, 1977), 1.

孔丘,□□. 李家秀.

□□木□: 新疆人民出版社, 2001.

Mei-Lin Lee and Te-Hsiung Sun, "The Family and Demography in Contemporary Taiwan." Journal of Comparative *Family* Studies 26 (1995): 101-115.

Mendis, Patrick. 2005. "Americanization of Globalization." *Public Manager* 34, no. 3: 3-8. *Political*

Science Complete, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 10, 2011).

Mitchell, Mark L., and Janina M. Jolley. *Research Design Explained*. 7th ed. : Cengage Learning, 2009.

Park, Insook Han and L.J.*Cho*, "*Confucianism* and the *Korean Family."* Journal of Comparative *Family* Studies 26 (1995): 117-134.

Roberts, J.A.G.. *The Complete History of China.* Stroud: Sutton, 2003.

Rozman, Gilbert. 1993. The East Asian Region. pg. 162-163.

Rozman, Gilbert. 2002. Can Confucianism Survive in an Age of Universalism and Globalization? *Pacific Affairs*. 75 (1):11.

Takeshi, Komagome. "Colonial Modernity for an Elite Taiwanese, Lim Bo-Seng." In *Taiwan Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895-1945,* edited by Liao Ping-Hui and David Der-Wei Wang (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2006), 143.

Walraven, Boudewijn. "Popular Religion in a Confucianized Society." In *Culture and the State in Late Choson Korea,* edited by Jahyun Kim Haboush and Martina Deuchler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 195-197.

Xiaoling Shu and Yifei Zhu, "The Quality of Life in China." *Social Indicators Research* 92 (2009): 191-225.

Yang, Key. P and Gregory Henderson . "An Outline History of Korean Confucianism: Part I: The Early Period and Yi Factionalism." *The Journal of Asian Studies*. Vol. 18, No. 1 (Nov., 1958), 81- 101.

APPENDICES

Appendix I: Decriptive Statistics ofIndependent Variables and Confucianism Indexes

Independent Variables

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Male Dummy	4029	.00	1.00	.5066	.50002
Education (F3) Unified	4028	1.00	5.00	2.7830	1.07807
Married/Widowed Dummy	4029	.00	1	.7789	.41507
Single Dummy	4029	.00	1.00	.1993	.39953
Divorced Dumy	4029	.00	1.00	.0186	.13518
Merchant Dummy	4029	.00	1.00	.2189	.41356
Educated Professional Dummy	4029	.00	1.00	.1901	.39245
Peasantry/Skilled Labor/Homemaker Dummy	4029	.00	1.00	.3713	.48321
Student Dummy	4029	.00	1.00	.0494	.21671
Retired Dummy	4029	.00	1.00	.0524	.22280
Unemployed Dummy	4029	.00	1.00	.0606	.23855
Income (F8) Unified	3965	1.00	20.00	4.0131	3.88960
Christian Dummy Variable	4029	.00	1.00	.1107	.31380

Buddhist Dummy Variable	4029	.0	1.0	.199	.3993
Confucian Dummy Variable	4029	.00	1.00	.0027	.05219
Taoist Dummy Variable	4029	.00	1.00	.1040	.30529
Irreligious Dummy Variable	4029	.00	1.00	.5642	.49593
Population (PopSize) Unified	4029	1.00	3.00	1.9509	.84120
Korea Dummy	4029	.00	1.00	.2539	.43530
Taiwan Dummy	4029	.00	1.00	.2497	.43289
China West Dummy	4029	.00	1.00	.0993	.29908

Confucianism Indexes

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Model I	4029	-1.32	.98	-.0274	.28725
Model II	4029	-.90	1.28	-.0345	.30856
Model III	4029	-.98	1.24	-.0705	.35275
Model IV	4029	-.91	1.37	-.0731	.42166

Appendix II: Frequency Distribution of Responses to Survey Questions

How would you like to see your son(s) grow up? - Become a loving and charitable person

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	(blank)	2800	69.5	69.5	69.5
	Yes	1229	30.5	30.5	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

How would you like to see your son(s) grow up? - Become a person who cares about family

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	(blank)	3135	77.8	77.8	77.8
	Yes	894	22.2	22.2	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

How would you like to see your daughter(s) grow up? - Find a good marriage partner

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	(blank)	1839	45.6	45.6	45.6
	Yes	2190	54.4	54.4	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

Do you think that people generally try to be helpful or do you think that they mostly look out for themselves?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	People generally try to be helpful	2145	53.2	53.8	53.8
	People look out for themselves	1843	45.7	46.2	100.0
	Total	3988	99.0	100.0	
Missing	Don't know	41	1.0		
	Total	4029	100.0		

In the company's employment examination, a relative of yours got the second highest grade, scoring only marginally less than the candidate with the highest grade. In such a case, which person would you employ?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Person with the highest grade	2476	61.5	62.8	62.8
	Your relative	1469	36.5	37.2	100.0
	Total	3945	97.9	100.0	
Missing	Don't know	84	2.1		
	Total	4029	100.0		

Do you think that on the whole men and women are treated equally in your country?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Men are treated much more favorably than women	562	13.9	14.0	14.0
	Men are treated somewhat more favorably than women	1401	34.8	35.0	49.0
	Men and women are treated equally	1611	40.0	40.2	89.3
	Women are treated somewhat more favorably than men	356	8.8	8.9	98.2
	Women are treated much more favorably than men	73	1.8	1.8	100.0
	Total	4003	99.4	100.0	
Missing	Don't know	26	.6		
Total		4029	100.0		

In your opinion, what are benefits of education? (3MA) - 1 Develops your humanity

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	(blank)	2326	57.7	57.7	57.7
	Yes	1703	42.3	42.3	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

In your opinion, what are benefits of education? (3MA) - 7 Enables you to contribute to your society

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	(blank)	2850	70.7	70.7	70.7
	Yes	1179	29.3	29.3	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

Which of the following describe your family structure?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Single-person household	158	3.9	3.9	3.9
	Married couple only	391	9.7	9.7	13.6
	A parent(s) and child(ren) who are not married	2408	59.8	59.8	73.4
	A parent(s) and child(ren) who is/are married	409	10.2	10.2	83.6
	Grandparent(s), parent(s) and child(ren)	544	13.5	13.5	97.1
	Other	116	2.9	2.9	100.0
	Total	4026	99.9	100.0	

Missing	Don't know	3	.1		
	Total	4029	100.0		

Do you believe in an unseen spiritual world that can influence events in the world we see around us?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Definitely I believe	543	13.5	13.8	13.8
	Somewhat I believe	1630	40.5	41.5	55.3
	I do not really believe	1095	27.2	27.9	83.2
	I do not believe at all	661	16.4	16.8	100.0
	Total	3929	97.5	100.0	
Missing	Don't know	100	2.5		
	Total	4029	100.0		

Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between (a) Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Never justifiable	2918	72.4	72.7	72.7
	2	388	9.6	9.7	82.4
	3	235	5.8	5.9	88.2
	4	117	2.9	2.9	91.2
	5	157	3.9	3.9	95.1
	6	78	1.9	1.9	97.0

	7	39	1.0	1.0	98.0
	8	27	.7	.7	98.7
	9	10	.2	.2	98.9
	10 Always justifiable	44	1.1	1.1	100.0
	Total	4013	99.6	100.0	
Missing	Don't know	16	.4		
Total		4029	100.0		

Appendix III: Frequency Distribution of Responses to Independent Variables

Sex

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Female	1988	49.3	49.3	49.3
	Male	2041	50.7	50.7	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

Education Level

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Elementary or Below	635	15.8	15.8	15.8
	Middle School	880	21.8	21.8	37.6
	High School	1324	32.9	32.9	70.5
	College	1102	27.4	27.4	97.8
	Graduate School	87	2.2	2.2	100.0
	Total	4028	100.0	100.0	

Missing	System	1	.0		
Total		4029	100.0		

Married or Widowed

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Other	891	22.1	22.1	22.1
	Married or Widowed	3138	77.9	77.9	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

Single

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Other	3226	80.1	80.1	80.1
	Single	803	19.9	19.9	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

Divorced

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Other	3954	98.1	98.1	98.1
	Divorced	75	1.9	1.9	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

Merchant

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Other	3147	78.1	78.1	78.1
	Merchant	882	21.9	21.9	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

Educated Professional

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Other	3263	81.0	81.0	81.0
	Professional	766	19.0	19.0	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

Producers (Peasantry, Skilled Labor, Homemaker)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Other	2533	62.9	62.9	62.9
	Producer	1496	37.1	37.1	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

Student

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Other	3830	95.1	95.1	95.1
	Student	199	4.9	4.9	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

Retired

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Other	3818	94.8	94.8	94.8
	Retired	211	5.2	5.2	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

Income Scale, 1-20, Relative to Country

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	1297	32.2	32.7	32.7
	2.00	690	17.1	17.4	50.1
	3.00	479	11.9	12.1	62.2
	4.00	322	8.0	8.1	70.3
	5.00	239	5.9	6.0	76.3
	6.00	183	4.5	4.6	81.0
	7.00	100	2.5	2.5	83.5
	8.00	120	3.0	3.0	86.5
	9.00	110	2.7	2.8	89.3
	10.00	112	2.8	2.8	92.1
	11.00	47	1.2	1.2	93.3
	12.00	37	.9	.9	94.2
	13.00	36	.9	.9	95.1
	14.00	86	2.1	2.2	97.3
	15.00	30	.7	.8	98.1
	16.00	28	.7	.7	98.8

	17.00	10	.2	.3	99.0
	18.00	9	.2	.2	99.2
	19.00	16	.4	.4	99.6
	20.00	14	.3	.4	100.0
	Total	3965	98.4	100.0	
Missing	System	64	1.6		
Total		4029	100.0		

Christian

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Other	3583	88.9	88.9	88.9
	Chrisitian	446	11.1	11.1	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

Buddhist

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Other	3227	80.1	80.1	80.1
	Buddhist	802	19.9	19.9	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

Confucian

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Other	4018	99.7	99.7	99.7
	Confucian	11	.3	.3	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

Taoist

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Other	3610	89.6	89.6	89.6
	Taoist	419	10.4	10.4	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

Non-Religious

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Other	1756	43.6	43.6	43.6
	Non-religious	2273	56.4	56.4	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

Population Size

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Rural	1529	37.9	37.9	37.9
	Small City	1169	29.0	29.0	67.0
	Large City	1331	33.0	33.0	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

Korea

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Other	3006	74.6	74.6	74.6
	Korean	1023	25.4	25.4	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

Taiwan

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Other	3023	75.0	75.0	75.0
	Taiwan	1006	25.0	25.0	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	

China (West)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Other	3629	90.1	90.1	90.1
	China West	400	9.9	9.9	100.0
	Total	4029	100.0	100.0	