Frontiers and Ghettos 2.0:
A New Test For The Relationship Between
State Violence and Institutional Settings In The Israel/Palestine Conflict

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Introduction

The use of state violence and repression against civilian populations continues to be one of the most troubling obstacles to conflict termination in the world. Despite post-world war two efforts to expand international adherence to human rights norms, civilian victimization in conflicts remains a common occurrence. While much work has been done to explain the usage of state violence, a recurring issue is the variation of state violence usage within a regime. Why is it that states may use brutal violence against civilians in some cases, but pursue more mild methods of control in other cases?

This thesis attempts to explain this variation by examining an existing theory of state violence put forth by researcher James Ron. He proposed that the setting from which a threat emerged is critical in understanding a state’s usage of violence in an era when regimes face strong pressure to appear legitimate and to adhere to human rights law. Using a qualitative methodology, this thesis tests Ron’s theory on four cases and finds, with some reservations, that his theory holds.

It begins with a discussion of the relevant literature on state violence and repression, with an overview of applicable theories to this thesis, with a more thorough discussion of Ron’s theory. The research design follows, which includes the operationalization of necessary concepts and a background of the cases used in this study. Four cases are discussed, followed by an interpretation of the results and a review of possible alternative explanations.

This thesis holds academic importance as it provides additional support for a theory of state violence which is not without controversy and may serve to strengthen existing knowledge
of this phenomenon. A proper understanding of the reasons behind variations in state violence may assist policy makers working to prevent civilian victimization aid in conflict termination.

**Review of Literature on Repression and State Violence**

In examining cases in the Middle East and in other regions, the usage of state violence may seem confusing. It not only varies from state to state, but its usage is varied also within regimes. What may cause a state to use state violence or repression against a population? Or, more perplexing, what causes variation in state violence in cases where the regime is the same? Literature on state violence and repression provides insights into these questions.

Since the 1970s, the predominant understanding of repression and state violence has shifted substantially from earlier interpretations. Early scholars generally interpreted incidents of political repression and state violence to derive from particular political-economic systems. Between the 1950s and the 1970s many observers believed that repression and violence was “something of a pathology.” (Davenport 2007) Essentially, they argued that governments which employed repression did so because they were unable or unwilling to rule in any other way. It was from this school of thought that the belief that democracies could not employ state violence and that it was a tool only of the autocracy emerged. (Davenport 2007)

In more recent years, scholars have begun to view repression as a tool used by rational actors, and that the reasons behind its use can be explained logically. (Kalyvas 2006) From this school, many important theories of repression and violence have been proposed, some of which can explain variations of state violence within a single regime. Some have argued that mass killings can be a calculated military strategy as a way to face a guerilla insurgency. They argue that governments facing guerrillas may target the civilian population to drain the support
network for the insurgents and to increase the costs of backing a rebellion. A parallel observation from these researchers is that the killings are more likely when the regime perceives a legitimate threat from the guerillas. (Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004) The importance of threat has been observed by many other researchers (Davenport 2007), (Earl 2011), and some researchers have proposed that states may perceive greater threats from opponents possessing strengths which the regime lacks. (Mahoney-Norris 2000), (Earl 2011) Other important findings include the theory that states are more likely to repress in situations in which they believe they can win (Gamson 1990) and that minority groups are more likely to encounter harsher repression (Wood 2007).

A compelling school of thought to explain within-country variations on state violence is state capacity. Although state capacity literature is diverse, a 2010 article (Hendrix 2010) aggregated and reviewed three predominate branches of state capacity theory. The first is military capacity, essentially arguing that state capacity is best defined by its capacity to deter challenges to its authority with force. The second is bureaucratic/administrative capacity, arguing that state capacity is best defined by its ability to collect and manage information as a way to repel challengers. The final branch is the quality and coherence of political institutions, which centers around a state’s ability to “repress or accommodate dissident political viewpoints.” (Hendrix 2010)

**Theoretical Argument: James Ron’s *Frontiers and Ghettos***

In 2000, James Ron proposed a new theory to explain variations of state violence within a single high-capacity regime. He argues that states may be constrained in the use of state violence and repression because of increasing outside pressure to appear legitimate and the expansion of
human rights laws and norms. He proposes that regimes are more likely to be bound by these constraints in areas of strong, concentrated state power\(^1\), where the pressure for legitimacy is greater, and thus employ less brutal methods of state repression. In settings on the margins of control, Ron argues that human rights norms and the need for legitimacy are less binding since the state has a decreased responsibility in areas with weaker institutional control, and more likely to experience harsh state violence.

In his use of state capacity, Ron emphasizes the importance of bureaucratic/administrative capacity and to a lesser extent military capacity. He defines the different geographic areas dealt with in his theory according to their institutional settings which “refers here to a clearly defined social or geographic space where organizational action is shaped by notions of appropriate and legitimate behavior.” (Ron 8) From his cases, he proposes two general (but not all-encompassing) institutional settings which may determine the state’s use of two general types of repression.

The first is a ghetto, a setting which is highly integrated into the control of the state. He argues that an important distinction of a ghetto is the state’s feeling of responsibility for the fate of the setting and its people. Under his theory, a regime is likely to use a set of tactics which he refers to as ethnic policing which are used to control and subjugate a people, but not to outright destroy it. The second setting is a frontier. He proposes that a frontier is on the fringes of control by the state, with few institutions and little capacity for control. Since it is not highly integrated into the state, Ron argues that in these areas of diffuse control the government will be less likely to feel any sort of responsibility towards the population and will be unrestrained by the need to

\(^1\) That is, an area where the state has a high level of control.
adhere to human rights norms or to appear legitimate to other states. It is more likely then, that the state will employ ethnic cleansing techniques to control the setting. These go far beyond the relative restraint of policing tactics, and are intended to disrupt or destroy a population in its setting.

**Research Design**

This thesis will focus on evaluating Ron’s theory by examining new cases which exploit variations in institutional settings in relation to a single regime. Ron focused primarily on cases from Serbia and the Israel/Palestine conflict during the First Intifada, with a brief discussion of Israel’s Grapes of Wrath operation in 1996. This thesis will examine four cases to evaluate this theory: the West Bank and Gaza between 1993-2000, the West Bank and Gaza between 2000-2005, the West Bank since 2005, Gaza since 2005. These cases vary spatially and temporally and in their institutional settings, but as they share the same regime, it will allow other explanatory variables to be controlled for such as regime type or target group.

For each of these cases, the institutional setting is first defined along five indicators described further on in this thesis. Then, the methods of state violence and repression are defined as ethnic policing or ethnic cleansing for each case. Finally, each case is evaluated to determine if the violence type corresponds to the institutional setting as predicted by Ron.

Human rights reports from Israeli, Palestinian, and international groups will be the primary source of information for determining both institutional setting and state violence. These reports not only document the instances or repression or violence, but often times document the institutions of control in these settings. Reports will primarily come from B’Tselem (an Israeli human rights monitor focusing on the West Bank and Gaza), Human Rights Watch, Amnesty
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International, Al-Haq (a Palestinian human rights monitor), as well as some references to Addameer (a Palestinian advocacy group for the rights of prisoners), and the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. In some cases secondary sources such as news reports or academic works on the Israel/Palestine conflict will used when primary sources are lacking.

**Operationalization of Institutional Setting**

To effectively describe the institutional setting of each of my cases, it is first necessary to take this somewhat abstract concept and develop real, measurable indicators to study as well as a scale to determine whether a case falls into “frontier,” “ghetto,” or some place in between. The institutional setting is dependent on the level of integration into the dominant polity, as well as the extent to which the controlling state feels responsibility for the fate of the geographic or social space which forms the case. From Ron’s discussion of the process by which Palestine became a ghetto to Israel, I choose five of his indicators from three areas of control which will allow for a setting to be determined a frontier or a ghetto. Although many indicators are discussed throughout Ron’s work, each of these indicators is regularly discussed or can be determined from the human rights literature on the Israel/Palestine conflict, and each is a particularly strong method of control:

- Control of the borders and movement into and out of the space
- Administrative control over the space
- Economic integration into the dominant polity
Control of the Borders and Movement Into and Out of the Space

The control of the borders and movement of a space is a key area of control by dominant polities over a space. If the movement into and out of a space is not fully controlled by the dominant polity, it is much easier for the people to resist the supremacy and regulation of the other state. It is similar to siege warfare, if the attacking state cannot restrict the movement of people, goods, or weapons into the city they will not be able to effectively conquer it. The control of movement into and out of the space is essential for determining the setting of a case. A frontier may have little restriction on movement and will still be able to have people, goods, or weapons come into or out of the space without the regulation of the other state. For a ghetto, however, the other state will likely have high level of control in this area.

The key indicator from this area to determine whether a space is a frontier or a ghetto is the presence of border control institutions. While Ron’s work deals more generally with the control of movement, I will specifically for the presence of barriers, blockades, or external checkpoints set up by the dominant polity to determine which administration is regulating movement. These institutions are key for integrating a space and gives a state great considerable responsibility for its fate.

Administrative Control Over the Space

To fully integrate a space into another state, it is necessary for the state to develop an administration over the space. Establishing broad networks of administrative control over the setting allows the state to curb resistance, force the population into subjugation, and ensure the continuation of its rule. The institutions used to develop administrative control broaden the responsibility the state has control over the state and its people. The dominant polity will have
little oversight of a frontier in this area, perhaps even less so than in other areas. For a space to be a ghetto, however, administrative control is crucial. For this reason, the largest number of indicators will come from this section.

Three primary indicators of administrative control may be studied to determine if a space is a frontier or a ghetto in relation to the state. The first is the military presence within the space. The presence of a military force allows the state to put down resistance, enforce its regulations, but also may indicate that it has some responsibility for maintaining law and order. The presence of a military does not, however, guarantee that a space is a frontier or ghetto. It will be essential to determine if the military presence has day-to-day authority in the space, or if the military is more withdrawn, dealing only with broad matters in the setting.

A second indicator of institutional control is the administration of civilian ministries within a space. A ghetto may have its ministries such as health or education supervised by the other state, but it would be unlikely that a frontier sees this type of institution. This is a double-edged indicator as it allows the state to make the space dependent on it, which can be a tool for subjugation, but it does force some responsibility upon the dominant polity.

Finally, administrative control may be determined by establishing if there is a registration of civilians and if there is a permitting system. The registration of civilians by the state allows it extend its rule, but again is double-edged as it provides a level of protection for the civilians. If there is legal proof that a person exists, the military cannot simply get rid of someone and claim that they never existed. This registration may allow for the state to more fully integrate a setting and ensure its rule through a system of permits restricting travel, work, health, or education. While these two indicators are two separate concepts, they frequently intertwine
within the Israel/Palestine conflict. Since a simple population registration or a single permit system may not provide for much rule over the setting, these two should be studied as one indicator, and should meet both criteria to be counted as an indicator of a ghetto.

**Economic Integration Into the Dominant Polity**

Integration of the economy of the space into the dominant polity is an important means of securing the subjugation of the setting. Economic activity is a way that the civilians in a space can assert some level of independence from the ambitious government and so it is necessary to force them into dependence on the economy of the dominant polity to prevent rebellion and insurgency. While many economic indicators are more difficult to study, the **control of public utilities** may be a way to determine the level of oversight a state has over a space. If the electricity or water or telecom is overseen by the dominant polity, then it has a readily available tool of control. While restrictions on movement, permits, or military presence may affect many key segments of a population, public utilities affect nearly every citizen. As Moshe Dayan, former Israeli Defence Minister, said “If Hebron’s electricity grid comes from our central grid and we are able to pull the plug and thus cut them off, this is clearly better than a thousand curfews and riot-dispersals.”

**Standard for Determining the Institutional Setting**

After each of the five indicators of institutional control are determined for each case, I will then determine the status of each as a frontier or ghetto based on the positive indicators of integration and responsibility. I will base this on the example of the West Bank and Gaza during the First Intifada in *Frontiers and Ghettos* as a “perfect” case of a ghetto. Ron determined that Israel had control over Palestine in each of these five areas, but I will consider a case to be a
ghetto if at least four of these indicators show evidence of a high level of responsibility and integration by Israel. If three or fewer of these indicators are met, I will consider them to be a frontier in relation to Israel.

**Operationalization of State Violence Types**

The two types of state violence relevant to this study are ethnic cleansing and ethnic policing, both of which have been used by Israel in the Palestinian conflict. Ethnic policing is a type of political repression designed to eliminate opposition in an ethnic group. According to Ron, as a power is more concentrated in a space and the responsibility of the state towards the populace grows, these methods become preferable to other, more extensive methods of state violence. This is not to say, however, that these methods are not brutal, rather they do not escalate to their full potential. Specific methods include mass incarcerations, curfews, restrictions on movement, beatings of detainees, and others.

For cases which are frontiers vis a vis the state, ethnic cleansing may be used as a method for eliminating opposition in an area. According to Ron, Ethnic cleansing is a type of state violence which permanently dislocates or destroys a community. It may come in the form of forced relocation of the population, massacres of civilians, bombing of residential areas, or others. This may be used as a way to empty a space for occupation by the state, however, in this study it is largely used to push out potential threats. These methods go far beyond the limited violence of ethnic policing. While repression may leave a community in tact, ethnic cleansing constitutes a destruction of a community in a specific location.

In classifying each of the cases as ethnic cleansing or ethnic policing, the threshold for defining the violence in a case as cleansing will be much higher than defining one as policing.
The presence of ethnic cleansing methodologies will trump the presence of ethnic policing methodologies, so if both are present in a case, it will be labeled a case of ethnic cleansing. It is also necessary to examine the scope of cleansing in each case. Isolated cleansing incidences resulting in few casualties likely do not represent well the overall policy of Israel, but more extensive campaigns by the state resulting in mass total casualties or a pattern of actions which dislocate a community will be considered cleansing. So, for each case, the state violence and repression will be described with a focus on methodology, and those cases which show “Savage Restraint” (Ron 2000) will be labeled ethnic policing. Those cases which show the usage of untargeted, extensive methods which aim to destroy a community will be classified as a case of ethnic cleansing.

**Background of Cases**

The cases chosen for this study are in many ways close to ideal. The first case begins where Ron’s work stops, the Oslo Accords period between the First and Second Intifadas from 1993-2000. The West Bank and Gaza are treated as a single case, during a relatively peaceful period. The second case follows the West Bank and Gaza through the al-Aqsa or Second Intifada from 2000-2005. The primary difference between the first and second cases is the level of resistance which Israel faced during this period, otherwise, it shares the institutional setting, regime type, and space of the earlier case. From 2005 until the present, the West Bank and Gaza are split into two cases following Israel’s decision to disengage from the Gaza Strip but remain in the West Bank. This allows for Ron’s theory to be tested under the same period, under the same regime, but with different institutional settings.
Results


Description of the Institutional Setting

After the signing of the Oslo Accords following the First Intifada, the status of the occupied territories changed significantly as the Palestinian Authority was created and a number of restrictions were relaxed. The West Bank was divided into three areas based on the type of control it would be under. Eighteen percent of the land was made into Area A, under full Palestinian control. Area B (twenty-two percent of the land) was to be under Palestinian control in civilian matter, but Israeli control over security matters. The rest of the land (sixty percent) was to be under full Israeli control for both civilian matters and security matters.

Although the Oslo I accords stated that the goal of the negotiations was to create an interim, self-governing Palestinian Authority (Israel 1993), the status of the West Bank and Gaza remained largely a ghetto to Israel. It may be worth noting that Benjamin Netanyahu who served as the Prime Minister of Israel from 1996 until 1999, was a vocal critic of the agreement (Netanyahu 1993) as it was being negotiated under Prime Minister Rabin. He then claimed in 1998 that Israel had fulfilled its obligations, and that Palestine was self-governing (Netanyahu 1998), despite evidence to the contrary. This may contribute to an explanation as to why the status of Palestine remained unchanged in spite of the goals of self-governance.

Under the accords, control of the borders of the West Bank and Gaza fell under the authority of Israel, and border control institutions were established. The Israeli government had sole responsibility to manage the movement into and out of the West Bank and Gaza through a
system of travel permits and border checkpoints. (Carmi 1999) In 1994, the Israel Airports Authority was given sole control of the western side of the King Hussein/Allenby crossing with Jordan which is the only border crossing for residents of the West Bank to travel internationally. (Israel Airports Authority IAA n.d.) During this time, Israel erected a separation barrier which fully encompassed Gaza, retained authority over maritime travel into and out of the area, and in the latter years when the Yasser Arafat International Airport was built, Israel controlled the airspace and security for the airport. (Wilkinson 1998)

During this period, the Israeli Defense Forces maintained a large presence in Areas B and C, and conducted occasional operations in Area A. At this time, the military exercised direct authority over a portion of the Palestinian population, especially those living outside the major towns of the West Bank. (Human Rights Watch 1998) As part of the creation of the Palestinian Authority, a number of civilian ministries were established which helped reduce the dependency on Israel for many Palestinians in Areas A and B. Ministries such as the Ministry of Health began providing services to civilians with some autonomy, however, Israeli authorities did maintain indirect influence through its control of the value-added-tax system and its control of the movement of goods and people into and out of the West Bank and Gaza. Registration of the citizens of the West Bank and Gaza still was controlled by the Israelis. The permit system which took basic rights like travel and work and turned them into a privileges which could be revoked (Gordon 2008), although weaker than it had been in the past, remained a key channel for Israeli control.

The accords allowed for the first time eased the restrictions on water usage in the territories. Previously Palestinians were not allowed to pump groundwater or to utilize springs
and Israel had sole control over the water resources of the territories. (Carmi 1999) After Oslo, the PA was allowed to develop a limited water system, however, Israel retained the right to approve development, supervise water pumping from existing well, and control of the amount of water sold to the PA by Mekorot (the state water company of Israel).

Although there were some hints of increased Palestinian autonomy through the development of its civilian ministries, the presence of Israeli-administered border control, the active military presence, the use of a permit system of control, and the control of public utilities all indicate that during this period, Israeli power was highly concentrated. Since four of the five indicators in the West Bank and Gaza show the status of the territories to remain highly integrated into the dominant polity, it is safe to conclude that the institutional setting during this period was a ghetto.

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<th>Border Control</th>
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**Description of State Violence**

Between the First and Second Intifadas, the methods of state violence employed by Israel to counter threats in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are noticeably harsh, however, they are restrained, policing methods. In 1996, B’tselem documented at least 8,000 accounts of Palestinian detainees or prisoners who were subject to physical and mental torture while being held by the Israeli authorities as well as the use of long administrative detentions without trials. (B’tselem/PHRMG 1996) The report also documented the use of punitive home demolitions in the territories, and restrictions on the right to movement such through rigorous checkpoints.
Human Rights Watch in their annual report from 1998 likewise documented the use of administrative detentions (used to detain people without meeting the higher legal requirements for arrest) under military orders and found that the authorities worked to prevent many of these cases from appearing before a judge. (Human Rights Watch 1998) Amnesty International documented similar practices in their 1999 report. It also documented widespread torture and other mistreatments of Palestinians detained by the Israelis, and documented between January and December of 1998 at least 270 administrative detentions without trial. It also documented a single punitive home demolition that year. Additionally, it found at least 20 cases of Palestinian civilians being killed unlawfully by the IDF or other Israeli bodies.

It is worth noting, however, that the practice of punitive home demolitions by Israel was in decline at this time. Between 1993-2000, there were 18 homes demolished for punishment in Palestine (a significant decrease from previous years). And the practice was discontinued completely from 1998 to 2001. (B’tselem 2011)

The state violence employed by Israel between the Intifadas was brutal, however, there is not evidence of ethnic cleansing, and the methods largely fell into the category of ethnic policing. Arrests, torture of prisoners, and restrictions on movement are all harsh methods, but they do not destroy or displace a community from a space. Since these methods do not reach the high threshold of ethnic cleansing, it can be concluded that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip faced a period of **ethnic policing** and not ethnic cleansing.
The West Bank and the Gaza Strip: 2000-2005

Description of Institutional Setting

Between September 2000 and February 2005, the Palestinians began a second period of uprising known as the al-Aqsa or Second Intifada. The period was marked by troubling violence on both sides, but the institutional settings of the West Bank and Gaza remained largely the same during this period (although it was this period which caused Gaza’s change of status in 2005).

Border control institutions were maintained and even expanded during this time. The most notable event was in 2002 with the beginning of the construction of the West Bank separation barrier\(^2\) designed to prevent unauthorized Palestinian entry into Israel, largely in response to suicide bombings which were common during this uprising. The barrier was primarily constructed within the West Bank, and created a number of Palestinian enclaves cut off from the rest of the West Bank. During this time Israel remained in control of the Gaza border crossings, and occasionally closed the Rafah crossing with Egypt, once leaving thousands stranded in a tent city. (Myre 2004)

Military presence was increased during this time in both Gaza and the West Bank, and the Israeli Defense Forces operated outside of Areas C and B. In 2002 during Operation Defensive Shield the IDF went so far as to occupy Ramallah and the other major towns of the West Bank. Other areas of administrative control remained largely the same during this period, Israel continued to be able to control many aspects of the Palestinian Authority’s civilian ministries through indirect action, especially as border crossings became more difficult which affected the flow of goods and supplies. But the Palestinian Authority did maintain some level of

\(^2\) Called the Separation Fence/Wall in Hebrew, a wall by the ICJ, and sometimes the Wall of Apartheid in Arabic.
autonomy in this period. It was during this time that Israel froze the population registry, keeping thousands of people from having any sort of legal status.

The status of public utilities remained largely the same at this time, with Palestinians remaining dependent on Israeli companies for water and electricity. In many military operations, however, the Israeli Defense Forces destroyed much of the water, electricity, and communications infrastructure that had been developed up to that point. (Human Rights Watch 2003), Amnesty International (Amnesty International 2005)

Throughout this period, there was not much change towards the status of the West Bank and Gaza as a ghetto. Military presence increased, the permitting system was in place and was used as a method of control, public utilities still were dependent on Israel. The border control institutions were increased at this time with the construction of the barrier. The Palestinian Authority was able to maintain some level of autonomy with it civilian ministries, however, the territories remained firmly as a ghetto towards Israel.

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**Description of State Violence**

As tensions increased between Palestinian militants and the Israeli authorities during this period, so did the state violence and repression in the West Bank and Gaza. Drawing on the imagery of the 1967 war, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon declared to the world that Israel must defeat terrorism for there to be peace. (Sharon 2002) But despite the imagery of war, many of the same tactics that were used between 1993 and 2000 continued to be used in an attempt to subdue
the militants. Arbitrary detainment and mass incarcerations continued to be implemented (Amnesty International 2005), with Human Rights Watch reporting the detainment or arrest of at least 4,500 men and boys from the Occupied Territories, many of whom had no connections to violent acts perpetrated by their cohorts. (Human Rights Watch 2003) Allegations of prisoner abuse and torture continued during this period. Human rights monitors continued to find the widespread use of checkpoints and curfews to restrict movement and to interrupt the lives of Palestinians throughout the al-Aqsa intifada. (Amnesty International 2005; Human Rights Watch 2005)

The use of punitive home demolitions increased during this period, with Al-Haq finding at least 2,647 had been affected in the West Bank by 2004 (Al-Haq 2004), and B’Tselem documenting at least 628 demolitions affecting 3,983 persons based on the actions of only 333 aggressors by the end of 2004. (B’Tselem 2004) In some cases, IDF soldiers carried out demolitions with occupants still inside the dwelling, with the Human Rights Watch documenting one case when soldiers refused to allow the family of a quadriplegic evacuate him from the home resulting in his death. In other cases, Human Rights Watch found the use of human shields, and massive damage to homes, businesses, and government buildings in IDF military operations. (Human Rights Watch 2003)

Casualties greatly increased during this period as well. Al-Haq found at least 27,000 Palestinians had been wounded by Israeli crowd control methods (twenty-six percent of cases resulting from the use of live ammunition, most likely small caliber, and twenty-two percent from rubber bullets), and that 1,423 had been killed in the West Bank and 1,621 in Gaza. (Al-Haq 2004) In 2004, Amnesty International found that at least 700 Palestinians had been
killed by Israeli Authorities including 120 extrajudicial executions, at at least 30 civilian deaths. (Amnesty International 2005) Human Rights Watch documented at least 3,000 Palestinians had been killed including many civilians. (Human Rights Watch 2005) B’Tselem also expressed concern at the increased use of extrajudicial executions which often resulted in the deaths of civilians (B’Tselem 2005) and pointed to Israel’s decision to end military police investigation of extrajudicial killings. (B’Tselem 2011)

While on the surface, it may seem counterintuitive to classify the violence in this period as ethnic policing, especially when viewing the number of casualties. But the predominant methods used by Israel continued to be restrained, despite the savagery. Even when Israeli leaders called for ethnic cleansing actions against the Palestinians, such as in Hebron (Gideon Alon And 2002), Israeli forces used policing methods. Rather than expel large portions of the population which was feared by many Palestinians and by the Jordanian government(Benn 2002), the community was not destroyed. Although the violence and repression perpetrated by Israel greatly increased during the al-Aqsa Intifada, it did not go so far as to constitute a classification of ethnic cleansing, remaining in the realm of ethnic policing.

The Gaza Strip: 2005-Present

Description of the Institutional Setting

In August 2005, Israel put into action a disengagement plan which resulted in the pullout of all troop and settler from the Gaza Strip for the first time in 38 years. The plan implemented by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon caused the paths of Gaza and the West Bank to split for the first time. Sharon’s chief of staff, Dov Weissglass, in the lead up to the implementation, made it clear that by disengaging from the Gaza Strip, Israel would ensure its lasting control of
the West Bank. By sacrificing the 10,000 settlers in Gaza, they could keep the hundreds of thousands of settlers in what they called Samaria and Judea. (Shavit 2004)

Since the pullout, Israel has remained in control of the borders of Gaza and has severely restricted movement into and out of the territory. The separation barrier which was erected in 1994 still remains, and has even been expanded to combat tunnels. (Staff 2016) All land borders, with the exception of the Rafah crossing on the border with Egypt (which is severely restricted), are controlled by Israeli forces. Israel also maintains a naval blockade just three miles off the Gaza coast, restricting fishing operations and movement beyond the three miles. Airspace remains under the control of Israel, and the only airport, Yasser Arafat International Airport, remains in ruins following a 2002 IDF operation which destroyed the runway. (Khan 2014) The control of movement into and out of the territory shows that Israel has a high level of responsibility for the fate of the Gaza Strip in this area.

Since the 2005 withdrawal, the Israeli Defence Forces do not operate in Gaza on a day-to-day basis, and there are not Israeli military facilities in the territory. Israeli forces have engaged in battles with Gazan military groups in the years since the disengagement. The IDF has frequently used airstrikes against targets in Gaza, and has entered the territory such as in the 2014 conflict, and as recently as May 2016. (Harris et al. 2016) Civilian ministries are predominantly controlled by the Palestinians. Twelve ministries operate under the Prime Minister of the Hamas government, including a Ministry of Health and a Ministry of Finance. Israel does still retain some control over the taxation of Gaza; it is responsible for collecting value-added taxes and customs on behalf of the Palestinian Authority, but it has occasionally withheld funds as a form of punishment. Israel still maintains a crucial role in the registration of
the population, but has refused to update the registry since 2000 and there are currently around 40,000-50,000 people in Gaza without legal status. Israel does not control internal permitting systems since the pullout, but does control travel permits as part of its border control policies. Each of these three indicators of administrative control demonstrate that Gaza has become more of a frontier to Israel than a ghetto.

Israel maintains indirect control over the public utilities in Gaza. Since 2007 Israel has restricted the import of fuel into the Gaza Strip needed to operate the water system and the power grid and when fuel is imported, it is often of a low quality. In 2006, IDF forces destroyed a power plant operating in Gaza as a retaliatory attack. (Li and Lein 2006) ninety-five percent of the water pumped in Gaza is polluted beyond acceptable levels, and Gazans live on an average of 91 liters of water per day. In 2012, the Palestinian Ministry of the Interior and National Security reported that the water system had been targeted by Israel, and put the cost of the damage at six million USD. (Ministry of Interior and National Security 2012) Israel has restricted the import of equipment and supplies to maintain and repair the water system in Gaza. Because of the dependence Gaza has on Israel for the maintenance of its public utilities, this indicator falls more to a ghetto than a frontier.

Although the external borders continued to be controlled by Israel, and the public utilities remain dependent on Israel, the complete administrative pullout from Gaza constituted a shift from a ghetto to a **frontier**.

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<th>Permit System</th>
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Description of State Violence

Since the 2005 pullout of the Gaza Strip, the methods of state violence used by Israel have increased in their scope reaching levels which have not been seen since before time covered by this thesis. The IDF have conducted at least seven military operations against militants in the Gaza Strip, the two largest being Operation Cast Lead (27 December 2008-18 January 2009) and Operation Protective Edge (8 July 2014-26 August 2014), which consisted first of an airstrike campaign followed by a full ground invasion. These conflicts have affected civilians within the strip much more than in previous clashes, with increasing intensity.

During the 2014 conflict, Al-Haq documented numerous violations against the rights of Palestinians in Gaza. One briefing reported that the Israeli forces disrupted ambulances and paramedics attempting to provide aid to those injured in the conflict, resulting in the deaths of civilians. The organization also documented the targeting of ambulances by Israeli airstrikes resulting in the deaths of paramedics and as a result, the civilians left without first aid care. (Al-Haq 2014b) A subsequent briefing documented Israeli-caused damage to at least 15 hospitals and 16 public health clinics, killing civilians and disrupting vital healthcare operations. (Al-Haq 2014a) A 2014 report by Amnesty International corroborates these claims. (Amnesty International 2014)

In the same conflict, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) documented the civilian toll of the conflict. OCHA reported that as a result of the hostilities, 1,176 Palestinian civilians had been killed, including 377 children. The report also found that 485,000 people were internally displaced because of the conflict, more than a quarter
of the population of Gaza. The conflict also resulted in destruction or major damage to the homes of 10,366 families. (OCHA 2014)

Reports from earlier years in the Gaza Strip confirm that civilians bore the burden of Israeli operations. A December 2012 OCHA report found that during hostilities, 103 Palestinians civilians had been killed, 450 homes had been destroyed, and 3,000 people were displaced. (OCHA 2012) The 2011 B’tselem annual report found that at least 37 civilians had been killed by Israeli security forces in the Gaza Strip and characterized the year as having “a sharp increase in the number of uninvolved Palestinians killed by the Israeli security forces in the Gaza Strip.” (B’Tselem 2012) Another B’tselem report found that during the December 2008-January 2009 hostilities, 759 civilians were killed in Gaza by Israeli forces. Prior to that, 518 Palestinians civilians in the Gaza Strip had been killed by Israeli forces between the pullout in 2005 and the beginning of Operation Cast Lead. (B’Tselem n.d.)

The high number of deaths caused by full military operations as well as the internal displacement of large portions of the Gazan populous is shocking, however, it is the change in methodology which indicates that Gaza has faced ethnic cleansing since the 2005 pullout. While Gaza was a ghetto in relation to Israel, it faced restrained ethnic policing. Since then, the methodologies have been extensive, and indiscriminate, and constitute ethnic cleansing.

The West Bank: 2005-Present

Description of Institutional Setting

Although Gaza experienced a pullout of Israeli settlers and military presence, Israel has maintained a high level of control over the West Bank in the years following the Second Intifada. The borders of the West Bank now are highly controlled by Israeli forces and there are many
border control institutions in place. On the eastern border with Jordan, the legal situation of the border is complicated, but Israel maintains control of all entry and exit into the West Bank via the King Hussein/Allenby Bridge crossing. Palestinians and tourists must alike go through several stages of border control to enter into the West Bank or to continue on to Jerusalem. Israel also controls the crossings in the west to enter Israel, and has constructed a separation barrier to prevent illegal crossings from occurring. (B’Tselem 2012)

Israel continues to maintain a high level of administrative control across two indicators and indirect control over one. The Israeli Defense Forces maintain what is described as a military occupation of the West Bank (Amnesty International 2016) and the military is active on a daily basis and regularly conducts operations, including raids against civilians. Residents in the West Bank have also been internally displaced due to Israeli military training operations. The Palestinian Authority operates the civilian ministries in the area under its control, although Israel retains some indirect control over the Palestinians in the West Bank, especially for healthcare. A key funding sources for healthcare in the West Bank are controlled by the Israeli authorities and are frequently restricted, forcing great reliance on travel to Israel for those seeking medical care, although permits for travel are frequently denied even for critical needs. (Efrat 2015) Israel still plays a large role in the maintenance of the population registration in the West Bank, and is responsible for updating the registry, but has refused to do so since 2000. A system of permits administered by Israel is used to reduce resistance and to control many aspects of the lives of Palestinians. (Gordon 2008)

The public utilities of the West Bank are highly integrated into Israel’s control. Water is controlled at a local level by the Palestinian Water Authority, however, the water is sourced by
Mekorot, the Israeli national water company. Palestinians in the West Bank receive significantly less water than is recommended by the World Health Organization, and water supplies have been reduced without warnings on several occasions. The Palestinian Authority is only able to produce around 10% of the Palestinian electricity need, and is reliant on electricity imports from the Israeli Electric Corporation for about 90% of its needs. (Administration 2014)

Because Israel maintains the border control institutions for movement into and out of the West Bank, because it maintains a high level of administrative control over the West Bank through a military presence, and through the population registry and permitting system, and because Israel maintains control of key public utilities, the West Bank since 2005 remains a **ghetto**.

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**Description of State Violence**

Compared to the situation faced by Gazans since the end of the Second Intifada, the violence used against Palestinians in the West Bank has been harsh, but much milder. One of the most common tactics used against the Palestinians in the West Bank continues to be home demolitions, but largely under the guise of a failure to obtain building permits (a virtually impossible task) rather than as a punitive measure. Since 2006, 1,219 homes have been demolished in the West Bank leaving 5,593 people homeless including 2,809 minors. (B’Tselem 2017) B’Tselem has also documented the use of dangerous methods of crowd control, including the use of live .22 rounds and in some cases higher caliber rounds and rubber-coated metal
bullets, aiming tear gas containers at protesters with the intent to strike them, and the use of “Skunk liquid” (a pungent liquid sprayed from water cannons to disperse crowds) against residences raising suspicions of collective punishment. (B’Tselem 2013)

Al-Haq has documented many techniques used by Israeli forces during this period. They have found what many others have: restrictions of movement, arbitrary arrests, administrative detentions, use of live ammunition against protesters. They have also documented cases of brutality during arrests, citing members of households being beaten by Israeli security and instances of authorities taking currency in the course of arrests. (Al-Haq 2014c) Addameer in their 2015 report found many cases of torture and degrading treatment, denial of fair trials, use of administrative detentions, as well as killings of Palestinians which they characterized as “Return of Summary Executions.” (Addameer 2016)

Amnesty International has documented many of the same tactics of control. They have found that Israel regularly restricts the movement of Palestinians, isolating communities and sometimes resulting in the deaths of those seeking medical aid. They also found over more than 2,500 arrests, many arbitrary, in the one year period covered by the report, and at least 580 cases of administrative detention. Amnesty International also reports cases of torture at the hands of Israeli forces, including the torture of children. Civilians continued to be victims of Israeli suppression, including fatalities, and the use of home demolitions which dislocate many families. (Amnesty International 2016)

Although there are some instances of home demolitions and extra judicial killings during this period, they are targeted and do not take aim at the entirety of the Palestinian population. While these actions do disrupt some members of the Palestinian community in the West Bank,
they do not destroy or disrupt the entirety of the population and the demolitions and killings are for the most part targeted. These results largely indicate that Israel continued the use of **ethnic policing** during this period.

**Interpretations of Results**

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<td>WB and Gaza 1993-2000</td>
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<td>Gaza 2005-Present</td>
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The results from this examination of these four cases largely align with what is to be expected under Ron’s theory. During the period between the First and Second Intifadas, the control of movement, administrative control, and economic control over the West Bank and Gaza by Israel kept the occupied territories as a ghetto. It is unsurprising then that as resistance emerged during this time that Israel, bound by international pressures due to its high-level of control, pursued ethnic policing rather than resorting to ethnic cleansing methods.

As the Al-Aqsa Intifada began, and the threat grew from the West Bank and Gaza (the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported sixteen suicide bombings between 1993-2000, but 126 during the Second Intifada) (Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel Since the
Declaration of Principles 1993), the methods used by Israel remained as ethnic policing. Since the institutional setting also remained a ghetto, it is unsurprising that Israel continued to use the more restricted methodology of policing.

The 2005 pullout from Gaza allows for the strongest evidence of Ron’s theory in this thesis. Although Israel retained some control over Gaza following August 2005, the area became a frontier as institutional control over the setting was minimized. Israel was no longer bound by international pressures, and has utilized tactics which constitute ethnic cleansing. Although the path of Gaza and the West Bank had been largely the same for the time period covered in this thesis and in Ron’s work, the West Bank remained a ghetto following 2005. It was not subject to the removal of Israeli institutional control, and as threats have emerged, the West Bank has been subjected to policing tactics rather than cleansing.

**Alternative Explanations**

Several other theories of state violence could explain the variation in Israel’s choice of tactics in dealing with threats. Threat level could possibly be used to explain the variation. That is, Israel could perceive a greater threat from Gaza since 2005, and so it uses more extensive methods of repression. Although this could possibly be part of the reason for the variation, I do not find it to be a compelling explanation for the entire phenomenon. If it were the case that Israel simply responded to a greater threat with more brutal methods, why did they continue to use ethnic policing methods of repression in the West Bank and Gaza throughout the Second Intifada? While the Second Intifada did not involve the level of participation seen in the First
Intifada³, the level of threat to Israel did increase, yet the methods of repression did not dramatically increase. Threat level could, however, serve to explain the extent to which Israel used certain methodologies.

The strongest alternative explanation is state capacity. That is, Israel uses ethnic policing when it has the capacity to use these more delicate methods which require more information and greater infrastructure and uses ethnic cleansing in situations where it lacks capacity. Although this is a theory which I cannot rule out entirely, it seems likely to me that this is a complementary theory. A state capacity explanation seems to work in each case, and it may be that the institutions, human rights norms, and international pressures which are key in Ron’s theory are factors which contribute to state capacity.

**Conclusion**

This thesis evaluated James Ron’s explanation of variations in state violence from his book *Frontiers and Ghettos* by applying the theory to four cases which follow chronologically after his original cases. I examined the institutional settings and state violence types used by Israel in the West Bank and Gaza between 1993-2000 and 2000-2005, Gaza 2005-Present, and the West Bank 2005-Present. I found support for Ron’s theory that states will use ethnic policing in settings which are ghettos in relation to the state and ethnic cleansing in frontier settings.

Future researchers of the relationship between state violence and institutional settings could continue to study Israel. A comparison could be made, between the methods of violence used by Israel in Lebanon both inside and outside of the Southern Lebanon security belt and

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³ The First Intifada consisted primarily of popular uprisings with minimum levels of violence. The Second Intifada had less participation, but the methods used by the militants were dramatically violent, i.e. suicide bombings against civilian targets.
before and after Israel’s 2000 pullout from the country. This was initially considered for this thesis, but was removed due to a lack of reliable sources. Further research in Arabic and Hebrew may provide the necessary information, especially if Israeli Defense Forces documents from that era are declassified. Additionally, future studies could work to differentiate between Ron’s theory and a more traditional understanding of state capacity which could better determine which is the more credible theory.

While the applications of thesis are somewhat narrow, it could serve as a basis for further testing of this theory. A future study could be conducted which expands outside the Israel/Palestine conflict which may provide an additional evidence for this theory. If this theory is in fact correct, it would benefit the political science community’s understanding of variations of state violence and may help to shape policy when dealing with regimes using repression or state violence.
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